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Foreword 
The history of the European Commission has overlapped with and fed into the 
history of European integration for more than 60 years. 
This history is that of an institution which is unique, and which has been able 
to develop experience and know-how that is irreplaceable when it comes to pro-
moting and defending the European general interest. It is also the history of 
men and women committed to serving a common cause, working day in, day 
out to build a united Europe, which has since become the European Union.
When the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the European Union on 10 De-
cember 2012, my thoughts were with the men and women who had come before 
us. In my acceptance speech, I referred with pride, emotion and gratitude to the 
memory of Europe’s founders. I also stressed the responsibility of my generation, 
and of those to come, to sustain this exceptional undertaking, this common 
endeavour that is the European Union.
To move forward and build the future, we must know our past. As President 
of the European Commission, I wanted through this work to make the history 
of the institution accessible to all and to revive the memory of its many partici-
pants. The approach is original: the aim was not to write an official history of 
the European Commission, but to hear the testimony of people who were there 
at the time and to allow the researchers to conduct their work in an independ-
ent and innovative fashion, thanks to unprecedented access to the archives and 
original sources. A similar project had already resulted in the publication of a 
volume about the institution’s formative years between 1958 and 1972. 
José Manuel Durão Barroso,
President of the European Commission
6 The European Commission 1973–86 — History and Memories of an Institution
This book continues the history of the Commission from 1 January 1973, the 
date of the first enlargement of the European Communities, with the arrival of 
Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, until the end of February 1986, 
with the signing of the Single European Act, just after the accession of Spain 
and Portugal.
These years are sometimes neglected in our collective memory. The term ‘Euro-
sclerosis’ is often used to describe the period. They were certainly difficult years. 
Democracy was struggling to assert itself in a Europe that was still divided and 
riven by Cold War tensions. The energy and economic crises intertwined and 
led to a breakdown of the growth model and a transformation of the social and 
productive structures inherited from the post-war period. Action by the Com-
munities remained limited and their legitimacy was sometimes questioned, 
while the global challenges of development, energy supply and the organisation 
of the international financial system were crying out for increasingly European 
responses.
This work and the reminiscences it contains shed new, refreshing light on the 
period by highlighting the fundamental progress made by Europe and by the 
Commission.
Firstly, in terms of political values and rights, the enlargement of the Commu-
nities, growing as they did from six to nine Member States in 1973, then to 10 
with the accession of Greece in 1981, and to 12 in 1986, constituted a major 
geopolitical upheaval. While southern Europe was rediscovering democracy, 
western and eastern Europe were growing closer together: the Helsinki Final 
Act of 1975 was concluded with the participation of all the Member States. In 
1980, Solidarność was born in Poland. Democracy was advancing on the conti-
nent and the foundations of a united Europe were being laid. As a young man in 
Portugal, these realities and these hopes shaped my political commitment and 
my European awareness.
Secondly, in terms of the institutions, the election of the European Parliament 
by universal suffrage and the emergence of the European Council marked de-
cisive turning points. It was also at this time that Europe established its place 
in the world, with the recognition of the Community’s role at G7 summits and 
in a number of international forums. Within the Commission itself, collective 
responsibility remained the guiding principle — as it does today — but working 
methods moved with the times and new practices saw the light of day.
Lastly, in terms of policies, the enlargement of the Communities went hand in 
hand with a deepening and widening of the Commission’s spheres of action. 
The period would prove to be extremely fertile: the first proposals for economic 
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and monetary union, consolidation of the momentum of the internal market 
that went far beyond the purely economic aspects, establishment of a region-
al policy embodying European solidarity, modernisation of the cooperation 
and development policy, consolidation of the common agricultural policy and 
embryonic policies on the environment and education — the foundations of a 
more extensive European integration were considerably strengthened, or at the 
very least the ground was prepared.
The lessons of history show what we are doing now in a new light, and there are 
numerous parallels with certain present-day issues. What stands out for me in 
this period is that, despite, and sometimes thanks to, the difficulties, Europe did 
in fact take significant steps forward, which made and continue to make history. 
The Commission played its part to the full, with lucidity and discretion, but also 
with responsibility, conviction and commitment.
Everyone who reads this work will have his or her own point of view and expec-
tations. Any bias is that of the authors and their interpretation may, of course, 
give rise to debate, but their analysis is all the more interesting because it reflects 
a diversity of perspectives and sources. Combined with the reminiscences col-
lected, this book therefore opens a new window on a key period in our history 
— a window which the reader of today and tomorrow may choose to open even 
further.
The work of the researchers who saw this project through is deserving of praise. 
Their task was not simply to understand and describe the issues of the day; they 
also had to take ownership of the subject matter. They were able to do so with 
the expected academic rigour, but also with a form of empathy and human curi-
osity that brings the Commission of the time back to life and allows us to share 
in its daily existence.
I should also like to extend special thanks to the former Commission officials 
involved. Retired officials have accompanied this project every step of the way, 
contributing their experience, wealth of knowledge and enthusiasm, while re-
specting the authors’ editorial freedom. Their contribution was not merely in-
valuable; it was indispensable.
Finally, I wish to pay tribute to the very many people active at the time who 
enriched this project with their recollections, which are now accessible in the 
historical archives of the European Union. Their voices are forever the institu-
tion’s collective memory, and their work lives on.
I wish you an enjoyable read.
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Building new 
momentum: 1973–86 
From the time of the enlargement of the European Communities to include 
Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom on 1 January 1973, followed by 
Greece on 1 January 1981 and Spain and Portugal on 1 January 1986, to when 
the Single European Act was signed in February 1986, 13 years had elapsed. 
This period before the revival of the mid-1980s is often presented as one of stag-
nation, given the hopes that had been aroused by the summit at The Hague in 
December 1969. However, this volume shows that, in spite of a less favourable 
climate, the series of advances that was made in the second half of the 1980s 
followed on from the plans, ideas and changes introduced in the 1970s.
A difficult environment 
By 1973, the European Economic Community (EEC) had established the cus-
toms union and the common agricultural policy (CAP), and there were already 
plans for developing new policies. However, over the next few years the climate 
grew gloomier. Europe went through a period of what has been described as 
‘Eurosclerosis’, or a prolonged and destabilising crisis. Above and beyond the short-
term economic fluctuations, a radical transformation in the world economy was 
under way, marked by the beginning of the era of globalisation. Following the 
economic and monetary shocks of the early 1970s — the monetary crisis, the 
energy crisis when the price of petrol quadrupled in a few months and the en-
suing social problems — the time was not right for European enthusiasm and 
ambitious integration plans: instead it was a time for inward-looking action and 
protectionist reflexes. A Eurosceptic wind was blowing, even amongst the popu-
lations of the founding nations.
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Furthermore, although the United Kingdom had only recently joined the EEC, 
its government — backed by a large share of public opinion — continued to 
harbour doubts as to the wisdom of this move. The outcome of the referendum 
of 5  June  1975 failed to dispel all these doubts, which only became stronger 
over the question of the United Kingdom’s contribution to the the Community 
budget. When she became prime minister in 1979, Margaret Thatcher began 
campaigning ‘to get our money back’.
As for the Commission, the empty chair crisis and the Luxembourg compro-
mise of 1966 had reduced its authority and power whilst making it even keener 
to achieve consensus through a series of compromises. In 1973, the institution 
had not regained the strong voice it enjoyed prior to 1965. Dialogue with the 
other institutions therefore became even more essential for effective action. But 
the decreased use of voting within the Council impeded the legislative work in-
stigated by the Commission. However, the prospect of establishing the internal 
market, which was a major goal for the Commission throughout this period, 
would eventually enable it to change this trend. If the subject areas to be han-
dled by the Commission only increased, the same was true for the Council and 
hence for the Permanent Representatives Committee (Coreper), cooperation 
with which would vary from one Presidency to another.
In this difficult European context, it was not easy for the Commission to make 
its mark or to bring new projects to a successful conclusion by fully exercising 
its roles of initiation, execution and representation in relations with non- 
member countries or international organisations. Working independently of the 
Member States and using ad hoc methods, the Commission had to look after 
the general interest and not the interests of one or other of its members, but it 
was nevertheless periodically faced with very real national influences. Yet when 
such national interests existed, they were tempered by the Commission’s deci-
sion-making process and the composition of the cabinets (private offices) and 
departments, which reflected a range of sectoral and national sensibilities.
New institutional challenges 
On the institutional front, the Commission faced the possibility of being weak-
ened by the creation of the European Council in 1974, which was formally 
recognised in the Single European Act of 1986. There were signs of misgivings 
within the Commission following the Spierenburg report of September 1979 
— submitted to Roy Jenkins — and its recommendations on reducing the num-
ber of commissioners. In 1979, the European Parliament was elected by univer-
sal suffrage for the first time, with the particular goal of engaging citizens with 
the European project and its organisations, and redressing the oft-cited ‘demo-
cratic deficit’. The Commission therefore intended to take more account of this 
institution than in the past. In any event, the fact that they had been elected 
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by universal direct suffrage led the members of the European Assembly to call 
for new powers with ever-increasing conviction. As for the accession of Greece, 
Spain and Portugal, some saw it as further encouragement for these countries to 
strengthen their democratic systems — a fact that did not escape the notice of 
the Nobel Peace Prize jury in 2012 (1).
Enlargement which made the Community less homogeneous in economic and 
social terms and more diverse in terms of political traditions combined with 
the broadening of the Community’s policy agenda to necessitate substantial 
institutional change. But while such changes were openly called for during the 
period covered by this volume, they would for the most part be implemented 
after 1986.
The Commission was often faced with what was presented as a choice between 
widening and deepening, even though new accessions could in fact also encour-
age deeper integration. In 1973, the EEC had undergone its first enlargement. 
Its nine Member States had 256 million inhabitants, compared with 245 mil-
lion in the USSR and 207  million in the United States  (2). In addition, the 
EEC had consolidated its status as the world’s leading trading power, causing 
some qualms in the US (3). Following the first enlargement and establishment 
of the customs union, the external relations of the Community (and hence the 
Commission’s role in that field) were transformed. This was particularly true 
of relations with the US and Japan but also more widely. The Community’s sui 
generis character led it to take part in multiple international negotiations.
The 1973 enlargement also brought about a revision of the association agree-
ment between the Community and its associated overseas countries and terri-
tories, since around 20 Commonwealth countries in Africa, the Caribbean and 
the Pacific (ACP) were to benefit from the new association agreement between 
the Community and 46 ACP countries signed in Lomé in 1975. Advances were 
made not just in this area, but in the whole of the EEC’s development cooper-
ation policy between 1973 and 1986, largely at the Commission’s prompting.
As for the CAP, it retained its status as the largest common policy, and was 
not changed radically after the first enlargement. Nevertheless, the Commission 
faced some considerable challenges in this area, among them the proverbial but-
ter mountains and milk lakes, successive enlargements and multiple rounds of 
(1) The press release states: ‘In the 1980s, Greece, Spain and Portugal joined the Communities. The introduction of de-
mocracy was a condition for their membership.’
(2) Bitsch, M.-T., Histoire de la construction européenne de 1945 à nos jours, 4th edn, Complexe, Brussels, 2004, p. 195.
(3) See in particular a highly significant letter from John B. Connally (Secretary of the Treasury) to Richard Nixon on 
12 June 1971. See also Zimmermann, H., ‘Western Europe and the American challenge: Conflict and cooperation in 
technology and monetary policy, 1965–73’, Journal of European Integration History, Vol. 6, No 2, Baden-Baden, 2000, 
p. 101.
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negotiations in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Fisheries 
policy, meanwhile, remained a controversial issue due to the divergent interests 
of the Member States. The Commission therefore had to seek solutions during 
fraught negotiations.
Adaptation, innovation and reform
Successive enlargements and the development of new policies inevitably had an 
impact on the Commission, which had constantly to adapt or reform, whether 
in terms of its structure, location — the question of its seat had still not been 
settled — workforce or the regulations governing the European civil service. 
Nevertheless, there was no revolution in the administrative culture, but rather 
a very gradual evolution. The Secretariat-General retained a central role in or-
ganising the administrative machine and maintained vital links with the Par-
liament and the Council. Émile Noël’s tenure as secretary-general of the Single 
Commission lasted from 1968 until 1987. The Legal Service meanwhile was 
modernising and played its full part in establishing an ever stronger European 
legal system. 
The 1973 enlargement had an impact on the internal organisation of the Com-
mission — witness the significant development of the translation and interpret-
ing services. It also had an effect on policies. Enlargement increased the Com-
munity’s importance on the global stage and led to a new diversity of interests 
and points of view. It encouraged, for instance, more favourable attitudes to free 
trade within the Commission.
A similar diversity was shown by the interest groups hovering around the Com-
mission, which were as varied as the fields they covered but which the Commis-
sion had to take account of — whether they were professional associations, such 
as agricultural organisations, or more specific bodies. In the absence of set rules, 
the Commission followed a ‘sectoral’ approach until the mid-1980s, favour-
ing professional associations that were well established in the Brussels coterie. 
Preparations for the Single European Act and the increasing number of bodies 
that the Commission had to deal with brought about a change in its approach 
and perspective. 
Four Colleges of commissioners facing the 
challenges of the day
Between 1973 and 1986 there were four Colleges and 45 commissioners. The 
Colleges of this period had different styles, statures and dynamics, but the 
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Commission managed to operate in a generally collegial spirit, regardless of how 
influential each president was. There was also notable progress in the workings 
of the cabinets, where sensitivities relating to national interests gradually gave 
way to the search for consensus.
The Ortoli Commission consisted of 13 members as a result of the 1973 en-
largement. Its success in encouraging cooperation amongst commissioners lent 
In the wake of enlargement and with the number of officials rising, the Commission had to develop new 
buildings, despite the ongoing disagreement about the official site of the Community.
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more weight to their joint decisions. This was even more necessary in view of 
the creation of the European Council, a meeting of the heads of state or govern-
ment attended by the president of the Commission. The international context 
had also convinced the president that the Communities’ responsibilities had to 
increase. The general climate had an adverse effect on the Commission’s work 
and it was struggling to cope with the renegotiation of the United Kingdom’s 
accession conditions and the crisis in relations with the United States. Even 
so, the Commission intended not only to retain the initiative on social policy, 
transport and aid to developing countries, but also to create a regional and an 
environmental policy. However, the resolutions of the Paris Summit of Octo-
ber 1972 could only be implemented very gradually. For example, the European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was not created until 18  March  1975. 
Despite the modesty of the fund’s initial budget, this was a key moment in the 
period covered by this volume, with the birth of a regional policy giving con-
crete expression to European solidarity. 
The Ortoli Commission was also deeply involved in the debate about Greek 
accession. In 1976, there were doubts as to Greece’s capacity to become a mem-
ber, doubts which were shared by several Member States. Under Jenkins, the 
‘new cold war’ context and the evolution of German and French attitudes al-
tered the situation. The Member States finally supported Greece’s candidacy, as 
much for political or geopolitical reasons, in view of its strategic location, as for 
economic ones. The prospect of a new government taking office in 1981 led to 
fears of the accession being challenged, since Andreas Papandreou’s Pasok party 
had promised a referendum on the issue once in power. Rather than renegotiat-
ing, Athens obtained temporary derogations from Community policies and an 
increase in aid (1). With the accession of Greece on 1 January 1981, the Euro-
pean landscape changed slightly, even if the European Communities increased 
in size by only 9.4 million inhabitants. 
With the selection of Roy Jenkins as president of the Commission, cham-
pioned by the leaders of Germany and France, the reins passed to a man who 
enjoyed a certain prestige both within his own country and abroad, and who 
had also been one of the supporters of British accession to the EEC. Jenkins 
failed, however, to make the British government more ‘European’: the Callaghan 
government decided not to join the European Monetary System (EMS), whilst 
Thatcher fought for revision of the British contribution to the European budget. 
Under Jenkins’s Presidency, other strong personalities, such as the former presi-
dent, Ortoli, who stayed on as vice-president, and Étienne Davignon, played 
a major role, whether in relation to economic and monetary union, the battle 
against protectionism or the steel crisis. One of the Commission’s roles was to 
(1) Gerbet, P., Bossuat, G. and Grosbois, T. (eds), Dictionnaire historique de l’Europe unie, André Versaille, Brussels, 
2009, p. 546.
François-Xavier Ortoli (on the right) hands over to Roy Jenkins (on the left), 6 January 1977.
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prevent the establishment of new barriers to trade. In its interpretation of the 
Cassis de Dijon judgment given by the Court of Justice on 20 February 1979, the 
Commission seized the opportunity to make a conceptual break with the past 
and encouraged the process of opening borders, at the instigation of Étienne 
Davignon in particular. 
Although Jenkins did not succeed in transforming the workings of the Com-
mission as he had set out to do, it was under his aegis that the Commission was 
admitted to G7 meetings. His attempts to assert a stronger European economic 
identity and to revitalise the process of monetary integration led to the creation 
of the EMS in 1979, albeit in a different form from what he had envisaged. 
Nevertheless, the Commission had shown that even in  a discouraging climate 
it could exercise its power of initiative vis-à-vis the Member States. This was 
further demonstrated by the Commission’s activities on the international front, 
especially during the GATT negotiations, its 1978 action plan for implement-
ing the single market, its social policy, its work on renewal of economic and in-
more weight to their joint decisions. This was even more necessary in view of 
the creation of the European Council, a meeting of the heads of state or govern-
ment attended by the president of the Commission. The international context 
had also convinced the president that the Communities’ responsibilities had to 
increase. The general climate had an adverse effect on the Commission’s work 
and it was struggling to cope with the renegotiation of the United Kingdom’s 
accession conditions and the crisis in relations with the United States. Even 
so, the Commission intended not only to retain the initiative on social policy, 
transport and aid to developing countries, but also to create a regional and an 
environmental policy. However, the resolutions of the Paris Summit of Octo-
ber 1972 could only be implemented very gradually. For example, the European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was not created until 18  March  1975. 
Despite the modesty of the fund’s initial budget, this was a key moment in the 
period covered by this volume, with the birth of a regional policy giving con-
crete expression to European solidarity. 
The Ortoli Commission was also deeply involved in the debate about Greek 
accession. In 1976, there were doubts as to Greece’s capacity to become a mem-
ber, doubts which were shared by several Member States. Under Jenkins, the 
‘new cold war’ context and the evolution of German and French attitudes al-
tered the situation. The Member States finally supported Greece’s candidacy, as 
much for political or geopolitical reasons, in view of its strategic location, as for 
economic ones. The prospect of a new government taking office in 1981 led to 
fears of the accession being challenged, since Andreas Papandreou’s Pasok party 
had promised a referendum on the issue once in power. Rather than renegotiat-
ing, Athens obtained temporary derogations from Community policies and an 
increase in aid (1). With the accession of Greece on 1 January 1981, the Euro-
pean landscape changed slightly, even if the European Communities increased 
in size by only 9.4 million inhabitants. 
With the selection of Roy Jenkins as president of the Commission, cham-
pioned by the leaders of Germany and France, the reins passed to a man who 
enjoyed a certain prestige both within his own country and abroad, and who 
had also been one of the supporters of British accession to the EEC. Jenkins 
failed, however, to make the British government more ‘European’: the Callaghan 
government decided not to join the European Monetary System (EMS), whilst 
Thatcher fought for revision of the British contribution to the European budget. 
Under Jenkins’s Presidency, other strong personalities, such as the former presi-
dent, Ortoli, who stayed on as vice-president, and Étienne Davignon, played 
a major role, whether in relation to economic and monetary union, the battle 
against protectionism or the steel crisis. One of the Commission’s roles was to 
(1) Gerbet, P., Bossuat, G. and Grosbois, T. (eds), Dictionnaire historique de l’Europe unie, André Versaille, Brussels, 
2009, p. 546.
François-Xavier Ortoli (on the right) hands over to Roy Jenkins (on the left), 6 January 1977.
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dustrial structures, and its research policy. Indeed, research was one of the areas 
in which European integration advanced most in this period, becoming an offi-
cial policy in its own right under the Single European Act.
Between 1981 and 1985, the Thorn Commission struggled to make its mark in a 
still difficult climate, even though several commissioners such as Davignon and 
Ortoli already enjoyed a firmly established reputation. Davignon had to deal 
with the deepening crisis in the steel industry. He also managed to forge close 
ties with the European electronic and computing industry and to launch major 
research programmes such as Esprit. Under Thorn, however, the Commission 
found itself largely sidelined from the discussions leading up to the Fontaine-
bleau budgetary compromise of June 1984. In the event, the content of the deal 
struck was not radically different from Thorn’s suggestions of the summer of 
1981, which had been rejected by the European Council. The solution was thus 
found in the context of a wider recovery plan, drawn up at the Council’s request 
with the aim of reforming the CAP and supporting common policies in the 
energy, industry, research and regional policy sectors. It was this type of revitali-
sation or development plan that provided a focus for the Commission through-
out the period: it had already drafted a report on the Community’s future in 
Roy Jenkins (on the left) hands over to Gaston Thorn (on the right), 6 January 1981.
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1975 (1), and two of its members would go on to participate in the work of the 
Dooge Committee. Under the leadership of Ireland’s former minister for for-
eign affairs, this committee recommended, amongst other things, convening an 
intergovernmental conference in order to negotiate a draft treaty on Euro pean 
Union. The idea would be adopted at the 1985 European Council in Milan.
Beyond questions of policy deepening or relaunch, the institutional dimension 
also had to be considered at a time when several Member States felt that new 
powers could not be handled in the same way as the CAP or customs union. 
Foreign policy and currency issues were at the forefront here, whilst the single 
market depended on a yet-to-be-established monetary union. As for enlarge-
ment towards Spain and Portugal, progress remained especially slow on issues 
linked to the CAP and to fisheries. Aside from political difficulties, economic 
problems were also a factor, given the clearly divergent interests in agriculture 
and industry. Spain clashed in particular with the French leaders, who under 
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s Presidency insisted that the European institutions 
should be consolidated before proceeding with any new enlargements. Con-
(1) ‘Report on European Union’, COM(75) 400 final, 25 June 1975, Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement, 
No 5, 1975, p. 44.
Bringing Europe to America: explaining the integration process to 
citizens outside of the EEC proved a constant challenge.
24 The European Commission 1973–86 — History and Memories of an Institution
cealed behind this argument was the French president’s fear that he would lose 
the support of farmers in south-west France in the presidential elections. Were 
Spain and Portugal to join, the EEC would have a surplus of wine, fruit and 
vegetables. In addition, both countries faced considerable economic and social 
challenges, which had in fact been assessed by the Commission. The decisive 
breakthrough would only be made in June 1985. 
Even so, the successes achieved in European integration after 1985 originated 
for the most part in this period, including the internal market, monetary issues, 
political cooperation and the adoption of majority voting.
With the arrival of Jacques Delors, who led the Commission for 10 years, the 
rate of progress would soon accelerate. The Commission played a dynamic role. 
After the 1986 enlargement, it gained three commissioners, growing from 14 
to 17 members. The Fontainebleau Summit finally enabled the question of the 
British contribution to be resolved. Yet although the economic situation was 
improving, European leaders had not forgotten the painful setbacks of the 
1970s and the need for substantial reform. Under Delors, who could also turn 
to the reinvigorated Franco–German alliance of François Mitterrand and Hel-
mut Kohl for support, the Commission succeeded in seizing the opportunities 
that came its way and was astute enough to focus initially on creating a single 
market by 1992. The goals of extending majority voting, increasing the Euro-
pean Parliament’s legislative role, achieving monetary integration, laying down 
an environmental policy and becoming more active in foreign policy, competi-
tion and justice and internal affairs now seemed within reach. For the first time, 
Delors managed to establish the Commission’s influence within the European 
Council, seeing it as an opportunity rather than a threat. Relations with the 
Parliament and the Council also improved, as did public perceptions of ‘Eur-
ope’.  In  addition, the Delors Commission brought in new personalities, un-
tainted by the difficulties of the preceding years. 
The proposals in the Commission’s White Paper on the creation of a single 
market formed the core of the Single European Act drawn up in Decem-
ber 1985. The Commission played a major part in preparing this text, and in its 
signing in February 1986. Creating the single market thus became a key task 
for the Commission in terms of economic and social cohesion, social and re-
search policy, the removal of internal borders, education and culture. There was 
consistency during the 1973–86 period in the construction of a social Europe. 
To begin with, a social action programme was adopted, followed by various 
initiatives in fields as diverse as health and safety at work, equal opportunities, 
social security for migrant workers and social dialogue. From 1984, the Com-
mission helped to launch a dialogue between European social partners and to 
incorporate a social dimension into the single market project. Similarly, the 
accession of Spain and Portugal encouraged an increase in financing for re-
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gional policy, as these countries had high rates of unemployment and inflation 
coupled with lower salaries. In 1986, Spain’s unemployment rate was twice the 
Communities’ average, and its GDP per capita was only 77 % of that of the 
Community of Twelve, whilst Portugal’s GDP was only 55  %. Ireland’s ac-
cession in 1973 had already increased the gap between the richest and poorest 
regions of the Community. Yet the third enlargement, like the earlier entry of 
Greece, required steps to be taken to reduce the gap in economic performance 
between the North and South, and to encourage a more uniform Community 
through an intensified regional policy, driven by the Commission. 
Between history and memory 
This work was written following a call for tenders by the Commission, and 
follows on from the book The European Commission, 1958–72 — History and 
Memories, edited by Professor Michel Dumoulin, who also initiated this vol-
ume. Contributions were made by 22 professors, including several holders of a 
Jean Monnet Chair in history, and researchers from 15 universities and research 
centres. In alphabetical order, they are: Charles Barthel (Centre d’études et de 
recherches européennes Robert Schuman, Luxembourg), Jan Willem Brouwer 
(Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, Netherlands), Éric Bussière (Université de 
Paris IV — Sorbonne, France), Filippa Chatzistavrou (Hellenic Foundation for 
European and Foreign Policy (Eliamep), University of Athens, Greece), Vincent 
Dujardin (Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium), Michel Dumoulin 
(Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium), Jürgen Elvert (Universität zu Köln, 
Germany), Pierre-Olivier Laloux (Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium), 
Johnny Laursen (Aarhus Universitet, Denmark), Piers Ludlow (London School 
of Economics, United Kingdom), Ivo Maes (Banque nationale de Belgique, 
Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium), Michel Mangenot (Université de 
Lorraine, Nancy, France), Guia Migani (Université François Rabelais, Tours, 
France), Élisabeth Palmero (Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium), Sigfrido 
Ramírez-Pérez (Saxo Institute, Københavns Universitet, Denmark), Sylvain 
Schirmann (IEP Strasbourg, France), Katja Seidel (University of Westminster, 
London, United Kingdom), Pierre Tilly (Université catholique de Louvain, 
Belgium), Christian Van de Velde (Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium), 
Arthe Van Laer (KADOC, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium), Angel 
Viñas (Universidad Complutense, Madrid, Spain) and Laurent Warlouzet 
(London School of Economics, United Kingdom). 
To facilitate their work, all the authors were given access to the Commission’s 
archives; a large number of documents had been declassified, giving the research-
ers privileged access. Since it would be impossible for historians to do their work 
without the assistance of archivists and librarians, our warmest thanks go to 
Jocelyne Collonval and her colleagues at the Commission’s Historical Archives 
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Service, who played a major role throughout the process, starting by welcoming 
researchers and declassifying documents. 
It is worth recalling that it was in the 1970s that Deputy Secretary-General 
Christopher Audland launched a scheme to preserve the archives of the Euro-
pean Communities. With the support of Émile Noël, he prepared a proposal 
for a regulation on the consultation and systematic storage of the institutions’ 
documents. The archives of the European Communities, managed by the Euro-
pean University Institute in Florence, accordingly welcomed researchers from 
1986. The personal archives of Audland and Noël now form part of the numer-
ous private collections deposited there, following the example of Ortoli. The 
Commission has its own archive service based in Brussels, which was estab-
lished in 1983 (1). 
Alongside this unpublished material and the rich body of historical work set out 
in the bibliography, 244 former Commission officials and commissioners were 
interviewed. Oral testimony can undoubtedly produce two different individual 
perspectives, those of the interviewer and interviewee, but it increases the range 
of sources available and offers a glimpse into the minds of those involved in 
events. Such testimony helps to avoid the writing of a ‘bureaucratic’ or disem-
bodied history; it brings a more human dimension to the account and makes it 
easier to recreate contexts and evoke settings. The interviewee can reveal much 
which is not written down. In this way, oral history sometimes enables the gaps 
left by archives to be filled in, whilst requiring that historical criticism be adapt-
ed to the technique’s peculiarities. In gathering people’s testimonies, the histor-
ian creates new documents and gains the opportunity to compare oral testimony 
with the available documentation, and even to use these archives to make wit-
nesses react  or to stimulate their memories. The interviews conducted and used 
in compiling this book have been transcribed and validated by the witnesses, 
and will be made available to researchers on the historical archives website of the 
European University Institute in Florence. These new sources, whether written 
or oral, together make up a plentiful and rich collection of resources enabling 
researchers to shed new light on the Commission’s activities between 1973 and 
1986.
Following the example of the volume on the history of the Commission be-
tween 1958 and 1972, this work applies the concept of ‘negotiated interpreta-
tion’ defined by the public history movement, which has four characteristics: 
‘(i) witnesses and historians engage in a joint investigation of the past; (ii) in 
response to a commission by an institution; (iii) to serve an educational purpose, 
(1) ‘European Oral History’, interview with Christopher Audland by R. Ranieri as part of the ‘Voices on Europe’ pro-
gramme, 11 July 1998.
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for example for the institution’s staff; and (iv) with due regard to the ethical 
rules on personal privacy’ (1). 
The work was coordinated by the Université catholique de Louvain. An editor-
ial committee was set up in autumn 2012, charged with harmonising texts and 
communicating with the Commission. The members of the committee were 
Jan Willem Brouwer, Éric Bussière, Vincent Dujardin, Piers Ludlow and Pierre 
Tilly. Mention must be made of the crucial work done by Élisabeth Palmero, 
who as research officer played an important part in the project’s day-to-day pro-
gress. Valérie Delporte facilitated each person’s work by running an efficient 
secretariat.
This work benefited from the guidance and comments of a steering committee 
organised by the Commission’s Secretariat-General, which brought together ac-
tive and retired colleagues — Jacqueline Lastenouse, Paolo Ponzano, Georges 
Rencki, Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi and Jean-Claude Eeckhout. Their suggestions 
and comments gave rise to plenty of discussions and even debates with the his-
torians, which were sometimes passionate, but always enriching — by bringing 
differing viewpoints together, the consortium of researchers was ultimately able 
to form its own opinion. 
This book benefits from rich illustrations thanks to the work of Étienne Des-
champs. We would also like to thank all those who contributed to gathering 
and processing the illustrations at the Commission’s audiovisual library, the 
Publications Office and the Joint Research Centre. 
Seizing the opportunities 
For the Commission, the overall picture of the period from 1973 to 1986 is 
one of strong continuity with the Treaty of Rome, with guidelines drafted for 
new policies that are still being developed today, such as the internal market, 
innovation, research, regional policy, energy and the environment. Between the 
first and third enlargements, the Commission demonstrated continuity in its 
objectives and in the means of achieving them. The period was therefore char-
acterised more by consistency than by revolution. With its permanent structure 
and role as initiator, the Commission has fostered continuity in the European 
project. This is how objectives such as the internal market have been maintained 
since the 1960s, how the need to complete that market was presented in similar 
terms in both the 1970s and the early 1980s and how policies launched at the 
start of the 1970s — whose roots sometimes go back even further — have been 
(1) Dumoulin, M., ‘Inventing things as they went along’, in The European Commission, 1958–72 — History and Mem­
ories, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2007, p. 17.
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On 29 May 1986, the European flag was raised for the first time in front of the Berlaymont in a 
ceremony marking its official adoption by the Community institutions. These last were represented 
(from left to right) by Charles Rutten, permanent representative of the Netherlands and representative 
of the Dutch Presidency of the Council, Jacques Delors, President of the European Commission, 
Pierre Pflimlin, President of the European Parliament, and Carlo Ripa di Meana, the member of the 
Commission responsible, amongst other things, for institutional matters and a people’s Europe.
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pursued in the longer term. The permanence of the European project thus forms 
the core culture in the Commission’s administration.
Similarly, aside from the increase in the European Parliament’s powers and the 
creation of the European Council, the existing institutional system did not 
undergo profound changes, but rather adaption. During the 1970s some of its 
partners within the institutions and in the Member States in particular were 
indeed tempted by a return to greater autonomy in implementing national pol-
icies, and were less willing to invest in the logic of European policy coordination. 
It did not prove easy to turn a deaf ear to protectionist voices, or to stop seeking 
solutions on a national or global scale and not on a European one. However, 
these tendencies did not in the end prevail, and by the early 1980s the Member 
States were once more inclined to follow the Commission’s lead and to turn to 
Europe as a means of overcoming economic stagnation. 
A number of obstacles to progress thus melted away. President Mitterrand 
showed himself willing to make compromises, particularly concerning enlarge-
ment, and Germany and France decided to resolve the conflict over the British 
budget — this clearly helped matters. Another positive element was the advent 
in 1985 of a new president of the Commission, who was experienced, deter-
mined and willing to work with the Member States’ governments rather than in 
spite of them, at precisely the moment when they needed to forge ahead. 
The Chinese word for ‘crisis’ is made up of two characters: the first means ‘dan-
ger’ and the second means ‘opportunity’, while the word for opportunity (or 
chance) is itself made up of this character combined with a second that means 
‘to know’. Weighing up, discerning and understanding the difficulties of the 
time, whilst reflecting on the potential opportunities to be grasped — these 
were the Commission’s goals between 1973 and 1986, a period in which we 
can perceive the origins of the new momentum provided by the Single Euro-
pean Act.
Vincent Dujardin

Part One 
Administrative structures 
and staff
On 16 and 17 September 1978, the Jenkins Commission spent a weekend ‘of reflection’ 
in Comblain-la-Tour, in the Belgian Ardennes, to discuss the main problems facing the 
Community and the Commission. The principal topics broached during the informal 
weekend, held outside the framework of the Commission’s weekly Wednesday 
meetings, were first and foremost the setting up of a study group — to be led by Dirk 
Spierenburg — on the administrative reforms required by the institution, but also the 
future of the Community budget, the common agricultural policy and the forthcoming  
European Parliament elections and their repercussions for the Commission.
From left to right: Finn Olav Gundelach, Christopher Tugendhat, Antonio Giolitti, 
François-Xavier Ortoli, Henk Vredeling, Roy Jenkins, Wilhelm Haferkamp, Claude 
Cheysson, Richard Burke, Lorenzo Natali, Raymond Vouel, Guido Brunner and Étienne 
Davignon.
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Introduction
Faced with the first enlargements and the new tasks 
it had to take on, the Commission had to constant-
ly demonstrate its ability to adapt. The following 
chapters concern its political and administrative 
structures, its places of business, its staff and the 
staff regulations. During the 1970s, the Commis-
sion underwent changes with regard to both its 
structures and procedures, as it was called on simul-
taneously to deal with a variety of challenges. 
The first was that of the successive enlargements 
and consequently the integration of new officials. 
But the emergence of new concerns was not with-
out impact either. The 1970s saw the development 
of new policies, which involved the creation of new 
services. The number of Commission officials and 
other staff rose from almost 6 000 in 1973 to over 
10 000 in 1985. The drive for efficiency in the ad-
ministration also prompted developments: financial 
control, planning and evaluation, and computerisa-
tion. The problem of setting up the services also had 
to be dealt with, in particular with regard to their 
scattered location in Brussels and in other Euro-
pean cities. The dynamic triggered by the enlarge-
ments and various reorganisations collided with the 
fact that the Commission was unable to implement 
a long-term buildings policy until the Member 
States resolved the headquarters issue. In the period 
1973–86, the status of Brussels as headquarters was 
merely provisional.
The second part of this section deals with the Col-
lege, and primarily with the commissioners, that 
is the four Colleges and the 45 individuals who 
successively held these positions, each with its own 
field of competence, between 1973 and 1986. The 
president has a key role in the working of the insti-
tution, but the individual commissioners and the 
size of their countries of origin obviously also have 
a bearing, even if the institution operates on a col-
legial basis.
The role and working of the cabinets (private of-
fices), essential components of the Commission, 
depends largely on the personality of the commis-
sioner and the nature of the portfolio for which 
he or she is responsible. How the work is allocated 
and methods of working can also vary. Within the 
cabinets, to an even greater extent than within the 
College, the sensitivities connected to national in-
terests increasingly gave way to a culture rooted in 
collegiality and consensus-seeking. 
Obviously, throughout this period the Commission 
was still searching for an effective system of commu-
nication. The chapter dedicated to the Spokesmans’ 
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Service deals in particular with the delicate period 
of the joint management of this service and the Dir-
ectorate-General (DG) for Information. 
The third part of this section is devoted to the Sec-
retariat-General and the Legal Service. The former 
has a central place in the organisation of the ad-
ministrative machine, serving the College and its 
president. It also provides a link to the Parliament 
and the Council. The years 1973–86 also saw the 
consolidation of the essential role of the Legal Ser-
vice, which gained even greater prestige as a centre 
of excellence and leadership on European integra-
tion issues. 
Jan Willem Brouwer
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Chapter 1  
The Commission’s organisation, 
office locations and staff 
1.1. Dynamics of 
organisational 
change
In 1973, the Commission of the European Com-
munities was a very young institution, three aspects 
of which should be highlighted from the outset. For 
one thing, its administrative culture testified to the 
difficulty of getting some very different national 
administrative cultures to cohabit effectively. For 
another, its very youth meant it was less susceptible 
to suffer from the ossification that can affect old-
er structures. Lastly, its characteristic dynamism, 
which bore the imprint of the changes generated 
by the 1967 Merger Treaty and then by the first en-
largement, stemmed from the role assigned to it by 
Article 155 of the EEC Treaty, that is  ‘in ensuring 
that the provisions of the treaty and the measures 
taken by the institutions pursuant thereto are ap-
plied’.   But the Commission did not restrict itself 
to merely being the ‘guardian of the treaties’, seen by 
some as a passive role. On the contrary, on the basis 
of those same treaties, it used its right of initiative to 
seize the ‘windows of opportunity’ that opened up 
or even to create its own (1), in order to take initia-
tives which might or might not come to fruition. In 
this sense, by assuming an executive role, the Com-
mission acted as both a laboratory and an incubator. 
Responding to internal and external 
challenges
To perform this role, which meant taking on board 
developments in the Community’s institutional 
structure and particularly in the workings of the 
institutional triangle comprising the European Par-
liament, the Council and the Commission, it relied 
(1) Crama, L., ‘The European Commission as a multi-organisation: Social pol-
icy and IT policy in the EU’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 1, No 2, 
1994, pp. 195–217. 
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on the existence of administrative structures. The 
Commission was formally composed of the Col-
lege of Commissioners, the Secretariat-General, 
directorates-general (19 in 1973, 20 in 1977, 22 in 
1986) and services, offices and agencies. However, 
an examination of its structures cannot be confined 
to a formal presentation. The organisation of the 
civil service and the nature of the administrative 
process and its development must also be taken into 
account (1) — even if the distinction between insti-
tutional organisation and institutional procedures 
is rather difficult to identify (2). 
(1) Gualmini, E., ‘Restructuring Weberian bureaucracy: Comparing manage-
rial reforms in Europe and the United States’, Public Administration, 
Vol. 86, No 1, 2008, p. 76. 
(2) Bulmer, S. J., ‘The governance of the European Union: A new institutional-
ist approach’, Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 13, No 4, 1993, p. 360.
As illustrated by the changes in the organisation 
chart, which, moreover, was deemed too ‘concise’ 
by the Court of Auditors (3), the structures evolved 
partly in response to internal needs and partly in 
response to external challenges. The Commission 
adapted its administrative structure in line with 
its role in drawing up and implementing the ever- 
growing and increasingly complex body of legisla-
tive texts and binding rules intended to translate the 
objectives set out in the treaties. But the evolution of 
the organisation chart also reflected, probably in a 
more spectacular fashion, the growing concern to 
respond to the economic, social and technological 
challenges faced by European society in a global en-
vironment marked by North–South and East–West 
divides. These two imperatives — internal and ex-
(3) Court of Auditors, Annual report concerning the financial year 1983 accom­
panied by the replies of the institutions, OJ C 348, 31.12.1984, p. 103.
ternal — required a dynamic of administrative re-
forms that affected both structures and procedures. 
It is striking to note the extent to which the General 
Report on the Activities of the European Communi­
ties, which offers so few details about how the struc-
tures evolved, regularly and emphatically refers to 
the studies and reports examining the workings and 
coordination of departments. The Commission, 
like other institutions, is marked by the essentially 
vertical nature of its chain of command. This means 
that the coordination between directorates-general 
can be particularly difficult (1). 
That said, the main consideration, namely that of 
collegiality, without which the dynamics of the in-
stitution, which was ‘a fundamentally fragmented 
body’  (2), would have been inconceivable, was not 
exercised solely at the level of the College of Com-
missioners. It started with the mid-level officials in 
the directorates-general  (3). In other words, al-
though the Commission was embodied by its com-
missioners, it was also embodied by its officials, 
who had a wide range of profiles and personalities, 
some career-driven, some driven by European ac-
tivism.
In the main, the Commission was based in and 
worked in Brussels  (4), although its departments 
were somewhat spread out across the city. In April 
1975, a short- and medium-term programme adopt-
ed the principle of grouping those departments in 
three areas around the Schuman roundabout. Some 
of its activities, however, were conducted in Luxem-
bourg and elsewhere. In particular, Luxembourg 
was host to the Statistical Office, the Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communi-
(1) Nugent, N., The Government and Politics of the European Community, 
2nd edn, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1991, pp. 69–72. 
(2) Smith, A., ‘Why European Commissioners matter’, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol. 41, No 3, 2003, p. 140.
(3) Bulmer, S. J., ‘The governance of the European Union: A new institutional-
ist approach’, Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 13, No 4, 1993, p. 361.
(4) See section 1.2, ‘The eternal question of location’.
In the interests of a more efficient and economical organisation of Europe’s administrative machinery, the Commission closed down many of 
its branch offices in Brussels at the start of the 1970s and began moving officials to the Schuman area.
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ties, the Euratom Safeguards Office (Directorate E 
of DG XVII (Energy)) and parts of DG V (Social 
Affairs). From 1977 on, most of these departments, 
which until then had been spread out around the 
city, were brought together in a building construct-
ed on the Kirchberg plateau. Also worth mention-
ing are the four establishments that made up the 
Joint Research Centre (JRC), which were located 
respectively in Belgium (Geel), Germany (Karls-
ruhe), Italy (Ispra) and the Netherlands (Petten), 
but with administrative coordination established 
in Brussels under the authority, from 1981 on, of 
Stelio Villani, Deputy Director-General of DG XII 
(Science, Research and Development). 
Without dwelling here on the College of Com-
missioners, the Secretariat-General and the Legal 
Service, which are discussed further below, it is 
important to bear in mind that structural changes 
took different forms depending on the underlying 
reasons. There were a number of types of change. 
Different patterns of development
The first was that of a directorate or a service 
which subsequently became a directorate-general. 
Here are four examples. Directorate D of the Dir-
ectorate-General for Agriculture (DG VI) was 
responsible for  fisheries. In 1977, it became the 
Directorate-General for Fisheries (DG XIV). The 
Administration of the Customs Union Service 
was transformed into DG XXI under the name 
Customs Union and Indirect Taxation in 1986. 
Responding to the needs created by successive en-
largements, in 1981 Directorate E, Interpreters and 
Conference Services, of DG IX (Personnel and Ad-
ministration), became the Joint Interpreting and 
Conference Service (SCIC)  (5), the head of which 
initially held the grade of director before acquiring 
(5) This is discussed in more depth in Chapter 5: see box ‘The challenge of 
the first enlargements for the Joint Interpreting and Conference Service 
(SCIC)’, pp. 166–67.
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‘Finding solutions is a task for the administrations 
concerned’ 
‘The organisation of the service, the choice of working methods and their 
adaptation to the changing demands made upon it must be achieved in such a 
way as to ensure efficient use of staff and sound financial management. It is 
incumbent upon the relevant administrations to find solutions to the problems 
that arise in these areas’ (1).
‘Staff, methods of management and evaluation’
‘As a result of in-depth review of the structures and operation of its 
departments ..., the Commission was able to reorganise 10 or so directorates-
general and to redeploy staff within departments as required by the 
objectives and priorities which the Commission had set itself.
In view of this constructive experience and the growing complexity of 
structures and administrative procedures the Commission decided that it 
wanted to have permanently at hand means of regularly and systematically 
adjusting the structures and establishment plans of its departments and of 
improving its organisation methods. It therefore set up an “Establishment, 
Organisation and Evaluation Department” and an inspection system for 
certain specific sectors of activity’ (2).
Computerisation 
‘The data-processing strategy for the years 1985-90 defined in 1984 is being 
steadily implemented. The architecture options adopted, notably the multi-
manufacturers procurement policy and the adherence to common standards, 
have now been vindicated by the approach and options adopted by the main 
computer manufacturers and large multinationals. 
In 1986 ... some 100 new projects are being developed: traffic on the data-
transmission network tripled in volume in 1986; total computing power 
(mainframe and distributed) should increase sixfold and storage capacity 
fourfold between 1985 and 1990; some 40 local minicomputers and almost 
400 microcomputers are to be installed each year between 1986 and 
1988’ (3).
(1) Court of Auditors, Annual report concerning the financial year 1978 accompanied by the replies of the institutions, 
OJ C 326, 31.12.1979, p. 137.
(2) EC Commission, Ninth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in 1975, Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1976, p. 21.
(3) EC Commission, Twentieth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in 1986, Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1987, pp. 46–47.
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director-general status. A further example was the 
response to a social challenge. The service for the 
environment and consumer protection inherited 
the number of the old Directorate-General for the 
Internal Market to become DG XI (Environment, 
Consumer Protection and Nuclear Safety) in 1981, 
with responsibility for the latter inherited directly 
from the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom) (1). 
In the second scenario, administrative bodies were 
brought together and merged. This was the case for 
DG III (Industrial and Technological Affairs) and 
DG XI (Internal Market), which merged in 1977 
to become DG III (Internal Market and Industrial 
Affairs).
The third case, which was similar, involved the cre-
ation of a new directorate-general for policy areas 
which until then had been the responsibility of one 
or more other DGs. One example is the creation 
in 1986 of DG XXII (Coordination of Structural 
Instruments), which took over activities that until 
then had been covered by DG VII and DG XVI.
The case of the Spokesman’s Group, which became 
the Spokesman’s Service, was rather special (2). For 
a short time (only a few years) it was incorporat-
ed into the Directorate-General for Information 
(DG  X) so that information and communication 
could be placed under one sole authority, in this case 
the president of the Commission. 
Lastly, it should be noted that, in addition to the 
cases we have mentioned here concerning the evo-
lution of existing structures, the period in ques-
tion saw the birth of working groups or task forces, 
which over time, because of their remit, warranted 
continuity or led to organisational adjustments. For 
(1) On the process leading up to the creation of DG XI, see Cini, M., ‘Admin-
istrative culture in the European Commission: the cases of competition and 
environment’, in Nugent, N. (ed.), At the Heart of the Union: Studies of the 
European Commission, Macmillan, London, 1997, pp. 71–88. 
(2) See section 2.3, ‘The Spokesman’s Group (later the Spokesman’s Service)’.
example, 1981 saw the creation of a task force  on 
‘Industrial innovation and support to telematics 
coordination’, which was close to DG XIII (Infor-
mation Market and Innovation).  Five years later, 
the task force, now known as ‘Information and tele-
communications technologies’,  was placed under 
the authority of a director-general. The astonishing 
scientific and technological progress made in the 
sectors in question more than justified the existence 
of an ad hoc structure. Developments in another 
area — small and medium-sized enterprises, which 
occupied a major place in the economic and social 
fabric — could be considered unusual. This sec-
tor came under Directorate  F of DG  III (Internal 
Market and Industrial Affairs), when a specific task 
force was set up at the start of 1986. 
It would be impossible to describe in detail the 
changes in the Commission’s structure in this 
period, particularly since the elimination of part of 
a title of an administrative unit did not necessarily 
mean that the corresponding tasks had disappeared 
with it. DG V (Employment and Social Affairs and 
Education) was a good example of this (3). Its Dir-
ectorate D was in charge of working conditions and 
migration policies. The latter disappeared from the 
organisation chart in 1986 but this did not mean 
that the Commission had suddenly lost interest in 
this important area. 
This last example also illustrates how important it 
is to weigh up carefully the words used. The rechris-
tening of the Spokesman’s Group as the Spokes-
man’s Service when it was integrated into DG X was 
not insignificant. Likewise, the fact that in DG VI 
(Agriculture), Directorate B responsible for agricul-
tural legislation had been split into two to create a 
Directorate B.II more specifically focused on issues 
relating to ‘quality’ and ‘health’ was a good illustra-
tion of the new and growing concern about veter-
(3) See Pierson, P., ‘The path to European integration: A historical institu-
tionalist analysis’, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 29, No  2, 1996, 
pp. 123–163. 
1973–77
 President
Ortoli, François-Xavier 
(FR)
HoC: de Margerie, Philippe 
 (1973–76)
 Gautier-Sauvagnac, Denis 
 (1976–77)
V — Social Aff airs
(VP) Hillery, Patrick John (IE)
1973–76
HoC: Fitzgibbon, Edwin
DG: Shanks, Michael (1973–75)
 Degimbe, Jean (1976–77)
X — Information
(VP) Scarascia Mugnozza, 
Carlo (IT)
HoC: Jacoangeli, Giuseppe 
 (1973–75)
 Toledano-Laredo, Armando 
 (1975–77)
DG: Ronan, Seán
VI — Agriculture
Lardinois, Petrus Josephus 
(Pierre) (NL)
HoC: Wijnmaalen, Hans
DG: Rabot, Louis Georges
VII — Transport
(VP) Scarascia Mugnozza, 
Carlo (IT)
HoC: Jacoangeli, Giuseppe 
 (1973–75)
 Toledano-Laredo, Armando 
 (1975–77)
DG: Le Goy, Raymond
I — External Relations
(VP) Soames, Christopher 
(UK)
HoC: Hannay, David
DG: Wellenstein, Edmund (1973–76) 
 Hijzen, Theodorus (1976–77)
II — Economic and 
Financial Aff airs
(VP) Haferkamp, Wilhelm (DE)
HoC: Froschmaier, Franz
DG: Mosca, Ugo
III — Industrial and
 Technological Aff airs
Spinelli, Altiero (IT)
1973–76
HoC: Perissich, Riccardo
Guazzaroni, Cesidio (IT)
1976–77
HoC: Perissich, Riccardo
(VP) Simonet, Henri (BE)
for steel
1976–77
HoC: Trappeniers, Félix
DG: Grierson, Ronald (1973–74)
IV — Competition
Borschette, Albert (LU)
1973–76
HoC: Sunnen, Robert
Vouel, Raymond (LU)
1976–77
HoC: Sunnen, Robert
DG: Schlieder, Willy
VIII — Development 
and Cooperation
Deniau, Jean-François (FR) 
1973
HoC: Chapperon, Jean
Cheysson, Claude (FR)
1973–77
HoC: Duchâteau, Pierre (1973)
de Sédouy, Jacques-Alain (1974–75)
Soubestre, Philippe (1976–77)
DG: Krohn, Hans-Broder
IX — Personnel 
and Administration
Borschette, Albert (LU)
1973–76
HoC: Sunnen, Robert
Ortoli, François-Xavier (FR)
1976–77
HoC: Gautier-Sauvagnac, Denis
DG: Baichère, Pierre
NB: This presentation is based on the Commission’s organisation charts. P: President; VP: Vice-President; HoC: Head of Cabinet; DG: Director-General; I, II, III, etc.: numbers of the directorates-general.
Secretary-General
Noël, Émile (FR)
Legal Service
Commissioner: Ortoli, François-Xavier
Director-General: Much, Walter (1973–74)
Spokesman’s Group
Commissioner: Ortoli, François-Xavier
Spokesman: Olivi, Beniamino
Statistical Offi  ce
Commissioner: Dahrendorf, Ralf, then Brunner, Guido
Director-General: Mayer, Jacques
Administration of the Customs Union
Commissioner: Gundelach, Finn Olav
Director: Pingel, Klaus
Environment and Consumer 
Protection Service
Commissioner: Scarascia Mugnozza, Carlo
Director: Carpentier, Michel
Joint Research Centre
Commissioner: Dahrendorf, Ralf, then Brunner, Guido
Director-General: Caprioglio, Pietro (1973–74), 
then Villani, Stelio (1974–77)
Euratom Supply Agency
Commissioner: Simonet, Henri
Director-General: Oboussier, Félix
Offi  ce for Offi  cial Publications 
of the European Communities
Commissioner: Ortoli, François-Xavier
Director: Knaff , Louis N. (1973–74), 
then Verheyden, Walter (1975–77)
XI — Internal Market
Gundelach, Finn Olav (DK)
HoC: Caspari, Manfred (1973–74)
 Petersen, Niels Helveg (1974–77)
DG:  Braun, Fernand
XVI — Regional Policy
Thomson, George (UK)
HoC: Morgan, Gwyn (1973–75)
 Jenkins, Michael (1975-77)
DG: Ruggiero, Renato
XVIII — Credit 
and Investments
(VP) Haferkamp, Wilhelm (DE)
HoC: Froschmaier, Franz
DG: Nicoletti, Antonino
XVII — Energy 
and Nuclear Safety
(VP) Simonet, Henri (BE)
HoC: Somers, Jean (1973–75)
 Vanden Abeele, Michel (1975)
 Trappeniers, Félix (1976–77)
DG: Spaak, Fernand (1973–75)
 Williams, Leonard (1976–77)
XII — Research, Science 
and Education
Dahrendorf, Ralf (DE)
1973–74
HoC: Gläsner, Hans
Brunner, Guido (DE)
1974–77
HoC: Möhler, Rolf
DG: Schuster, Günter
XIII — Scientifi c and 
Technical Information and 
Information Management
Dahrendorf, Ralf (DE)
1973–74
HoC: Gläsner, Hans
Brunner, Guido (DE)
1974–77
HoC: Möhler, Rolf
DG: Appleyard, Raymond
XIX — Budgets
Deniau, Jean-François (FR)
1973
HoC: Chapperon, Jean
Cheysson, Claude (FR)
1973–77
HoC: Duchâteau, Pierre (1973)
de Sédouy, Jacques-Alain (1974–75)
Soubestre, Philippe (1976–77)
DG: Van Gronsveld, Jozef
XX — Financial Control
Deniau, Jean-François (FR)
1973
HoC: Chapperon, Jean
Cheysson, Claude (FR)
1973–77
HoC: Duchâteau, Pierre (1973)
de Sédouy, Jacques-Alain (1974–75)
Soubestre, Philippe (1976–77)
DG: Facini, Carlo
XV — Financial 
Institutions and Taxation
(VP) Simonet, Henri (BE)
1973–77
HoC: Somers, Jean (1973–75)
 Vanden Abeele, Michel (1975)
 Trappeniers, Félix (1976–77)
Guazzaroni, Cesidio (IT)
1976–77
HoC: Perissich, Riccardo
DG: Alban-Hansen, Erik
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1977–81
President
Jenkins, Roy (UK)
HoC: Tickell, Crispin
V — Employment 
and Social Aff airs
(VP) Vredeling, Henk (NL)
HoC: Cohen, Robert (1977)
 Barendregt, Nel (1978–81)
DG:  Degimbe, Jean
X — Spokesman’s Group 
and Directorate-General 
for Information
(P) Jenkins, Roy (UK)
HoC: Tickell, Crispin
Spokesman and DG: 
 Ruggiero, Renato (1977–78)
 Perlot, Enzo (1978–80)
VI — Agriculture
(VP) Gundelach, Finn Olav 
(DK)
HoC: Larsen, Arne (1977)
 Løkkegaard, Knud (1978)
 Lyrto -Petersen, Erik (1978–81)
DG: Rabot, Louis Georges 
 (1977–78)
 Villain, Claude (1978–81)
VII — Transport
Burke, Richard (IE)
HoC: Hogan, John
DG: Le Goy, Raymond
I — External Relations
(VP) Haferkamp, Wilhelm (DE)
HoC: Froschmaier, Franz
DG: Denman, Roy
IV — Competition
Vouel, Raymond (LU)
HoC: Sunnen, Robert
DG: Schlieder, Willy
II — Economic and 
Financial Aff airs
(VP) Ortoli, François-Xavier 
(FR)
HoC: Gautier-Sauvagnac, Denis 
 (1977–78)
 de Boissieu, Pierre (1978–81)
DG: Mosca, Ugo (1977–78)
 Padoa-Schioppa, Tommaso (1979–81)
III — Internal Market 
 and Industrial Aff airs
Davignon, Étienne (BE)
HoC: Paemen, Hugo (from 1978)
 Defraigne, Pierre 
 for industrial aff airs
 (from 1978)
DG: Braun, Fernand
VIII — Development
Cheysson, Claude (FR)
HoC: Soubestre, Philippe
DG: Meyer, Klaus
IX — Personnel 
and Administration
Tugendhat, Christopher (UK)
HoC: Hay, Richard (1977–80)
 Neville-Jones, Pauline
 (1980–81)
DG: Baichère, Pierre
XII — Research, Science 
and Education
Brunner, Guido (DE)
1977–80
HoC: Möhler, Rolf (1977–78)
 Kühn, Jürgen (1978–80)
Burke, Richard (IE)
except for international nuclear 
relations (Davignon, Étienne)
1980–81
HoC: Hogan, John
DG: Schuster, Günter
NB: This presentation is based on the Commission’s organisation charts. P: President; VP: Vice-President; HoC: Head of Cabinet; DG: Director-General; I, II, III, etc.: numbers of the directorates-general.
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Secretary-General
Noël, Émile (FR)
XVI — Regional Policy
Giolitti, Antonio (IT)
HoC: Cafagna, Luciano
DG: Mathijsen, Pierre
XVIII — Credit 
and Investment
(VP) Ortoli, François-Xavier 
(FR)
HoC: Gautier-Sauvagnac, Denis 
 (1977–78)
 de Boissieu, Pierre (1978–81)
DG:  Nicoletti, Antonino
XIII — Science, Research 
and Development
(until October 1980)
Information Market and 
Innovation
Brunner, Guido (DE)
1977–80
HoC: Möhler, Rolf (1977–78)
 Kühn, Jürgen (1978–80)
Davignon, Étienne (BE)
1980–81
HoC: Paemen, Hugo
DG: Appleyard, Raymond
XIX — Budget
Tugendhat, Christopher (UK)
HoC: Hay, Richard (1977–80)
 Neville-Jones, Pauline
 (1980–81)
DG: Strasser, Daniel
XX — Financial Control
Tugendhat, Christopher (UK)
HoC: Hay, Richard (1977–80)
 Neville-Jones, Pauline
 (1980–81)
DG: Facini, Carlo
XVII — Energy
Brunner, Guido (DE)
1977–80
HoC: Möhler, Rolf (1977–78)
 Kühn, Jürgen (1978–80)
Davignon, Étienne (BE)
1980–81
HoC: Paemen, Hugo
DG: Williams, Leonard
XV — Financial 
Institutions and Taxation
Burke, Richard (IE)
for taxation
HoC: Hogan, John
Tugendhat, Christopher (UK)
for fi nancial institutions
HoC: Hay, Richard (1977–80)
Neville-Jones, Pauline (1981–82)
DG: Henriksen, Ole Bus
XIV — Fisheries
Gundelach, Finn Olav (DK)
CC: Larsen, Arne (1977)
 Løkkegaard, Knud (1978)
 Lyrto -Petersen, Erik
 (1978–81)
DG: Gallagher, Eamonn
Legal Service
Commissioner: Jenkins, Roy
Director-General: Ehlermann, Claus-Dieter
Statistical Offi  ce
Commissioner: Ortoli, François-Xavier
Director-General: Dornonville de la Cour, Aage
Customs Union Service
Commissioner: Davignon, Étienne
Director: Pingel, Klaus (1977–79),  
then Klein, Friedrich (1980–81)
Environment and Consumer 
Protection Service
Commissioner: Natali, Lorenzo,
for the environment, and
Burke, Richard, for consumer protection
Head of service: Carpentier, Michel
Joint Research Centre
Commisioner: Brunner, Guido
Director-General: Villani, Stelio
Euratom Supply Agency
Commissioner: Brunner, Guido
Director-General: Mennicken, Jan-Baldem
Offi  ce for Offi  cial Publications 
of the European Communities
Commissioner: Tugendhat, Christopher
Director: Verheyden, Walter
Enlargement and Nuclear Safety
Commissioner: Natali, Lorenzo (IT)
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1981–85
President
Thorn, Gaston (LU)
HoC: Ries, Adrien (1981)
 Spaak, Fernand (1981)
 Durieux, Jean (1981–85)
V — Employment and 
Social Aff airs, Education
Richard, Ivor (UK)
HoC: Hughes, Aneurin
DG: Degimbe, Jean
VI — Agriculture
Dalsager, Poul (DK)
HoC: Juul Jørgensen, Ove
DG: Villain, Claude
VII — Transport
Contogeorgis, Giorgios (EL)
HoC: Yennimatas, Ioannis
DG: Steele, John Roderic
I — External Relations
(VP) Haferkamp, Wilhelm (DE)
including nuclear aff airs
HoC: Rhein, Eberhard (1981–84)
(VP) Natali, Lorenzo (IT)
for enlargement and overall 
Mediterranean policy
HoC: Pensa, Paolo
DG: Denman, Roy (1981–82)
 Fielding, Leslie (1982–85)
III — Internal Market 
and Industrial Aff airs
(VP) Davignon, Étienne (BE)
for industrial aff airs
HoC: Defraigne, Pierre (1981–83)
 Paemen, Hugo (1983–85)
Narjes, Karl-Heinz (DE)
for the internal market
HoC: von Moltke, Heinrich
DG: Braun, Fernand
Task force: Information and
Telecommunications Technologies (from 1983)
DG: Carpentier, Michel
IV — Competition
Andriessen, Frans (NL)
HoC: Trojan, Carlo
DG: Caspari, Manfred
II — Economic 
and Financial Aff airs
(VP) Ortoli, François-Xavier 
(FR)
HoC: de Boissieu, Pierre
DG: Padoa-Schioppa, Tommaso
(1981–83)
 Russo, Massimo (1983–85)
VIII — Development
Cheysson, Claude (FR)
1981
HoC: Soubestre, Philippe (1981)
Pisani, Edgard (FR)
1981–84
HoC: Blanc, Christian (1981–83)
Delorme, Jean (1983–85)
DG: Meyer, Klaus (1981–82)
 Frisch, Dieter (1982–85)
IX — Personnel 
and Administration
O’Kennedy, Michael (IE)
1981–82
HoC: Fitzgibbon, Edwin
Burke, Richard (IE)
1982–85
HoC: Hourican, Liam
DG: Morel, Jean-Claude
NB: This presentation is based on the Commission’s organisation charts. P: President; VP: Vice-President; HoC: Head of Cabinet; DG: Director-General; I, II, III, etc.: numbers of the directorates-general.
Secretary-General
Noël, Émile (FR)
XI — Environment, 
Consumer Protection 
and Nuclear Safety
Narjes, Karl-Heinz (DE)
HoC: von Moltke, Heinrich
DG: Andreopoulos, Athanase
XIII — Information Market 
and Innovation
Narjes, Karl-Heinz (DE)
HoC: von Moltke, Heinrich
DG: Appleyard, Raymond
XIV — Fisheries
Contogeorgis, Giorgios (EL)
HoC: Yennimatas, Ioannis
DG: Gallagher, Eamonn
XII — Science, Research 
and Development
(VP) Davignon, Étienne (BE)
HoC: Paemen, Hugo
DG: Fasella, Paolo
XVII — Energy
(VP) Davignon, Étienne (BE)
HoC: Paemen, Hugo
DG: Audland, Christopher
XVI — Regional Policy
Giolitti, Antonio (IT)
HoC: Perissich, Riccardo
DG: Mathijsen, Petrus (Pierre)
XVIII — Credit 
and Investment
(VP) Ortoli, François-Xavier 
(FR)
HoC: de Boissieu, Pierre
DG: Nicoletti, Antonino 
 (1981–82)
 Cioffi  , Enrico (1983–85)
XV — Financial 
Institutions and Taxation
(VP) Tugendhat, Christopher 
(UK)
HoC: Neville-Jones, Pauline 
 (1981–82)
 Lever, Paul (1982–85)
DG: Henriksen, Ole Bus
XIX — Budget
(VP) Tugendhat, Christopher 
(UK)
HoC: Neville-Jones, Pauline 
 (1981–82)
 Lever, Paul (1982–85)
DG: Strasser, Daniel
XX — Financial Control
(VP) Tugendhat, Christopher 
(UK)
HoC: Neville-Jones, Pauline 
 (1981–82)
 Lever, Paul (1982–85)
DG: Facini, Carlo
X — Information
(VP) Natali, Lorenzo (IT)
HoC: Pensa, Paolo
(P) Thorn, Gaston (LU)
for the Spokesman’s Group
HoC: Durieux, Jean
DG: Froschmaier, Franz
Spokesman: Santarelli, Manuel
Legal Service
Commissioner: Thorn, Gaston
Director-General: Ehlermann, Claus-Dieter
Joint Interpreting and Conference Service
Commissioner: O’Kennedy, Michael, then Burke, Richard
Director: Van Hoof, Renée
Statistical Offi  ce
Commissioner: O’Kennedy, Michael, then Burke, Richard
Director-General: Dornonville de la Cour, Aage 
(1981–82), then de Geus, Pieter (1983–85)
Customs Union Service
Commissioner: Narjes, Karl-Heinz
Director: Klein, Friedrich
Joint Research Centre
Commissioner: Davigon, Étienne
Director-General: Villani, Stelio (1981–82), 
then Dinkespiler, Jean-Albert (1982–86)
Euratom Supply Agency
Commissioner: Davignon, Étienne
Director-General: Mennicken, Jan-Baldem (1981–83), 
then von Klitzing, Georg (1983–85)
Offi  ce for Offi  cial Publications 
of the European Communities
Commissioner: O’Kennedy, Michael, then Burke, Richard
Director: Verheyden, Walter
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Secretary-General
Noël, Émile (FR)
XI — Environment, 
Consumer Protection 
and Nuclear Safety
Narjes, Karl-Heinz (DE)
HoC: von Moltke, Heinrich
DG: Andreopoulos, Athanase
XIII — Information Market 
and Innovation
Narjes, Karl-Heinz (DE)
HoC: von Moltke, Heinrich
DG: Appleyard, Raymond
XIV — Fisheries
Contogeorgis, Giorgios (EL)
HoC: Yennimatas, Ioannis
DG: Gallagher, Eamonn
XII — Science, Research 
and Development
(VP) Davignon, Étienne (BE)
HoC: Paemen, Hugo
DG: Fasella, Paolo
XVII — Energy
(VP) Davignon, Étienne (BE)
HoC: Paemen, Hugo
DG: Audland, Christopher
XVI — Regional Policy
Giolitti, Antonio (IT)
HoC: Perissich, Riccardo
DG: Mathijsen, Petrus (Pierre)
XVIII — Credit 
and Investment
(VP) Ortoli, François-Xavier 
(FR)
HoC: de Boissieu, Pierre
DG: Nicoletti, Antonino 
 (1981–82)
 Cioffi  , Enrico (1983–85)
XV — Financial 
Institutions and Taxation
(VP) Tugendhat, Christopher 
(UK)
HoC: Neville-Jones, Pauline 
 (1981–82)
 Lever, Paul (1982–85)
DG: Henriksen, Ole Bus
XIX — Budget
(VP) Tugendhat, Christopher 
(UK)
HoC: Neville-Jones, Pauline 
 (1981–82)
 Lever, Paul (1982–85)
DG: Strasser, Daniel
XX — Financial Control
(VP) Tugendhat, Christopher 
(UK)
HoC: Neville-Jones, Pauline 
 (1981–82)
 Lever, Paul (1982–85)
DG: Facini, Carlo
X — Information
(VP) Natali, Lorenzo (IT)
HoC: Pensa, Paolo
(P) Thorn, Gaston (LU)
for the Spokesman’s Group
HoC: Durieux, Jean
DG: Froschmaier, Franz
Spokesman: Santarelli, Manuel
Legal Service
Commissioner: Thorn, Gaston
Director-General: Ehlermann, Claus-Dieter
Joint Interpreting and Conference Service
Commissioner: O’Kennedy, Michael, then Burke, Richard
Director: Van Hoof, Renée
Statistical Offi  ce
Commissioner: O’Kennedy, Michael, then Burke, Richard
Director-General: Dornonville de la Cour, Aage 
(1981–82), then de Geus, Pieter (1983–85)
Customs Union Service
Commissioner: Narjes, Karl-Heinz
Director: Klein, Friedrich
Joint Research Centre
Commissioner: Davigon, Étienne
Director-General: Villani, Stelio (1981–82), 
then Dinkespiler, Jean-Albert (1982–86)
Euratom Supply Agency
Commissioner: Davignon, Étienne
Director-General: Mennicken, Jan-Baldem (1981–83), 
then von Klitzing, Georg (1983–85)
Offi  ce for Offi  cial Publications 
of the European Communities
Commissioner: O’Kennedy, Michael, then Burke, Richard
Director: Verheyden, Walter
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1985–86
President
Delors, Jacques (FR)
HoC: Lamy, Pascal
VI — Agriculture
(VP) Andriessen, Frans (NL)
HoC: Trojan, Carlo
DG: Legras, Guy
VIII — Development
(VP) Natali, Lorenzo (IT)
HoC: Pensa, Paolo
DG: Frisch, Dieter
VII — Transport
Clinton Davis, Stanley (UK)
HoC: Meadows, Graham
DG: Steele, John Roderic 
 (1985–86)
 Peña Abizanda, Eduardo 
 (from 1986)
I — External Relations
De Clercq, Willy (BE)
HoC: Schaub, Alexander
Cheysson, Claude (FR)
for Mediterranean policy 
and North–South relations
HoC: Soubestre, Philippe
(VP) Natali, Lorenzo (IT)
for enlargement
HoC: Pensa, Paolo
DG: Fielding, Leslie
IV — Competition
Sutherland, Peter (IE)
HoC: O’Toole, Richard
DG: Caspari, Manfred
II — Economic 
and Financial Aff airs
Pfeiff er, Alois (DE)
HoC: Dibelius, Otto
DG: Russo, Massimo
IX — Personnel 
and Administration
(VP) Christophersen, Henning 
(DK)
HoC: Bladbjerg, Bjarne
DG: Morel, Jean-Claude (1985–86)
 Hay, Richard (from 1986)
X — Information, 
Communication and Culture
Ripa di Meana, Carlo (IT)
HoC: Perissich, Riccardo
DG: Froschmaier, Franz
III — Internal Market 
and Industrial Aff airs
(VP) Narjes, Karl-Heinz (DE)
for industrial aff airs and information 
technology
HoC:  von Moltke, 
Heinrich
(VP) Cockfi eld, Arthur (UK)
for the internal market
HoC: Fortescue, Adrian
Matutes, Abel (ES)
for the SME Task Force
From 1986
HoC: Prat y Coll, Juan
DG: Braun, Fernand
Task force: Information 
and Telecommunications 
Technologies (up to 1986)
DG: Carpentier, Michel
Task force: Small and Medium-sized
Enterprises (from 1986)
Director: Mayhew, Alan
V — Employment, Social 
Aff airs and Education
Pfeiff er, Alois (DE)
for employment
HoC: Dibelius, Otto
Sutherland, 
Peter (IE)
for social aff airs 
and education
HoC: O’Toole, Richard
(VP) Marín, 
Manuel (ES)
HoC: Gómez-Reino Lecoq, Santiago
DG: Degimbe, Jean
NB: This presentation is based on the Commission’s organisation charts. P: President; VP: Vice-President; HoC: Head of Cabinet; DG: Director-General; I, II, III, etc.: numbers of the directorates-general.
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Secretary-General
Noël, Émile (FR)
XIII — Information Market 
and Innovation
(up to 1986)
Telecommunications, 
Information Industries 
and Innovation
Narjes, Karl-Heinz (DE)
HoC: von Moltke, Heinrich
DG: Appleyard, Raymond (to 1986)
 then Carpentier, Michel
Task force: Information and Telecommunications
Technologies
DG: Carpentier, Michel
XII — Science, Research 
and Development
(VP) Narjes, Karl-Heinz (DE)
HoC: von Moltke, Heinrich
DG: Fasella, Paolo
XVII — Energy
Mosar, Nicolas (LU)
HoC:  Peters, John (1985–86)
Thurmes, Fernand (from 1986)
DG: Audland, Christopher 
 (1985–86)
XI — Environment, 
Consumer Protection 
and Nuclear Safety
Clinton Davis, Stanley (UK)
HoC: Meadows, Graham
Varfi s, Grigoris (EL)
for consumer protection
(from 1986)
HoC: Mitsos, Achilleas
DG: Fairclough, Anthony John 
 (from 1986)
XIV — Fisheries
(VP) Andriessen, Frans (NL)
HoC: Trojan, Carlo
Cardoso e Cunha, 
António José Baptista (PT)
HoC: Cabral da Fonseca, Eurico Luís
DG:  Gallagher, Eamonn
XVI — Regional Policy
Varfi s, Grigoris (EL)
HoC: Mitsos, Achilleas
Pfeiff er, 
Alois (DE)
HoC: Dibelius, Otto
DG: Mathijsen, Pierre (1985–86)
 Landaburu, Eneko (from 1986)
XVIII — Credit 
and Investments
Pfeiff er, Alois (DE)
HoC: Dibelius, Otto
Matutes, Abel (ES)
HoC: Prat y Coll, Juan
DG: Cioffi  , Enrico
XV — Financial 
Institutions and Taxation
(up to 1986)
Financial Institutions 
and Company Law
(VP) Cockfi eld, Arthur (UK)
HoC: Fortescue, Adrian
DG: Henriksen, Ole Bus (until 1986)
 Fitchew, Geoff rey
XIX — Budgets
(VP) Christophersen, Henning 
(DK)
HoC: Bladbjerg, Bjarne
DG: Strasser, Daniel (1985–86)
 Morel, Jean-Claude (from 1986)
XX — Financial Control
(VP) Christophersen, Henning 
(DK)
HoC: Bladbjerg, Bjarne
DG: Facini, Carlo
XXII — Coordination of 
Structural Instruments
(from 1986)
Varfi s, Grigoris (EL)
HoC: Barlebo-Larsen, Kaj
DG: Facini, Carlo
XXI — Customs Union 
and Indirect Taxation
(from 1986)
(VP) Cockfi eld, Arthur (UK)
HoC: Fortescue, Adrian
DG: Rui Vilar, Emilio
Legal Service
Commissioner: Delors, Jacques
Director-General: Ehlermann, Claus-Dieter
Spokesman’s Service
Commissioner: Delors, Jacques
Spokesman: Paemen, Hugo
Joint Interpreting and Conference Service
Commissioner: Delors, Jacques
Director: Van Hoof, Renée
Statistical Offi  ce
Commissioner: Pfeiff er, Alois
Director-General: Ronchetti, Silvio
Customs Union Service (up to 1986)
Commissioner: Cockfi eld, Arthur
Director: Klein, Friedrich
Joint Research Centre
Commisioner: Narjes, Karl-Heinz
Director-General: Dinkespiler, Jean-Albert (1985–86), 
then Contzen, Jean-Pierre (from 1986)
Euratom Supply Agency
Commissioner: Mosar, Nicolas
Director-General: von Klitzing, Georg
Offi  ce for Offi  cial Publications 
of the European Communities
Commissioner: Mosar, Nicolas
Director: Verheyden, Walter
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inary matters. Yet another example is provided by 
DG XII (Research, Science and Education), which 
became Science, Research and Development in 
1981, when that DG created a new directorate deal-
ing with ‘energy R & D strategy’, the name of which 
constituted a whole programme in itself, since in 
the wake of the second oil crisis, a strategy had to be 
developed for this vital sector along with provisions 
to implement a research and development approach 
undoubtedly inspired by corporate culture.  
While the organisation chart and its evolution 
might reveal some broad tendencies in the dynamics 
at work, it provides little or no information on the 
importance of certain structures, such as the trans-
lation service of DG IX which was part of Direct-
orate D, Translation, Documentation, Reproduc-
tion and Library. With 955 translators by the end of 
1985, the service soon became a completely separate 
directorate (1).
Efforts to respond to internal and external challeng-
es not only meant adapting vertical structures, but 
also (as already mentioned) efforts towards hori-
zontal coordination, which was barely taken into 
account in the organisation chart (2), and a quest for 
efficiency.
The quest for efficiency 
As already noted, the General Report was so discreet 
as to be practically silent on the nature of the chang-
es that occurred within the Commission’s internal 
organisation. However, it had a lot to say, albeit in 
very general terms, on how the institution was on a 
perpetual quest for ever greater efficiency — a quest 
(1) European Commission, History of Translation at the European Commission, 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxem-
bourg, 2010, pp. 24–25; see also box ‘The translation services’ in Chapter 5, 
pp. 164–165.
(2) Except in regard to the relations between DG II and the European Invest-
ment Bank or between the Statistical Office and the services of the Euro-
pean institutions based in Brussels. 
for efficiency which raised the question of what ob-
jectives were set and what means were deployed, and 
how to monitor the achievement of those objectives 
and the use of those means.
Objectives
In terms of objectives, we must concentrate on the 
essentials. Every year the Commission president or 
— as was the case in February 1974 — one of its 
vice-presidents gave a policy address in the Euro-
pean Parliament, certain points of which were set out 
in more detail in an additional memorandum which 
was published afterwards (3). At the very end of the 
period studied here, there was a symbolic change. In 
February 1986, Jacques Delors presented the Com-
mission work programme for that year to the MEPs. 
This presentation was based on a document which 
had been sent to Parliament in advance. It was the 
subject of a debate during which the president an-
swered questions from the MEPs  (4). In addition 
to this type of general policy statement which, it 
must be said, acquired a clearer outline and content 
under Delors, we must point out that until 1984 it 
was up to the Commission to set out its priorities 
for each president of the Council before the latter 
took office. However, things were to change. From 
that point on, the Commission was faced with the 
work programme of rotating Council Presidencies, 
which formalised the objectives for their particular 
6-month term. 
The fact that these two changes took place in a short 
space of time was no coincidence. It also explains 
why ‘the main lines of the modernisation policy 
endorsed by the Commission in September 1985’ 
(3) The text of the policy address and that of the additional memorandum were 
published in the General Report on the Activities of the European Communi­
ties in 1973, 1974 and 1975. From 1976 to 1983 they were published sepa-
rately. 
(4) See ‘Programme of the Commission for 1986: Statement by Jacques Delors, 
President of the European Commission, to the European Parliament and 
his reply to the ensuing debate, Strasbourg, 19 February 1986’, Bulletin of 
the European Communities Supplement, No 1, Office for Official Publica-
tions of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1986. 
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were incorporated in an action plan, which aimed 
‘to set clear objectives for each department with-
in the framework of the annual work programme 
adopted by the Commission and to focus efforts on 
them’ (1). 
Management and organisation (2)
The will clearly expressed here was not really any-
thing new. Indeed, in 1980, on the basis of the re-
port from a group of members of the Commission 
chaired by François-Xavier Ortoli, the Commission 
adopted a set of measures aimed at implementing 
the recommendations of part 3 of an earlier report 
on administrative policy, the 1978 Spierenburg re-
port (3). Furthermore, it is worth noting that from 
1975 the Commission created an  Establishment, 
Organisation and Evaluation Department as a per-
manent means of ‘regularly and systematically ad-
justing the structures and establishment plans of 
its departments and of improving its organisation 
methods’ (4). But it is curious, to say the least, that 
while the Court of Auditors took pains to point 
out that the Commission was the only European 
institution with such a department  (5), it was not 
until 1981 that a mention of it was made in the or-
ganisation chart, where it was shown as attached to 
the deputy director-general of DG IX. In practice, 
it is difficult to measure the impact of the action of 
this department and of the Spierenburg and Orto-
li reports, but one thing that emerged nevertheless 
was the Court of Auditors’ comment in 1983 that 
‘an explanation based on duties performed, regard-
ing the total number of posts and their distribution 
(1) EC Commission, Twentieth General Report on the Activities of the Euro­
pean Communities in 1986, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, Luxembourg, 1987, p. 44. 
(2) These aspects are explored in more detail in Chapter 6, ‘An administrative 
culture in transition’. 
(3) EC Commission, Fourteenth General Report on the Activities of the Euro­
pean Communities in 1980, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, Luxembourg, 1981, p. 30. 
(4) EC Commission, Ninth General Report on the Activities of the European 
Communities in 1975, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, Luxembourg, 1976, p. 21.
(5) Court of Auditors, Annual report concerning the financial year 1978 accom­
panied by the replies of the institutions, OJ C 326, 31.12.1979, p. 137. 
between departments was not directly available at 
the Commission’, which made it ‘desirable, both 
for the Commission and for the budgetary author-
ity, to have a more complete method for assessing 
workloads and more operational criteria for deter-
mining the posts required’  (6). This undoubtedly 
sheds more light on one of the reasons for drawing 
up the plan of September 1985. The strategy for im-
plementing that plan involved the organisation of 
a seminar on 25 and 26 April 1986 entitled ‘Man-
agement and organisation’  aimed at directors- 
general, while a series of further seminars were held 
for directors, heads of divisions and specialised 
departments, and assistants to directors-general, 
followed, in 1987, by measures for other categories 
of staff (7). 
Financial resources and the monitoring 
of their use
Achieving objectives involving the mobilisation of 
human resources also meant deploying financial re-
sources and monitoring them. 
The budget  (8) was the responsibility of DG XIX. 
Its structure, which became somewhat simplified 
over the years, was a faithful reflection of its mis-
sion, as it was organised into three directorates, 
the names of which in 1986 — ‘Expenditure’,  ‘Re-
sources’  and  ‘Budget Execution’ — pointed to an 
evident concern for efficiency. Monitoring was both 
internal and external. The latter took several forms 
which involved, to varying degrees, the Parliament, 
the Council and the Court of Auditors, whose first 
report covered the year 1977. Internal financial 
monitoring was the responsibility of DG XX (Fi-
nancial Control) and its director-general was called 
(6) Court of Auditors, Annual report concerning the financial year 1983 accom­
panied by the replies of the institutions, OJ C 348, 31.12.1984, p. 103. 
(7) EC Commission, Twentieth General Report on the Activities of the Euro­
pean Communities in 1986, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, Luxembourg, 1987, p. 44. These aspects are explored in more 
detail in Chapter 6, ‘An administrative culture in transition’.
(8) On the budget, see Chapter 11, ‘The politics of the Community budget’.
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the financial controller. From 1981 on, DG XX was 
also responsible for monitoring expenditure on so-
cial and regional policy (DGs V and XVI, respec-
tively) and in 1986 its remit was extended to the 
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee 
Fund (EAGGF). Responsibility for overseeing the 
growing number of external offices and delegations 
was assigned to the Secretariat-General in 1982. 
Evaluation
Another task which became increasingly impor-
tant for the institution was evaluating the results 
achieved in relation to the objectives set and assess-
ing the costs involved. In this respect, the September 
1985 plan seems to have been a major turning point. 
However, we need to be careful here since it is obvi-
ous that, as was the case elsewhere, certain practices 
were being employed well before they were reflected 
in the organisational structure. Notwithstanding 
this caveat, an examination of the 1986 organisa-
tion chart shows some examples of what constituted 
a general trend: ‘development analysis and forecast’ 
and ‘general programming questions’ in DG VIII, 
‘implementation of programmes’ in DG XI, ‘ex post 
evaluation’ in DG XVI and ‘economic and financial 
assessment’ in DG XIX. It is also worth noting that 
all these administrative units were under the direct 
authority of the director-general or the deputy dir-
ector-general of the DG concerned. 
The challenge of computerisation
During the 1970s and the early 1980s, informatics 
came under the domain of DG IX, in which a new 
directorate specifically for this sector appeared in 
1981. At the same time, a management committee 
for data processing in the Commission acted as a 
sort of computer user group. The priority then was 
calculating officials’ salaries, managing the budget 
and general documentation. Performing these and 
other tasks, including those of the Statistical Of-
fice, required a computing centre equipped with 
large computers, the choice of manufacturer of 
which  owed more to political motivations (priori-
tising European production) than to managerial 
logic (reliability and efficiency of resources)  (1). 
The difficulties of the European IT industry now 
meant the problem had to be tackled head-on at a 
time when microcomputers were being introduced 
by Microsoft and Apple. The challenge was con-
sequently twofold: introducing these office tools 
across the board was an entirely natural part of the 
Commission’s modernisation policy,  as comput-
erisation made it possible to streamline work  (2), 
increase efficiency  (3) and thus  increase productiv-
ity (4); at the same time the Commission also had 
to address a considerable number of technical prob-
lems and organise its services. Some people found 
this dual challenge impossible to resolve, to the 
point where in June 1981 the Parliament passed a 
resolution recommending that an agency be set up 
to handle all the institutions’ data-processing activ-
ities (5). Although this never got off the ground, the 
recommendation illustrated a concern that was em-
phasised by international consultants at the time, 
namely  ‘the gradual strengthening of the planning 
function and preparation of an action plan to secure 
more effective management of data processing in 
the Commission’ (6). 
(1) De Michelis, A., ‘The difficult years: From 1981 to 1985’, in De Michelis, A. 
and Chantraine, A. (eds), Memoirs of Eurostat: 50 Years Serving Europe, Of-
fice for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 
2003, p. 115.
(2) EC Commission, Eleventh General Report on the Activities of the Euro­
pean Communities in 1977, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, Luxembourg, 1978, p. 38. 
(3) EC Commission, Seventeenth General Report on the Activities of the Euro­
pean Communities in 1983, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, Luxembourg, 1984, p. 29. 
(4) EC Commission, Nineteenth General Report on the Activities of the Euro­
pean Communities in 1985, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, Luxembourg, 1986, p. 46. 
(5) EC Commission, Fifteenth General Report on the Activities of the Euro­
pean Communities in 1981, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, Luxembourg, 1982, p. 38.
(6) Ibid.
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Emergence of ‘new public 
management’ at the Commission
The concerns raised and reforms prompted by the 
formal administrative structure and by the organ-
isation of the civil service and of administrative 
procedures and processes testify to the penetration 
of managerial thinking at the Commission  (1). 
The neo-liberal wind blowing from the United 
Kingdom and then the United States with regard 
to administrative matters had a decisive impact at 
the end of the 1970s and the start of the 1980s, as it 
brought with it the practice of ‘new public manage-
ment’ (NPM), whose ‘more value for money’ motto 
(1) Gualmini, E.,  ‘Restructuring Weberian bureaucracy: Comparing mana-
gerial reforms in Europe and the United States’, Public Administration, 
Vol. 86, No 1, 2008, p. 76.
was emblematic of a doctrine that was perhaps not 
as straightforward as it might seem (2).
The aim of NPM was not to dismantle public or-
ganisations but to  ‘save’  them, by importing into 
the public sector the body of knowledge, techniques 
and best practices which had proven efficient in 
the private sector. The conviction that reforms of 
a mainly organisational nature would improve ad-
ministrative performance  (3) drove a movement 
which, it has been said, is probably older than is gen-
erally thought (4).
Michel Dumoulin
(2) Pollitt, C., Managerialism and Public Services, Blackwell, Oxford, 1993. 
(3) Eymeri-Douzans, J.-M., ‘Les stratégies de réforme administrative en 
Europe: essai d‘évaluation comparative’,  in Meinon, J. (ed.), Les réorgani­
sations administratives. Bilan et perspectives en France et en Europe, Institut 
de la gestion publique et du développement économique, Comité pour l’his-
toire économique et financière de la France, Paris, 2008, pp. 115–140.
(4) This issue is explored in more detail in Chapter 6, ‘An administrative cul-
ture in transition’. 
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1.2. The eternal question 
of location 
It was during a slack period in the summer, when 
most European officials had left on holiday, that one 
of them  — he must have postponed his leave — in-
vented the ‘Brussels EEC office allocation game’. 
Created with a great deal of humour, it was easy 
to explain: on a board containing as many boxes as 
there were buildings occupied by the Commission, 
the white pawns (ordinary officials) competed with 
the black pawns (directors-general and financial 
controllers) to divide the entire staff of the Com-
munities between 4 206 offices, while scrupulously 
matching the various administrative subdivisions 
with the corresponding number of offices, meeting 
rooms and parking spaces to which they were each 
entitled. ‘Obstacle’ and ‘surprise’ cards announcing, 
for example, the unexpected creation of a DG for 
astronomy which had to be crammed into an al-
ready over-full building were another feature of this 
European version of Monopoly. A further feature 
was the rule that no game was ever ‘finished, only 
adjourned!’ (1).
By poking fun at the unfortunate repercussions of 
the chronic lack of space, the game’s creator — his 
name is unfortunately not known — was of course 
seeking to pillory the not always comfortable work-
ing conditions which prevailed in Brussels, Luxem-
bourg and Strasbourg. He was, moreover, not the 
only one to be irritated by the persistent problems 
created by the question of where to house the Com-
munity institutions. For its part, the Commission 
had for years been battling against the red tape im-
posed on it in this area. Unfortunately, the difficult 
issues involved had forced it to make do with a pol-
icy of gradual improvements, which did not always 
(1) HAEC, BAC 84/1986/94, Document by Enrico Angelini, ‘Jouez avec 
nous … ’, 1977.
mean, however, that the fruits of its efforts were not 
worth mentioning.
In search of more efficient planning
Albert Borschette, Permanent Representative of 
Luxembourg and later European Commissioner for 
Competition from 1971 to 1976, pondered over the 
matter from the beginning of the 1970s. As man-
ager of the European Executive’s financial resources, 
he was quick to discover that one of the roots of the 
problem lay in the strictly arithmetical correlation 
between the staff budget and the funds available to 
rent office space intended to accommodate new re-
cruits determined according to a rigid system where-
by an official’s grade determined the size of office he 
or she was entitled to (2). In these circumstances, it 
was simply impossible to plan properly because the 
fact that the budget was adopted annually meant 
the Commission was back to square one at the end 
of each financial year. Underlying this was obvious-
ly the eminently political question of the location 
of the institutions, an issue which was never settled 
during the period covered here and which explains 
the various prevarications which made it impossible 
to pursue an efficient buildings policy with a long-
term perspective. 
However, this short-termism, which could be justi-
fied ‘as long as the size of the staff remained modest’, 
eventually turned into a nightmare. Since there was 
often no more spare space in existing buildings, the 
slightest increase in staff resulted ipso facto in a need 
to rent whole floors of offices in other buildings, 
which were often difficult to find in the immediate 
vicinity of the general area in which the Commu-
nity institutions were located. Moreover, alternative 
accommodation was often situated in buildings that 
had originally been built for other purposes. Con-
(2) HAEC, BAC 148/1988/220, ‘Problems of office accommodation and 
storage space faced by the Commission in Brussels’, SEC(74) 2858, 10 July 
1974.
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sequently, they did not necessarily meet the specific 
needs of the departments which were to be accom-
modated there. Before they could move in, there-
fore, modifications of varying degrees were neces-
sary. Apart from causing delays, this also obviously 
increased rents, especially as the Commission, faced 
with an urgent need to billet its troops, found itself 
in a weak position in respect of landlords.
The lack of offices therefore forced senior man-
agers  in the Berlaymont to put up not only with 
seeing their staff dispersed across various districts of 
Brussels, but also with some DGs having to be split 
over a number of sites unless they were prepared to 
move wholesale, unit by unit, as soon as a broaden-
ing of their tasks and, hence, an expansion of their 
workforce made relocation inevitable. As Borschette 
stressed, ‘it is well known that moving is the worst 
option for expanding operations because of the dis-
organisation it creates, the damage it causes to furni-
ture and, above all, the cost it imposes on the Com-
munity’ because it usually gave rise to a loss of space 
of up to 8–10 % (1). This phenomenon, which might 
seem odd at first sight, was due to the fact that mov-
ing a department away from the centralised general 
services inevitably gave rise to a duplication of space 
allocated to reception areas, archives, documenta-
tion and technical installations. It also goes without 
saying that this also led to an increase in the posts to 
be filled — and of course the salaries to be paid.
In short, learning from the bottlenecks that 
emerged, particularly at the time of the first enlarge-
ment in 1973 when the arrival of the Danes, Irish 
and British presented the bodies of the Community 
with an unprecedented upheaval, Borschette short-
ly afterwards established a buildings policy which 
made a clean break with the mistakes of the past. 
Instead of reviewing the matter year by year, the 
Council finally allowed the Commission to draw 
up a multiannual plan. The first one covered the 
(1) HAEC, BAC 148/1988/220, ‘Problems of office accommodation and stor-
age space faced by the Commission in Brussels’, SEC(74) 2858, 10 July 1974.
period 1976–80. It was innovative in a number of 
respects. For example, it granted DGs ‘expansion 
reserves’, enabling them in future to deal with the 
immediate situation without too many hitches or 
pointless moves. Medium-term projections allowed 
increases in staff equivalent to a minimum office 
space of 9 000 m2 a year to be anticipated. As a re-
sult, it also made sense to remodel the relationship 
with property developers in the private sector. Since 
the Commission would in future be able to commit 
itself 1 to 2 years before the buildings likely to suit it 
were completed, it could take precautionary action 
to get the architects responsible for the finishings of 
buildings under construction to take account of its 
requirements from the outset. This proved success-
ful, saving both time and money (2).
This dual advantage was accompanied by a much 
more efficient European civil service. This was an 
automatic result of the fact that forward planning 
simultaneously cleared the way for the administra-
tive machinery to be better distributed and assem-
bled around a single centre of gravity. At the same 
time, it was an ideal way of shaking off a series of 
unfortunate legacies from the time when the hur-
ried establishment of the initial Community bodies 
had required the governments of the host countries 
to do their utmost to meet the urgent demand for 
offices coming from the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) and later the EEC and the 
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). 
The problem was particularly serious in Luxem-
bourg. At the start of the 1970s, the Commission 
maintained barely 1 400 officials there, but they oc-
cupied as many as 17 separate buildings spread right 
across the city. It was therefore unrealistic to expect 
any close cooperation between the staff concerned. 
Borschette therefore urged his former boss, Prime 
Minister Pierre Werner, to come to his rescue by 
speeding up the construction of the Jean Monnet 
building in Kirchberg. Once completed in the mid-
(2) HAEC, BAC 148/1988 220, Letter from Albert Borschette to the Presi-
dent of the Council Garret FitzGerald, 21 April 1975.
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1970s, this ‘strictly utilitarian, no-luxury’ complex 
absorbed virtually all of the Commission’s staff in 
the grand duchy. Day-to-day business immediately 
felt the benefits, if only because it was now possible 
to do away with the tiresome shuttle services which 
transported mail from one department to another. 
The improvement in staff morale was palpable, their 
hierarchical superiors noted (1).
(1) HAEC, BAC 84/1986/94, Commission memo, 6 September 1974.
A similar concentration also took place in Brus-
sels. There the Commission was striving as far as 
possible to eliminate the various outposts which it 
maintained in the city centre by bringing staff close 
to the Schuman roundabout where, according to a 
‘plan to house all departments within a geograph-
ical perimeter to encourage the institution’s smooth 
functioning’ (2), the future European district was to 
(2) HAEC, ‘Report from the Commission to the Council on the location of 
Community departments in Brussels and Luxembourg’, SEC(74) 4771, 
9 December 1974; ‘Report from the Commission to the Council on the lo-
cation of Community departments in Brussels and Luxembourg: Situation 
at the end of the third quarter of 1976’, COM(76) 710 final, 6 January 1977.
Constructed in 1975, the Jean Monnet building on the Kirchberg plateau is the headquarters 
for the European Commission departments in Luxembourg.
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be established around the Berlaymont, which was 
becoming the ‘representative building of the Com-
mission’. 
The Berlaymont would eventually house only the 
Commission itself and those departments directly 
attached to it or whose mission related more spe-
cifically to European activities of which the Berlay-
mont had become a symbol. All other administra-
tive entities were sooner or later destined to leave 
the headquarters as replacement offices gradually 
became available around the main centre of power. 
Thus, for example, the removal of all financial and 
administrative services towards the brand new 
triangle formed by the Avenue de la Joyeuse En-
trée/Blijde Inkomstlaan, Avenue de Cortenbergh/
Kortenberglaan and Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat was 
scheduled to take place from 1976 (1). 
Prospects and limitations of the new 
buildings policy
While the policy of rationalisation launched by 
Borschette was still fairly tentative and highly re-
spectful of the established order, that of his succes-
sors proved to be considerably bolder. Indeed, faced 
with a series of hold-ups resulting from disagree-
ments with the Belgian authorities concerning the 
building at Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 120 in Brussels, 
the senior management of DG  IX (Personnel and 
Administration) developed a self-assured approach. 
Jean-Claude Morel, its director-general, and his 
colleagues wanted Europe to stop restricting itself 
to its traditional role of tenant. This was basical-
ly prompted by the Court of Auditors. As early as 
1979, the guardians of budgetary rectitude had cal-
culated that becoming the owner of the 50 000 m2 
included in the urban development plan for the 
(1) HAEC, ‘Report from the Commission to the Council on the location of 
Community departments in Brussels and Luxembourg’, SEC(74) 4771, 
9 December 1974; ‘Report from the Commission to the Council on the lo-
cation of Community departments in Brussels and Luxembourg: Situation 
at the end of the third quarter of 1976’, COM(76) 710 final, 6 January 1977.
abovementioned site would cost Europe exactly the 
equivalent of six times the annual rent that it would 
otherwise have to pay for the same building (2)! It 
was no contest. Although there were many who 
warned the Commission against the heavy work-
load and risks that an overall shift in policy of this 
nature would involve, it was not put off the idea (3). 
Ultimately, the advantage to be gained from Europe 
transforming itself into the developer of a building 
which it would itself own was much too tempting. 
And let there be no mistake: it was not just about 
saving money but more about freeing itself further 
from the yoke of governments. 
Despite the obvious progress achieved over the 
period 1973–86 as regards the location of the insti-
tutions, one should not exaggerate the Commission’s 
margin of manoeuvre to the extent of suggesting 
that everything in the garden was rosy. Far from it. 
Although it put up a good fight, the Communities’ 
Executive was overtaken by events. However much 
it expanded into new office space, the accession of 
(2) HAEC, BAC 55/1995/9, ‘L’écho de la Bourse’, 16 October 1986.
(3) HAEC, BAC 148/1988/220, Note from Michael Loy to Paolo Cecchini, 
31 March 1982.
Commissioner Albert Borschette’s aim in redeploying the various DGs was to 
transform the Berlaymont into the flagship building of the Commission, a building 
housing ‘the Commission alone and the departments directly attached to it’.
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the Mediterranean countries, combined with the 
breathtaking pace of new recruitments dictated by 
the growing powers of the Communities, immedi-
ately killed off any hope of ever reaching the end. 
A particularly striking example would serve to illus-
trate its Sisyphean task. In 1973, when the keys to a 
building which had been built close to the central 
railway station in Luxembourg were handed over, 
the Office for Official Publications of the Euro-
pean Communities (OPOCE) was allocated prem-
ises which, for the first time in its 20-year history, 
allowed it to house all of its staff at the same ad-
dress. Designed according to plans drawn up in line 
with the precise instructions of OPOCE’s Manage-
ment Committee, the building met the needs of its 
209 officials perfectly. 
Exactly 10 years later, this harmonious coexistence 
was at an end. Apart from the arrival of Greek and, 
soon after, Spanish and Portuguese officials, which 
increased the staff to 353, the growing role played by 
computers in publishing made substantial changes 
imperative. As a result, centrifugal forces gained 
the upper hand over the move towards concentra-
tion.  Reluctantly, OPOCE was again forced to split 
off part of its staff, who were relocated to another 
building pending the completion of major works at 
the main premises (1).
(1) HAEC, BAC 63/1988/853, ‘Report from the Commission to the Council 
on the location of Community departments: Situation at the end of Sep-
tember 1983’, COM(83) 796 final, 10 January 1984; interview with Lucien 
Emringer, 17 December 2010.
Not noted for its beauty or luxury, the building opened in Luxembourg’s station district in 1973 to house the 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities is above all functional. The Office’s Management Committee was closely 
involved in the building’s design.
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European officials fearful of the creating a ‘European ghetto’ in the centre of Brussels (1) 
Some European officials are sometimes far from happy 
about the new building they are being promised. 
‘Brussels, capital of Europe, capital of ugliness’ read 
leaflets posted in the corridors of the Charlemagne 
building, which houses the General Secretariat of the 
Council of Ministers. Since last November, the Staff 
Committee, a kind of trade union delegation 
representing all Council officials, has been fighting to 
prevent the construction work from giving rise to a 
series of office blocks separating European officials 
from the people of Brussels and transforming the 
workplace environment into a ‘bunker’ removed from 
the life of the city. But also because they [the members 
of the Staff Committee] have had enough of being 
criticised by local residents who feel that the 
transformation of the city centre into a desert of office 
blocks is the fault of the ‘Eurocrats’. The officials in 
question are unhappy about the fact that the existing 
buildings, and in particular the colossus that is the 
Berlaymont, have turned the area into a sort of 
European administrative district. But this urban 
destruction would, they feel, be made much worse by 
the new building.
In the 1980s, protests began to be heard against the European Communities’ ‘administrative bulimia’. 
The movement involved not only natives of Brussels, but also European officials who were conscious that the Schuman area 
was becoming a ghetto.
(1) Vaes, B., Le Soir, 18 April 1980.
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The inextricable history of the 
‘precarious’ and ‘provisional’ working 
places
Following the adoption of a kind of modus viv-
endi at the end of the tough negotiations on the 
Treaty on the Merger of the European Executives 
(8 April 1965), the battle for the seat of the insti-
tutions between Brussels, Luxembourg and Stras-
bourg became less intense as long as the three cit-
ies seemed willing to make do with sharing them 
amongst themselves (3). This truce was, of course, 
not the same as a genuine peace given that they 
each sought to nibble away at the respective share 
allocated to the others with the unspoken aim 
of creating faits accomplis which might, once the 
dispute was finally settled, act in their favour. For 
example, the Luxembourgish government resolved 
in the mid-1970s to build a plenary chamber in 
Kirchberg capable of hosting the larger number 
of members of the Common Assembly that would 
result from the first direct elections scheduled for 
1979. Would this not be an ideal opportunity to 
consolidate the country’s position as a place where 
certain short and/or extraordinary sessions could 
be held? The habit which the parliamentarians had 
adopted for several years of holding some of their 
sessions in Luxembourg had suited Gaston Thorn, 
the then prime minister, well. He was therefore no 
longer ready to give up something that had appar-
ently been heaven-sent thanks to a fortunate com-
bination of circumstances, particularly since the 
presence of European deputies also served as an 
argument to prevent the transfer of certain Com-
mission officials to Brussels. In Belgium, the office 
of Leo Tindemans opted for similar tactics. He 
proposed the construction of a huge auditorium 
intended to make it more likely that MEPs would 
settle in Brussels by seducing them with benefits 
(3) See Dumoulin, M. and Lethé, M., ‘The question of location’, in Dumoulin, 
M. (ed.), The European Commission, 1958–72 — History and Memories, Of-
fice for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 
2007, pp. 273–286.
It was not only factors inherent to the process of in-
tegration which put a damper on those singing the 
praises of extreme centralisation in the name of effi-
ciency. From the 1980s, influenced by environmen-
tal concerns aroused by the ‘alternative’ movements, 
a vociferous opposition to the European Commu-
nities’ ‘administrative bulimia’ emerged in the Bel-
gian capital. The planned demolition of two thirds 
of the buildings on a parcel of land bordered by 
Rue Froissart/Froissartstraat and Rue de Comines/
Komenstraat in order to build a new headquarters 
for the General Secretariat of the Council set the cat 
among the pigeons. Angry at having been deceived 
by false promises concerning the preservation of 
their old houses, the inhabitants of the district were 
quick to rise up. They were soon joined by a crowd 
of Brussels residents supported — remarkable 
though it may sound — by Solidarité européenne, 
a non-profit association set up by the Union Syndi-
cale trade union, which represented the staff of the 
Communities. The ranks of those Community offi-
cials who were concerned about the damage caused 
by the ‘anti-urban policy of the EEC’ were growing 
by the day. After all, were Community employees 
not themselves victims, in the same way as the local 
population, of the creation around the Berlaymont 
of a vast ‘mono-functional’ zone which ‘excluded 
residents, businesses and services’ and in which one 
had the impression of being trapped in a ghetto (1)?
However, the main obstacle to the development of 
a long-term buildings strategy in the Schuman area 
was to be found elsewhere. It was linked to the ab-
sence of any official decision concerning the location 
of the European institutions. As long as complete 
uncertainty prevailed as to the single ‘seat’ referred 
to in the treaties, the Commission was unable to de-
fine a long-term buildings plan (2).
(1) HAEC, BAC 55/1995/9, Le Soir, 13 November 1984. See also the inter-
view with Ivo Dubois and Guy Van Haeverbeke, 7 November 2011.
(2) HAEC, BAC 84/1986/94, ‘Report from the Commission to the Council on 
the location of Community departments in Brussels and Luxembourg: Situa-
tion at the end of the third quarter of 1976’, COM(76) final, 6 January 1977.
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such as being able to hold their plenary sessions in 
the same location as their political groups and par-
liamentary committees. All these intrigues inevi-
tably provoked vehement protests from the French 
government and a Strasbourg lobby determined to 
defend the acquired rights of the Alsatian capital 
tooth and nail.
The dormant conflict between the three cities 
was ultimately accompanied by a trial of strength 
between a Council of Ministers that was strong-
ly attached to its prerogatives as to the choice of 
seat and a European Parliament emboldened by 
being elected by universal suffrage and a strong-
er awareness of its mission. The fervour of MEPs 
to demonstrate their independence vis-à-vis the 
Member States was reflected in the adoption in 
March 1981 and February 1983 of two resolutions 
to cease meeting in Luxembourg and to withdraw 
most of the 2  600 officials working there in the 
Parliament’s Secretariat-General. As a result, the 
dispute was taken over by the lawyers. The ac-
tion for annulment initiated by the grand duchy 
against these two resolutions, which it considered 
to be incompatible with the MEPs’ mandate, did 
not, however, bring any of the clarification hoped 
for by many interested parties. While the Court 
of Justice of the European Communities acknow-
ledged that the democratic representatives of the 
citizens were entitled to determine their agenda 
as they wished, the judges nevertheless expressed 
‘reasonable doubts’ as to the precise extent of the 
European Parliament’s powers of internal organ-
isation, which was limited in legal terms by the 
prohibition to which it was subject on fully or 
partially transferring its Secretariat-General in law 
The expansion of the Community’s offices in Brussels was a good deal for the Belgian capital: at the end of the 1980s, 
internal Commission memos estimated the benefit gained from the presence of European officials at about USD 1.1 billion.
60 The European Commission 1973–86 — History and Memories of an Institution
or in fact (1). Consequently, apart from being able 
to open ‘antennae’ in Strasbourg and Brussels, the 
bulk of Parliament’s administrative and technical 
staff had to stay in Luxembourg, even though there 
would in future not be any further sessions there. 
The judges had wisely played the ball back into the 
politicians’ court. It was now up to them to find a 
way out of a situation that had largely gone awry.
The Luxembourgish prime minister was, inciden-
tally, the first to realise that only a political solution 
would be able to lead Europe out of the impasse 
which poisoned relations between the various part-
ners more each day. During the famous Stuttgart 
Summit in June 1983, i.e. before the final Court ver-
dict was handed down, Pierre Werner announced 
that he would shortly submit ‘a lasting solution to 
the question of location’. Although driven by an 
honest desire to put an end to a ‘regrettable quarrel’ 
once and for all, his plan failed (2). It was probably 
a question of bad timing. In reality, the relaunch of 
Europe was taking up too much of the attention of 
the heads of state or government for them to want 
to become embroiled in a bidding war which, as 
they all knew only too well, would require delicate 
handling.
For the Executive and other Community bodies, 
this meant continuing to wait until a more auspi-
cious negotiating climate emerged, which would 
not in fact happen before the late 1980s/early 
1990s, i.e. after the period covered by this work. It 
does not therefore concern us, except to point out 
that the Commission would quite radically change 
its approach in the meantime, a shift which came 
(1) HAEC, BAC 408/1991/42, Information note from the Legal Service of the 
Commission, 1984; HAEC, SI(84) 54 of 24 January 1984 containing the 
annex to the memorandum presented by the Luxembourg government to 
the Athens European Council, 4 December 1983.
(2) HAEC, BAC 408/1991/42, ‘Mémorandum sur l’adaptation des structures 
institutionnelles présenté par le gouvernement du Grand-Duché au Conseil 
européen d’Athènes’, 4 December 1983.
about shortly after the interlude before the Court of 
Justice. Before the judgments were handed down in 
1983 and 1984 respectively, the Community Execu-
tive had always taken care to stay out of the dispute, 
even at the risk of being reprimanded by the presi-
dent of Parliament for its silence (3). Was this be-
cause the Commission genuinely believed that the 
choice of location did not fall within its mandate? 
Or should the reason for its passivity be sought more 
in a fear that a resolution of the issue might come at 
its expense, i.e. that it might have to cough up and 
offset the departure of certain European Parliament 
departments in one direction or another by sending 
some of its services to Luxembourg if the latter were 
ever to be compensated for the wrongs resulting 
from MEPs’ hotheaded choices (4)? Who can tell?
It is certain, however, that from the end of the 1980s/
start of the 1990s, the debate on the establishment 
of agencies such as the Office for Harmonization in 
the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) and 
the European Environment Agency (5) went hand 
in hand with a shift towards a more dynamic pol-
icy. Without going as far as to claim that the Com-
mission would surreptitiously and unlawfully try to 
secure a transfer of powers, it seems undeniable that 
those around Jacques Delors at least wanted to have 
their say. Moreover, since at the same time Delors 
clearly opted in favour of a polycentric Union based 
on the existence of three working places, it must be 
assumed that he was not entirely disinterested in re-
solving the question of location 40 years after it had 
come into being (6). But that is another story.
Charles Barthel
(3) HAEC, BAC 408/1991/42, Note from M. A. Feffer to President Gaston 
Thorn, 8 May 1984. 
(4) HAEC, BAC 148/1991/58, Note from J.-J. Schwed to H. Étienne, 29 Sep-
tember 1981.
(5) See Chapter 21, ‘Environmental and consumer protection’.
(6) Centre d’études et de recherches européennes Robert Schuman (CERE), 
‘La question du siège’, Note from the Luxembourgish delegation, February 
1988.
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1.3. Consolidating the 
European civil service
The years 1973–86 saw the consolidation of a 
European civil service model which had achieved 
stability in terms of recruitment method and prac-
tices, but which was also growing and changing 
in response to the development of Community pol-
icies.
Staff regulations, staff practice
The European civil service is governed by the staff 
regulations, of which the Commission is the guard-
ian. The staff regulations division formed part of the 
first directorate of DG IX (Personnel and Admin-
istration), which was headed by Dieter Rogalla be-
tween 1970 and 1981. Rogalla drew on this long ex-
perience when he produced his authoritative work 
on the European civil service (1). 
The decision to opt for a career-based civil service, 
in which officials were appointed under staff regu-
lations laid down by law rather than employed 
under contracts of employment, as was the case 
in some international organisations, was taken in 
1956 under the aegis of the ECSC by René Mayer, 
who headed the High Authority, and Jacques Rueff, 
the first French judge at the Court of Justice of the 
ECSC. These two men can be seen as the ‘fathers’ 
of the staff regulations; by contrast, Jean Monnet 
favoured a more flexible system of rotation with the 
national civil services which would be more busi-
ness-friendly. The staff regulations were explicitly 
based on the rules applicable to Beamten in Germa-
ny and to all civil servants in France from 1946 on-
wards. The idea was to prevent the Member States 
(1) Dienstrecht der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Carl Heymanns Verlag KG, 
Cologne … Munich, 1981.
exercising direct influence over the recruitment 
and careers of European civil servants.
The decision to pursue the European civil service 
option reflected a concern to ensure its independ-
ence, embodied in the ideal of the civil service as an 
instrument of Community policy.
However, when it was set up in January 1958, the 
EEC Commission practised contractual recruit-
ment, until the adoption in 1962 of a second set 
of staff regulations, the EEC–Euratom staff regu-
lations, by the regulation of 14 June 1962, which 
entered into force on 1 July of that year. This took 
over the ECSC career system while introducing a 
clear distinction between the arrangements applic-
able to officials and to ‘other servants’. According to 
the former director of personnel, Gianluigi Valsesia, 
the 1962 staff regulations were ‘the administra-
tive Bible of the day’ (2), but following the Merger 
Treaty a single set of staff regulations was adopted 
on 29  February 1968 which ended the remaining 
specific arrangements applicable to the ECSC. These 
merged staff regulations were subsequently amended 
on several occasions following proposals from the 
Commission — in 1972 (when the staff regulations 
ceased to apply to Euratom research employees), in 
1973 (equal treatment for female staff) and in 1976, 
1977 and 1978–79 (simplification of basic salaries). 
More wide-ranging reforms were shelved in 1982 (3).
The staff regulations provide for strict rules on re-
cruitment (only by way of competition, on a broad 
geographical basis), rights (like the right to strike) 
and responsibilities (public service obligation, loyalty 
to the institution). As in any career-based civil ser-
vice, the Commission takes action if these obligations 
are not discharged. The body that legally exercises 
this power is termed the Appointing Authority, and 
in the Commission’s case this body was DG IX. Last-
ly, the staff regulations laid down rules governing car-
(2) Interview with Gianluigi Valsesia, 10 February 2011.
(3) See Chapter 6, ‘An administrative culture in transition’.
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posts were filled immediately at all levels of the hier-
archy, and direct nomination by the Member States 
to certain ‘strategic’ posts, although these tended to 
occur less frequently. One-off appointments, like that 
of Guy Legras in 1984 to the post of director-general 
for agriculture, continued to be made even at the end 
of the period under review. Because of the special ar-
rangements for appointing A1/A2 grade officials, 
specific conditions also applied when they left the 
Commission. Under Article  50, their employment 
could be terminated in the interests of the service, 
which was not the case for A3 grade heads of division 
or any other European civil servants.  
As the years went by and the staff grew, there was 
an increase in the number of administrative com-
plaints against the Commission lodged by members 
of staff under Article 90 of the staff regulations: the 
number rose from around 10 a year at the end of the 
‘The fall of Icarus’. Article 50 of the staff regulations hangs over 
grade A1 and A2 officials like the sword of Damocles. Liable to ‘fall’ 
at any moment, it threatens ‘those who have been lucky, or unlucky, 
enough to move faster than others up the hierarchy of grades, 
if not of values’. (Illustration published in Courrier du personnel, 
No 427, 25 November 1981, p. 53.)
eer advancement/promotion based on a fixed grading 
scale comprising four grades (A, B, C and D). For 
administrative grades (A grade staff), promotion was 
possible from grade A8/A7 to grade A3.
However, posts at the top of the administrative hier-
archy (A1 (directors-general) and A2  (directors)) 
were regarded as ‘political’ and, in accordance with 
Article  29(2) of the staff regulations, were exempt 
from the competition rule, which generated consider-
able talk of officials being ‘parachuted in’ by national 
governments (1). Here, a distinction should be made 
between structural appointments, when a new Mem-
ber State joined the EU, the aim being to ensure that 
(1) See Spence, D., ‘Staff and personnel policy in the Commission’, in Edwards, 
G. and Spence, D. (eds), The European Commission, John Harper Publish-
ing, London, 1997, pp. 62–96; Michelmann, H. J., ‘Multinational staffing 
and organisational functioning in the Commission of the European Com-
munities’, International Organisation, Vol. 32, No 2, 1978, pp. 477–496.
Cartoon entitled ‘rêve hiérarchique’ (‘hierarchical dream’), published in Courrier du personnel, No 436, 8 October 1982.
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posts were filled immediately at all levels of the hier-
archy, and direct nomination by the Member States 
to certain ‘strategic’ posts, although these tended to 
occur less frequently. One-off appointments, like that 
of Guy Legras in 1984 to the post of director-general 
for agriculture, continued to be made even at the end 
of the period under review. Because of the special ar-
rangements for appointing A1/A2 grade officials, 
specific conditions also applied when they left the 
Commission. Under Article  50, their employment 
could be terminated in the interests of the service, 
which was not the case for A3 grade heads of division 
or any other European civil servants.  
As the years went by and the staff grew, there was 
an increase in the number of administrative com-
plaints against the Commission lodged by members 
of staff under Article 90 of the staff regulations: the 
number rose from around 10 a year at the end of the 
‘The fall of Icarus’. Article 50 of the staff regulations hangs over 
grade A1 and A2 officials like the sword of Damocles. Liable to ‘fall’ 
at any moment, it threatens ‘those who have been lucky, or unlucky, 
enough to move faster than others up the hierarchy of grades, 
if not of values’. (Illustration published in Courrier du personnel, 
No 427, 25 November 1981, p. 53.)
1960s to around 20 at the beginning of the 1970s 
and to 50 in 1981. The Commission responded on 
22  September 1978 by proposing to the Council 
that an administrative tribunal be set up to exam-
ine complaints before they were lodged with the 
Court. But fears that a precedent would be set for 
other sectors and concerns about the legal basis for 
this amendment meant that discussions got bogged 
down in the Council. The European Civil Service 
Tribunal would not be set up until the Treaty of 
Nice was signed in February 2001, some time after 
the establishment of a court of first instance.
Staff numbers rise
As a result of successive enlargements and the de-
velopment of Community policies, the total num-
ber of Commission officials and members of staff, 
excluding ‘other servants’ and outside staff, rose by 
70.15 % between 1973 and 1985.
Year Total staff numbers
1972 5 708
1973 (March) 5 965
1975 7 457
1977 7 846
1979 8 448
1980 8 684
1981 (May) 8 857
1982 9 433
1983 9 682
1984 (March) 9 863
1985 10 150
NB: Statistics are not available for all years.
Staff numbers grew more slowly in the Commission 
than in the other institutions. Comparable data are 
not readily available. However, over the 10-year pe-
riod (and especially over the 5 years following the 
1973 enlargement), the Commission workforce in-
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creased at a much slower rate (93 % less) than the 
General Secretariat of the Council. 
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1970 603 5 008
1975 1 475 144.61 % 7 457 48.90 %
1980 1 593 164.17 % 8 684 73.40 %
1985 1 790 196.84 % 10 150 102.67 %
The increase in staff was greatest for linguists (LA), 
followed by assistants (B) and ushers (D), although 
the latter were fewer in number than administra-
tors and secretaries, who increased at a slower rate 
than staff as a whole. The increase in translators 
and interpreters is easily explained by successive en-
largements. The increase in B grade staff perhaps re-
flected a greater burden of management (as opposed 
to advisory) tasks. Nevertheless, the total number 
of officials does not seem excessive given that the 
Commission’s remit was expanding. 
Trends in A grade staff
Year Staff Percentage increase
1972 1 625 —
1977 2 133 31.26 %
1980 2 254 38.70 %
1984 2 561 57.60 %
Trends in B grade staff
Year Staff Percentage increase
1972 1 039 —
1977 1 663 60.05 %
1980 1 872 80.17 %
1984 2 099 102.02 %
Trends in C grade staff
Year Staff Percentage increase
1972 2 183 —
1977 2 743 25.65 %
1980 3 029 28.75 %
1984 3 427 56.98 %
Trends in D grade staff
Year Staff Percentage increase
1972 297 —
1977 381 28.28 %
1980 422 42.08 %
1984 535 80.13 %
Trends in LA grade staff
Year Staff Percentage increase
1972 548 —
1977 1 032 88.32 %
1980 1 117 103.80 %
1984 1 213 121.35 %
A surprising decline in the number of job appli-
cants was recorded in this period. Director-General 
Jean-Claude Morel noted that competition results 
suggested a deterioration in the number and qual-
ity of applicants after 1977. The number of appli-
cants for the A grade general competition fell by 
almost 43  % from 1977 to 1982 (8  903 against 
5 086), something that was all the harder to under-
stand when a new Member State had joined and, 
as Morel put it, the jobs crisis should have encour-
aged more people to apply. The decline was qual-
itative  too, with applicants significantly less well 
qualified, to judge from the number of applicants 
who passed the competition. The director-general’s 
general impression was that good applicants were 
few and far between, and that it would not be easy 
65Chapter 1 — The Commission’s organisation, office locations and staff 
to continue recruiting well-qualified staff with suf-
ficient experience (1). 
Accordingly, the Commission launched a new re-
cruitment policy at its meeting of 23  November 
1983 (2). By 1984, arrangements would be in place 
to organise competitions for administrators more 
regu larly. On an experimental basis, it also planned 
to hold A8 competitions for young graduates with-
out professional experience. Competitions for ad-
ministrators had hitherto been held for grade A7 
posts, i.e. for graduates with experience, because, 
unlike most Member States at the time, the Com-
mission and the other European institutions did not 
really train their new recruits. Lastly, the Commis-
sion extended the age limit for these A grade compe-
titions from 32 to 35.
A competitions
In 1972  In 1982
Law Law
Economics Economics
Political and social sciences Administration
Agriculture Agronomy
Finance/accounting Technical
Statistics Customs
What were the causes of this recruitment crisis? Ac-
cording to Jean-Claude Morel, there were several: 
changing perceptions of Europe, which was seen as 
symbolising failure rather than hope for the future, 
the emergence of more liberal economic theories 
which called the civil service into question, the dif-
ficulties of expatriation, in particular the fact that 
officials’ spouses struggled to find work in Brussels, 
and worsening career prospects.
(1) Courrier du personnel, No 451, March 1984, pp. 28–29.
(2) HAEC, Communication  from Richard Burke, SEC(1983) 1801/1, 10 No-
vember 1983, and memorandum to the members of the Commission, 
SEC(1983) 1801/2, 21 November 1983.
The recruitment situation varied considerably be-
tween the Member States. A 1979 memo on the 
subject summed up the problem as follows: ‘a per-
manent surplus of Belgian applicants, not enough 
Dutch applicants, a large number of Italian appli-
cants of low calibre and the inability of the Irish to 
meet the language requirement, a problem which 
also affected the British, although to a lesser ex-
tent’ (3).
During the accession negotiations, the United King-
dom requested a quota of 18 % of the total number 
of Commission staff. By way of a reaction, Italy was 
awarded 20 additional A4/A5 officials. However, 
British officials accounted for only 8.37  % of the 
Commission’s total workforce in 1975 and no more 
than 9.61 % 9 years later. The percentage of A grade 
officials remained stable, declining from 15.10 % in 
1975 to 14.41 % in 1984. As the country in which 
most Commission departments were located, Bel-
gium continued to be exceptionally well represent-
ed, with its nationals accounting for 26.15 % of the 
workforce in 1975 — a figure which remained vir-
tually unchanged in 1984 (26.91 %) — and 13 % on 
average of A grade officials.
Uneven progress in gender equality 
The proportion of female members of staff remained 
stable during the period under review. In 1972, they 
numbered 2 509 (44.07 % of the total workforce of 
5  692); by 1982,  their number had risen to 4  191 
(44.45 % of the total workforce of 9 433). Although 
the overall percentage of women staff was main-
tained, no progress was made in reducing the sig-
nificant imbalances between grades in the 10 years 
under review. 
(3) HAEC, BAC 81/1984/75, GO/24, Note from the Secretariat-General of 
20 November 1979 to the members of the group charged with examining 
how the third Spierenburg report should be followed up, comprising a 
document from DG IX of 19 November 1979.
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Proportion 
of women
1972 1982
A 6.09 % 7.93 %
LA 37.40 % 45.00 %
B 40.42 % 38.74 %
C 81.63 % 81.45 %
D 1.01 % 7.80 %
More specifically, not a single higher A grade post 
was occupied by a woman. There was no female dir-
ector-general in 1972, and although two women 
were appointed to grade A1 posts later in the dec-
ade, by 1982 there was no female director and only 
three female heads of division. The lower the grade, 
the higher the percentage of women, a general rule 
which continued to apply throughout the 10 years, 
except that the percentage of women in A5 posts 
(chief administrators) doubled in the period under 
review.
Total staff broken down by Member State
BE DK DE IE EL FR IT LU NL UK Total
1975 1 795 223 1 148 136 7 1 039 1 153 368 419 575 6 863
1984 2 628 361 1 314 215 397 1 300 1 620 461 528 939 9 763
A grade staff broken down by Member State
BE DK DE IE EL FR IT LU NL UK Total
1975 265 73 371 59 5 369 351 57 126 297 1 966
1984 333 74 458 86 122 500 414 59 157 371 2 574
Directors‑general broken down by Member State
BE DK DE IE EL FR IT LU NL UK Total
1975 4 1 7 1 0 7 7 1 4 6 38
1984 5 2 8 1 1 7 8 1 4 9 46
Proportion 
of women
1972 1982
A1 0.00 % 4.34 %
A2 0.89 % 0.00 %
A3 0.00 % 0.61 %
A4 2.99 % 4.62 %
A5 5.30 % 10.00 %
A6 15.00 % 14.28 %
A7 16.25 % 14.59 %
Although gender equality was guaranteed by the 
staff regulations and the judgments of the Court of 
Justice, the Commission could hardly remain un-
affected by the dominant conventions in the Mem-
ber States at the time. Accordingly, women were most 
heavily represented in C grade posts, since most typ-
ists and secretaries were female, and in the linguistic 
departments, where they accounted for 45 % of staff. 
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The year 1975 was the UN International Women’s 
Year, which the Commission marked with a com-
munication and a proposal for a directive on equal 
treatment for women in the Community (1). Ac-
cording to Jacqueline Nonon, a DG V official who 
championed the directive: ‘We lit the fuse that 
year’ (2). With a view to practising what it preached, 
the Commission started to examine the situation of 
its own female officials. A survey which it conduct-
ed showed that 55 % of women felt that their cur-
rent job did not reflect their skills or education (3), 
suggesting that women were often overqualified, as 
exemplified by C grade women officials with univer-
sity degrees. In 1978, the Commission set up a work-
ing group on equal opportunities and treatment for 
women which found inequalities in recruitment 
and promotion. Once again, this particular issue 
tied into broader concerns about gender equality in 
the Community. At the end of 1981, the Commis-
sion adopted the 1982–85 Community action pro-
gramme on the promotion of equal opportunities 
for women. That year, it took steps to put its own 
house in order by setting up a committee on equal 
treatment for women and men, later renamed the 
Joint Committee for Equal Opportunities. Its ob-
jectives were to improve recruitment, training and 
career development for women and to provide bet-
ter social infrastructure and working time arrange-
ments. These measures eventually produced change, 
albeit at a slow pace because what was involved was 
a shift in attitudes rather than mere amendments to 
the rules. 
(1) Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation 
of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to 
employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions, 
adopted a year after Council Directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975 
on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the ap-
plication of the principle of equal pay for men and women; HAEC, ‘Com-
munication of the Commission to the Council on the equality of treatment 
between men and women workers’, COM(75) 36, 12 February 1975.
(2) Interview with Jacqueline Nonon, 25 October 2010. 
(3) Courrier du personnel, No 365 (‘Women’ special edition), December 1975, 
pp. 1–48.
Career management
These years marked the start of a problem of career 
structure in the A grades. Excessive growth in the 
number of chief administrators and irregular waves 
of recruitment eventually resulted in promotion to 
senior management positions being blocked. Be-
tween 1970 and 1974, the number of A4 posts rose 
from 330 to 518 (188 additional posts, a 57  % in-
crease), whereas over the same period the number of 
A3 posts rose by only 39, from 257 to 296 (a 15 % 
increase). This was aggravated by the fact that a pro-
portion of these coveted A3 posts were given to staff 
external to the Commission. Thwarted career pros-
pects were damaging staff morale, as was pointed 
out in the 1979 Spierenburg report, which suggested 
that outside recruitment of A3 officials be limited 
to a minimum (4). The relatively slow advancement 
on the career ladder of Commission civil servants 
becomes evident when their careers are compared 
with those of Council officials. The president of 
the Staff Committee of the Commission raised this 
issue in a memo sent to the director of personnel, 
Jeremy Baxter, in 1979: ‘The discrepancies between 
arrangements for Council officials and Commission 
officials are enormous. Normal career progress at 
the Commission starts when normal career progress 
at the Council ends’ (5). Whereas Council officials 
(4) HAEC, BAC 88/2004/112, ‘Proposals for reform of the Commission of 
the European Communities and its services’ (Spierenburg report), 24 Sep-
tember 1979, pp. 94–102.
(5) Courrier du personnel, No 405, September 1979, pp. 58–59.
The president of the Commission pays tribute to the European civil 
service by presenting Commission staff with the Robert Schuman 
medal for 20 years of ‘good and loyal service’.
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were appointed to grade A4 between the ages of 32 
and 42, on average Commission officials achieved 
that grade between the ages of 42 and 50, resulting 
in a bottleneck in the age pyramid in terms of pro-
motion and access to the highest grades. 
The question of career progress was a recurring con-
cern at the Commission during the period under 
review: active career management, mobility within 
the institution, training needs and the possibility 
of reducing the normal retirement age from 65 to 
60. In the early 1980s, mobility was introduced, at 
first tentatively, to aid career planning. As suggested 
in the Spierenburg report, a committee was created 
under the chairmanship of Secretary-General Émile 
Noël to consider internal candidates for A2 and A3 
vacancies. Moreover, the Commission pledged to 
fill 80 % of A3 posts with internal candidates (1). 
Policy developments and staff trends
From 1973 to 1986, the Commission’s workforce 
grew considerably, from nearly 6 000 in 1973 to over 
10  000 in 1986  (2). The 1970s saw the emergence 
of several new policy areas. Regional policy had its 
origins in the early 1960s, but the DG for Regional 
Policy (XVI) was not put in place until 1967; En-
vironment and Consumer Protection (XI) and 
Fisheries (XIV) became DGs in their own right in 
1981 and 1977 respectively. Other DGs and depart-
ments were added over time. At the same time, the 
DGs set up in 1958, like External Relations (I) and 
Agriculture (VI), continued to play a major role in 
the Community, developing and extending their 
policy areas. The new kids on the block and the 
well-established DGs competed for staff reserves. 
This section looks at which areas stagnated or even 
(1) Courrier du personnel, No 424, June 1981, p. 35.
(2) Permanent posts. Rectifying Budget No 3 of the European Communities 
for the financial year 1973 (OJ L 366, 31.12.1973, p. 21); Final adoption 
of the general budget of the European Communities for the financial year 
1986 (OJ L 358, 31.12.1985, p. 84).
lost personnel and which gained vital human re-
sources in the period under review. 
Looking at individual DGs, among the growth 
champions were DG I, DG VI and the DG for De-
velopment (VIII). External relations was clearly an 
expanding policy area in the period. The DG shoul-
dered several important tasks such as the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and en-
largement negotiations; moreover, the expansion of 
the network of representatives of the Community 
in third countries, the trade agreement with 
China and negotiations with east European coun-
tries were among the priority areas of the Commis-
sion in the early 1980s (3). Accordingly, DG I grew 
by 178 posts between 1973 and 1986 to a staff of 
417.  DG VIII was another expanding policy area 
which accumulated new responsibilities in the 
period. As a result of the Lomé Convention alone, 
the DG grew by 42 members of staff in 1976  (4). 
Over the period DG  VIII grew from 313 to 444 
members of staff. As a fully developed Community 
policy, agriculture had always absorbed a large work-
force in the Commission and the DG accumulated 
further responsibilities over the period, for example 
in 1979 veterinary control and the management of 
the co-responsibility levy. The period 1973–86 saw 
the DG’s staff rise from 591 to 733. 
As a new policy area, DG XVI also did rather well, 
growing from 80 to 153 staff. The establishment 
of the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF) in 1975, as well as two enlargements that 
brought countries with structurally weak regions 
into the Community, provided credible reasons for 
expanding this DG for Regional Policy. By con-
trast, DG XIV struggled at first to expand much 
beyond the initial staff it was allocated from DG I 
and DG VI on its foundation. A Council decision 
(3) See, for example, HAEC, BAC 163/1999/33, IX/1042/80, EC Commis-
sion, ‘État Justificatif motivant les emplois demandés dans l’avant-projet de 
budget 1981, Part II, “Élargissement”’,  July 1980.
(4) HAEC, BAC 163/1999/32, Extract from a Council document, R/2381/75 
(FIN 639) of 2 October 1975, on the Commission’s request for staff. 
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firming up policy in the area of fishing was pending 
for a long time, which held staff development back. 
The DG received additional posts once the develop-
ment of the policy accelerated in the early 1980s, for 
example with the implementation of an inspection 
system (1). Its staff grew from 51 in 1979 to 104 in 
1986. 
Staff development stagnated in a number of DGs 
during the period. One example is the DG for 
Transport (VII); as Chapter 19 in this volume 
shows, the policy, a ‘bastion of nationalisms’, made 
hardly any progress before the mid-1980s (2). With 
128 officials in 1973 and 136 in 1986, the lack of 
progress in this policy area was reflected in stagnat-
ing staff numbers. A DG with a surprisingly nega-
tive staff balance was Economic and Financial Af-
fairs (DG II), with 237 in 1973 against 210 in 1986, 
peaking at 249 in 1983. Most likely this loss of staff 
in 1986 was due to a temporary rise in vacant posts. 
However, while the policy field developed consider-
ably during the 1970s, culminating in the European 
Monetary System (EMS) in 1979, DG II arguably 
remained a small and rather elite service of high- 
(1) HAEC, COM(82), Minutes No 661, meeting of 22 September 1982, p. 29.
(2) See Chapter 19, ‘Transport policy in transition’. 
level policy analysis and theoretical work rather than 
one performing staff-intensive routine management 
tasks  (3). The DG for Competition (DG IV) grew 
slowly, from 248 staff in 1973 to 268 in 1986. In 
principle, competition was an ambitious policy 
area in which the Commission was potentially very 
powerful, but it remained a secondary field of action 
until the 1980s (4). The slight increase in personnel 
the DG experienced in the early to mid-1980s large-
ly coincided with the policy field experiencing a new 
dynamism and DG IV playing a more assertive role 
in liberalising a number of economic sectors. 
In a period characterised by budgetary constraints, 
the Commission found itself in the difficult posi-
tion of having to strike a balance between the need 
to build up and staff new services and the need to 
maintain and further develop its long-established 
DGs. DGs could hope to expand their depart-
ments only if this was justified by concrete policy 
developments. 
Michel Mangenot 
and Katja Seidel
(3) See Chapter 15, ‘Economic and monetary affairs: new challenges and ambi-
tions’. 
(4) See Chapter 14, ‘Competition at the service of the market’.
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François-Xavier Ortoli: a vision 
marked by permanence 
and change 
François-Xavier Ortoli (1925–2007) has never 
been thought of as one of the ‘fathers’ of Europe, 
and yet he was one of the main players in the 
putting into practice of the European idea. His 
involvement stretched over many years: he was 
director-general for the internal market from 1958 
to 1961, president of the Commission from 1973 
to 1976, vice-president for two terms from 1977 
to 1984 and subsequently, through various bodies 
representing industry, a determined supporter of 
the establishment of the single market — Objec-
tive 1992 — and of economic and monetary union 
(EMU).
Upon graduating from the École nationale d’ad-
ministration (ENA), France’s national college of 
administration, which he entered in 1947, Ortoli 
joined the civil service in the inspecteur  des  finan­
ces (financial officer) grade, bringing with him the 
spirit of the Resistance and the reforming ethos of 
the immediate post-war years. He began his career 
in the Finance Ministry’s Directorate for External 
Economic Relations (DREE), a department with an 
inbuilt insistence that France had to find its place 
on the international stage. He was not a militant 
supporter of the European cause but that he was 
indeed a supporter was never in any doubt: his sup-
port was the outcome of internationalism coupled 
with a hope for reconciliation between peoples. 
Hence his interest in the European project driven 
by Robert Schuman and Schuman’s chief-of-staff, 
Bernard Clappier. In 1957, Ortoli became head of 
the external trade policy department at France’s 
Ministry of Finance, and found himself tracking 
the beginnings of the implementation of the Treaty 
of Rome. When Robert Lemaignen was appointed 
commissioner in Brussels, Ortoli agreed to go with 
him to head his private office. A meeting with Rob-
ert Marjolin, vice-president of the Commission, a 
few weeks later, decided the shape of his career. He 
was appointed director-general for the internal mar-
ket, becoming the youngest, and one of the most 
influential, directors-general at the Commission, 
where he stayed until 1961.
3
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This Brussels experience explains the course his car-
eer took thereafter. Placed in charge of the SGCI, 
the  body coordinating France’s European policy, 
he was soon combining that position with the role 
of chief-of-staff to Georges Pompidou, the prime 
minister. When Pompidou became president, Or-
toli served as France’s minister for research and in-
dustrial development from 1969 to 1972. He built 
his major projects — aerospace, nuclear energy, in-
formation technology and telecommunications  — 
around the integration of his country into Europe. 
His return to Brussels in 1973 as the first French 
president of the Commission was the culmination 
of a stage in his career that made him the leading 
French expert on European affairs. As it had been 
for other French commissioners before him, the re-
action among his colleagues was initially doubtful. 
He did share Pompidou’s view, after all, that in the 
European institutional structure the Commission 
Sicco Mansholt (on the right) hands over to François-Xavier Ortoli (on the left), 6 January 1973.
Since the 1960s, Commission presidents have developed 
a strategy of communication and relations with the press. 
President Ortoli at a press conference on 28 May 1975.
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should act essentially as a driving force, with the pol-
itical decisions being taken by the Member States. 
But very quickly, as a member of his private office re-
calls, opinions changed: ‘Who’s this French Gaullist 
they’re sending us? It’s Pompidou, heir to de Gaulle, 
he’ll go on talking about a homogenised soulless 
Europe’, and then, after Ortoli’s first speeches in 
January, February and March 1973, Agence Europe 
wrote: ‘This time there’s no doubt a shift has taken 
place; we’re dealing with a genuine European’ (1).
In Paris, in October 1972, EEC Member States had 
set themselves the ambitious objective of transform-
ing the relations between them into a European 
Union. Ortoli supported the project enthusiastical-
ly, because he was strongly aware of the close inter-
(1) Interview with Denis Gautier-Sauvagnac, 10 September 2010. 
play between the Community sphere proper and the 
sphere of cooperation between states. The economic 
situation at the beginning of the 1970s — the eco-
nomic crisis and the energy shock — only strength-
ened these links. The policy areas in which the 
Commission was working, both old and new, were 
taking on a more and more political dimension: 
monetary questions, trade relations, cooperation, 
Mediterranean policy and energy policy. President 
Ortoli’s first speech to the European Parliament, 
in February  1973, ‘Defining European identity’, 
demonstrates a sharp awareness of this reality.
Ortoli stamped his authority on the College of 
Commissioners through his grasp of most of the 
matters it was dealing with. But he also provided an 
impetus within the Commission in the form of a 
strong adherence to the collegiality principle, which 
lent greater weight to the decisions taken. The gen-
The European Parliament has the power to scrutinise the activities of the European Commission and can remove it by 
a motion of censure. Like his predecessors, President Ortoli explains the content of his policy to the Parliament 
at its session in Strasbourg in May 1975.
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The creation of the European Council was regarded as a relative weakening of the Commission’s political importance; 
the Commission was initially excluded from the discussions on European political cooperation. President Ortoli attempted to remedy this 
situation. Here he is arriving at the European Council in Luxembourg in April 1976.
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eral context was scarcely favourable, however, given 
the trend towards a renationalisation of policy in 
the Member States as a result of the economic cri-
sis of the 1970s; the position of the Commission in 
the institutional structure was also weakened by the 
creation of the European Council in 1975. On these 
subjects Ortoli asserted himself less, convinced as 
he was that nothing was to be achieved by attempt-
ing to force the hand of the Member  States. This 
sometimes brought him into conflict with men like 
Spinelli, whose federalist principles and character 
were far removed from his own. Nevertheless, dur-
ing his term in office he managed to preserve what 
was essential, while gradually coming round to the 
view that the powers of the European institutions 
had to be broadened: ‘People expect the Commis-
sion to have ideas, to convey momentum, to stim-
ulate European creativity, but that is not possible 
without a strong European structure. You cannot 
conduct policy through permanent negotiation. To 
try to resolve everything through a form of cooper-
ation that rejects any sort of pooling of interests, 
and insists on unanimity, is to take the superstruc-
ture for the structure, to deny the means, to deny 
the narrative, to refuse any permanence, it is clear-
ing the way for a Europe of empty resolutions’ (1). 
(1) Quoted by Noël Bonhomme in Badel, L. and Bussière, É., François­Xavier 
Ortoli: l’Europe, quel numéro de téléphone? Descartes & Cie, Paris, 2010, 
p. 140.
François-Xavier Ortoli during the swearing-in ceremony of the Commission under his Presidency 
and of the new judges of the European Court of Justice under the Presidency of Robert Lecourt, Luxembourg, 6 January 1973. 
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These years were also the point of departure for a 
long-term European endeavour that goes some way 
towards explaining Ortoli’s decision to remain in 
Brussels, with the agreement of the then French 
president, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, in 1976. He 
was vice-president of the Commission with re-
sponsibility for economic and financial affairs until 
1984, in the Commissions led by Roy Jenkins and 
Gaston Thorn. Far from making his position dif-
ficult, the fact that he was a former president gave 
him a measure of influence over his colleagues, an 
influence shared by some of the other commission-
ers such as Étienne Davignon, and though relations 
with Roy Jenkins in the first year of his Commis-
sion were not easy, very soon a balance was struck. 
In these years his conviction grew that further 
responsibilities had to be transferred to the Com-
munities, most notably in the economic sphere. He 
strengthened the expertise available to the Com-
mission, and used his personal influence with the 
Member  States, and notably with France in 1983, 
to promote greater convergence between national 
policies. This approach was guided by a reading of 
current events that led his thinking very early on to 
centre on globalisation, which, he felt, had to be or-
ganised around three poles: the United States, Asia 
and a Europe that needed, imperatively, to assert its 
interests at the international level.
One of his co-workers sums up his tenure at the 
interface between pragmatism, long-term think-
ing and action that was sometimes discreet but 
always went to the heart of things: ‘Ortoli, he was 
a visionary … there was all this technical ground-
work done during the Thorn  Commission that 
wasn’t talked about, but there was a lot of laying 
of foundations done at that time, by people like 
Ortoli, Davignon or the German commissioner 
Narjes, men like that, who did a lot of spadework, 
and when Jacques Delors took over Ortoli certain-
ly convinced him that the time had come to take 
the initiative, and in the situation that presented 
itself, for economic and political reasons, he had 
the very article there ready, he had only to pull out 
the Single European Act, all the preparatory stuff 
had been done’ (1).
When François-Xavier Ortoli became chairman of 
the oil conglomerate Total in 1984, he was follow-
ing a well-trodden path for former high-ranking 
French civil servants. In those years, and then in 
1989 when he became chairman of the French em-
ployers’ association CNPF International, he turned 
his mind to the processes of regional integration 
and played an essential part in setting up the Asia–
Europe Meeting (ASEM). And yet he viewed these 
huge projects in terms of their interaction with 
matters Euro pean, which is why he took part in the 
foundation of the European Round Table of Indus-
trialists (ERT), and then in 1987 in the foundation 
of the Associ ation for the Monetary Union of Eur-
ope (AMUE), organisations that backed the drive 
to relaunch European economic and monetary in-
tegration in the second half of the 1980s.
Éric Bussière
(1) Interview with Yves-Thibault de Silguy, 20 July 2010.
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The Commission as a body 
2.1. The commissioners
There were four Commissions between 1973 and 
1986, with a total of 45 members. With successive 
enlargements, the number of commissioners — two 
each for the big countries, one each for the small 
ones — rose from 13 in 1973 to 14 by 1981, and 
then to 17 by 1986. 
The commissioners, whose offices were located in 
the Berlaymont building, held Wednesday’s weekly 
meeting on the 13th floor (1). Others also attended 
these meetings: the secretary-general, Émile  Noël, 
seated to the left of the president, the deputy secre-
taries-general, whose duties were taken over by a 
single official in 1977, the director-general of the 
Legal Service, the president’s head of cabinet, the 
spokesman, the director-general for information, 
the interpreters and the head of the registry. It 
(1) See also Bitsch, M.-T. and Conrad, Y., ‘The College of Commissioners: a 
new type of public authority’, in Dumoulin, M. (ed.), The European Com­
mission, 1958–72 — History and Memories, Office for Official Publications 
of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2007, pp. 181–204.
was the latter’s task to draw up the minutes, which 
would then be reviewed by Noël and distributed on 
Thursday. Finally, civil servants could be invited to 
take part on an ad hoc basis, depending on which 
topics were on the agenda. Noël noted that the for-
mality which had prevailed in the past disappeared 
while François-Xavier Ortoli’s Commission was 
in office. ‘Members called each other by their first 
names even in session. Discussion was thus more 
dir ect, with more cut and thrust,’ he wrote, also not-
ing a tendency to limit the number of civil servants 
invited to the meetings, to ensure that discussions 
were as free as possible (2).  
The College of Commissioners was an all-male 
body with an average age of about 50. This meant 
that there were often significant age gaps between 
the younger and the older members. The most strik-
ing example of this was in the Delors Commission; 
the Spaniard Manuel Marín was 36 when he took 
office, whilst Arthur Cockfield, from the United 
Kingdom, was 68.
(2) Simonet, H., Je n’efface rien et je recommence, ‘Politiques’ series, Didier 
Hatier, Brussels, 1986, p. 96.
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Legal background and experience 
of national politics
Nearly half of the commissioners had legal training, 
while some also held other degrees, particularly in 
economics or humanities. Very few had an educa-
tional background diverging from the norm. The 
British commissioner, Christopher Soames, had 
trained at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst. 
The Irish commissioner, Patrick Hillery, was  a 
doctor by profession. Finally, a number of com-
missioners stood out as regards the way in which 
they had acquired their training. The German 
commissioner, Karl-Heinz Narjes, had studied the 
subjects in which he was later to qualify in post-
war Germany while a prisoner of war in Canada, 
then the United Kingdom. His compatriot Alois 
Pfeiffer had studied social economy and labour law 
at night school. The Danish commissioner, Poul 
Dalsager, had trained on the job in the banking 
sector. Jacques Delors, who had qualified in bank-
ing at the Centre d’études supérieurs de la banque 
while working at the same time, was ‘like [Jean] 
Monnet, an outsider’ (1). Unlike Jean-François De-
niau, François-Xavier Ortoli and Claude Cheysson, 
he had not attended the ENA (École nationale 
d’administration) and ‘had a career that was atyp-
ical for a Frenchman’ (2). In his case, this was due 
mainly to the war — a war that had marked the 
lives and memories of many commissioners — 
and its aftermath. Their experiences varied widely. 
Some had fought in their country’s armed forces 
(Roy Jenkins, Christopher Soames, George Thom-
son and Claude Cheysson) or in the Resistance 
(Antonio Giolitti, Lorenzo Natali, François-Xavier 
Ortoli and Edgard Pisani). Others, like Wilhelm 
Haferkamp, ‘a confirmed anti-Nazi’ (3), and Albert 
Borschette, who had been conscripted and forced 
to serve with the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front, 
(1) Narjes, K.-H., Europäische Integration aus historischer Erfahrung. Ein 
Zeitzeugengespräch mit Michael Gehler, Centre for European Integration 
Studies, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, Bonn, 2004, p. 72.
(2) Ibid., p. 60. 
(3) Interview with Franz Froschmaier, 4 October 2010.
fought against their will. Some had been injured 
(Natali). Others had been prisoners in the Allied 
camps (Narjes and Pfeiffer) or had been arrested 
by the Nazi police, like Gaston Thorn, a young 
teenager at the time, or the Dutch commissioner, 
Henk Vredeling, who nursed strong anti-German 
feelings after his captivity in Buchenwald. As for 
Altiero Spinelli, sentenced to banishment by a fas-
cist court well before the war, it was in Ventotene 
prison camp, together with Ernesto Rossi, that he 
wrote the ‘Manifesto’ which was later to inspire 
European federalists. 
Taking into account compulsory labour service 
which some, such as Delors, had managed to es-
cape, but others, Pierre Lardinois among them, had 
been unable to avoid, over a third of the commis-
sioners had experienced war. In other words, that 
particular generation of commissioners brought 
together men who tended to share a common view, 
‘not necessarily intellectually but emotionally … 
that the Community was there in a way to prevent 
the worst things happening again in terms of Euro-
pean conflict’  (4). Over the years, however, gener-
ational change gradually eroded the role of memory 
as a wellspring of action. The Delors Commission 
stands out as the first one to include members who 
were not only born after 1945 (Manuel Marín and 
Peter Sutherland) but also came from countries 
which had remained neutral during the Second 
World War.
As regards political experience, many Commission 
members (33 in all) had been members of their na-
tional parliament (29), a regional parliament (one) 
or the European Parliament (three) after the 1979 
elections, before taking up their duties as com-
missioners. Twenty-seven had been members of 
a national government on one or more occasions. 
Another had served in the government of a Ger-
man Land. Claude Cheysson was a Commission 
(4) Interview with Hayden Phillips, 2 February 2011.
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member before becoming a government minis-
ter,  and subsequently returned to the Commis-
sion. Finally, three commissioners (Jean-François 
Deniau, Karl-Heinz Narjes and François-Xavier 
Ortoli) had served in the European civil service 
for varying periods of time before becoming com-
missioners. 
Six diplomats and two civil servants accounted for 
most of those who had not served as a member of 
parliament or a government minister. Whilst two 
German commissioners had a background in trade 
unionism, Alois Pfeiffer was the only one who 
lacked any other experience, in contrast to Wilhelm 
Haferkamp.
A certain level of turnover
Successive Commissions, most of which bore the 
stamp of their members’ legal backgrounds and 
experience of national politics, brought together 
over a 4-year period men from often strikingly dif-
ferent national cultures, despite what they had in 
common as regards their training and their ex-
perience of war and politics. The 4-year term of of-
fice, renewed once or more in some cases, was not 
necessarily completed by all members. The Ortoli 
Commission, for example, lost Albert Borschette, 
who died in office, Jean-François Deniau, who was 
appointed to a ministerial post, Ralf Dahrendorf, 
who was offered the post of director of the London 
School of Economics, Patrick Hillery, who became 
president of the Republic of Ireland, and Altiero 
Spinelli, who stood as an independent candidate 
on the Partito Comunista Italiano list in the 1976 
general elections (1). The Thorn Commission also 
lost several of its members. Finn Olav Gundelach, 
an old hand in politics, died just 8 days into his 
term of office. Claude Cheysson and Michael 
O’Kennedy became ministers in May 1981 and 
(1) Chevallard, G., L’Italia vista dall’Europa: testimonianza da Bruxelles, 
Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli, 2008, p. 179.
Text of the solemn declaration made and signed by the 
members of each new Commission in front of the European 
Court of Justice. The swearing of the oath was the subject 
of a written question (No 2086/80) to the Commission on 
5 March 1981 by five MEPs (Schmid, van Minnen, von der Vring, 
Wieczorek-Zeul and Walter): ‘On the basis of what provisions 
do the members of the Commission take their oath of office 
(the solemn undertaking required under Article 10 of the treaty 
establishing a single Council and a single Commission) before 
the Court of Justice and not before the European Parliament 
although political supervision of the Commission is one of 
Parliament’s duties and Parliament has the right 
to dismiss the Commission?’ President Thorn replied for the 
Commission on 22 April 1981: ‘There are indeed no treaty 
provisions which dictate that the solemn undertaking required by 
Article 10 of the Merger Treaty be administered by the Court of 
Justice. The main justification for the present practice is that this 
solemn undertaking is an individual act by each commissioner 
concerning binding legal obligations, the violation of which 
can only be adjudicated by the Court pursuant to Article 10 of 
the Merger Treaty. In contrast, the commissioners’ responsibilities 
vis-à-vis the Parliament are political and collective in nature.’ 
(OJ C 129, 29.5.1981, p. 1.)
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March 1982 respectively. Finally, François-Xavier 
Ortoli and Edgard Pisani left office at the very end 
of their mandates.
There was quite a high level of turnover in the 
Ortoli and Thorn Commissions, raising questions 
as to the degree of importance which some com-
missioners attached to their role, and their percep-
tions of it.
A leap into the unknown 
The president was always selected on the basis of a 
consensus negotiated between the Member States. 
Talks would start several months before the inaug-
uration of the new Commission. When recruiting 
the people he wanted to work with him in Brus-
sels, including civil servants, the future president 
consulted the Member State governments, it being 
their prerogative to appoint Commission members 
by common accord, in accordance with the treaties 
(Article 158 of the EEC Treaty and Article 11 of 
the Merger Treaty). Since the big countries had 
two Commission posts, one of them was allotted 
to a member of the party in government, the other 
being assigned to someone from the opposition. 
The fact that Delors’ Commission included both 
Cheysson and Delors himself broke this unwritten 
rule. 
During the preparatory stage, close contact was 
maintained with the secretary-general, Émile Noël, 
to familiarise the future commissioners with the 
intricacies of their institution’s administration and 
with its civil servants. The services prepared files 
that were not overly dense, covering the establish-
ment plan, the departments, how the Commission 
worked, how to draw up the relevant documents, 
relations between a cabinet and the corresponding 
directorate-general, and so on. However, Noël was 
not the only person to be consulted. Future Com-
mission presidents and members sought the advice 
of elder statesmen, Max Kohnstamm (1) being the 
one whose name comes up most often. 
Once the composition of the Commission had been 
decided, it was time to divide up duties among its 
members. As may readily be imagined, responsibili-
ties were carved up in such a way that far less atten-
tion was paid to the wishes of those most directly 
affected — including the president — than to cer-
tain governments’ desire to have ‘their’ commission-
ers wielding authority over a particular policy 
area  (2). DG VIII is a textbook example of this, 
being essentially a French fiefdom. In certain cases a 
portfolio might be allotted after a government had 
vetoed the nomination of a commissioner by an-
other Member State. Thus the Dutchman Henk 
Vredeling, one of the two commissioners not select-
ed personally by Roy Jenkins (3), was also blocked 
by the Germans, who were averse to having him in 
charge of agriculture — despite his credentials as a 
trained agronomist and an acknowledged expert in 
the field (4). A different situation arose in the case of 
a commissioner whose government had consider-
able hopes for him, but who confounded expecta-
tions by taking too independent a stance. Cockfield 
was a striking example. Having rapidly ‘gone native’, 
he wrong-footed 10 Downing Street, so that Marga-
ret Thatcher soon found herself at odds with her old 
friend (5). Ivor Richard, a British member of Gaston 
Thorn’s Commission from the ranks of the Labour 
(1) A diplomat and historian, Max Kohnstamm was a former secretary of the 
ECSC High Authority and a former colleague of Jean Monnet. He occu-
pied the posts of secretary-general and vice-president of the Comité d’ac-
tion pour les États-Unis d’Europe (Action Committee for the United States 
of Europe) until 1975. He was the first president of the European University 
Institute in Florence, from 1976 to 1981.
(2) Interview with Christopher Tugendhat, 17 August 2010.  
(3) Jenkins, R., European Diary, 1977–81, Collins, London, 1989, p. 10.  
(4) Braak, B. (van den), ‘Een Nederlandse machtspoliticus machteloos in Brus-
sel: Henk Vredeling, lid van de Europese Commissie (1977–88)’, in Baalen, 
C. (van), Braak, B. (van den) and Voerman, G. (eds), De Nederlandse Euro­
commissarissen, Boom, Amsterdam, 2010, p. 189. 
(5) Thatcher, M., The Downing Street Years, Harper Collins (paperback), 
1995, p.  468; HAEU, ‘European Oral History’, Arthur Cockfield, 
‘Voices on Europe’, 24 August 1998, by Andrew Crozier; Cockfield, F. A., 
The European Union: Creating the Single Market, Wiley Chancery Law, 
London, 1994.
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opposition, was informed by a telephone call from 
the foreign secretary, Geoffrey Howe, that his 
mandate would not be renewed and that his succes-
sor’s name would be announced within the next 
10 minutes (1)!
The responsibilities to be assigned are said to have 
been carved up at a session known as ‘the night of 
the long knives’, although the sense of drama con-
jured up by this allusion to one of the bloodier events 
of contemporary history is no doubt something of 
an exaggeration. After Ortoli, whose approach was 
(1) Interview with Ivor Richard, 21 October 2010.  
The commissioners’ confession or act of penitence. Montage created in 1974 based on the cover page of the Courrier du personnel 
and the text of the ‘commissioners’ Confiteor’, 1974.
more conventional  (2), Jenkins (at Ditchley Park, 
Oxfordshire), Thorn (at L’Hôtellerie de Gaichel) 
and, finally, Delors (at Royaumont Abbey) or-
ganised a preparatory session at a spot conducive 
to informal exchanges. The main purpose of the 
get-together was to give people an opportunity to 
get to know each other, as some of the commission-
ers-to-be had never met. Meetings of this kind held 
the odd surprise even for those who were acquaint-
ed. ‘I even spotted Lorenzo Natali wandering about 
the corridors … at around seven in the morning, in 
(2) ‘In the days leading up to the first meeting [6 January 1973] the new presi-
dent, Mr Ortoli, had spoken at great length with each member of his team. 
At the meeting itself, a break in proceedings allowed him to talk with them 
in twos and threes to iron out any last-minute snags. By early evening he 
had secured the unanimous agreement of the full Commission’, Noël, É., 
The European Community: How it works, ‘European perspectives’ series, Of-
fice for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 
1979, p. 100.
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his pyjamas, clutching a towel and searching for 
one of the few bathrooms,’ Jacques Delors rem-
inisced  (1). Cockfield recalled that it was at the 
Royaumont seminar that he introduced the custom 
of serving bread with butter at Commission meals. 
Referring to the Community’s butter mountains 
and the huge farm subsidies involved, he playfully 
mocked the practice of not serving butter at table, 
while at the same time underlining how differences 
in cultural practices often lie in the detail (2). More 
seriously, the meeting was also designed to round off 
any sharp edges — at a safe distance from Brussels 
and the accredited press — as regards the allocation 
of portfolios. However, it was vital for the president 
to play his role effectively from the outset. Whilst 
both Jenkins and Delors were able to strike a swift 
balance between the different forces at play within 
the College of Commissioners, it was not the same 
for Thorn. Richard Burke compared him to ‘an elec-
tive monarch surrounded by powerful barons’  (3). 
Under these circumstances, it was impossible for 
the preparatory meeting held at Gaichel to have any 
meaningful outcome, either immediately or in the 
future (4). 
A complex role
The reference to barons is significant. Ortoli, Jen-
kins and Delors came from big countries. Thorn, 
who inherited eight members of the previous Com-
mission, including the former president, Ortoli — 
who, to the amazement of the British, was also a 
vice-president of the Jenkins Commission —  hailed 
from the Community’s smallest country. These two 
factors were crucial. According to Richard Burke, 
‘presidents suffer or do not suffer in relation to the 
territorial size of the Member States they repre-
(1) Delors, J. and Arnaud, J.-L., Mémoires, Plon, Paris, 2004, p. 195. 
(2) HAEU, ‘European Oral History’, Arthur Cockfield, ‘Voices on Europe’, 
24 August 1998, by Andrew Crozier.
(3) HAEU, ‘European Oral History’, Richard Burke, ‘Voices on Europe’, 
21 April 1999, by A. Lovett.
(4) Interview with Ivor Richard, 21 October 2010.
sent’  (5). Consequently, the barons — whom some 
describe as a sort of ‘phantom cabinet’ (6) in which 
Étienne Davignon, disappointed at not having been 
chosen as president and carving out an ‘empire of 
portfolios’ for himself, played first fiddle — made 
life difficult for Thorn. In the presence of Davignon, 
Thorn was like ‘a rabbit facing a mongoose’ (7). He 
‘thought we were going too far.  Then, when we 
stopped talking, he thought we were undermining 
him. So it wasn’t easy,’  according to Davignon (8), 
who set his stamp on things from the outset of the 
Thorn Commission; the latter’s inaugural address 
clearly bears his mark.
Beyond these considerations, the chief problem was 
the very nature of the Commission and the status of 
its president and members. ‘The Commission is the 
guardian of the treaties; it is the executive arm of the 
Communities; it is the initiator of Community pol-
icy and exponent of the Community interest in the 
Council,’ noted Émile Noël (9). And when Ortoli 
opened the 234th meeting of the Commission — 
the first he chaired  — on 6 January 1973, he called 
on his colleagues to take ‘collegiate action on the 
basis of solidarity’.
However, good intentions are one thing, reality 
another. Henri Simonet confessed that he did not 
join the Commission ‘with the fervour of a cru-
sader’  (10).  He was not alone. New members were 
confused. Their role was neither that of a minis-
ter nor that of a top civil servant, even if that was 
(5) HAEU, ‘European Oral History,’ Richard Burke, ‘Voices on Europe’, 
21 April 1999, by A. Lovett. 
(6) Interview with Jacques Delors, 11 March 2011. Several witnesses used the 
expression ‘the gang of four’ to describe the group comprising Davignon, 
Haferkamp, Natali and Ortoli.   
(7) Denman, R., The Mandarin’s Tale, Politico’s Publishing, London, 2002, 
p. 211; interview with Christopher Tugendhat (17 August 2010), who de-
scribed Thorn as being like a rabbit frozen in the light of a projector. 
(8) Interview with Étienne Davignon, 14 September 2010. 
(9) Noël, É., Les rouages de l’Europe, 2nd edn, Fernand Nathan-Labor, Paris/
Brussels, 1979, p. 23.   
(10) Ibid., p. 96.
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Margaret Thatcher’s view of the Commission pres-
ident  (1). The hybrid status of commissioners, par-
ticularly if they have held ministerial responsibili-
ties in their native country, requires a sometimes 
lengthy period of adjustment to both the adminis-
tration in which they are working and a culture of 
governance different from that prevailing in their 
own country. The Commission ‘must believe in its 
innate necessity’, as an outside observer has written. 
It must display both vision and prudence. In short, 
it must err neither on the side of utopianism nor of 
technocracy  (2). More prosaically, Delors took the 
view that ‘a commissioner’s place is in the kitchen’, 
since the Commission both provides impetus and 
acts as a mediator to bring governments’ viewpoints 
closer together  (3). A commissioner must, in fact, 
have ‘the right qualities of being like a minister, a 
political ani mal, and yet like a fonctionnaire [offi-
cial] as well. You have to combine those two … ’ (4). 
Whatever the terms in which it is described, the 
action taken by the commissioners — which, ac-
cording to Ortoli’s declaration in 1973 — was to be 
‘collegiate … on the basis of solidarity’  was criticised 
6 years later in the report of the Three Wise Men (5). 
The Commission ‘doesn’t really give the impression 
of being a team; it’s the president’s actions or those 
of individual members which have made the most 
impression on the outside world’ (6). 
(1) Thatcher, M., The Downing Street Years, Harper Collins (paperback), 1995, 
p. 558.
(2) Soutou, J.-M., Un diplomate engagé. Mémoires, 1939–79, Éditions de Fal-
lois, Paris, 2011, p. 499. 
(3) Delors, J. and Arnaud, J.-L., Mémoires, Plon, Paris, 2004, p. 248.
(4) Interview with Michael Franklin, 5 August 2010.
(5) See the introduction to Part Three and section 9.1, ‘The Council of Minis-
ters’.
(6) Quoted by Rogalla, D., Fonction publique européenne, Fernand Nathan-
Labor, Paris/Brussels, 1982, p. 298.  
Treaty establishing a single Council 
and a single Commission of the 
European Communities (7) 
‘Article 10
1. The Commission shall consist of seventeen 
members, who shall be chosen on the grounds of 
their general competence and whose 
independence is beyond doubt (8).
...
Only nationals of Member States may be members 
of the Commission.
The Commission must include at least one national 
of each of the Member States, but may not include 
more than two members having the nationality of 
the same state.  
2. The members of the Commission shall, in the 
general interest of the Communities, be 
completely independent in the performance of 
their duties.
In the performance of these duties, they shall 
neither seek nor take instructions from any 
government or from any other body. They shall 
refrain from any action incompatible with their 
duties. Each Member State undertakes to respect 
this principle and not to seek to influence the 
members of the Commission in the performance 
of their tasks. 
...
Article 11 
The members of the Commission shall be 
appointed by common accord of the governments 
of the Member States.
Their term of office shall be four years. It shall be 
renewable.’
Working together as a team was indeed a tricky 
matter, with the gap between Community solidar-
ity and national interests accounting for much of 
the difficulty. Despite the formal rule, this disparity 
meant that the commissioners, some of whom hur-
ried back to their own countries each weekend, like 
(7)  OJ 152, 13.7.1967, p. 2.
(8) First sub-paragraph of paragraph 1, as modified by Article 15 of the Act of 
Accession of Spain and Portugal.
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Cultural compromise and political 
compromise
Consequently, some commissioners appeared hesi-
tant to commit themselves fully to the project, as it 
was not easy to ‘leave behind [national politics] for a 
time, officially at any rate’ (3). Moreover, aside from 
the obvious fact that language could be an issue, not 
so much in the context of Commission meetings as 
in that of personal contacts between commissioners 
— Poul Dalsager, for instance, spoke only Danish 
— relations between them could be marked by con-
siderable cultural differences. Henk Vredeling, who 
in 1979 described the atmosphere between strong 
Commission members as ‘icy’ (4), was himself far 
too Calvinistic in the eyes of his southern col-
leagues (5), between whom ‘there was a sense of be-
longing to the same family … a familiarity. I sat next 
to one or other of them, and we used to joke during 
meetings,’ Grigoris Varfis reminisced. ‘It would be 
my Spanish or my Italian colleague. Delors would 
get annoyed when he saw us having a laugh’ (6).
Some laughed on the other side of their faces. There 
were commissioners who left memories of stinging 
ripostes that were often barbed with cutting hu-
mour. Simonet, Soames, Davignon and Cockfield 
were among those whose sallies of wit did not al-
ways win them friends.
Of course, the commissioners, both collectively and 
individually, did not exist in a vacuum. The mem-
bers of their cabinet (7) played a decisive role, with 
an occasional major conflict between a commission-
er and a director-general, for instance. 
(3) Simonet, H., Je n’efface rien et je recommence, Didier Hatier, Brussels, 1986, 
p. 97, and interview between Harry Kreisler and Frans Andriessen, 26 Oc-
tober 1993, Berkeley, Institute of International Studies, ‘Conversations 
with History’.  
(4) Vrij Nederland, 12 May 1979.  
(5) Braak, B. (van den), ‘Een Nederlandse machtspoliticus machteloos in Brus-
sel: Henk Vredeling, lid van de Europese Commissie (1977–88)’, in Baalen, 
C. (van), Braak, B. (van den) and Voerman, G. (eds), De Nederlandse Euro­
commissarissen, Boom, Amsterdam, 2010, p. 208. 
(6) Interview with Grigoris Varfis, 6 October 2010.
(7) See section 2.2 , ‘The cabinets’.
Following the submission to President Jenkins of the Spierenburg 
report on the structures, organisation and personnel policy of the 
Commission on 24 September 1979, the Courrier du personnel 
(No 406, 15 October 1979, p. 37) published this cartoon together 
with a short story entitled ‘Les conseils d’Esculape’ (the advice 
of Aesculapius), under the name of Eureka: ‘Once upon a time, 
there was a king who ruled over an imaginary kingdom. 
Tired of hearing from all quarters that his kingdom was badly 
governed, he summoned Aesculapius. “Sire,” said Aesculapius, “if 
the sickness is imaginary, we will treat it accordingly; if it is real, 
we will do likewise. In either case we will examine it and we will 
tell you what we think on the next ides.” On the ides, Aesculapius 
gave his advice and reported to the king on his consultations: “In 
my opinion, Sire, you do not have enough power and you are, by 
Zeus, too good-natured. Increase your power and your kingdom will 
be the better for it. The weak love the strong and admire them. And 
if one day you too should fall ill — power soon weakens those who 
abuse it — come back and see me! If the sickness is imaginary, 
we will treat it accordingly and, if it is not, 
we will do just the same.”’
Ortoli  (1) and Cheysson, were subject to influence 
by their capital or party. ‘You are there partly as a 
Labour Party politician, as a member of a Labour 
Party … and you’re also there as a representative of 
the country … I didn’t regard myself as being totally 
detached from British politics,’ said Ivor Richard, 
another commissioner who returned home every 
weekend (2). 
(1) Denman, R., The Mandarin’s Tale, Politico’s Publishing, London, 2002, 
p. 211.
(2) Interview with Ivor Richard, 21 October 2010.
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However, more generally, it was the working meth-
ods of certain commissioners that tended to pose 
problems. The Dutchman Lardinois, for example, 
who had ‘a pathological loathing of any kind of 
memorandum’, was particularly difficult to work 
with, since what he liked to call his ‘room for man-
oeuvre’ considerably reduced the effectiveness of 
his civil servants, who were wary of venturing out 
into virtually uncharted territory (1). More gener-
ally, the British commissioners were disconcert-
ed by the system prevailing at the Commission, 
seen as being more dirigiste than that operating 
in London, since the cabinet acted as a filter both 
between commissioners and their civil servants 
and between the commissioners themselves  (2). 
This was undoubtedly one of the reasons, personal 
affinities aside, why some commissioners, Hafer-
kamp and Soames among them, made sure to meet 
outside the Commission at a good restaurant — or 
(1) Interview with Michael Franklin, 5 August 2010.
(2) Interview with Ivor Richard, 21 October 2010 .
chez Davignon, who had a passion for the culinary 
arts. Others again, like President Roy Jenkins him-
self, maintained good working relations with their 
colleagues whilst avoiding developing any personal 
links (3).
However, it was precisely because of the differences 
between the members of the Commission that — 
paradoxically — a cultural compromise gradually 
emerged (4). This represented the blending of dif-
ferent identities and allegiances in the name of a 
common project which individual commissioners 
took to heart with admittedly varying degrees of 
inten sity. However, collectively they were helping 
gradually to establish a sui generis public authority 
with the capacity to seek and achieve political com-
promises. 
Michel Dumoulin
(3) Interview with Crispin Tickell, 21 August 2010. 
(4) See comments by Abélès, M. and Bellier, I., ‘La Commission européenne du 
compromis culturel à la culture politique du compromis’, Revue de Science 
Politique, Vol. 46, No 3, 1996, p. 432.
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2.2. The cabinets 
The cabinets (private offices) are an important part 
of the Commission: they support the work of the 
members of the Commission and they help bring 
the principle of collegiality to life, but they also raise 
the question of how much influence Member States 
have at the heart of the Commission. Consequent-
ly, one of the difficulties of analysing the role of the 
cabinets is that of establishing a balance between 
these two aspects: the heart of Community collegi-
ality for some, and a vehicle for intergovernmental-
ism for others. To resolve this seeming conflict, we 
shall look first at what are the cabinets within the 
Commission and then at who are the members of 
the cabinets, in particular those of presidents.
What are the cabinets? Organisational 
structure and role within the Commission
The history of the cabinets is not entirely straight-
forward. They came into being at the same time as 
the High Authority as, from the summer of 1952, 
each member needed very close collaborators to set 
up the institution. From 1952 to 1956, before there 
were any staff regulations, these collaborators were 
not fundamentally different from the first Commu-
nity officials, who were also recruited on a contrac-
tual basis. In 1958, the first commissioners arrived 
in Brussels with one or two aides. For example, 
François-Xavier Ortoli served as head of cabinet to 
Commissioner Robert Lemaignen for a few months 
before becoming the first director-general of the 
DG for the Internal Market. 
Altiero Spinelli’s cabinet on the eve of his departure, from left to right: Massimo Bonanni, Claus Stuffmann, Gianfranco Rocca, Altiero Spinelli, 
Riccardo Perissich and Eugenio Pino. Altiero Spinelli remained at the Commission for 6 years until 1976, but was never totally at 
ease with the complex Community machinery. Finding the constraints of the role of commissioner and administering a bureaucracy 
hard to bear, he quit the Commission in the spring of 1976. He subsequently played an important role in the European Parliament. 
(Courrier du personnel, No 476, July 1986.)
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The word cabinet, which is taken from the Belgian 
and French politico-administrative system with its 
ministerial private offices, may not seem very apt in 
a Community context. The cabinets were originally 
made up of two people who were soon called head of 
cabinet (chef de cabinet) and deputy head of cabinet 
(chef adjoint de cabinet) and not director and dep-
uty director, as at national level, to show clearly that 
they did not perform the same functions.
At national level, the cabinet director was the min-
ister’s political right-hand man, whereas the head of 
cabinet was simply in charge of logistical and organ-
isational matters. This terminological modesty re-
flected an initial wish not to compete too much with 
the true heads of the Commission’s administration, 
i.e. the directors-general. But this different name 
did not stop the head of cabinet from gradually tak-
ing on the role of cabinet director, albeit of a much 
‘Heads of cabinet had tremendous power. Monday was the day of the heads of cabinet meeting and that’s where things were decided. 
What the heads of cabinet didn’t decide on Monday would be decided by the commissioners on Wednesday.’ (Interview with Louis Kawan, 
5 March 2012.) A meeting of heads of cabinet in 1975, chaired by Émile Noël (not present in the photo).
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smaller cabinet fulfilling a different function. While 
a ministerial cabinet would have 20 to 80 members, 
the cabinet of a commissioner originally had only 
two members (1), a figure that rose gradually to five 
(A grade) members: head of cabinet, deputy head of 
cabinet and three members. The president’s cabinet 
was granted one, then two, additional members (2).
As for the actual role played by the cabinets in the 
functioning of the institution (3), it increased in 
importance with the (written, then empowerment) 
procedures set up for the smooth running of Col-
lege meetings. 
However, this did not mean that each cabinet car-
ried the same weight in terms of importance. The 
president’s cabinet, which for years remained a pri­
mus inter pares, had specific prerogatives and occu-
pied a special position. The head of the president’s 
cabinet, unlike the other heads of cabinet, was 
present at Commission meetings although, at the 
time, he sat, not ‘at the table’, but just behind the 
secretary-general, Émile Noël, who was seated on 
the president’s left.
During meetings of heads of cabinet, the president’s 
head of cabinet was seated next to the secretary- 
general. The president’s head of cabinet had addition-
al powers of coordination and chaired heads of ca b-
inet meetings in Émile Noël’s absence. The impor-
tance of the other cabinets was much more variable.
This difference in clout depended on various factors 
— the reputation of the commissioner, the impor-
tance of his portfolio, the personality of his head 
of cabinet and the political weight of the Member 
State the commissioner came from — but it was also 
based on each cabinet’s vision of its role. Naturally, 
officials who were familiar with the role of cabinets 
(1) Two members, one secretary and one typist in 1958.
(2) In January 1973, the structure was as follows: each commissioner’s cabinet 
consisted of five A-grade, two B-grade and six C-grade members. The presi-
dent’ cabinet had in addition one more A, B and C grade members.
(3) See Chapter 4, ‘Working methods’.
in their Member State had an advantage over those 
who were not. For example, in 1973, Michel Vanden 
Abeele moved from the cabinet of Henri Simonet, 
the Belgian minister for economic affairs, to Si-
monet’s cabinet in his new capacity as vice-president 
of the Commission. He continued his career with 
Presidents Ortoli, Jenkins and Thorn, spending a 
total of 9 years in these various cabinets.
The cabinet of President (subsequently Vice- 
President) Ortoli was very French in its approach. 
Its members improved or rewrote documents from 
the directorates-general. The cabinet acted as a filter 
between the commissioner and the departments. 
Other cabinets, unfamiliar with the role of filter, 
simply played the part of intermediary or link be-
tween the directorates-general and their commis-
sioner, or simpler still acted as the DG’s mouthpiece. 
From 1967, a key feature of a cabinet’s work con-
sisted in taking part in the weekly meeting of heads 
of cabinet on Monday afternoons (4). For example, 
in a journalist’s biography of Christian Blanc, Ed-
gard Pisani’s head of cabinet from 1981 to 1982, 
the author summarises this activity as follows: ‘On 
Mondays, all the heads of cabinet meet ... they reach 
agreement on certain dossiers, while disagreeing on 
others. On Wednesdays, the commissioners approve 
the proposals of their heads of cabinet and discuss 
any outstanding business’ (5). This collegial style of 
work through meetings was adopted by all members 
of the cabinets and the number of ‘special’ meetings 
rose; these meetings brought together the sectoral 
advisers of each cabinet to discuss a specific subject. 
The 1970s thus saw the development of a veritable 
cabinet culture.
With regard to the allocation of portfolios among 
members, a common practice seems to have devel-
(4) In 1965, Walter Hallstein called an ad hoc meeting of cabinets for the first 
time to prepare the ground for difficult discussions, but it was Jean Rey who 
institutionalised the practice.
(5) Faujas, A., Christian Blanc l’ inclassable, Balland, Paris, 2002, p. 49.
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‘The cabinets derive their chief importance from the weekly meeting of heads of cabinet, a collegiate body that helps the 
Commission take decisions, but in a very organic way, as it has the job of tidying up the Commission agenda. If all the heads of 
cabinet are in agreement, the issue is treated as an ‘A’ item and the Commission can focus on the two or three difficult items on 
the agenda. Of course, for this mechanism to work — Émile Noël was always a respected and fierce guardian of the practice 
— coordination is required at different levels, both internally and externally. The role of the cabinets is, firstly, to work well with 
their directorate-general. The DGs, where the expertise lies, are the defenders of orthodoxy and have a very rich interaction with 
the cabinets, which endeavour to meet what they consider the political expectations of big countries or small countries with a 
particularly sensitive issue and, at the same time, of the sector concerned by the commissioner’s portfolio: agriculture, industry, 
etc. The cabinets generally have a better idea of what is going on in these sectors than the DG, which is more focused on the 
specific issues, although the DG has its own contacts in the world of industry, but usually at an expert level.’ (Interview with 
Pierre Defraigne, 13 October 2010.)
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oped: the head of cabinet took charge of general co-
ordination, the deputy head of cabinet looked after 
the commissioner’s portfolio and the other mem-
bers divided up other commissioners’ portfolios be-
tween them. A variation on this model was that the 
commissioner’s portfolio might also be divided up 
between several members. In this way, each mem-
ber kept an eye on both part of ‘his’ commissioner’s 
portfolio and one or more portfolios of other com-
missioners. In both cases, this was the main differ-
ence compared with a ministerial cabinet, where the 
members specialised and worked only in the minis-
ter’s policy area. Working with other portfolios was 
crucial to the effectiveness of a Commission cab-
inet, measured in terms of its capacity to participate 
in meetings (special meetings, then heads of cabinet 
meetings) and discuss the portfolios of commission-
ers other than their own. From this point of view, a 
cabinet which focused too much on one sector had 
less influence within the Commission’s structures. 
In the case of the president, the configuration was 
more specific in that he did not have a sectoral port-
folio apart from oversight of the cross-cutting de-
partments: the Secretariat-General, the Legal Ser-
vice, the Spokesman’s Group, the Security Office 
and the interpreting service. There were two excep-
tions to this, however, with Gaston Thorn focusing 
on culture and Jacques Delors on monetary affairs. 
The allocation of tasks between the main members 
of presidents’ cabinets shows some continuity: polit-
ical cooperation was the responsibility of the head 
of cabinet (or the deputy head under Delors (1)), 
while economic and financial affairs and agriculture 
enjoyed a special status and were generally handled 
by the deputy head or the ‘number 3’ (for example, 
under Jenkins) or even by the head of cabinet in the 
(1) It was Pascal Lamy’s deputy who took over this and who also became the 
Commission’s political director, i.e. its representative in European coopera-
tion policy meetings.
case of agriculture under Thorn (2). However, there 
were also some differences in the allocation of re-
sponsibilities: the Jenkins cabinet, with its system-
atic recourse to dividing up sectors, differed clearly 
in this respect from the Thorn cabinet, which did 
not divide sectors up at all, while the Ortoli cabinet 
lay somewhere in between. The Jenkins cabinet also 
differed in that the research sector was part of the 
shared workload of the head of cabinet, whereas it 
did not even appear in the list of areas of responsi-
bility of the highest three members under the other 
presidents. Some differences were more structural, 
such as entrusting the task of monitoring European 
Council and G7 meetings to the head of the presi-
dent’s cabinet from 1981, with the cabinet becom-
ing the president’s ‘sherpa’, similar to the approach 
adopted by the heads of state or government. 
Finally, with regard to the cabinets’ internal work-
ing methods, two models coexisted. The first con-
sisted in centralising everything around the head 
of cabinet, who monopolised direct relations with 
the commissioner. The second was more collegial in 
style, being characterised by a greater involvement 
of each member in the life of the cabinet. Under the 
first model, which was followed by Ortoli’s heads 
of cabinet, and in particular by Pierre de Boissieu, 
from 1977 to 1984, the members of the cabinet had 
very little direct contact with their ‘boss’. The sec-
ond model, which was followed under Jenkins and 
involved sharing numerous areas of responsibility, 
was characterised by frequent meetings of the whole 
cabinet. The spokesman occupied a special place 
within the cabinet as he enjoyed the commissioner’s 
special trust. He was also a member of the Spokes-
man’s Group, which was attached to DG X (Infor-
mation) from 1977 to 1981.
(2) In the first Delors cabinet, economic and financial affairs and monetary af-
fairs were managed by the cabinet ‘number 4’, Jérôme Vignon. Agriculture 
was dealt with by the ‘number 3’, Michel Jacquot.
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Portfolios of the members of the president’s cabinet
ORTOLI CABINET (portfolio: Secretariat-
General, Legal Service and Spokesman’s 
Group) in 1976
Head: general coordination of work, general and 
political matters, institutional matters;
plus, for policy areas shared with a member of 
cabinet: external relations, political cooperation, 
development.
Deputy head: economic and financial matters, 
regional policy, budgetary matters, transport;
plus, as a shared policy area: agriculture.
Adviser 1: ‘dialogue’, energy and Euratom, ECSC 
matters, research, education, technology.
JENKINS CABINET (portfolio: Secretariat-
General, Legal Service, information and 
Spokesman’s Group) in 1979
Head: coordination and general functions;
plus, for policy areas shared with a member of 
cabinet: political cooperation; external relations 
and development; research and science;  
North–South dialogue; United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (Unctad).
Deputy head: Secretariat-General, Legal Service, 
enlargement, agriculture, fisheries;
plus, as a shared policy area: transport; 
environment and consumer protection; 
competition.
Adviser 1: economic and financial affairs; 
coordination of Community funds; budget, 
financial control, European Investment Bank, 
ECSC, credit and investments, financial 
institutions and taxation; regional policy, 
employment and social affairs;
plus, as a shared policy area: industry and 
internal market; customs union.
THORN CABINET (portfolio: Secretariat-
General, Legal Service, Spokesman’s Group, 
culture and Security Office) in 1981
Head: management of the cabinet, general 
coordination; preparation of European Council 
and economic summit meetings; political 
cooperation; agriculture and fisheries; personnel 
and administration.
Deputy head: economic and financial affairs, 
credit and investments, relations with the 
European Investment Bank; Statistical 
Office; industrial affairs and internal market; 
competition, budgetary matters, mandate of 
30 May and coordination of financial funds.
Adviser 1: external relations and development; 
North–South relations; Security Office; 
Secretariat-General; preparation of Council 
meetings (General Affairs); relations with 
Member States.
DELORS CABINET 1 (portfolio: Secretariat-
General, Legal Service, Spokesman’s Group, 
Security Office, Conference and Interpreting 
Service and monetary affairs) in 1986
Head: management of the cabinet, general 
coordination; president’s personal representative 
for the preparation of economic summits; 
industrial policy;
plus, as a shared policy area: Conference and 
Interpreting Service; Security Office.
Deputy head: external relations and trade 
policy; political cooperation; North–South 
relations; Mediterranean policy; cooperation and 
development; Secretariat-General;
plus, as a shared policy area: European 
Parliament; personnel and administration.
Adviser 1: agriculture; enlargement; 
environment; consumer protection.
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President’s 
cabinet
Non-nationals
Ortoli (1976) 2 BE, 1 DE
Jenkins (1979) 1 BE, 1 LU, 1 DE
Thorn (1981) 2 BE (head and deputy head), 
2 IT, 1 FR, 1 UK, 1 DE (2nd 
deputy head)
Delors (1985–86) 1 DE (deputy head), 1 UK, 1 BE
The next question is whether the members of the 
president’s cabinets came from national administra-
tions or from within the Community civil service. 
A clear trend can be observed here with the number 
of Community officials increasing.
Jacques Delors (on the right) and his head of cabinet, Pascal Lamy (on the left), at the seminar in Royaumont Abbey. ‘Pascal Lamy had 
been a deputy director in my private office when I was minister for finance and the economy. He had been a student of mine at the ENA. 
Afterwards, with Émile Noël’s invaluable assistance, we tried to put together a cabinet that was more European than French.’ 
(Interview with Jacques Delors, 11 March 2011.)
Who are the cabinet members?
Let us focus on the members of the president’s cab-
inet and examine two main factors in their profile: 
their nationality and their professional background. 
With regard to nationality, the situation described 
by Hans J. Michelmann (1) in 1978, whereby most 
cabinet members were from only one Member 
State, slowly changed and gave way to a more even 
distribution of nationalities, i.e. the commissioner’s 
nationality and others, in particular Belgian and 
German.
(1) Michelmann, H. J., Organisational Effectiveness in a Multi­National Bu­
reaucracy: The Case of the Commission of the European Communities, Saxon 
House, Farnborough, 1978.
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inet, he became a director-general (for regional pol-
icy) and then spokesman for Jenkins. His succes-
sors, under Ortoli and Jenkins, did not follow the 
same path as they left the Commission at the same 
time as their president.
Even though the French heads of cabinet were ap-
pointed at a much younger age, their career path was 
fairly similar to that of their British counterparts. 
But how did this practice affect the Commission? 
Was a head of cabinet from outside the Commis-
sion more independent from the Community civil 
service as he was not seeking to make a career in it? 
This is what might be called the Paye model, named 
after Jean-Claude Paye, head of cabinet to Raymond 
Barre from 1967, who managed the difficult transi-
tion with the Ortoli Commission at the end of 1972 
before leaving Brussels for a new position in the 
French civil service.
While Ortoli’s cabinet was dominated by French 
civil servants (1) and Jenkins’s by national civil ser-
vants, Thorn’s cabinet broke the mould. All three 
of his heads of cabinet were Community officials: 
Adrien Ries, Fernand Spaak and Jean Durieux. 
Delors’ deputy head of cabinet in 1985, Günter 
Burghardt, was also an internal candidate. Is it thus 
possible to draw conclusions about a link between 
the profile of the head of cabinet and the manage-
ment of the cabinet? The answer to this question 
is influenced by the career aspirations of the heads 
of cabinet who were Community officials. It is true 
that some heads of cabinet coming from national 
administrations then wished to remain in the Com-
mission. A leading example of this was Renato Rug-
giero, a brilliant Italian diplomat who was working 
in the permanent representation and who in 1970 
became head of cabinet to Franco Maria Malfatti. 
After spending some time in Sicco Mansholt’s cab-
(1) His heads of cabinet all came from the grands corps de l’État (major state 
bodies): one member of the Council of State, one from the Inspectorate 
General of Finance and one from the Diplomatic Corps, in chronological 
order.
President’s cabinet National civil 
servants
Community officials Others (and not recorded)
Ortoli 5 3 0
Jenkins 6 3 1 (international civil servant) + 
1 not recorded
Thorn 4 7 0
Delors (1985–86) 2 3 2 + 2 not recorded
President’s cabinet Heads of cabinet Age when 
appointed
Position after leaving
Ortoli 1973–75 Philippe de Margerie 35 Working in the private sector (Hachette)
Ortoli 1976–77 Denis Gautier-Sauvagnac 33 SGCI, Paris
Jenkins Crispin Tickell 47 Ambassador to Mexico
Thorn (Jan. 1981) Adrien Ries 48 Director DG VI
Thorn (Feb.–June 1981) Fernand Spaak 58 Deceased in June 1981
Thorn 1981–84 Jean Durieux 57 Adviser hors classe then director-
general
Delors Pascal Lamy 38 Crédit Lyonnais (1994)
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instructions from the Foreign Office found their 
way into heads of cabinet meetings (2). 
But a national interest, however strong or however 
powerfully conveyed, came up against a work cul-
ture firmly anchored in collegiality and consen-
sus building, as no cabinet could impose its views, 
whether national or sectoral — not even the presi-
dent’s. A distinction must be made here between 
heads of cabinet and other cabinet members. Even 
if heads of cabinet retained a stronger national al-
legiance, the years 1973–86 saw the beginning of 
a more general trend towards denationalisation (3) 
and communitarisation of the cabinets.
Michel Mangenot
(2) Interview with Pierre Bockstael, 7 July 2010, see section 9.1, ‘The Council 
of Ministers’. 
(3) Egeberg M., ‘The denationalisation of cabinets in the European Commis-
sion’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 48, No 4, 2010, pp. 775–786.
A possible side effect of this external profile of heads 
of cabinet who were only ‘passing through’ the 
institution was that it could lead to a renationali-
sation of the Commission. At all events, this was 
the view taken by many directors-general, such as 
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, according to whom ‘the 
members of the cabinets have two unfortunate 
characteristics: they are nationalistic and they care 
only about their own career’  (1). The close ties be-
tween heads of cabinet and their own capital could 
lead to the maintenance of certain types of informa-
tion flow. Pierre Bockstael, a head of division first in 
DG IX (Personnel and Administration) and then in 
DG X (Information), remembers, for example, that 
(1) HAEC, BAC 40/1986/42, note from Claus-Dieter Ehlermann to Nick 
Stuart, 26 February 1979. ‘Caring only about their own career’ refers here 
both to Community officials and to ‘national’ civil servants, the only differ-
ence being that the former focused on the Commission, whereas the latter 
did not necessarily do so.
François-Xavier Ortoli (on the right) and his head of cabinet, Philippe de Margerie (on the left) (1976). 
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tailed information on the weekly meetings of the 
Commission and press conferences given by the 
president or by commissioners, sometimes jointly 
with prominent visitors. These activities went hand 
in hand with press releases and information memos 
issued to the press, and provided a platform for ‘the 
presentation of the Commission’s official views as 
promptly and effectively as the political role and 
specific nature of its functions permit’ (5). 
Although the centre of Community activity was 
in Brussels, information had also to be channelled 
to the outside offices, i.e. the press and information 
offices in the Member States and the delegations in 
non-member countries, so that they could brief their 
partners in the local press. For every statement made 
in the press room by the spokesman or a member 
of the Spokesman’s Group, therefore, and for every 
meeting of the Council at which the spokesman 
was present, a BIO (bureau information only) note 
was sent by telex (6). In addition, from 1977 until 
April 1981, a ‘Tuesday telex’ was drawn up by Paul 
Collowald, director of decentralised information at 
DG X, ‘working closely with the spokesman’. The 
aim of the Tuesday telex was ‘to put recent events in 
the Communities into their context and outline the 
main issues, and at the same time to maintain solid 
links between the centre and the periphery, includ-
ing at the human level’ (7).
The Commission itself had to keep abreast of the 
news and to be aware of what was written and said 
about it. This was the reason behind the daily press 
review, which was based on an analysis of a con-
stantly expanding number of press sources.
(5) EC Commission, Ninth General Report on the Activities of the European 
Communities in 1975, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, Luxembourg, 1976, p. 25. 
(6) Interview with Martin Vasey, 20 October 2010.
(7) Interview with Paul Collowald, 6 September 2010. 
2.3. The Spokesman’s 
Group (later the 
Spokesman’s Service)
In 1973, the Commission decided to restructure 
the offices in charge of information policy, which 
had repeatedly sparked sharp debate since 1958 (1). 
Amongst them was the spokesman’s department, 
now named the Spokesman’s Group, whose main 
task was to keep the journalists accredited to the 
Commission informed of the Commission’s activ-
ities; the reorganisation was emblematic of the wish 
of successive presidents to ‘transform the depart-
ment so as finally to set up an effective system of 
communication’ (2). 
Keeping journalists informed
The number of accredited journalists was large. It 
continued to increase from year to year, to the point 
where Brussels became ‘one of the world’s great 
centres of international press activity’, along with 
Washington and New York (3). There were 271 
journalists in 1973, and more than 400 in 1986; in 
1983, they were made up of 43 different national-
ities (4). They represented the press, radio and televi-
sion networks and press agencies.
The information provided to journalists by the 
Spokesman’s Group took many forms: daily press 
briefings for the latest information, weekly press 
conferences given by the spokesman for more de-
(1) Spanier, B., Europe, anyone? The ‘Communication Deficit’ of the European 
Union Revisited, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2012. 
(2) Interview with Fabio Colasanti, 25 January 2011. 
(3) EC Commission, Fourteenth General Report on the Activities of the Euro­
pean Communities in 1980, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, Luxembourg, 1981, p. 37. 
(4) Bastin, G., ‘Les journalistes accrédités auprès des institutions européennes 
à Bruxelles. Quelques signes de changement d’un monde du travail’, in 
Georgagakis, D. (ed.), Les métiers de l’Europe politique. Acteurs et profes­
sionnalisations de l’Union européenne, Presses universitaires de Strasbourg, 
Strasbourg, 2002, p. 118. 
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or even a particular region, led to a certain amount 
of deviation from the principle that the Commis-
sion should communicate a single message even 
though it speaks through many voices. In practice, 
the job of delivering the Commission’s message fell 
to the Spokesman’s Group. But each member of the 
group found himself or herself covering the words 
and actions of a particular commissioner in the area 
for which he or she was responsible. Members of the 
group had sometimes to work at maintaining close 
contact with the directorates-general they covered, 
in order to obtain information at source, and some-
times to give priority to their commissioner and his 
or her private office or cabinet. As summarised by 
Giancarlo Chevallard: ‘All the successive spokesmen 
tried to create a large but closely knit group. But the 
Ups and downs
Whatever the theoretical approach, the importance 
attached to information meant that the Spokes-
man’s Group, as it was called from 1973 to 1985, or 
the Spokesman’s Service, as it was called thereafter, 
went through numerous changes of circumstances. 
This was an inevitable result of the jockeying for in-
fluence that went on and the often ambiguous con-
duct of those involved. Some commissioners were 
known to be great communicators, and commis-
sioners generally sought to embody the Community 
as they were expected to do. But most commission-
ers were also anxious to see their role highlighted in 
the press, and especially the press in their own coun-
try. This concern for opinion in a particular country, 
On 4 May 1973, François-Xavier Ortoli (centre) delivers the activity report after 4 months of his Presidency of the Commission. Ferdinando 
Riccardi, Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Agence Europe, wrote some months after the new president took office: ‘From the outset of his 
Presidency, Mr Ortoli has surprised us ... He has shown a readiness to vigorously defend positions founded on the difficult concept of 
common interest. His statements have struck quite a different chord, however. Several quite dull and, frankly, disappointing interviews have 
given way to a distinctly new tone. “I genuinely believe that we are witnessing the birth of a nation,” he announced in Lille. “The necessity 
exists. A bit of idealism and faith is all we need now ... ” His favourite metaphor for the role of the Commission in the current phase of 
European integration also reveals the character of the man: ‘‘Giving daily expression to political will.’’’ (Riccardi, F., ‘Ortoli, le Français qui 
mène le Marché commun’, Réalités — Revue de Paris, No 330, July 1973, p. 46.)
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i.e. to deal with the media,’ and the job of DG X, 
which was to communicate (2), was diluted by a 
reform that placed the DG and the Spokesman’s 
Group under the sole supervision of the president 
of the Commission, with the new director-general 
of DG X, Renato Ruggiero, also becoming the 
spokesman (3). 
The reform was prepared before Roy Jenkins took 
office, and called for him to replace the spokes-
man of the time, Bino Olivi. Olivi was a lawyer by 
training, and had been spokesman since 1961. He 
felt that he was there ‘to serve other people’s truth’; 
he believed that ‘if you really want to do politics, 
you can’t run a press service just to be nice to 
people’ (4). He was perceived as being a little arro-
gant in his dealings with the press room, ‘which he 
controlled to an amazing degree’ (5), and is some-
times said to have invented press relations at the 
Commission (6). 
Olivi reacted very badly to his painful removal, 
owing to what he saw as the terrible way in which he 
was treated by the British (7). His removal triggered 
a spirit of revolt (8), but most importantly it inaugur-
ated a period of instability, because Ruggiero ‘was 
a solid man, but he couldn’t hope to do two full-
time jobs’ (9). Ruggiero focused more on his role as 
spokesman, and created ‘a rather odd situation’ (10) 
which some did not hesitate to describe as a habit 
of imposing a fait accompli on those he was working 
with (11). Be that as it may, internal communication 
(2) Interviews with Willy Hélin, 15  June  2011, and Robert  Pendville, 
24 March 2011. 
(3) Interview with Paul Collowald, 6 September 2010. 
(4) HAEU, ‘European Oral History’, in Olivi, B., ‘The European Commission 
Memories’, 26 January 2004, interviewed by M. Dumoulin and M. Rancon. 
(5) Interview with Jean Somers, 4 October 2010. 
(6) Bastin, G., ‘Une politique de l’information? Le “système Olivi” ou l‘inven-
tion des relations de presse à la Commission européenne’, in La communi­
cation sur l’Europe. Regards croisés, Centre d‘études européennes de Stras-
bourg, Strasbourg, 2007, pp. 125–136. 
(7) Interview with Aneurin Hughes, 5 October 2010. 
(8) Interview with Giancarlo Chevallard, 25 January 2010.
(9) Interview with Paul Collowald, 6 September 2010.
(10) Ibid.
(11) Interview with Roy Pryce, 19 September 2011. 
fact that everyone in reality depended on their own 
commissioner meant that this did not really work, 
because your promotion prospects depended on 
how you got on with your commissioner, and quite 
a few lost their jobs because their commissioner did 
not want to work with them any more’ (1).
The problems faced by the group were compounded 
in 1977, when the distinction that had been made 
between ‘the spokesman’s job, which is to inform, 
(1) Interview with Giancarlo Chevallard, 25 January 2010. 
A native of Treviso and holder of a doctorate in law 
from the University of Padua, Beniamino (known as ‘Bino’) 
Olivi (1925–2011) was a magistrate at Milan’s Court of First 
Instance before joining DG IV in 1959. Deputy head of cabinet 
to Vice-President Caron in 1960, he was appointed spokesman 
the following year. He served in that role until 20 January 1977, 
when he bade farewell to the assembled press. Speaking on 
behalf of the journalists that day, the German Henry Schavoir, 
Brussels correspondent of the German press agency in Hamburg, 
said: ‘Your task has been thankless, but you succeeded in making 
yourself heard and not being stifled by the bureaucracy. You set 
about it the right way through your daily efforts. It was you who 
opened this press room. Before you there was an air of secrecy 
about these corridors. Thanks to you, this press room has become 
a real “European news exchange”.’ (Clément André, ‘Une bourse 
de nouvelles européennes. La salle de presse de la Commission’, 
Courrier du personnel, No 379, 28 February 1977, p. 35.) 
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The Ruggiero period was born of a desire to control 
information and the sources of power it represent-
ed, and set out to break with the approach taken 
previously. Despite the problems it caused, the 
new approach was pursued for the entire Jenkins 
Presidency. Although Ruggiero resigned in Septem-
ber  1978, to be replaced by another Italian, Enzo 
Perlot, it was not until the arrival of Gaston Thorn 
as president in 1981 that the Spokesman’s Group 
channels became blurred. Hayden Phillips, deputy 
head of cabinet to Jenkins, kept a close eye on the 
activities of DG X, which Ruggiero left to one side, 
and an official from DG X, Aneurin Hughes, was 
appointed adviser to the director-general and was 
effectively senior to the two directors. The damage 
to lines of communication spread to the Spokes-
man’s Group, where Roy Jenkins placed a man in 
whom he had confidence, Roger Beetham.
Born in Naples in 1930, Renato Ruggiero (centre) was awarded a doctorate in law by his home-town university and embarked on a 
career in Italy’s diplomatic service in 1953. Appointed head of President Malfatti’s cabinet in July 1970, he briefly acted as adviser to 
President Mansholt before being awarded the post of director-general of DG XVI. In 1977, he combined the role of spokesman with 
that of director-general of DG X, but left the Commission the following year. He returned to Brussels in 1980 as Italy’s permanent 
representative to the European Community.
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mission. Like Olivi, he was a generalist rather than 
a specialist, and like him he was also an arbitrator 
who worked hard to apply the principle that the 
Commission must present a united front, which 
meant trying to ensure consistency between the 
statements made by the various members of the 
Spokesman’s Group (2). It could be a thankless 
task, as some members of the group would fail to 
mention the preparation of a media coup by their 
(2) Interview with Nikolaus van der Pas, 9 June 2010.
was once again separated from DG X, ‘in the light 
of past experience’, as the General Report soberly 
put it (1).
The new spokesman was Manuel Santarelli, who 
had a great deal of experience in communication, 
as he had already been the deputy spokesman in 
Olivi’s time. He shared Olivi’s loyalty to the Com-
(1) EC Commission, Fifteenth General Report on the Activities of the Euro­
pean Communities in 1981, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, Luxembourg, 1982, p. 35. 
1982: Étienne Davignon (centre) holds a press conference accompanied by the spokesman, Manuel Santarelli (right). A member of the 
Jenkins Commission, then vice-president in the Thorn Commission, Étienne Davignon was considered a great communicator. ‘Whenever 
he came to the press room, it would be packed out’, Willy Hélin, a member of the Spokesman’s Group, reported. He was renowned for his 
repartee. Here is an example: on 6 August 1982, Davignon and Haferkamp went to Washington to sign a memorandum of understanding 
with Secretary of State for Trade Malcolm Baldridge on exports of Community steel to the United States. On Saturday, on his return to 
Europe, Davignon learnt that David Roderick, the head of US Steel, had told Reuters that the agreement should be considered null and void. 
That Monday, the vice-president appeared in the press room and announced: ‘I would really like to know which one of them is the president 
of the United States, Mr Roderick or Ronald Reagan!’ The line ‘went global’. (Interview with Willy Hélin, 15 June 2011.) 
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A classic moment
‘The members of the Spokesman’s Service had 
to speak in French. One member’s French was 
not the best. One day, during a press briefing, he 
made his announcement, and then took 
questions from the floor. He was asked [in 
French, but the conversation translates easily 
into English]: “Can the Commission confirm the 
rumour that President Jacques Delors is going to 
resign?” He replied: “Unfortunately not.” The 
press room erupted. He hurriedly added that 
“The word ‘unfortunately’ referred only to my 
ability to answer your question”’ (6).
A good atmosphere in the press 
room 
‘The bar was in the same room. This 
immediately created a convivial atmosphere, 
because when we had finished we would stay 
for a coffee or a beer with the journalists. The 
other thing that helped create a convivial 
atmosphere was that the spokesmen sat at a 
table on the same level as the journalists’ table. 
There was no psychological distance created, we 
were not making grand speeches from a 
rostrum’ (7).
The convivial atmosphere in the press room con-
tinued for a long time (8). But the climate slowly 
changed. The change was attributed to the British 
press, who were present in large numbers and who 
competed hard in a context where European issues 
often made headlines in their papers (9). Asked 
whether there were changes following the entry of 
Spain and Portugal, other eyewitnesses comment 
that the Spanish journalists were ‘very aggressive, 
but in a positive sense … they spent their time writ-
ing negative comments about their government 
(6) Ibid.
(7) Interview with Willy Hélin, 15 June 2011.
(8) Ibid.
(9) Interview with Giancarlo Chevallard, 25 January 2010.
commissioner  (1), or an announcement that their 
commissioner had dissociated himself or herself 
from a vote of the whole Commission (2). 
Maintaining consistency 
The most difficult part of the spokesman’s job, 
therefore, was to maintain consistency, and to en-
sure that everyone else was maintaining consistency, 
between what the president of the Commission was 
asking for and what was said on the Commission’s 
behalf in the press room. To achieve this aim, the 
members of the Spokesman’s Group, who inciden-
tally numbered only three women at the time (3), 
would meet every day in the middle of the morning 
on the first floor of the Berlaymont to prepare the 
midday press briefing. The press briefings were held 
in French. Each briefing was generally quite short, 
but it could sometimes become turbulent owing to 
the questions asked. There was only one exception 
to the rule that the working language was French. If 
a commissioner was present at the press conference, 
there would be interpretation for the commission-
er if necessary (4). The rule requiring French lasted 
until 1995; the justification was that ‘as everyone 
should understand the same thing, only one lan-
guage should be used’ (5). The practice could some-
times lead to comical misunderstandings. 
(1) Interview with Willy Hélin, 15 June 2011. 
(2) Interview with Giancarlo Chevallard, 25 January 2010. 
(3) Liselotte Klein (1973–78), Christine Boon (1980–84) and Françoise Le 
Bail-Elles (1985–89).
(4) Interview with Fabio Colasanti, 25 January 2011. 
(5) Ibid.
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The Spokesman’s Group (later the Spokesman’s Service) in figures
Year Accredited 
journalists
Daily 
briefings
Weekly press 
conferences 
with the 
spokesman
Press 
conferences 
with the 
president or 
commissioners
Press 
releases and 
information 
memos
BIO 
notes
1973 271 305
1974 258 200 40 30 302
1975 260 297
1976 260 297
1977 274 203 42 37 451
1978 285 195 33 45 415
1979 316 181 34 66 450
1980 320 185 36 28 480
1981 340 183 44 40 350 280
1982 365 240 44 40 1 900 850
1983 360 240 44 30 3 000 800
1984 360 200 42 25 2 600 720
1985 390 190 46 65 3 800 753
1986 403 185 47 50 > 4 000 400
Source: European Commission, General Reports from 1973 to 1986.
through a European filter’, thus reflecting the left–
right tensions that could be felt in the press room (1). 
Many journalists did not content themselves with 
the official statements made at the midday press 
briefings. They often made telephone calls, or asked 
for meetings, so that they could get more details 
or discuss the implications of a measure at greater 
length (2). Informal contact might continue over 
lunch at one of the restaurants near the Berlaymont 
frequented by some members of the Spokesman’s 
(1) Interview with Willy Hélin, 15 June 2011. 
(2) Interviews with Nikolaus van der Pas, 9  June  2010, and Martin Vasey, 
20 October 2010.
Group (3). Friendly relations were essential because, 
although the members of the Spokesman’s Group 
had the task of keeping public opinion informed of 
what it needed to know, they had to face the fact 
that the public was not interested, and found Euro-
pean news boring. The journalists posted in Brussels 
had difficulties of the same kind. The stories they 
sent to their papers were considered boring by their 
editors, who could brush them aside with a peremp-
tory ‘we are not interested!’ (4). The public’s lack of 
information on matters European was not solely the 
(3) Interview with Aneurin Hughes, 3 October 2010. 
(4) Interview with Marcell von Donat, 23 July 2010. 
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Commission’s fault. But it was the Commission’s re-
sponsibility to change the state of affairs. 
Draconian measures
Jacques Delors, who was himself ‘an excellent 
spokesman’  (1), introduced draconian reforms  (2). 
As well as renaming the department the Spokes-
man’s Service, he introduced the principle that 
there should be one spokesperson for two com-
missioners, with the spokesperson being of a dif-
ferent nationality to the commissioners (3). Delors 
wanted to avoid the tendency for commissioners 
(1) Interview with Hugo Paemen, 17 March 2011. 
(2) Interview with Fabio Colasanti, 25 January 2011. 
(3) Ibid.
to choose ‘someone with the same nationality and 
often the same political leanings to be their repre-
sentative in the Spokesman’s Group’, and he gave 
the spokesman the right to select his or her own 
staff in the future (4). This decompartmentalisa-
tion provoked strong opposition (5), but it prob-
ably helped to improve the flow of information 
at a time when major projects, such as ‘a citizen’s 
Europe’, were being undertaken, and it was vital 
that ‘the spokesperson for the Commission should 
more than ever try to represent the common inter-
est’ (6).
Michel Dumoulin
(4) Interview with Hugo Paemen, 17 March 2011.
(5) Interview with Fabio Colasanti, 25 January 2011.
(6) Santarelli, M., ‘L’information du citoyen européen’, in Dassetto, F. 
and Dumoulin, M. (eds), Naissance et développement de l’ information 
européenne. Actes des journées d’ étude de Louvain­la­Neuve des 22 mai et 
14 novembre 1990, ‘Euroclio’ collection, ‘Études et documents’ series, Peter 
Lang, Bern … Vienna, 1993, p. 72. 
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Chapter 3  
The Secretariat-General 
and the Legal Service
3.1. The Secretariat-General
Falling within the remit of the president of the 
Commission, the Secretariat-General, headed by 
Émile Noël, was at the heart of the bureaucratic 
machine. The hub of the institution’s internal activ-
ities, it also played a key role in relations with the 
other institutions. 
Appointed secretary-general of the single Commis-
sion in 1967, Noël was a workaholic. The time when 
Walter Hallstein had sought to confine the French-
man to the role of executive secretary had long since 
passed. As the incarnation of the Community sys-
tem and a believer in collegiality rather than the 
president’s right-hand man (1), Noël was adept at 
(1) Interview with Paolo Ponzano, 27 September 2010.
step-by-step policymaking, keen as he was to act in 
a way which would see the states form an ever-closer 
community. He had therefore gradually fashioned a 
tool which served as an interface, performing vari-
ous executive tasks yet also taking some — often 
low-key — initiatives. 
Well-versed in the history of the institution and its 
practices, Noël was like the captain of a ship who 
knew his vessel down to the smallest detail. He also 
knew its strengths and weakness, including those 
of its crew, which explains in particular the impor-
tance he attached to staff promotion. 
3
104 The European Commission 1973–86 — History and Memories of an Institution
Promotion Committee
‘All the directors-general were present and 
every item was prepared well in advance. Whilst 
I was still assigned to the Directorate-General 
for Administration and Personnel, I remember 
this meeting being considered a very important 
moment because it was the point at which 
decisions would be taken on all those matters 
that had been prepared over the course of 
lengthy consultation procedures. The meeting 
took place in the evening and was preceded by a 
small buffet. The next day the officials would 
find out what had happened ... If any 
directors-general tried to call any of the 
Secretariat-General’s proposals into question, 
they would be put in their place by the latter in 
no uncertain terms’ (1). 
A British deputy secretary-general
In 1973, the Secretariat-General was looking for 
a second breath of fresh air in the light of enlarge-
ment. On the one hand, Noël now had an enlarged 
role  (2) and on the other hand, he had to reckon 
with the arrival of a second deputy secretary-general 
in March 1973. In addition to Klaus Meyer, from 
Germany, who would be responsible for overseeing 
relations with the Permanent Representatives Com-
mittee (Coreper) until his departure in Septem-
ber 1977, Christopher Audland, from the United 
Kingdom, would import the administrative cul-
ture of his home country. Arriving from the British 
diplomatic corps, Audland had ‘a terribly military 
side’  (3). He was imposed on Noël, ‘perhaps as an 
alternative solution’ (4), given the failure to appoint 
a new secretary-general, as wished by some, whether 
or not they dared to admit it (5). 
(1) Interview with Daniela Napoli, 27 September 2010. 
(2) Interview with Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi, 27 September 2010.
(3) Interview with Jean-Claude Eeckhout, 27 September 2010. 
(4) Interview with Paolo Ponzano, 27 September 2010.
(5) Interview with Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi, Jean-Claude Eeckhout, Daniela 
Napoli and Paolo Ponzano, 27 September 2010.
‘Émile Noël was a great organiser, but without following the rules that 
administrations usually apply. He established a certain balance between 
personal contact and the formal administrative structure. 
I’m talking about his office because he made sure 
that the usual administrative rules were followed throughout the 
Commission. But he had a rapport with his colleagues that had a formal 
administrative side, sure, but there was a human side to it as well.’ 
(Interview with Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi, 27 September 2010.)
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the government in Bonn had wanted to succeed 
Noël after his retirement. 
A deputy secretary-general 
who would not become 
secretary-general
‘As deputy secretary-general, I had to represent 
the Commission both in Coreper and in the 
context of European political cooperation 
(EPC) ... In Coreper, my representatives included 
[Marcell] von Donat … For EPC, there was a very 
good United Kingdom official, Simon Nuttall … It 
was a doubly heavy weight to bear … I was also 
appointed to represent the Commission in Berlin 
on difficult and in part very specific affairs 
relating to the four-power status [of Berlin]. 
There was one other important matter, namely 
working with [Émile] Noël. The 
secretary-general, legendary figure that he was, 
actually wanted another deputy. However, 
Gaston Thorn and Étienne Davignon had me 
appointed … As a result, I initially had some 
difficulties with Noël, however cooperation 
prevailed between us ... What interested him 
was the development of the Community … The 
federal government wanted me to take over 
from Noël as secretary-general … They 
absolutely wanted a German secretary-general 
within an international institution. Jacques 
Delors would always say: ‘It’s out of my hands.’ 
Then it turned out that at the Fontainebleau 
Summit Margaret Thatcher had struck a deal 
with the French president: the future 
secretary-general would be British’ (9).
Opinions are divided as to Audland’s motives. 
Some believe that ‘no doubt in order to compensate 
for Noël’s authority, which he could not rival, he 
wanted to have procedures he could turn to in order 
to familiarise himself with matters and take action 
under a more hierarchical process, rather than one 
based on direct contact with the official respon-
sible’ (10). For others, ‘this British approach of impos-
ing new procedures and different working methods 
(9) Interview with Horst Krenzler, 20 August 2010. 
(10) Interview with Paolo Ponzano, 27 September 2010. 
The two men had opposite ways of governing. The 
secretary-general had the benefit of experience, an 
in-depth knowledge of the issues and a network of 
officials ‘who often took the initiative to contact him 
in writing for instructions’  (1). Audland, however, 
was looking to promote ‘bureaucratic standardisa-
tion’ (2). ‘Passionate about procedures,’ he assigned 
Aneurin Hughes, also from the Foreign Office and 
responsible for the ‘Internal Coordination’ admin-
istrative unit, to draw up a manual of procedures (3). 
The first version of this working tool, the develop-
ment of which continues to this day, dates back to 
July  1976  (4). And it did not stop there. Oversee-
ing the preparation of the General Report and the 
drafting of the monthly Bulletin of the European 
Communities, he progressively introduced internal 
coordination meetings at the Secretariat-General. 
Together with the Legal Service, he was also behind 
the arrangements introduced in 1974 for monitor-
ing how Community legislation was being trans-
posed into national law (5). 
Responsible for the programme for computeris-
ing administration  (6), which proved particularly 
long (7) and complicated both on a technical level, 
due to how disordered the systems were, and on a 
cooperative level, with services located in Brussels 
and Luxembourg (8), Audland became the sole dep-
uty secretary-general in September 1977, occupying 
the position until December 1981. At this point, 
he handed over the reins to his compatriot Michael 
Jenkins, who was then replaced in September 1984 
by Horst Günter Krenzler, from Germany, whom 
(1) Interview with Paolo Ponzano, 27 September 2010. 
(2) Ibid.
(3) Interview with Aneurin Hughes, 5 October 2010. 
(4) Audland, C., Right Place — Right Time, The Memoir Club, Stanhope, 
2004, p. 242. 
(5) Ibid., p. 245.
(6) Interview with Aneurin Hughes, 5 October 2010. 
(7) The Courrier du personnel did not introduce the regular column on the com-
puterisation of the work of officials, entitled ‘Le bit baladeur’, until May 
1984. 
(8) Interview with Dieter Koenig, 6 May 2011. 
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two areas explain why there were nine administra-
tive units at the Secretariat-General in 1973, and 13 
by 1986. 
Implementation
Very much mindful of its independence  (8), the 
Secretariat-General, with its ‘highly isolated de-
partments’ (9), carried out regular tasks at differing 
speeds.
Working for the College
For the meetings of the College on Wednesdays (10), 
minutes would need to be drafted which Noël 
would read through meticulously. This job, as with 
many other tasks related to the meeting, was car-
ried out under the responsibility of the director of 
the registry, ‘an entirely central unit since it was one 
of the few units working exclusively for the Com-
mission as a College and not for its president or 
particular members of the Commission’ (11). Frans 
De Koster held the position of director of the reg-
istry and was succeeded by Rodolphe Gachot in 
February 1980.
However, the Secretariat-General and in particular 
its chief would not settle for the work of a notary. 
The meeting of the College, if it was to fulfil its 
function, needed to be prepared and its outcomes 
interpreted. This meant work both beforehand and 
afterwards. 
Noël, who ‘knew all the dossiers almost by heart’ (12), 
would chair the Monday meeting of the heads of 
cabinet, other than on the rare occasions when he 
(8) Interview with Jean-Claude Eeckhout, 27 September 2010.
(9) Interview with Eduard Weimar, 21 July 2010.
(10) See Chapter 2, ‘The Commission as a body’.
(11) Interview with Frans De Koster, 13 October 2010.
(12) Interview with Paolo Ponzano, 27 September 2010. 
could … be considered a “strategy for conquering” 
the administrative territory of the Commission’ 
which incidentally ‘significantly improved the style 
of Community procedures which were somewhat 
“old-fashioned”’  (1). At the same time, it meant to 
some extent ‘breaking free from the Franco–Italian 
shackles’ around the method of governance then in 
force at the Secretariat-General (2). 
The balance between what his critics referred to as 
the empiricism of Noël, for whom it was ‘the role 
rather than the grade that mattered’ (3), and Aud-
land’s resolve to establish a hierarchy, is emblematic 
of the trend which took hold during the second half 
of the 1970s. It was at this time that the General 
Reports began to mention very discreetly under the 
staff section the in-depth examinations into how 
the Commission operated and how it was struc-
tured. In other words, the issue of ‘“managing” (4) 
rather than administering’ was raised (5). 
Be that as it may, ‘it was not the Directorate- 
General for Administration that could have made 
Noël restructure his departments’  (6). Or, as Ivor 
Richard used to say: ‘This place will never change 
as long as Émile is there’  (7). There were two areas 
in which nothing would change. The first was im-
plementation, which bore the hallmark of the sec-
retary-general. The second, for want of a name, can 
be described as discreet initiatives with sometimes 
far-reaching consequences. Developments in these 
(1) Interviews with Daniela Napoli, 27  September 2010, and Ivo Dubois, 
7 April 2011: ‘Audland, who was rather austere, brought efficiency, pragma-
tism and clarity with him … It made a very positive contribution to Com-
munity work and the way the Commission was run.’
(2) Interview with Eduard Weimar, 21 July 2010.
(3) Interview with Paolo Ponzano, 27 September 2010. 
(4) See Chapter 6, ‘An administrative culture in transition’.
(5) Courrier du personnel, No 383, 28 July 1977, and EC Commission, Thir­
teenth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in 
1979, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Lux-
embourg, 1980, p. 36: ‘The management and organisation studies carried 
out during the year were mainly concerned with the implementation of 
improvements in organisation, methods and administrative procedures 
suggested by studies on the operation and structure of Commission depart-
ments completed in 1978.’
(6) Interview with Daniela Napoli, 27 September 2010. 
(7) Interview with Aneurin Hughes, 5 October 2010.
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Relations with the Council
The gifts of diplomacy and political skill exercised 
by Noël within the Commission, accompanied by 
an exceptional knowledge of the matters at hand, 
also shone through in relations with the Council 
and Coreper for which the agenda for the Thurs-
day meeting ‘was largely based on the decisions and 
discussions of the Commission’  (7). Deputy Secre-
tary-General Meyer had responsibility in this area, 
which was passed on to Audland in 1977 and then 
to his successors. 
In short, what did the Secretariat-General of 
the  Commission do? As Paolo Ponzano  explains: 
‘Prior to Council and Coreper meetings, it contact-
ed officials from the Council but gradually also the 
Presidency, often to test an idea in order to find out 
what the sensitive areas for the delegations were — 
should a compromise need to be proposed. Contact 
was made by telephone, which gradually became 
common practice across the institutions. Meetings 
with the Commission and its Secretariat-General 
would be convened by the Presidency in order to 
discuss matters before each meeting. In those days, 
a lot was done by telephone. Noël’s Secretariat 
would call its counterpart headed by Niels Ersbøll, 
Secretary-General of the Council, or vice versa, 
when very sensitive matters were being referred over 
to the meeting of the ambassadors (Coreper II) and 
even more so when the conclusions of the European 
Council were being drafted’ (8). 
But the role of the Secretariat-General did not stop 
there. At least until 1977, Noël was able to keep 
‘half an ear’ on the Special Committee on Agri-
culture. His role was almost that of a clerk ‘noting 
what appeared important in the preparations for 
the Council’ (9). 
(7) Interview with Klaus Meyer, 20 October 2010.
(8) Interview with Paolo Ponzano, 27 September 2010.
(9) Interview with François Benda, 2 November 2010. 
would be called away to attend Coreper  (1). Dis-
liking the fact that certain heads of cabinet ‘had a 
habit of sending their number two or number three’ 
as a replacement (2), he did not chair this meeting, 
which represented an opportunity to oil the wheels, 
out of a sense of duty, but rather did so in order that 
the president’s cabinet need not take on this role 
and could therefore ‘express certain wishes, certain 
political lines more directly’ (3). From 1977–78 on-
wards, special meetings of the heads of cabinet were 
held  (4), generally attended by a delegated cabinet 
colleague. These meetings would address technical 
matters, which increased in number and complexity 
as the responsibilities of the Community grew (5). 
In keeping with Noël’s philosophy and style, the 
Wednesday meetings of the College, prepared 
on the previous Monday, would require feeding 
back to the directorates-general. On Thursdays, he 
would therefore chair a meeting of the directors- 
general, which some would avoid attending. This 
was probably because Noël ‘often used this meeting 
… to “give a lecture”, in other words to say that now 
was not the time to present a particular document, 
that it would not go through, nor was it likely to go 
through in the next fortnight or month because it 
had been presented far too early and prompted a 
number of objections’ (6). 
Knowing his flock and keen to complete the picture, 
the secretary-general would make sure a meeting 
was held on Fridays with the assistants to the dir-
ectors-general to ensure messages had got through, 
sometimes explaining in greater detail what had 
been said to the directors-general the day before. 
(1) In this case, the meeting would be chaired by the president’s head of cabinet. 
Interview with Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi, 27 September 2010.
(2) Interview with Jean-Claude Eeckhout, 27 September 2010.
(3) Interview with Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi, 27 September 2010.
(4) Explained in greater detail in section 4.1, ‘Coordination and decision- 
making process in the Commission’.
(5) Interview with Jean-Claude Eeckhout and Paolo Ponzano, 27 September 
2010.
(6) Interview with Frans De Koster, 13 October 2010. 
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This anecdote is indicative of the importance of 
the Secretariat-General, which had duties with an 
undeniably political impact, one example being the 
production of the General Report. 
From the second half of 1975, the Secretariat-
General also participated in the Antici Group, 
acting through one of its officials. Named after the 
Italian diplomat, Paolo Antici, who was the first to 
chair the group, it was made up of one official from 
each permanent representation, one official from 
the General Secretariat of the Council and one from 
the Commission. It was responsible for ‘approving 
the minutes of the weekly Coreper meetings and 
preparing the agenda for the next meeting’ (1). Over 
time, the role of its members and, as such, of the des-
ignated official from the Commission’s Secretariat-
General would be extended.
Relations with the Parliament
The Secretariat-General was also responsible for 
relations with the European Parliament, which, 
as with relations with the Economic and Social 
Committee, fell within the remit of the deputy 
secretary-general. There was only one exception 
to this rule. Admittedly it did not last long, but it 
was nevertheless testimony to the flexibility which 
was often required of the Secretariat-General. In 
1976, David Marquand, a former British member of 
Parliament for the Labour Party and a close friend 
of President Jenkins, was appointed chief adviser in 
the Secretariat-General. As he himself remembers: 
‘This was a kind of deal between Jenkins and Émile 
Noël.’ The president considered his compatriot and 
friend as a kind of private parliamentary secretary 
who was a member of neither the cabinet nor the 
Secretariat-General. Initially, his role was to focus 
on relations with the Parliament. However, the 
president quickly stopped developing this area of ac-
tivity, and so the ‘pontifical legate on heretical terri-
tory’, as Noël would jokingly refer to him, returned 
to England (2).
(1) Interview with Marcell von Donat, 23 July 2010. 
(2) Interview with David Marquand, 7 June 2011. 
The role of the members 
of the Antici Group
‘The result of obscure circumstances, the 
primary duty of the Antici Group was for its 
members to wait outside the door to the 
meeting room where the European Council took 
place. They were the personal manservants to 
the heads of government, raised to the level of 
plenipotentiaries. Only they could enter the 
meeting room if ever a head of government 
required anything. I was the Antici assistant to 
President Delors. I brought him documents, 
aspirin or informed his wife if, once again, the 
meeting would be running over. Every head of 
government had his or her own Antici assistant. 
The Antici Group would sit around a table in 
front of the Council meeting room. The heads of 
government would summon their Antici 
assistants much as servants were once called to 
the lounge, by pressing a buzzer. If a C, for 
Commission, appeared in the black box, I knew I 
was required inside … Assistants entered the 
room very quickly and left very slowly. Then they 
would each tell the rest of the group outside 
what they had heard. By piecing together all this 
information, we were more or less able to follow 
what was being negotiated. We wrote it down on 
a piece of paper and passed it on to our 
delegations. The ministers and ambassadors in 
office would be informed on the basis of these 
rather arbitrary notes … It was quite 
unbelievable. But fascinating … ’ (3).
(3) Interview with Marcell von Donat, 23 July 2010. He is the author of Brüs­
seler Machenschaften: Dem Euro­Clan auf der Spur, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 
1975.
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table, to show the type of text Émile Noël was look-
ing for,’ reported Jean-Claude Eeckhout (8). On the 
other hand, the work of checking, selection and 
harmonisation, which would entail redrafting, had 
to be done very quickly because ‘this report covered 
the whole year right up to 31 December and had to 
be available in all languages, in book form, 6 weeks 
later,’ in the words of Ivo Dubois (9). However, for 
the officials responsible for this particularly onerous 
and stressful task, their troubles were not yet over. 
The report contained an introduction which was 
written by the person responsible for the report. It 
firstly had to be checked by the deputy secretary- 
general and then finally by the secretary-general, 
whose reading of it would be ‘extremely rigorous’ (10). 
As the icing on the cake, so to speak, Christopher 
Audland ‘added his two cents worth and intro-
duced the memorandum annexed to the address on 
the programme, which was a more technical text’ 
that would also need to be finalised (11). This addi-
tional memorandum would be phased out follow-
ing the departure of its creator and replaced by the 
programming of the Commission’s activities.
‘And the raccoon?’
The programming exercise itself was introduced 
by Hans Beck, a former member of Wilhelm 
Haferkamp’s cabinet, who was assigned to the 
Secretariat-General where ‘he completely over-
hauled Audland’s system’  (12). It involved inviting 
the directorates-general to document the initiatives 
they were proposing to launch over the coming year. 
The replies, which were submitted to Noël for his 
opinion and comments, would inevitably evoke 
Inventaire, the 1946 poem by Jacques Prévert, so 
much so that in reading the end result of the pro-
gramme, the secretary-general would be prompted 
(8) Interview with Jean-Claude Eeckhout, 27 September 2010.
(9) Interview with Ivo Dubois, 7 April 2011. 
(10) Ibid. 
(11) Interview with Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi, 27 September 2010.
(12) Ibid. 
The ‘Commission’s business card’ (1)
Imposed by Article 18 of the Merger Treaty, the 
General  Report on the Activities of the European 
Communities had to be submitted to the President 
of the European Parliament in February. It was 
hugely important as far as Noël was concerned as it 
was ‘a way for him to convey messages’ (2). He con-
sidered it the ‘Commission’s business card’, which 
required a huge amount of work and had to be ‘ac-
curate, obsessively meticulous and could not have a 
single mistake. The actions of the Commission were 
always checked and double-checked to be sure that 
what was being said was true!’ (3). 
As material proof of the importance which Noël at-
tached to the exercise, it was ‘the secretary-general 
who drew up the contents page, submitting it to the 
Commission for approval by written procedure’ (4). 
However, it was a contents page with a given focus 
as ‘the directorates-general would be asked to ad-
dress certain matters and not others’ (5).
The procedure for drawing up the report was rather 
special, both in terms of how it was done and the 
length of time it took. On the one hand, it was 
very carefully crafted, with the directorates-general 
being asked for contributions, whilst also drawing 
on the monthly  bulletin (discussed below), which 
provided a valuable basis on which to work (6). These 
contributions, which would have to be checked to 
make sure that what was written corresponded with 
reality (7), tended to create another type of problem. 
Some ‘directorates-general provided better contri-
butions than others, to the extent that sometimes 
when one … was clearly inferior … the contribution 
from a very good DG would be offered, under the 
(1) Interview with Jean-Claude Eeckhout, 27 September 2010. 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) Interview with Eduard Weimar, 21 July 2010. 
(4) Interview with Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi, 27 September 2010. 
(5) Interview with Paolo Ponzano, 27 September 2010. 
(6) Interview with Ivo Dubois, 7 April 2011.
(7) Interview with Eduard Weimar, 21 July 2010.
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power (5). Noël would therefore use but not abuse 
this power, including for subsidies coming under 
the ad personam category, which harsher tongues 
would call his slush fund. A slush fund it was not, 
because from setting up the first Centre for Euro-
pean Studies in the United Kingdom to support-
ing the Council of European Municipalities and 
Regions, the boost it offered was always subject to 
written procedure (6). 
While any claim to be exhaustive would be illu-
sory,  it is worth mentioning, in addition to initia-
tives such as organising and consulting the historical 
archives (7), those initiatives which targeted areas as 
diverse as the inspection of external delegations and 
offices, culture and emergency aid. Such initiatives 
would always be in response to a request, be it inter-
nal or external, long term or short term. 
Inspection of delegations
Noël believed he should have a special relationship 
with the heads of the press and information offices. 
Two or three times a year he would therefore send an 
official from the Secretariat-General to visit one or 
more of these offices. Based on interviews with the 
staff and the head, a report would be sent to Noël, 
who would not divulge its content, not even to the 
director-general of DG  X  (8). As well as illustrat-
ing once again how Noël would exercise personal 
power, this more or less informal inspection would 
sooner or later also pave the way for an innovation 
that had an impact on the Commission’s growing 
presence in EU and non-EU countries.
In 1982, the Commission decided to establish a 
unit responsible for inspecting the external offices 
(5) Ibid. 
(6) Interview with Jean-Claude Eeckhout, 27 September 2010. 
(7) Audland, C., ‘The historical archives of the European Union: Their opening 
to the public, management and accessibility’, The Journal of the Society of 
Archivists, Vol. 28, No 2, 2007, pp. 177–192.
(8) Interview with Jean-Claude Eeckhout, 27 September 2010. 
to add a comment directly inspired by the poem 
to emphasise the confusion, disorder and lack of 
structure to the text submitted to him: ‘a series of 
small dots followed by a single sentence “and the 
raccoon”’ (1).
‘Cuckoos’ eggs’ (2)
Like the bird that hosts the cuckoo’s egg, the Sec-
retariat-General played a sometimes decisive role in 
introducing new subject areas within the Commis-
sion. In particular, these would be areas which did 
not initially fall within the remit of the Communi-
ties. This incubator role taken on by the Secretar-
iat-General required ‘vision since it meant looking 
beyond the Community acquis, courage since it 
would involve entering unexplored territory, power 
since new approaches would have to be imposed on 
lawyers and Community “fundamentalists”, and fi-
nally strategic ability since it was vital to proceed in 
a way which did not offend the sensibilities of the 
Member  States, whilst still ensuring that decisive 
initiatives were implemented’ (3). 
The conditions were clear, as were the motives. The 
topics that the Secretariat-General would place in 
incubation often came under the responsibility of 
several directorates-general. It was therefore im-
portant for them to be entrusted to a department 
which would ensure coordinated management 
whilst taking advantage of the fact that, until the 
1982 interinstitutional agreement on budgetary 
matters, amounts could be entered in the budget 
even without a legal basis (4). In this respect, it 
should be said that the Secretariat-General was 
responsible for managing subsidies not necessarily 
because it had to, but because by giving out sub-
sidies Émile Noël could consolidate a position of 
(1) Interview with Daniela Napoli, 27 September 2010. 
(2) Interview with Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi, 27 September 2010.
(3) Interview with Daniela Napoli, 27 September 2010.
(4) Interview with Paolo Ponzano, 27 September 2010. 
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fice were brought together with relations with the 
Economic and Social Committee. 
Emergency aid
On 28 August 1977, a particularly devastating tor-
nado hit the small town of Ronchi on the Riviera 
di Versilia, Tuscany. At that time, Umberto Stefani, 
the owner of a small house in the region, was prin-
cipal adviser for relations with Coreper  II at the 
Secretariat-General. With the support of Commis-
sioner Lorenzo Natali, he spearheaded the initiative 
to create an interservice group for emergency aid to 
Member States (4). 
What was new about it was not so much that emer-
gency aid was to be provided, since the principle was 
already being applied with respect to non-EU coun-
tries by DG VIII (5); rather this was an attempt to 
coordinate and achieve economies of scale with the 
funds used to help victims of disasters occurring in 
Member States. This was at a time when ‘a disaster 
culture’ was developing outside of the Commission, 
particularly in the Council of Europe  (6). Up to 
that time, certain directorates-general would take 
action as part of their sectoral responsibilities, rang-
ing from agriculture to transport. However, since 
this involved having to manage budget lines which 
had little funding and were difficult to access, the 
opportunity was seized in 1977 to go beyond ‘emer-
gency intervention which would generally be a sym-
bolic gesture, albeit reported on in the press, with a 
photo of the cheque being handed over to the bene-
ficiary … in favour of pursuing more serious matters 
where the Regional Fund, the European Agricul-
tural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) 
and other sources would need to be used,’ whilst 
ensuring everything was coordinated. Over time, 
this coordination led to the creation of a network 
(4) Interview with Umberto Stefani, 9 June 2010. 
(5) Interview with Paolo Ponzano, 27 September 2010. 
(6) Interview with Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi, 27 September 2010. 
and delegations (1). Checks would focus on the one 
hand on their actual functioning, and on the 
other hand on their financial management. Inspired 
by the system introduced by DG VIII for inspect-
ing projects supported by the European Develop-
ment Fund (EDF), responsibility was assigned to 
Eduard Weimar, formerly of the European Agency 
for Cooperation, who had moved to the Secretar-
iat-General. The decision to place the unit there was 
somewhat surprising. It was the result of a ‘huge 
fight between DG I and DG VIII. With neither of 
them wanting to back down, a third player [Noël] 
was all too happy to take it on,’ and so he made off 
with the prize, Eduard Weimar laughingly recalls, 
adding that DG X was also involved but had less of 
a say in the matter, as the other two DGs carried 
more weight (2).
European Youth Forum
At the end of the 1970s, the economic crisis, to-
gether with the alarming results of surveys into how 
young Europeans felt about Europe, led to the cre-
ation of the European Youth Forum in 1979. In con-
junction with the Parliament and the Commission, 
various activities geared towards this section of the 
population were organised, including a campaign 
about youth employment (3). In principle, there was 
no reason why the Secretariat-General should get 
involved, or indeed the social partners, for whom an 
office had been created in 1977. So once again the 
same thing happened. Amid a particularly gloomy 
climate, initiatives were lacking and, with several 
DGs proving incapable of cooperating, the Secretar-
iat-General played the role of incubator, although 
over time responsibilities were grouped in a single 
administrative unit: in 1986 the forum and the of-
(1) EC Commission, Sixteenth General Report on the Activities of the European 
Communities 1982, Office for Official Publications of the European Com-
munities, Luxembourg, 1983, p. 28.
(2) Interview with Eduard Weimar, 21 July 2010. 
(3) EC Commission, Sixteenth General Report on the Activities of the European 
Communities 1982, Office for Official Publications of the European Com-
munities, Luxembourg, 1983, pp. 37–38.
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ficials at the Secretariat-General responsible for 
forward planning were left to themselves. Present 
when the group was established, Eduard Weimar 
remembers: ‘Nobody knew what they were sup-
posed to do or how they were supposed to do it, 
where intervention was possible or what help could 
be requested’  (6). The arrival of Michael Jenkins 
2  years later, in May 1979, brought no change to 
the situation since he prepared dossiers for the me-
dium term, particularly on budgetary matters, and 
without asking anything of anyone. In 1981, when 
Jenkins replaced Audland as deputy secretary- 
general, Michel Vanden Abeele took over the helm: 
‘A point for consideration by the cabinet,’ he re-
ported ‘ … our small team has worked a little on 
the medium-term prospects for Europe … We tried 
to launch the idea of a Europe at different speeds … 
We produced some good work but there was no pol-
itical will to use it’ (7). Did this will exist in 1983 
when Jean-Louis Lacroix replaced Vanden Abeele? 
According to Jérôme Vignon, who led the forward 
studies unit after Lacroix’s untimely death, it was 
only with Jacques Delors, who was initially some-
what bemused as to the use of such a body, that ‘the 
group headed by Jean-Louis Lacroix was called on 
directly to make a substantive contribution to insti-
tutional affairs, on matters which really concerned 
everyday work. It was a sort of extra cabinet’ (8).
Given the many varied and often complicated duties 
of the Secretariat-General, this begs the question 
as to how it fulfilled an essential function, namely 
sending out information to its own officials but also 
to the whole Commission and, of course, to an even 
wider public. 
(6) Interview with Eduard Weimar, 21 July 2010. 
(7) Interview with Michel Vanden Abeele, 30 November 2010.
(8) Interview with Jérôme Vignon, 4 April 2011. 
of specialists active within the disaster units in the 
different directorates-general (1). 
Culture 
In December 1981, Robert Grégoire was appoint-
ed to head the unit for cultural questions, a pos-
ition in which he would stay until his retirement 
in May 1985 (2). The creation of this unit is inter-
esting in itself. It is no secret that at that time, as 
Grégoire  writes, ‘all our governments would have 
protested against attempts by the Community to 
meddle with what they would have portrayed, with 
varying degrees of hypocrisy, as the core of their sov-
ereignty … Community action was not supposed to 
attract attention. It was meant to evolve almost out 
of sight’ (3). However, at the same time, the Thorn 
Presidency gave momentum to a cultural policy, as 
is evident from the president’s speech of 24 Novem-
ber 1981 to the European Parliament’s Committee 
on Youth, Culture, Education, Information and 
Sport. This momentum was also apparent from the 
space now set aside for culture in the General Re-
port. Yet no directorate-general was capable of 
hosting this cuckoo’s egg. Once again, the Secretar-
iat-General would serve as the incubator for an area 
it was not intended to take care of (4). 
Forward planning
A group of advisers appeared on the organ-
isation chart of the Secretariat-General in 
September  1977. It was created on the request of 
Roy Jenkins ‘as an extension to the cabinets and 
to swell the number of trusted people’  (5),  as il-
lustrated by the case of David Marquand referred 
to earlier. In practice, this meant that the few of-
(1) Interview with Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi, 27 September 2010. 
(2) ‘Au revoir Monsieur Culture’, Courrier du personnel, No 464, May 1985.
(3) Grégoire, R., Vers une Europe de la Culture, du Théâtre à l’action communau­
taire, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2000, p. 62.
(4) See Chapter 25, ‘At the service of the European citizen: information policy, 
a people’s Europe, culture, education and training’.
(5) Interview with Michel Vanden Abeele, 30 November 2010. 
113Chapter 3 — The Secretariat-General and the Legal Service 
On 8 and 9 January 1985, Jacques Delors summoned the members of his new Commission to Royaumont Abbey, a former Cistercian 
monastery in Asnières-sur-Oise, some 30 kilometres north of Paris, before their first meeting in Brussels. Only Claude Cheysson, who was 
busy with the negotiations for Lomé III, failed to turn up. Referring to his time working with Pascal Lamy and Émile Noël from August 
1984 during his tour of the capitals, Jacques Delors wrote in his memoirs: ‘From the outset I received the enthusiastic support of one of 
the founding fathers of Europe, Émile Noël, ... the foremost secretary-general of the Commission since its creation. He had become such 
a key part of the Commission that you couldn’t help but wonder sometimes whether it was he who had put his mark on this policy or that 
decision’ (Delors, J. and Arnaud, J.-L., Mémoires, Plon, Paris, 2004, p. 182). Hence the observation by one witness to ‘intellectual conflicts 
between Noël and Delors’ that Delors ‘admired Noël’s independent spirit’ (interview with Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi, 27 September 2010), 
while another commented that, in 1985, ‘the president’s cabinet began to whittle away the secretary-general’s powers’ (interview with 
Paolo Ponzano, 27 September 2010).
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foundations for ‘the entire body of information 
about the activities of the Commission and the 
Community’ (2). Moreover, without expanding on 
the role played by the external Daily Bulletin from 
Agence Europe, it should be mentioned that in the 
1970s, as well as having the Courrier du personnel, 
officials could also call ‘Informaphone’ from their 
work telephones in Brussels, then Luxembourg 
(1  March  1973) and ultimately Ispra (Novem-
ber  1978), in order to listen to the Commission’s 
daily news bulletin (3). 
So everything would have been for the best in the 
best of worlds ‘had there not been this oral circu-
(2) Interview with Ivo Dubois, 7 April 2011. 
(3) According to the Seventh General Report on the Activities of the European 
Communities in 1973 (Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, Luxembourg, 1974, p.  96), each daily bulletin received 
about 1 000 calls in 1973. 
Information 
Under Noël, there was no real, established pro-
cedure for circulating information within the Sec-
retariat-General or, on a larger scale, across the 
Commission departments, despite the existence 
of a standard hierarchical channel for passing on 
information. At the registry, Lucien Depaus set up 
a simple but extremely effective system involving a 
team of around 20 people which allowed internal 
documents to be circulated quickly (1). The month-
ly bulletin was a further source of information, the 
culmination of a very complicated and extreme-
ly demanding journalistic exercise which laid the 
(1) Interview with Frans De Koster, 14 October 2010. In an additional note, 
he wrote: ‘For the sake of completeness, it should be mentioned that there 
was an “office for secret documents”, with a statistics unit as of 1975 for 
cooperation with delegations in certain non-EU countries.’ 
Administratively part of 
DG IX, not DG X or the 
Spokesman’s Group as 
many officials believed, the 
Informaphone was used by 
Émile Noël every Wednesday 
night to inform interested 
members of staff about the 
results of the Commission 
meeting. Original illustration 
published in the Courrier 
du personnel, No 377, 
20 December 1977, p. 98. 
The Official Journal of the European Communities (P series) which, in April 1958, replaced the 
Official Journal of the European Coal and Steel Community (A series), created in 1952, was split into 
two series in 1968: L (legislation) and C (information and notices). Like a factory with a multitude of 
tasks to complete every day, the Official Journal, which has become increasingly automated since 
1979 both in its composition and distribution, is published by the Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities in Luxembourg in all the official languages of the Member States (other than 
Irish) from the date of their accession.
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3.2. The Legal Service
As early as 1965, President Walter Hallstein had 
made the memorable statement that the European 
Community’s only weapon was the law: ‘The 
Community is not merely a creation of law. There 
is virtually no other holder of public power that is, 
like the Community, exclusively dependent on law 
in order to carry out its functions. The Community 
has no administrative infrastructure, no direct 
power of coercion, no army and no police. Its 
only tool, its only weapon, is the law that it estab-
lishes’ (7).
Indeed, the Commission’s lawyers, organised with-
in the influential Legal Service, battled on various 
fronts, in particular at the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities in Luxembourg. Pioneer-
ing research on the history of European law shows 
clearly that the Legal Service played a fundamental 
role in establishing a Community law which was 
‘constitutional’ in nature, in opposition to those 
who wanted to reduce it to one of several branches 
of international law. 
The director-general until 1969, Michel Gaudet, 
left a lasting mark on his colleagues, in particular 
because of his ability to allow a teleological inter-
pretation of the treaties to emerge, which went hand 
in hand with the primacy and direct effect of Euro-
pean law in relation to national law (8). 
Gaudet’s successors tried to retain and consolidate 
that direction, at the same time modernising the 
(7) HAEC, Archive of speeches, Speech by Walter Hallstein on 17 June 1965 
to the European Parliament in the legal debate on the report ‘Priorité du 
droit communautaire sur celui des États membres’, cited by Louis, J-V., ‘Com-
munity law 50 years on’, in Baquero Cruz, J. and Closa Montero, C. (eds), 
European Integration from Rome to Berlin 1957–2007: History, Law and 
Politics, PIE-Peter Lang, Brussels, 2009, pp. 65–91.
(8) On Gaudet, see Dumoulin, M., ‘The administration’, in Dumoulin, M. 
(ed.), The European Commission, 1958–72 — History and Memories, Of-
fice for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 
2007, pp. 219–239.
lation of information within a special network’ (1) 
which many of those involved refer to as Noël’s net-
work. This explains not only why certain officials 
had access to the secretary-general without having 
to go through the usual channels, but also why 
others felt they were at the mercy of successive leaks, 
the origin of which lay in what Noël wished or did 
not wish to share. 
What this meant was that the concept of transpar-
ency was largely unheard of, as illustrated by Noël’s 
refusal to publish the Commission organisation 
chart for fear of junior officials being put under 
pressure by Member States or lobbyists (2). 
Towards modernisation: management 
and organisation (3)
Even if, at the end of the period covered by this 
volume, ‘it is clear that the Secretariat-General was 
where the power ultimately rested in terms of how 
the Commission arrived at a decision’  (4), the fact 
remains that in September 1985, the College ap-
proved the policy lines for modernising the Euro-
pean civil service (5). The following year an action 
plan was developed, the aim of which was to mo-
tivate every official by more clearly defining their 
responsibilities and improving the way information 
was circulated (6). As in other areas of Commission 
life, one period had well and truly drawn to a close, 
and another was beginning. 
Michel Dumoulin
(1) Interview with Paolo Ponzano, 27 September 2010.
(2) Ibid. 
(3) For further details see Chapter 6, ‘An administrative culture in transition’.
(4) Interview with Aneurin Hughes, 5 October 2010. 
(5) See section 1.1, ‘Dynamics of organisational change’, and Chapter 6, ‘An 
administrative culture in transition’.
(6) EC Commission, Twentieth General Report on the Activities of the Europe­
an Communities in 1986, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, Luxembourg, 1987, p. 44.
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broken by the arrival of President Roy Jenkins and 
the resolution of a political conflict within the rul-
ing coalition parties in Germany.
Ehlermann’s 10 years at the helm can be seen as a 
period of modernisation which helped to increase 
the prestige of the Legal Service as a centre of ex-
cellence at the vanguard of European integration. 
This was achieved by retaining the best traditions 
from the earlier period, while Ehlermann himself 
was a pure product of the Legal Service, which 
he had joined in 1961. Having worked for 8  years 
under Olmi on complex common agricultural pol-
icy issues, Ehlermann turned to institutional mat-
ters in 1969 under the supervision of Olivier. He 
was therefore the linchpin of the Vedel Committee 
secretariat set up at the request of Commissioner 
Altiero Spinelli to reform the functioning of the 
European institutions. This career path was inter-
rupted in 1973, when the French commissioner, 
Claude Cheysson, suggested that he become a dir-
ector in financial control, where he was responsible 
for the first amendment to the Treaty of Rome with 
the adoption of the Budgetary Treaty (2), before re-
turning to the Legal Service.
More modernisation followed when Ehlermann 
highlighted the horizontal and collective aspect of 
the service in 1977 by making the rotation of its 
lawyers obligatory. This was made easier by the fact 
that the College had not determined once and for 
all the internal structure of the Legal Service (which 
comprised some 10 thematic teams and several hori-
zontal groups headed by grade A2 managers). 
Rotation, at least for young lawyers, was an accept-
ed principle but was applied only occasionally. It 
was Ehlermann who made it systematic within the 
service. It was necessary to prevent lawyers from 
being too influenced by the directorate-general they 
were advising and becoming too set in the ways and 
(2) HAEU, ‘European Oral History’, Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, ‘The Euro-
pean Commission memories’, 29 January 2004, interview by Y. Conrad 
and M. Rancon.
service in order to adapt it to the enlargement and 
deepening of the Community. This was facilitated 
by the fact that, exceptionally, his successors Walter 
Much and Claus-Dieter Ehlermann had worked in 
the Legal Service for a long time. This explains why, 
in the period covered by this volume, the service was 
able to maintain an esprit de corps unparalleled in-
side the Community administration.
The staff and organisation of the Legal 
Service
When Gaudet left in 1969, Walter Much provid-
ed that continuity until his death in 1975. He had 
already been Gaudet’s deputy after being the last 
director-general of the Legal Service of the ECSC 
before the legal services of the three communities 
merged in 1967. While working at the German 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in 1950 he had also 
taken part in the preparatory negotiations for the 
Treaty of Paris as a member of the German delega-
tion led by Walter Hallstein. Shortly afterwards, he 
had joined the ECSC’s new legal service, which was 
headed by Robert Krawielicki from its inception 
until 1966. At the head of the Legal Service, Much 
received very solid support from Gérard Olivier, 
an ENA graduate and French prefect, who had 
also come from the ECSC’s legal service, which he 
had joined in 1955. Olivier did not leave the Legal 
Service until 1972, after 17 years, and was replaced 
as deputy director-general by the Italian Giancarlo 
Olmi, who stayed in office until 1987. 
Olmi played a rather important role since, between 
Walter Much’s premature death in 1975 and the ap-
pointment of his successor, Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, 
in March 1977, he was acting director-general for a 
long period because of the opposition to having a 
German in place as director-general  (1), at a time 
when that post was the subject of a certain rivalry 
between France and Germany. The deadlock was 
(1) Interview with Jean Groux, 25 June 2010.
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Furthermore, the Legal Service was not cut off from 
the outside world. Ehlermann also expanded the 
policy of opening up the world of Commission law-
yers to universities. While Gaudet was in charge, he 
deliberately encouraged contacts with law societies 
and lawyers’ associations by financing the creation 
of the International Federation for European Law 
(FIDE) and specialised journals, but his successor 
went a step further. Ehlermann became personal-
ly involved with the academic world as a lecturer 
at the College of Europe in Bruges between 1971 
and 1981 and subsequently at the Université libre 
de Bruxelles (ULB). He even ‘rather encouraged 
colleagues who were wondering whether or not to 
leave the service and teach, and therefore embark on 
an academic career’ (1). 
(1) Interview with Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, 8 October 2010.
routine of their field. Mobility would give them 
an overview of Community law, enabling them to 
draw up opinions that took account not only of the 
sector covered but also of other sectors, thereby pro-
moting the consistency of Community law. More-
over, when mobility later became general policy in 
the Commission, the service could point out that it 
already operated such a policy. 
The modernisation brought about by Ehlermann 
within the Legal Service did not stop at rotation. 
It also concerned better dissemination of informa-
tion within the service and wider participation in 
administrative management. In other words, man-
agers were consulted more often on administrative 
matters, including promotions. Lawyers could have 
a voice through a ‘transparency group’, while sec-
retaries had a system of self-organisation and were 
consulted on changes in assignment.
Family photo of the Commission’s Legal Service, 1979. Its director-general, Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, believed that ‘the strength 
of the Legal Service lay in its ability to see a problem from different angles or perspectives and to combine those facets of often 
very complex problems.’ (Interview with Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, 8 October 2010.)
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previous volume, were (and still are) to provide legal 
advice to the Commission and its departments and 
to represent the Commission before the Court of 
Justice.
With regard to the first function, the opinion of 
the Legal Service was necessary to allow the Com-
mission to consider a decision, proposal or  any 
other formal position. That involved intense pre-
paratory work by the operational departments, 
which avoided as far as possible submitting a draft 
act to the College without a favourable opinion 
from the Legal Service. Moreover, a commissioner 
could not carry out the empowerment procedure if 
the Legal Service did not give a favourable opinion: 
in that case the commissioner lost the power to de-
cide alone and had to submit the proposed decision 
to the College.
This mechanism, which the Commission had 
wanted from the outset, gave the Legal Service 
considerable influence. Its prestige was enhanced 
by its role as the Commission’s advocate before the 
Court. The Commission could find itself in the 
position of a plaintiff before the Court, in particu-
lar in infringement proceedings against the Mem-
ber States, or a defendant where a Member State 
or a company petitioned for one of its decisions to 
be annulled. In addition, it systematically made 
observations on requests for a preliminary ruling 
referred to the Court by a national court. In all 
these cases, a member of the Legal Service was ap-
pointed by the Commission as an agent and given 
wide discretion.
Unlike the operational departments, the Legal Ser-
vice is not supposed to receive instructions from 
the  members of the Commission on the content 
of legal opinions. It is subordinate to the president 
only in administrative terms. Furthermore, the dir-
ector-general of the Legal  Service takes part in all 
meetings of the College. This enables the Legal Ser-
vice to build up a wealth of information, in the same 
way as the Secretariat-General. 
This opening up further cemented the Legal Ser-
vice’s place as a cornerstone of the legal community, 
a process that had been begun by Gaudet. In addi-
tion, there was the introduction of regular lunches 
with the ‘rival’ legal service of the Council, so it 
cannot be said that the Legal Service was an ivory 
tower. Its value came from the quality and versatility 
of its staff, because the service was relatively small in 
relation to the impact it had on the development of 
European law. In 1974, there were only 66 A grade, 
17 B grade, 44 C grade and 13 LA officials. The latter 
were responsible for reviewing the legal and linguis-
tic concordance of legal documents and for translat-
ing written pleadings. They were also pioneers in the 
use of computers in the legal world through the cre-
ation of the CELEX database (1). That database of 
all Community legislative acts made online consul-
tation in French possible from 1981, before making 
it available in the main official languages in 1985. 
This primacy of the French language should come as 
no surprise because French remained the predom-
inant working language both within the service and 
in the deliberations of the Court of Justice, despite 
the enlargement of 1973, which had no immediate 
effect in this regard. 
Beyond that, the attitude introduced by Ehlermann 
was above all to attach less importance to grade 
than to the value of legal opinions expressed with-
in the Legal Service during the process of drafting 
advice (2). 
The functions of the Legal Service
We should bear in mind that the two essential func-
tions of the Legal Service, as already outlined in the 
(1) Bernet, H., ‘Les racines: histoire de CELEX 1963–86’, 25 years of European 
law online, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 
Luxembourg, 2006, pp.  11–25; Interview with Hélène Bernet and Jean-
Claude Séché, 14 June 2011.
(2) Informal interview with Giuliano Marenco, 11 June 2013.
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sion in the well-known AETR case  (2), the Court 
affirmed the view that there was a ‘parallelism’ be-
tween the Community’s internal and external com-
petences, which it later had the opportunity to de-
velop further in subsequent cases (see in particular 
Opinion 1/76 on the draft agreement establishing a 
European laying-up fund for inland waterway ves-
sels). 
The recognition of these implicit powers had 
opened the way to broad interpretations concerning 
the possibility of the Community taking action as 
an actor under international law. The question of 
the Community’s power to conclude agreements 
with its international partners alone (exclusive 
competence) or with the Member States (mixed 
competence) had been the subject of rather lively 
political and legal disputes, such as the case of the 
International Rubber Agreement in 1978 and the 
agreements concerning other commodities (wheat, 
sugar, cocoa, coffee, tin). On this matter the Legal 
Service had maintained an ambitious position, al-
beit less maximalist than that advocated by some in 
the Commission, and that position was finally ac-
cepted by the Court of Justice in its judgments.
The Legal Service then focused its attention on 
the question of the effects of the international 
agreements concluded by the Community with 
non-member countries or international organisa-
tions. There were two schools of thought among 
legal writers: a classical school, based on dualist the-
ory, which rejected out of hand any direct effect of 
international agreements and in any event required 
transposition by national legislation, and another 
school closer to the Community system itself, based 
on monistic theory and personified by Ehlermann, 
which was in favour of recognising, under certain 
conditions, the direct effect and also the primacy of 
(2) Judgment of 31 March 1971 in Case 22/70 Commission v Council [1971] 
ECR 263.
The role of the Legal Service 
in the development of European 
law, 1973–86
According to a number of accounts, contempor-
aneous and more recent works (1), we can conclude 
that Gaudet’s legacy was the project of developing 
the European legal order as a type of ‘constitutional’ 
law  that was very different from classical inter-
national law. 
By virtue of its role as the Commission’s agent be-
fore the Court of Justice, the Legal Service made a 
substantial contribution to the functioning of the 
European legal order through the developments in 
case-law from 1983 to 1986, in particular in the 
fields of external relations and the completion of the 
single market. The common theme of this contri-
bution was to defend solutions that developed the 
principles on which the system of treaties was based 
in order to promote the process of Community in-
tegration, while not falling into the trap of the max-
imalist positions adopted by those who advocated 
going further than, or even counter to, the provi-
sions of the treaties. In short, the Legal Service acted 
as a counterbalance: if one commissioner wanted to 
go too far in legal terms, it acted as a brake; if an-
other was too cautious, it encouraged the commis-
sioner to be bolder. Furthermore, its position often 
allowed it to find a legal solution bridging depart-
ments that were defending diverging positions.
By way of example, we can cite the notable advances 
in the field of external relations. Until the beginning 
of the 1970s, legal theorists took the almost unani-
mous view that the Community did not have the 
power to conclude international agreements outside 
the few cases expressly provided for in the treaties. 
Despite that, following an appeal by the Commis-
(1) European Commission, Thirty years of Community law, Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1983; 
Gilsdorf,  P., ‘Le service juridique de la Commission’, unpublished manu-
script, Legal Service, Brussels, 2003. The author would like to thank the 
Legal Service library for making this manuscript available. 
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from other Member States (starting with the Das­
sonville judgment  (5)) and the confirmation — in 
the absence of harmonised Community rules — of 
the principle of mutual recognition of national legis-
lation protecting essential interests that had primacy 
over the free movement of goods (starting with the 
Cassis de Dijon judgment (6)). Once again, the solu-
tions worked out by the Court of Justice were based 
to a large extent on the positions taken by the Legal 
Service. These went much further than the argu-
ments supported by the prevailing doctrine, which 
regarded the prohibition laid down by the treaty as 
concerning only national measures discriminating 
against products from other Member States (7).
Indeed, in almost every field we can find evidence 
of action by the Legal Service to ensure the smooth 
functioning of the European machine. We should, 
for example, credit it with finding the solution to 
the crisis caused by the Council’s inability to set 
agricultural prices at the start of the 1980s. In the 
absence of such price-setting, were the Member 
States to be allowed to regain their freedom of ac-
tion, leading to the collapse of the common agri-
cultural policy? The Legal Service took the view 
that, on the basis of the principle of continuity of 
government, the old prices continued to apply. The 
Commission, by following that argument, was able 
to prevent a major crisis (8). 
Sigfrido Ramírez-Pérez
(5) Judgment of 11 July 1974 in Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837.
(6) Judgment of 20 February 1979 in Case 120/78 Rewe [1979] ECR 649.
(7) European Commission, Thirty Years of Community Law, Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1982.
(8) Lamoureux, F., ‘Les pouvoirs de la Commission en cas de vide juridique 
du fait de la carence du Conseil’, Revue du Marché Commun, No 277, May 
1984, pp. 215–224.
these agreements (1). The Court of Justice did not 
settle this question of principle, instead preferring 
to adopt a more flexible position based on the spe-
cific characteristics, terms and spirit of each cat-
egory of agreement. Thus, with regard to free trade 
and/or association agreements with non-member 
countries, aimed at creating a single market in imi-
tation of the Community’s internal market, the 
Court followed the monist argument (see the Kup­
ferberg judgment (2)) by allowing the possibility of 
the direct effect of these agreements; later, this case-
law would be clarified by the need for a clear, pre-
cise and unconditional obligation (see the Demirel 
judgment (3)). By contrast, the Legal Service never 
sought to push the Court to recognise a direct ef-
fect of more ‘traditional’ international agreements, 
such as the GATT agreement (see the International 
Fruit Company judgment (4)). 
The 1970s and 1980s were also the decades in which 
an effective internal market within the Commu nity 
was actually established, thanks not only to the le-
gislative activity, which would culminate in the 
adoption of the Single European Act in 1986, but 
also to the Court’s extensive case-law that exploited 
and developed the relevant provisions of the EEC 
Treaty, essentially using a teleological interpretation 
of the objectives pursued by the treaty. We can re-
strict ourselves here to recalling the advances in the 
free movement of goods that enabled the removal of 
many ‘hidden’ restrictions to the detriment of goods 
(1) Gilsdorf, P., ‘Le service juridique de la Commission’, unpublished manu-
script, Legal Service, Brussels, 2003, p 36. The author would like to thank 
the Legal Service library for making this manuscript available.
(2) Judgment of 26 October 1982 in Case 104/81 Kupferberg & Cie [1982] 
ECR 3641.
(3) Judgment of 30 September 1987 in Case 12/86 Demirel [1987] ECR 3719.
(4) Joined Cases 21/72 to 24/72 International Fruit Company and Others 
[1972] ECR 1219.
Part Two 
Administrative culture 
and methods
An essential cog: few European meetings could have functioned without 
the Commission interpreters, who quickly became renowned as some of the most expert 
in the world.
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Introduction 
As conceived by the negotiators of the Treaty of 
Rome, the Commission is a sui generis institution 
combining the political responsibility of an execu­
tive, administrative expertise and defence of the 
European general interest. Although the experience 
it accumulated during the 1960s enabled it to define 
its methods of operation at the heart of the Commu­
nity institutional system, the years that followed 
saw a number of changes resulting from the conse­
quences of shifts in the political balance, as well as 
internal adjustments.
The Commission’s influence in the legislative process 
was weakened as a result of the pursuit of consensus 
arising from the Luxembourg compromise. Voting 
in the Council became uncommon, thereby slowing 
down the legislative process driven by the Commis­
sion on the most challenging issues. The establish­
ment of the internal market, which was a key aim of 
the work carried out in the late 1970s, was one of the 
areas in which the Commission was able to counter­
act this trend, first under the Presidency of Gaston 
Thorn and then under that of Jacques  Delors. The 
single market was only made possible by a return to 
the voting procedure in the Council. 
The Commission also took into account in its initi­
atives and actions the role of interest groups, includ­
ing trade associations, such as farming organisations, 
and more specific bodies. While the lobbies tried to 
influence decisions, the Commission, for its part, 
tried to benefit from their expertise to enhance the 
scope of its action. The Commission’s interlocu tors 
also became more and more diverse in view of the 
ongoing expansion of Community policies between 
1973 and 1986.
Did the arrival of new members alter the administra­
tive culture or practices established under the Com­
munity of Six? The challenge was primarily political. 
It was linked to the relative economic poverty of 
Ireland, and to the persistence of a Eurosceptic op­
position in Denmark and the United Kingdom. The 
Commission exercised discretion in the ‘renegotia­
tion’ of the accession treaty requested by the British 
government. But the 1973 enlargement had a num­
ber of effects on Community policies. Although the 
fundamental transformation of the common agri­
cultural policy (CAP) demanded by London did not 
materialise, regional and trade policies were reinvig­
orated. The enlargement also had administrative im­
plications. The arrival at all levels of three sets of na­
tionalities went smoothly. The Danes and Irish were 
quickly integrated into the system, thanks to diligent 
commissioners and well­prepared officials. However, 
for several years the British experienced some diffi­
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culties in recruiting officials to available posts. The 
outcome of this was a relatively low number of British 
officials in the Commission in the early days.
The administrative culture was, however, subject 
to influences which largely transcended the specifi­
cities of national cultures. At an internal level, be­
yond the role played by the cabinet, the Secretariat­ 
General continued to emerge as a key player at the 
heart of the coordination and decision­making pro­
cess, under the authority of the president.
During this period, a significant driving force was 
the relationship between ‘bureaucratisation’ and 
‘managerialisation’, a process which the Commission 
sought to introduce in order to make better use of its 
skills and resources. In spite of the sometimes dras­
tic recommendations of certain reports, the period 
1973–86 was ultimately a time of gradual transition 
or maturing of the Commission’s administrative cul­
ture, rather than a revolution. 
Jan Willem Brouwer
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Chapter 4  
Working methods
4.1. Coordination and 
decision-making 
process in the 
Commission
The particularity of the Commission’s working 
methods lies in its position in the European political 
system, where its role is more one of administration 
than implementation. It combines a Franco–British 
tradition of hierarchical interministerial arbitra­
tion and a key role for the Secretariat­General with 
a Germanic culture of ministerial independence or 
autonomy and strong directorates­general. 
To this is added a tradition of collegiality dating 
back to the High Authority when, we should re­
member, ‘portfolios’ did not exist. This collective 
tradition is close to the Swedish administrative mod­
el, in which ministers do not have authority over the 
departments, since they are generally grouped into 
autonomous agencies. This model was chosen from 
the outset to prevent any states from exerting exces­
sive influence on a file and thus to neutralise direct 
national influences. The complexity of the Com­
mission’s model for internal decision­making and 
working methods lies in this ‘patchwork’, to quote 
Jacques Ziller (1).
The Commission is both a governmental structure 
with commissioners and cabinets (as in Belgium 
and France) and at the same time a bureaucracy 
with directorates­general managed according to a 
strict hierarchical principle. Two internal coordina­
tion networks therefore coexist: a political network 
of cabinets, in particular that of the president, and 
an administrative network of the directorates­ 
general and the Secretariat­General. The distinc­
tive feature and great originality of this model is 
that both networks have been progressively organ­
ised around one key person, the secretary­general, 
who has authority over the Secretariat­General, has 
chaired the weekly meeting of heads of cabinet since 
1967 and has always attended the College meeting 
alongside the president.
(1) Ziller, J., ‘De la nature de l’administration européenne’, Revue française 
d’administration publique, No 95, 2000.
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The Commission has one last special feature: the 
duality between formal and informal channels in 
the decision­making process. The formal decision­ 
making channels (interservice consultation between 
directorates­general, meetings of ‘special heads of 
cabinet’ and ‘hebdo’ (weekly) meetings of the heads 
of cabinet) are supplemented by other informal co­
ordination channels such as the weekly meetings of 
the directors­general and their assistants, the real 
impact of which is difficult to assess.
British membership  (1) initially had very limited 
consequences. This was the case, for example, for 
the presentation of documents as of 1977. In this 
respect, we could refer to the instructions drafted 
at the request of President Roy Jenkins and signed 
by Christopher Audland concerning the memos to 
him and the answers to parliamentary questions (2).
Memos ‘à la Jenkins’
1. Speaking briefs
 • Talking points
 • Defensive points
2. Background briefs 
The most noteworthy point here is that the 1973 
enlargement resulted in the Commission having 
to explain its working methods, in use since 1958 
and formalised in 1967. This involved above all re­
(1) See Chapter 5, ‘The impact of the first enlargement’.
(2) For Philippe Petit­Laurent, member of the cabinet of François­Xavier 
Ortoli: ‘The British fitted into the structure without any difficulties, some­
times with some very remarkable personalities, but they were far from caus­
ing a revolution. By way of anecdote, what I remember of the arrival of the 
British, as a young official at the time, is that they had really improved the 
procedure for answering parliamentary questions by setting up a system for 
replying to the questions raised by European MEPs: there were the replies 
themselves but also “background briefs” and “supplementary questions”. 
Whereas, before, each department provided the response they thought fit 
in a non­standardised fashion. The British had structured the procedure 
somewhat and I thought that this was a very good reform’ (interview with 
Philippe Petit­Laurent, 19 July 2010).
minding newcomers of the rules, but at the same 
time formalising or settling existing methods. For 
instance, the first manual of procedures dates back 
to May 1976. Before Roy Jenkins arrived, Émile 
Noël explained the Commission’s working methods 
at great length, in English, to his (future) head of 
cabinet, Crispin Tickell, who was still in the Cabi­
net Office in London, essentially to show him that 
changing them would be pointless (3). 
(3) HAEU, Émile Noël papers EN­2536, Letter from Émile Noël to Crispin 
Tickell, ‘The Commission’s working methods’, Brussels, 19 November 
1976.
Files for the president
The task of coordinating the preparation of files for 
the President of the European Commission for his 
travels in the Member States or third countries, the 
idea for which dates back to the Malfatti/Mansholt 
Commission, has been carried out without 
exception by the Secretariat-General since the 
Ortoli Commission. It involves coordinating the 
preparation of files for the Commission president 
for visits to Member States and non-EU countries. 
A similar system was set up to prepare the files for 
the President of the European Council. In both 
cases, the Secretariat-General, working together 
with the president’s head of cabinet, asks for 
contributions from the departments, drafted with 
the agreement of their own cabinets, and 
coordinates them to give the file a coherent policy 
approach. In his role as deputy secretary-general, 
Christopher Audland developed instructions on the 
format of contributions from the departments. His 
instructions, based on Foreign Office practice, 
distinguish between speaking briefs (comprising 
talking or defence points) and background briefs. 
They were included in the manual of procedures 
and continued to apply after Audland’s departure.
Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi
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Collegiality in practice 
The division of portfolios between commission­
ers  (1) was adjusted over this period. While nine 
commissioners easily shared the various Commu­
nity policies from 1958 to 1967 (and then from 1970 
to 1972), this was not the case with 13 and then 
14  members. Under Walter Hallstein, there were 
as many commissioners as there were directorates­ 
general. However, the expansion of Community 
powers was not enough to give substantial fields to 
the five new members. It was therefore necessary to 
create new portfolios (e.g. for taxation and indus­
try) by dividing up certain large sectors of activity. 
Furthermore, certain directorates­general could 
be allocated to more than one commissioner. The 
Jenkins Commission tried to solve this problem: 
between 1977 and 1981, a directorate­general was 
answerable to only one commissioner.
How could collegiality be preserved in an enlarged 
Commission? The discussions centred first on how 
the meetings of the College were organised. Their 
purpose was to refocus the meeting of the commis­
sioners on essentially political questions. They pro­
vide a general illustration of the inherent tension in 
the Commission between a sectoral approach and 
collective responsibility. Under François­Xavier 
Ortoli, the Wednesday  meetings were very long: 
they started at 10.00 and often ended at 19.00. 
Items on the agenda were examined from 10.00 to 
11.00, after a series of formal adoptions (in particu­
lar the conclusions of the heads of cabinet), leading 
up to lunch at 13.00. Time was made at 15.00 for 
an exchange of political opinions on current issues, 
before finishing with the agenda between 16.00 and 
19.00. 
Starting with Jenkins, the meetings were held in 
two stages: formal adoptions and then the agenda 
and current issues together. Jenkins tried to achieve 
(1) See section 2.1, ‘The commissioners’.
consensus systematically (sometimes also recording 
differences of opinion in the minutes). Under the 
Thorn and Delors Commissions, voting became 
essential. One of the specific features in these years 
was the friendly interaction, and even complicity, 
between some of its members. 
From year to year, the workload was lightened and 
the items included on the Commission’s agenda 
on Wednesdays were cut down, thereby logically 
shortening the duration of the meetings. The writ­
ten procedure, introduced in 1960, became the 
tacit procedure: the number of decisions rose from 
850 in 1962 to 2 500 in 1967 and almost 4 000 in 
1973–75. In 1968, the empowerment procedure (2) 
was introduced as part of the common agricultural 
policy. As of 1978, no fewer than 6  000 decisions 
were adopted in this manner, on behalf of the Col­
lege but by one commissioner, and under specific 
conditions. 
Developments in the decision­making process 
strengthened the influence of the cabinets almost 
automatically: a growing number of items were 
dealt with as early as Monday at the weekly meeting 
of heads of cabinet. This meeting, held on an occa­
sional basis under Walter Hallstein, became weekly 
under Jean Rey and was permanently scheduled for 
Monday afternoons at the start of the 1970s. It was 
the time to discuss the items on the agenda of the 
College meeting, during which areas of agreement 
between heads of cabinet were endorsed without 
discussion by their ‘bosses’, the commissioners. The 
Commission reproduced here the procedure fol­
lowed by the Council for ‘A’ items (endorsed before­
hand by the permanent representatives). In relative 
terms, the heads of cabinet of the commissioners are 
the functional equivalent of the permanent repre­
sentatives for the members of the Council.
(2) The College may empower one or more of its members to take management 
or administrative measures on its behalf. It may also instruct one or more 
of its members to adopt the definitive text of any instrument or of any pro­
posal, the substance of which has already been determined in discussion.
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The 1970s saw the more significant development 
of ‘special heads’ or ‘special heads of cabinet’ meet­
ings on Thursdays and/or Fridays. These meetings, 
intended to cover technical and specific issues, 
brought together specialised advisers from the vari­
ous cabinets under the authority of a cabinet mem­
ber of the president or the commissioner responsible 
for the policy in question. They prepared or clarified 
items on the agenda of the ‘hebdo’, the weekly meet­
ing of the heads of cabinet. 
Administrative coordination in action
The second internal coordination mechanism is 
administrative, under the aegis of the Secretariat­ 
General. In this respect, these years were also char­
acterised by the professionalisation of methods, 
although coordination sometimes remained dif­
ficult. Despite being a director­general himself, 
Claus­Dieter Ehlermann claimed in a memo to Nick 
Stuart, a member of President Jenkins’s cabinet, in 
February 1979  (1): ‘Coordination does not work 
well because there is no cohesion between directors­ 
general: they do not form a body (like the heads of 
cabinet), they work together only on a sporadic basis.’
Yet interservice coordination was overhauled 
in 1975, with a change from non­permanent to 
standing groups. This coordination arose pro­
gressively from the relations maintained by the 
directorates­general with each other in the prep­
aration phase for Commission initiatives. In 1975, 
a working group on the matter was created, and 
chaired by Willy Schlieder, Director­General for 
Competition  (2). His report was adopted by the 
Commission on 15 July 1975 and explained by the 
Secretariat­General in a procedural note in Sep­
tember:  ‘The Commission considers it essential to 
(1) HAEC, BAC 40/1986/42, ‘Problèmes administratifs’, Memo from 
Claus­Dieter Ehlermann to Nick Stuart, 26 February 1979.
(2) Since DG IV (Competition) was in principle less concerned, there are two 
possibilities: either a more ‘neutral’ chair could be chosen or DG IV could 
be more involved in this procedure.
further develop team spirit and cooperation on all 
levels between officials. Suitable interservice co­
ordination should guarantee that the proposals sub­
mitted to the Commission reflect the most relevant 
and balanced opinion of the departments and avoid 
any unnecessary discussions between Commission 
members on technical problems, thereby allowing 
them to dedicate their time to the important policy 
aspects of their decisions’ (3). To foster this practice 
as early in the procedure as possible, the obligation 
to date all final documents submitted to other de­
partments for their opinion was introduced. In the 
event of ‘insurmountable divergences of opinion’ 
within standing groups, ‘objective reference must 
be made to them in the document submitted to the 
Commission by the responsible department’.
Interservice coordination was to be formalised after 
the Delors Commission under the name ‘interser­
vice consultation’ (CIS). However, other coordina­
tion mechanisms also existed, which were informal. 
Every Thursday morning, the secretary­general 
called together the directors­general to inform them 
of the College decisions at the meeting which only 
a few of them had attended. Indeed, apart from the 
director­general of the Legal Service, the spokesper­
son and the registrar, the ‘sectoral’ directors­general 
attended only for the discussion of the agenda items 
concerning them. The changes were brought about 
by Jacques Delors, who would be the first presi­
dent to maintain direct contact with the directors­ 
general and convene regular meetings for them, 
thereby fostering a more important procedural role 
for the president.
Lastly, the start of the Hallstein Commission saw 
the introduction of a meeting for the assistants to 
the directors­general: ‘Noël’s children’, as he liked to 
call them. On his departure in September 1986, he 
chaired his 1 000th meeting. Officially, the assistant 
(3) HAEC, BAC 17/1986/272, Memo from Christopher Audland, Deputy 
Secretary­General, to the directors­general and heads of service, SEC(75) 
2864, 17 September 1975.
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to get on well. It was not easy at the start because 
Wellenstein could have been an equally good sec­
retary­general’ (2). But it became a well­established 
practice and many of the president’s heads of cab­
inet, seated at his right, acknowledged his chair­
manship skills, a sometimes formidable art (3). For 
Denis Gautier­Sauvagnac, the second head of cabi­
net to President Ortoli, he had ‘very deft authority, 
and we were all bowled over by him’ (4).
In 1986, after Noël’s departure, ‘Lamy asked De­
lors to chair the weekly meeting, but the position 
was coveted by David Williamson, the new secre­
tary­general, who was aware of how the Commis­
sion worked’ (5). Lamy intended to take advantage 
of the departure of Noël, whose methods were 
judged by the Delors Cabinet to be rather out­
dated, particularly his conciliatory style during the 
meetings of heads of cabinet (6). However, tradition 
was upheld by the new secretary­general. Between 
1985 and 1986, there was a severe culture clash for 
18 months between Noël, the 64­year­old keeper of 
the flame, and Lamy, 38 years old, who represented 
a new generation of senior officials and was nick­
named ‘the Exocet’. 
In the Secretariat­General, Noël was flanked be­
tween 1973 and 1977 by two deputies. One was 
German: first Helmut Sigrist, from 1958, when 
Noël was still only executive secretary, followed by 
Klaus Meyer from 1969 to 1977 (deputy head of 
cabinet to Hallstein). The second was British in the 
person of Christopher Audland, from 1973 to 1981. 
They formed a Franco–German–British trio, and 
then a Franco–British duo following Meyer’s depar­
ture, from 1977 to 1981. Without changing the cul­
ture of the Secretariat­General, Audland made an 
(2) HAEU, ‘European Oral History’, Gerard Oliver, ‘The European Commis­
sion memories’, by G. Bossuat and M. Rancon, 29 January 2004. 
(3) Bossuat G., Émile Noël, premier secrétaire général de la Commission 
européenne, Bruylant, Brussels, 2011, pp. 158–159. 
(4) Interview with Denis Gautier­Sauvagnac, 10 September 2010.
(5) Interview with Maria Pia Filippone, 8 July 2011.
(6) Endo, K., The Presidency of the European Commission under Jacques Delors, 
Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1999, p. 117.
to the secretary­general convened the Friday meet­
ing from 9.00 to 12.30, but Noël attended it regu­
larly to tell them about the Commission meetings. 
This unchanging ritual started with: ‘This is what 
the Commission said on Wednesday’. It was both 
a tool for disseminating information and a means 
of exerting influence by the secretary­general, who 
then followed the careers of his ‘children’, many of 
whom became ‘Noël boys’, members of Noël’s in­
formation network within all the services, and not 
only at the level of the directors­general.
Where two coordination networks meet: 
the secretary-general
These two coordination networks within the Com­
mission were gradually placed in the hands of one 
person: Émile Noël. His central role was consolidat­
ed over this period, since in addition to the meetings 
of heads of cabinet, which he chaired every Monday, 
he chaired the weekly meetings of the directors­ 
general and also of their assistants. He found him­
self at the junction of these two networks, and could 
thereby control all the information and internal co­
ordination mechanisms. It would take the arrival of 
Jacques Delors and his head of cabinet Pascal Lamy 
for the first changes in the nature of relations be­
tween the Presidency and the Secretariat­General to 
come about.
The matter of the secretary­general chairing the 
meeting of heads of cabinet was debated from the 
outset. According to Gérard Olivier, deputy dir­
ector­general of the Legal Service, Renato Rug­
giero, head of cabinet to Franco Maria Malfatti, 
would like to have chaired it in 1972: ‘Ruggiero 
would have done so willingly, but no one succeeded 
in challenging Émile Noël. He was an astonishing 
character. The good thing was that men like Émile 
Noël and Edmund Wellenstein (1) always managed 
(1) Director­general of DG I (External Relations).
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decision­making process: time management. After 
the introduction in 1979 by Daniel Strasser (3), dir­
ector­general for budget, of the financial statement 
(a prerequisite for any measures in staff matters) for 
new proposals, the form for including a document 
on the Commission agenda was integrated into the 
system on 1  September  1980. On a more political 
level, in 1978, Jenkins introduced the annual pro­
gramme, which is annexed to the speech delivered 
by the president before the Parliament at the start of 
each year. In order to give it substance, the president 
held an informal 2­day seminar every September 
on the development of general policy guidelines for 
the upcoming year. Its implementation was entrust­
ed to a group chaired by the secretary­general and 
composed of one representative of the president and 
two directors­general, in rotation. These scheduling 
efforts were to continue in the early 1980s follow­
ing the reports by Spierenburg and the Three Wise 
Men (4), although they did not succeed in covering 
all Commission activities. 
Michel Mangenot
(3) Following the Commission decision of 19 October 1977, ‘each time a new 
proposal is submitted to the Council, its implications in terms of staff must 
be clearly specified’, Memo from Daniel Strasser to the directors­general 
and heads of service, 8 November 1978.
(4) See Chapter 6, ‘An administrative culture in transition’, and the introduc­
tion to Part Three.
impact thanks to being more organised than Noël, 
who, having founded the system, practised a rather 
sophisticated form of DIY. Furthermore, Audland 
attached importance to keeping French as the work­
ing language, while taking care to avoid any abuse of 
its dominant position (1). 
Schedule challenges
One of the major challenges in this period, apart 
from putting the finishing touches to the coord­
ination procedures, was to improve the scheduling 
of Commission activities. A series of gradual ad­
justments relating to own­initiative proposals can 
be observed. On 1 January 1974, the obligation to 
provide a schedule of procedural phases for each 
proposal was introduced: this was the establish­
ment of the ‘timetable annex’ (2). It was used by the 
Secretariat­General to create and update a schedule 
of all proposals. Noël referred to it as a ‘schedule 
follow­up’. The Secretariat­General thus central­
ised a fundamental element of the Community 
(1) Take, for instance, the call to order addressed to Roland de Kergorlay, Dep­
uty Director­General for External Relations, concerning a meeting held by 
the latter in French because no interpreting was available. Audland pointed 
out to him that he could not have it assumed that French was the default 
language, ‘without giving any explanation or expressing any regret’, HAEC, 
BAC 488/1988/7, Memo from J. N. Stempels to R. de Kergorlay, 28 June 
1974.
(2) HAEC, BAC 488/1988/7, Memo from Émile Noël to the directors­general, 
SEC(73) 4766, 10 December 1973.
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number of Commission proposals rose by 29.9  %. 
This momentum did not persist because the num­
ber of proposals remained stable between 1978 and 
1985 (see table ‘Statistical overview of legislative 
work by the Commission, 1978–85’, page 132). The 
Commission exercised its right of initiative in the 
framework of established Community powers (in­
ternal market, agriculture, trade policy, transport, 
etc.), Directorates­General III (Internal Market and 
Industrial Affairs) and VI (Agriculture) being the 
most active in this field.
Despite the increase in executive action, the Com­
mission’s legislative activity remained stable between 
1978 and 1985. In 1978, with a view to the upcom­
ing enlargements, the Commission reiterated its po­
sition (in a communication ‘General considerations 
on the problems of enlargement’, referred to as the 
‘Fresco’ (5)) in favour of applying the conclusions of 
the Paris Summit of 1974, referred to above. The 
criteria established at the meeting in Comblain­la­
Tour from 15 to 17 September 1978 (6) set priority 
fields for the Commission: agricultural and fisheries 
policy, economic and monetary union (EMU), en­
largement and external relations.
By defining priority objectives for legislative action, 
Roy Jenkins stated for the first time that monitor­
ing the application of Community law was as im­
portant as making it. At the instigation of Étienne 
Davignon, the Secretariat­General inaugurated 
the assessment of action taken by the Commission 
through the quarterly examination of pending pro­
posals and the planning of policy priorities with 
a view to establishing a genuine legislative pro­
(5) ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council on the transitional 
period and the institutional consequences of enlargement’, Bulletin of the 
European Communities Supplement, No 2, 1978.
(6) HAEC, BAC 408/1991/203, Note from the Secretariat­General, SEC(79) 
516, March 1979. These criteria, based on both the cost and the effective­
ness of the Commission’s working method, favour legislative action with­
out excluding incentive or coordination actions, guide the development of 
proposals in non­economic sectors of the ‘grey area’ and propose using the 
principle of subsidiarity in advance. 
4.2. The Commission’s 
strategy for the design 
and implementation 
of European policies: 
between pragmatism 
and conviction
The practice of consensus which stemmed from 
the Luxembourg compromise of 1966 consid­
erably weakened the Commission’s influence in 
the legislative process, as recounted by its various 
presidents  (1). Without calling into question the 
existing practice of consensus for the adoption of 
instruments, the Paris Summit of 9 and 10 Decem­
ber 1974 advocated more frequent voting as well as 
implementation and management powers for the 
Commission. 
The Commission entrusted its departments with 
ensuring that proposals were formulated as far as 
possible on a majority legal basis, and also with iden­
tifying those fields most suitable for the use of qual­
ified majority voting (2). There were only a few such 
fields. Following the Commission’s request, the Le­
gal Service examined the matter of ‘potential pow­
ers’ and possible problems linked to their transfer 
(3). The Commission underlined the validity of this 
practice of taking ‘small steps’, which had been de­
veloped since 1975 (4); between 1976 and 1977, the 
(1) Group of independent personalities, IRB/14, Summary record dated 
26 February 1979 of the meeting held in Brussels on 23 and 24 February 
1979 (quote from François­Xavier Ortoli); Interview with Roy Jenkins, 
Courrier du personnel, No 402, 14 March 1979; Quote from Gaston Thorn, 
Courrier du personnel, No 430, 12 February 1982.
(2) On this subject, see the interview with Hélène Bernet and Jean­Claude 
Séché, 14 June 2011.
(3) BAC 83/1984/251, ‘Le service juridique ne manque pas de se pencher sur 
les éventuels problèmes que poserait aux États membres le transfert des 
compétences potentielles dans le cadre d’un futur traité instituant l’UE’, 
Note from the Legal Service, 13 June 1975, JUR/1773/75 — BP/fg.
(4) HAEU, Émile Noël papers (EN), File No 50, January 1978, ‘Rapport du 
Groupe interservices sur les questions institutionnelles liées à l’élargisse­
ment’ (Kergorlay Group) sur ‘Les adaptations des traités entrainées par 
l’élargissement’. 
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Statistical overview of legislative work by the Commission, 1978–85 (1)
Year Legislative 
proposals (a)
Variation (% calculated 
by the author)
Executive autonomous 
instruments with or 
without comitology (b)
1978 654 4 799
1979 542 – 17 % 4 764
1980 753 39 % 5 901
1981 590 (d) – 22 % 6 044
1982 646 9 % 5 280
1983 544 – 16 % 6 101
1984 559 3 % 5 220
1985 (c) 654 17 % 7 490
(a) Proposed legislative instruments (regulations, directives and decisions), 
as well as recommendations and opinions on draft legislative instruments 
transmitted to the Council.
(b) Acts adopted by the Commission, i.e. EEC regulations, general and in­
dividual ECSC and EEC decisions, EEC directives and ESCS and EEC 
recommendations and opinions.
(c) In 1985, the number of instruments increased considerably compared with 
1984. This phenomenon is the result of preparation for enlargement of the 
Communities to include Spain and Portugal and the increase in legislative 
work as soon as the Delors Commission took office.
(d) The significant decrease in instruments from 1980 to 1981 can be ex­
plained in part as the result of the new Commission being established.
Planning
With enlargement, the General Report presented by 
the Commission each year (2) included, by way of 
introduction, the address on the programme for the 
following year, delivered by the president of the 
Commission to the European Parliament, accompanied 
by a text giving a more technical description of the 
initiatives envisaged, referred to as the supplementary 
memorandum annexed to the address on the 
programme. This procedure was followed by the 1973, 
1974 and 1975 reports and disappeared with the 
departure of its designer, Deputy Secretary-General 
Christopher Audland. The address on the programme 
and the annexed memorandum were no longer 
published as an introduction to the General Report. 
Moreover, the supplementary memorandum was 
replaced by a new type of programming exercise 
introduced by Hans Beck, who had previously been a 
member of the Haferkamp cabinet before working for 
the Secretariat-General.
(1) In 1985, the number of instruments increased considerably compared with 1984. 
This phenomenon is the result of preparation for Community enlargement to in­
clude Spain and the increase in legislative work as soon as the Delors Commission 
took office.
(2) See section 3.1, ‘The Secretariat­General’.
What is the difference between the two exercises? The 
supplementary memorandum was drawn up by the 
Secretariat-General on the basis of contributions from 
the departments, in accordance with the policy 
priorities set in the address on the programme which 
the president was to deliver to Parliament, and which 
had been approved by the College. The planning 
system devised by Hans Beck took the opposite 
approach. The departments were asked to present 
their programmes, to be discussed during a process 
which led to the Commission adopting its priorities. 
When the new system was put into practice, the work 
of the departments was most probably not sufficiently 
monitored and directed, and the end result was 
rejected without pity by Émile Noël. It would take years 
before an effective programming system was 
established.
Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi
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down the proposal (4). It was only in February 1986 
that the vice­president of the Commission, Arthur 
Cockfield, requested, without success, that the 
Council vote on the Commission’s proposal and 
not on the Presidency compromise (5). 
Monitoring the application of 
Community law: an example of the 
Secretariat-General’s coordination role
In the pre-litigation phase, explicit provision is 
made in the treaty for monitoring the application 
of Community law. Depending on the issue, this 
involves the directorates-general and, in all cases, 
the Legal Service. The arrangement established in 
1974 (6) gives a significant coordination role to the 
Secretariat-General. Thanks to this coordination, 
the College has been able to guarantee fair 
treatment for both the Member States and the 
matters at issue.
Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi
In order to maintain the momentum, the Com­
mission turned towards new fields which were not 
always covered by the provisions of the treaties. It 
presented new initiatives in the social field — in­
cluding four directives adopted between 1974 and 
1980 — and in the energy sector (7). The Council 
was parsimonious in adopting the Commission’s 
proposals for new common policies. In some cases, 
it changed them from mandatory actions to simple 
(4) File note, Secretariat­General — Directorate D, ‘Relations with the Coun­
cil’, PP/ev/2001­168, 30 April 2001, Annex 1.
(5) This proposal concerned the Council’s change to the legal basis of the Com­
mission proposal concerning a customs convention.
(6) See section 3.1, ‘The Secretariat­General’.
(7) ‘The Commission insisted that it was necessary to distinguish between 
binding legislative action and other actions. In order for new initiatives 
to be adopted more easily in the Council, it was better for them to be pre­
sented using a binding legal basis’, HAEC, BAC 49/1987/855, Note from 
Deputy Secretary­General Christopher Audland to the directors­general, 
SEC(78) 4685, 24 November 1978.
gramme (1). As regards the application of the law, a 
monitoring system was established to follow up in­
fringements and complaints in the Member States 
regarding Community legislation, the effects of 
which gradually became apparent (see table below). 
Statistical overview of Commission decisions 
on infringements and complaints (2), 1978–85
Year Number
1978 —
1979 370
1980 751
1981 579
1982 291
1983 1 028
1984 1 584
1985 1 265
Cases where the Commission used its prerogatives 
when negotiating its proposals in the Council were 
relatively rare (3). Indeed, it was not in the Com­
mission’s interest to amend its proposals to achieve 
a qualified majority in the Council when the Coun­
cil reached a decision by consensus on Presidency 
compromises. The 1978 food aid programme was 
the only case of a real ‘political’ withdrawal. It was 
withdrawn by Claude Cheysson, Commissioner 
for Development, after the Council had watered 
(1) The idea of a legislative programme arose at the meeting in Comblain­la­
Tour, where it was suggested that the Commission approve a declaration 
each year on the political priorities which could later become the general 
outline of a work programme. The same applies to the report by  the Three 
Wise Men, which stipulated that ‘The timing and terms of its proposals 
should be determined by a programme of policy and operational objec­
tives, adopted when it is appointed and revised at least once a year’, HAEC, 
BAC  88/2004/112, Council of the European Communities, ‘Report 
on European institutions presented by the Committee of Three [Barend 
Biesheuvel, Edmund Dell and Robert Marjolin] to the European Council, 
October 1979’, Office for Official Publications of the European Communi­
ties, Luxembourg 1980, p. 53
(2) Sui generis decisions which were not covered by Article  189  of the EEC 
Treaty or Article 14 of the ECSC Treaty.
(3) ‘Pending proposals’ which came up against significant difficulties in the 
Council, in whose adoption the Commission continued to express interest.
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The first legislative programme was developed in 
1981. In September of that year, Gaston Thorn an­
nounced the implementation of new Community 
policies or actions on the organisation of working 
time, industrial innovation and the implementa­
tion of Community programmes (the social action 
programme, the multiannual research and develop­
ment programme and the integrated Mediterrane­
an programmes). In the field of regional develop­
ment, Regulation (EEC) No  1787/84 introduced 
Community priorities and established multiannual 
socioeconomic development programmes based on 
global co­financing which replaced the system of fi­
nancing individual projects.
Between 1970 and 1986, the increasing delegation 
of implementing powers to the Commission, pur­
suant to Article 155(4) of the EEC Treaty, gave rise 
to a proliferation of management and regulatory 
committee procedures, thereby conferring a more 
important role on the Member States and, conse­
quently, the Council (7). The Commission wanted 
the Council to stick to the single system of the regu­
latory committee with a ‘safety net’, which allowed 
the Council a period of 3 months in which to amend 
the implementing measures proposed by the Com­
mission. To this was added the ‘aerosols’ statement 
in the Council minutes in 1974, whereby the Com­
mission undertook to take account of a prevailing 
tendency for the Member States to oppose an im­
plementing measure in order to avoid the Commis­
sion taking action which would run counter to the 
majority position of the national delegations. The 
so­called ‘double safety net’ procedure, on the other 
hand, allowed the Council to reject a Commission 
implementing measure by a simple majority vote, 
thereby preventing its entry into force. However, in 
practice, the Secretariat General of the Council not­
(7) These committees were introduced in 1962. The management commit­
tees developed spontaneously with the implementation of the common 
agricultural policy, whereas the regulatory committees became the pre­
dominant procedure, in particular for the internal market. HAEC, 
BAC  408/1991/226, ‘Questions institutionnelles — Rôle des comités’, 
Note from the Legal Service, 30 May 1985.
recommendations (1). On the basis of Article 235 of 
the EEC Treaty or with no specific legal basis in the 
treaties, the Commission submitted proposals in 
fields in the grey area, thereby developing strategies 
to bring policies into the Community field (‘creep­
ing competences’)  (2). Across all fields, such incur­
sions often started with a formal request from the 
European Councils to the Commission (3), and not 
with the Commission directly —  whether it con­
cerned an overall policy or a one­off action — and 
less frequently with a national ministry. The Com­
mission’s influence was thus often to be found below 
the level of the European Councils (4). 
From 1980, following the Court’s judgment 
of 20  February 1979 in Case 120/78 Cassis de 
Dijon (5), the Commission introduced a new qual­
itative approach to the legislative method. Thanks 
to this approach, harmonisation would be under­
pinned by the principle of mutual recognition. On 
this basis, the Delors Commission would subse­
quently considerably develop secondary legislation 
on the internal market, which would extend to all 
technical regulations on products (6).
(1) The issue of the Commission’s independence was underlined in the report 
by the Three Wise Men, October 1979, p. 54. According to the treaties, the 
Commission may either refer a formal proposal to the Council or recom­
mend that it take action (Article 155 of the EEC Treaty). The Council may 
request the Commission to conduct a study on whether it is advisable to 
take certain measures or submit a proposal (Article 152 of the EEC Treaty). 
(2) Although Article  235 is broadly applicable, it cannot cover each sector 
of activity in which the Member States wish to take joint action. In this 
case, other bases must be found. See the interviews with Fernand Van 
Hoeck, 4 April 2011, and Konstantinos Maniatopoulos, 16 July 2010. 
Although Denmark participated in a whole series of directives based on 
this article in the social and environmental fields, it found the way in which 
Article 235 was applied to be excessive (HAEC, BAC 408/1991/226, 
SEC(80) 403/2), Note from the Legal Service, 14 March 1980.
(3) In the 1980s, the European Council started to include ‘policy requests’ for 
the Commission in its conclusions. This practice, which was never formal­
ised by the treaties, was developed over time. For details of the excesses of 
this system, see the interview with Hélène Bernet and Jean­Claude Séché, 
14 June 2011.
(4) HAEC, BAC 49/1987/855, Note from the Deputy Secretary­General 
Christopher Audland to the directors­general, SEC(78) 4685, 24 Novem­
ber 1978.
(5) See Chapter 12, ‘Devising a strategy: the internal market and industrial pol­
icy’.
(6) See the interview with Hélène Bernet and Jean­Claude Séché, 14 June 2011.
135Chapter 4 — Working methods 
Changes in (the number of ) committees, 1980–86 (1)
DGs/services Year
1980 1986
Services other than the DGs (Secretariat-
General, Eurostat, Customs Union Service 
(CUS), Joint Research Centre (JRC), Euratom 
Supply Agency)
14 
including 1 advisory 
committee on programme 
management (ACPM) in the 
JRC
21
including 2 ACPMs in the JRC
DG I External Relations 10 25
DG II Economic and Financial Affairs 3 8
DG III Internal Market and Industrial Affairs 33
including 2 concerted action 
committees (COMACs)
45
including 1 COMAC, which 
became Community–COST 
concertation committees (CCCCs)
DG IV Competition 2 2
DG V Employment, Social Affairs and Education 18 31
DG VI Agriculture 49 64
DG VII Transport 9 14
DG VIII Development 1 8
DG XI Environment, Consumer Protection and 
Nuclear Safety 
13 32
DG XII Science, Research and Development 18
(including 12 COMACs)
26
(including 12 COMACs and 
8 COMACs which became CCCCs)
DG XIII Information Market and Innovation 1 2
DG XIV Fisheries 4 5
DG XV Financial Institutions and Taxation 3 3
DG XVI Regional Policy 2 3
DG XVII Energy 8 9
DG XIX Budgets 2 2
ACPMs (not included in DG XII and/or the JRC) 24 16
of which 12 became 
management and coordination 
consultative committees (CGCs)
TOTAL 214 316
Source: Filippa Chatzistavrou.
(1) Based on a comparison of various documents on the committees: ‘Répertoire des comités I’, IX/C/3 (internal document), Terminology Office, EC Commis­
sion, Brussels, 1980; Compendium of Committees, Terminology and Computer Applications (TAI), EC Commission, Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities, 1986; HAEC, BAC 516/2004/8, ‘List of Council and Commission committees’, Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement, 
No 2, 1980; HAEU, BAC 82/1989/246, ‘Note à l’attention des directeurs généraux et chefs des services sur les comités et groupes d’experts’, 18 November 1985; 
HAEU, BAC 408/1991/260, ‘Essai de classification des groupes et comités’, Michel Aural, Administrator at the Commission of the European Communities, 
Revue du Marché Commun, No 187, 1975, pp. 330–342. The table contains all the committees which contribute to both the development and implementation 
of legal acts and  adopts the same presentation as the two compendiums in which the committees are listed by directorate­general or service, with the exception 
of the ACPMs not included in DG XII and/or the JRC. For a detailed overview of the committees established in the Commission, see the annex ‘Committees’.
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ed that the ‘double safety net’ had never been used. 
In reality, the Commission almost always found a 
sufficient qualified majority in the committees. The 
Council only rarely received appeals to amend the 
draft measure of the Commission (fewer than 1 % 
of cases) (1). Furthermore, the European Parliament 
also underlined that the existence of the commit­
tees made the representatives of the Member States 
more aware of their responsibilities, while allowing 
the Commission to keep its executive role (2).
The Commission realised that a more radical im­
provement in quality would be necessary in terms of 
reform. It expressed reservations regarding both the 
Genscher–Colombo initiative (November 1981) (3) 
and the Spinelli draft treaty (February 1984)  (4). 
Gaston Thorn considered it a failure that the 
Commis sion had not been able to have added to the 
text of the Genscher–Colombo plan the idea that 
voting should become normal practice. Following 
the Athens European Council in December 1983, 
the Commission proposed updating the treaties in 
fields such as research and development, energy, re­
gional policy and environment, adopting of a new 
institutional framework which would broaden the 
scope of qualified majority voting in the Council de 
jure and de facto (by limiting the practice of con­
sensus), and strengthening of the role of the Euro­
(1) Ponzano, P., Andreone, F. and Neframi, E., ‘Chronique de l’administration 
européenne’, Revue française de l’administration publique, Vol. 4, No 140, 
2011, p. 295.
(2) HAEC, BAC 391/2003/69, ‘Draft European Act, Answer to the questions 
to the president on the European Union at the meeting of the Institutional 
Committee of the Parliament on 29 April 1982’.
(3) HAEC, BAC 391/2003/67, JUR(82) D/00240, Memo from A. Marchini­
Camia of the Legal Service to J. Durieux dated 18 January 1982 containing 
an analysis of this topic; BAC 391/2003/70, Memo from A. Marchini­
Camia to C.­D. Ehlermann dated 4 November 1982 concerning the re­
marks of Commissioner Karl­Heinz Narjes on the Genscher–Colombo 
plan. 
(4) HAEC, BAC 391/2003/76, JUR(82) D/00784, Memo from A. Marchini­
Camia of the Legal Service to J. Durieux dated 10 February 1984 including 
the revised speech by President Thorn on the Treaty on European Union.
pean Parliament (in line with the procedures of the 
Spinelli draft). After the Milan European Council 
in June 1985  (5), the Delors Commission, follow­
ing the line taken by the Fontainebleau Euro pean 
Council in June 1984, opted for the more ‘func­
tionalist’ approach of the Single European Act 
(SEA)  (6), in comparison with the more ‘constitu­
tional’ approach of the Spinelli draft. The full ap­
plication of the Single European Act would involve 
the dismantling of internal borders by 1992 and the 
extension of both majority voting and Community 
competences. Despite the scope of the exceptions 
agreed upon, qualified majority voting covered two 
thirds of the measures in the White Paper. Further­
more, it proposed rationalising the arrangements 
for exercising its competences (7). Article 202 SEA 
constitutionalised the exercise of the Commission’s 
executive powers, but left the question of fields of 
competence unresolved. On this basis, the Coun­
cil adopted a ‘comitology’ framework decision on 
13 July 1987 in which it set the types and number of 
committees (three types, with two variants for the 
regulatory and management committees). In 1987, 
when the comitology decision entered into force, 
President Delors described the aerosols statement as 
null and void.
Filippa Chatzistavrou
(5) HAEC, BAC 391/2003/78, SI(85) 501, 5 July 1985, Press conference by 
Jacques Delors after the Milan European Council, 3 July 1985.
(6) HAEC, BAC 391/2003/80, Statement by Jacques Delors on the conclu­
sions of the intergovernmental conference (internal market), SEC(85) 
2008, 23 December 1985.
(7) As of 1984, the Commission established an annual procedure to approve the 
number of committees and expert groups authorised to meet in the follow­
ing year. It did the same in relation to the elimination, merger or suspension 
of the activities of certain committees whose work no longer corresponded 
to institutional needs (52 in 1983). In 1984, the Commission entrusted 
DG  IX with creating a database of fundamental information concerning 
the organisation of committee meetings and expert groups. On this basis, 
it sent two successive reports to the European Parliament in 1983 and 1984 
concerning the rationalisation measures it had taken (COM(1984)0093/F, 
21 February 1984; COM(85)0497/F, 12 September 1985).
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in Brussels to respond to the implementation of 
common policies. The access of such groups to the 
European institutions and to the Commission in 
particular could take one of two forms: formal or 
institutional access through advisory or consulta­
tive committees, or informal access through regular 
meetings and contacts, whether on the Commis­
sion’s initiative or otherwise. 
A consultative body — the Economic and Social 
Committee (ESC) (4) — was set up in 1958 to ex­
press to the Council and the Commission the views 
and opinions of the occupational groups represen­
tative of economic and social interests (employers, 
trade unions and other groupings) on draft Euro­
pean legislation. However, the real significance of 
the ESC’s formal opinions rapidly became a topic of 
debate and subject of criticism, to the extent that in­
terest groups would choose other ways of influenc­
ing the Community decision­making process. 
In view of the increasing number and size of such 
groups, they became key partners of the Commis­
sion, enabling it to benefit from their technical 
expertise, while having its attention drawn to sen­
sitive issues in certain subject areas (5). These inter­
est groups were acknowledged by the Commission 
as active and valid contributors to the legislative 
process, provided they were backed by legitimate 
representation in each Member State and were suf­
ficiently independent. Depending on the case, they 
came to represent essential support for or, on the 
contrary, a serious obstacle to specific measures at 
the European level, as well as playing a more gen­
eral role in the integration process by rallying their 
members on matters of public interest, such as con­
sumer affairs or the environment (6). 
(4) See box ‘The Economic and Social Committee’ in Chapter 18, p. 353.
(5) Kirchner, E. J., ‘Interest group behaviour at community level’, in Hurtwitz, 
L. (ed.), Contemporary Perspectives on European Integration, Greenwood 
Press, Westport, 1980, pp. 192–239. 
(6) Sidjanski, D., ‘Les groupes de pression dans la Communauté’, L’Europe en 
formation, No 207, June 1977, p. 7. 
4.3. Interest groups: 
a necessary evil (1)?
Pressure groups are as different from one another 
as the areas in which they operate. The category 
includes trade associations and chambers of com­
merce, business and industrial groupings, think 
tanks, international organisations, regional associ­
ations and even law firms. 
Although the activity of many interest groups tend­
ed to level out or change nature as of the mid­1970s, 
their numbers continued to grow, from an estimat­
ed 300 in 1970, thanks among other things to the 
emergence of action groups focused on one product 
or sector in particular. According to a directory 
from 1980, 515 professional organisations were ac­
tive at the Community level at that time, of which 
431 were interest groups and the remainder special­
ist bodies or international groups (2). 
The increasing influence of the ‘Brussels lobbies’ did 
not go unnoticed. An article at the beginning of the 
1980s highlighted the fact that ‘the Brussels tele­
phone directory is full of acronyms, which all con­
tain at least one letter E. E as in Europe, of course. In 
most cases, these are the initials of pressure groups 
which have opened offices in the Belgian capital, 
close to the European institutions’ (3). 
The question of how interests should be represent­
ed arose right from the start of the European inte­
gration process. Community interest or pressure 
groups — depending on the term you choose to 
use — set up permanent transnational structures 
(1) The title of a special report on the subject published in 30 jours d’Europe, 
No 188, Brussels, March 1974.
(2) EC Commission, Directory of the professional organisations set up at Com­
munity level, Delta, Brussels, 1980.
(3) 30 jours d’Europe, Brussels, January 1982. Cited in Basso, J., ‘Les groupes 
d’intérêt, les groupes de pression et le fonctionnement de la démocratie en 
société civile européenne’, L’Europe en formation, No 303, 1996–97, p. 48.
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At the beginning of the 1970s, there was grow­
ing debate about the conduct of Community in­
terest groups, as illustrated by the beginning of a 
controversy sparked by a press article (3) and tak­
en up by a member of the European Parliament, 
Henk  Vredeling. Underlying it were what were 
viewed as abnormal relations between the Commis­
sion and certain multinationals, such as Unilever, 
St­Gobain and Plasmon, during the consultations 
preceding the drafting of Community legisla­
tion  (4). In its reply of 7 June 1972 to a question 
tabled on the issue by Vredeling, the Commission 
merely stated that it was not accustomed to com­
menting on press reports. 
This case is an illustration of the influential role 
henceforth played by pressure groups in relation 
to the Community institutions as a whole, not just 
the Commission. To take another example, in the 
mid­1970s a Commission proposal for a directive 
on producer liability for damage caused by defective 
products had the support of consumer organisations 
and insurance companies. The draft, however, was 
met by concerted criticism from various employers’ 
organisations, which lobbied against it before the 
Council. It was some years before the directive was 
finally adopted (5). 
In practice, with the steady expansion of Com­
munity policies between 1973 and 1986, most 
directorates­general were, in different ways and 
to varying degrees, exposed to an ever increasing 
number of interest groups. The business, manufac­
turing and agricultural worlds, through the Union 
of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of 
Europe (UNICE), the Committee of Profession­
al Agricultural Organisations (COPA) and the 
(3) ‘Les groupes de pression qui hantent les couloirs de la CEE’, Vision, 
March 1972.
(4) European Parliament, Minutes of the sitting of 25  April  1972. Written 
Question No 65/72 from Henk Vredeling to the Commission of the Euro­
pean Communities on pressure groups and the European Communities. 
(5) Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of 
the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States 
concerning liability for defective products, OJ L 210, 7.8.1985, p. 29.
The Commission’s sectoral  
approach to interest groups
At the time, the Commission had not adopted any 
official, consistent rules on pressure groups (1). Until 
the mid­1980s, and the launch of the Single Euro­
pean Act, its attitude can be described as ‘sectoral’, 
focusing on relations with those professional group­
ings most solidly entrenched in the Brussels micro­
cosm. This was notably the case with the Committee 
of Professional Agricultural Organisations (COPA) 
concerning implementation of the common agricul­
tural policy and the European Confederation of the 
Iron and Steel Industries (Eurofer) for steel policy, 
which were viewed as key partners in their respec­
tive fields. This sometimes gave rise to problems in 
the case of Eurofer owing to the crisis in the steel 
industry in the early 1980s (2). 
The European Bureau of Consumers’ Unions 
(BEUC), which was set up in 1962 to act as the con­
sumer’s voice in the European institutions, was one 
of the most influential interest groups. From 1973 
to 1989, it played an important role in the Com­
munity decision­making process through the Con­
sumers’ Consultative Committee. This committee 
was part of an extensive network of consultative 
committees engaged in a regular dialogue with the 
Commission. At the same time, the adoption in the 
1970s of a number of regulations and directives on 
the free movement of various categories of profes­
sional people gave rise to an occasional single in­
terest group, such as the European Association of 
Osteopaths. In the professionals category alone, 
the number of organisations at the Community 
level rose from 28 in 1970 to 54 in 1980. 
(1) HAEC, ‘Commission communication on an open and structured dialogue 
between the Commission and special interest groups’, SEC(92) 2272 final, 
2 December 1992. It should, however, be noted that regular relations were 
maintained as of the 1960s with certain interest groups in specific sectors 
with reference to agricultural and industrial policy. A division for relations 
with professional organisations was set up in DG VI for that purpose. 
(2) See box ‘Eurofer’ in Chapter 12, pp. 269–270.
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tions and hearings of economic and social decision­ 
makers, in particular company executives (1). This 
went hand in hand with a sharp increase in oc­
cupational and specialist groups in Brussels, in 
turn linked to the extension of the Community’s 
powers.
With respect to company executives, the real or 
supposed influence of proposals by the Euro­
pean Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) raised 
many eyebrows. Created in 1982 on the initiative 
of the then managing director of Volvo, Pehr G. 
Gyllenhammar, it is said to have played a major 
(1) Sidjanski, D., ‘Les groupes de pression dans la Communauté européenne’, Il 
Politico, No 3, 1982, p. 540.
General Committee for Agricultural Cooperation 
(Cogeca), which represented cooperatives, had a 
long­standing practice of formal and informal con­
tacts with the Commission. At the same time, Irish 
and British farmers’ associations and unions set 
up national representation offices in Brussels after 
their countries joined in 1973. From that point on, 
public interest movements saw the light of day, like 
the European Environmental Bureau (EEB), creat­
ed in 1974. 
Towards a pluralistic approach
Starting in the 1980s, a new tendency appeared as 
the Commission moved to a process of consulta­
Keeping a watchful eye on the CAP: a meeting of the European farmers’ lobby organisation COPA in Brussels, 18 March 1986.
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The establishment of the European Environmen­
tal Bureau signalled the emergence of non­govern­
mental organisations (NGOs) at the Community 
level, with the setting­up of transnational consul­
tation and negotiation structures. In 1980, animal 
welfare groups began to open offices in Brussels in 
response to the new powers acquired by the Com­
mission under the common agricultural policy. As 
for the European Women’s Committee, set up in 
1984 by a group of women working at the Euro­
pean Commission, it was a logical development in 
view of the progress made on equal opportunities 
following the Defrenne case in 1976 (3). There was 
also a long tradition of dialogue between the Com­
mission and organisations active in development 
policies for the South by way of the joint funding 
of projects, particularly in Africa and Latin Amer­
ica, by DG  VIII and, to a lesser extent, by other 
Commission departments.
Regional offices also sprang up in line with the de­
velopment of regional policy. Two representation 
offices for local public authorities, the City of Bir­
mingham and Strathclyde Regional Council, both 
British, were opened in Brussels in 1984. They were 
followed by a German office in 1985, and Spanish 
and French ones in 1986.
At the beginning of the integration process, the 
Member States had been well able to handle the 
conflicting interests and claims of pressure groups 
involved in European public policy. As the 1970s 
advanced, however, there was a growing trend for 
interests to come together at a European level, 
striking up direct relations with the European in­
stitutions and bypassing the national authorities.
From the mid­1980s, faced with a proliferation of 
interest groups in Brussels prompted by the expan­
sion of the Community’s powers, the Commission 
(3) See Chapter 18, ‘Free movement of workers, social rights and social affairs’. 
role in the Single European Act signed in Febru­
ary 1986 through what was viewed as close co­
operation between Europe’s business circles and 
the Commission. Aware of this, the Commission 
showed a degree of prudence in its dealings with 
the Gyllenhammar group so as not to reflect ad­
versely on the legitimacy or representativeness of 
other European business leaders’ organisations (1). 
In any event, the negotiations on the Single Euro­
pean Act gave rise to renewed comment on and 
analysis of the influence of interest groups on the 
shape European integration was taking and on 
specifically European methods of political rep­
resentation (2). The Commission also made effec­
tive use of the representativeness of the European 
Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), established 
in 1973 by employee organisations, to build up 
vital cooperation in the implementation of Com­
munity social legislation. Consultative and advis­
ory bodies in which employers’ representatives also 
took part helped maintain a regular dialogue, even 
if the results did not always meet expectations. 
After the Council adopted a social action pro­
gramme in January 1974, a number of consultative 
committees were set up on the initiative of Com­
missioner Patrick Hillery on health and safety at 
work, social security for migrant workers and the 
free movement of workers. On a more general level, 
contacts between unions and the Commission as 
a whole were put in place with the arrival of Roy 
Jenkins as president in January 1977. In the 1980s, 
these meetings became more institutionalised and 
were held twice a year. However, trade unions also 
managed to exert pressure to defend their interests 
through informal contacts with commissioners 
and directorates­general. 
(1) HAEC, BAC  78/1989/52, Memo to Karl­Heinz Narjes, Vice­President 
of the Commission, from Fernand Braun on the Gyllenhammar ‘Round 
Table’, 13 June 1985. 
(2) As shown convincingly in the work of Cowles, M. G., including: ‘L’eu­
ropéanisation de l’action politique des multinationales’, Politique étrangère, 
No 2, 1997, pp. 309–324.
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abandoned its sectoral approach for a pluralistic 
one. Subsequently, one of the biggest challenges 
lay in the Commission’s ability to devote its at­
tention in equal measure to the diversity of views 
expressed by the major groups representative of 
economic and social interests. This change of ap­
proach and outlook was to be hammered home by 
the Single European Act. 
Pierre Tilly
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Roy Jenkins: momentum 
regained but interrupted
The recruitment of Roy  Jenkins as the first Brit­
ish President of the European Commission was a 
remarkable coup. Twice British home secretary, a 
highly successful chancellor of the exchequer, and 
a man tipped as the next foreign secretary and heir 
apparent as Labour leader had Harold Wilson not 
unexpectedly lost the 1970 British general election, 
Jenkins arrived in Brussels in 1977 with a substantial 
domestic and international reputation. He was also, 
with Edward  Heath, the most high­profile pro­ 
European in British politics: he had been a support­
er of British EEC membership since the early 1960s, 
had famously led the Labour rebellion which saved 
the 1971 European Communities Bill in the House 
of Commons, and had been the leader of the ‘Yes’ 
campaign in the British 1975 referendum. His 
ministerial track record spoke for itself. Moreover, 
as a renowned speaker and writer he seemed better 
qualified than his predecessors to demystify and ex­
plain the role of Commission president. Better still, 
his appointment had been championed by the two 
most powerful political leaders in the Commu nity, 
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and Helmut Schmidt. 
Here at last, it seemed, was a British statesman who 
could begin to fulfil those far­reaching hopes that so 
many on the continent had attached to the United 
Kingdom’s participation in the integration process, 
while at the same time demonstrating the value of 
the United Kingdom’s   EEC  membership to the 
British public.
The European context of his appointment was 
discouraging, however. The mid­1970s  had been 
a phase during which the integration process had 
seemingly moved backwards, not forwards. Ambi­
tious new targets, like the dream of economic and 
monetary union by 1980, had disappeared from 
view; existing achievements, such as a functioning 
customs union, were under threat from protection­
ist currents both within Europe and beyond. The 
misgivings about Community membership felt by 
the British continued, despite the apparently deci­
sive outcome of the 1975 referendum. And even de­
velopments that ought to have been seen as positive, 
like the determination of the Greeks, Spanish and 
Portuguese to consolidate their democracies by en­
tering the EEC as soon as possible, were discussed 
amongst the Nine in terms that emphasised the dis­
advantages of enlargement rather than its potential 
merits. 
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So how, then, did this passionate pro­European, un­
versed in the operation of the European system, fare 
once in charge of the European Commission? And 
did Jenkins’s high profile and evident gifts overcome 
the gloom of the situation he inherited? The best way 
of answering these questions is to identify the suc­
cesses and disappointments of his 4­year Presidency.
The first achievement of his Presidency was to 
win the right for the Commission  president to at­
tend meetings of the G7, the regular summits held 
amongst the leaders of the seven most industrialised 
countries. There had been calls for Commission par­
ticipation in this forum ever since the start of regular 
economic summits in 1975. After all, a substantial 
proportion of the subject matter discussed over­
lapped with Community powers. But Jenkins and 
his supporters had to battle long and hard to gain 
Moreover, Jenkins lacked any real inside knowledge 
of how the Community system worked. Although 
a passionate advocate of the United Kingdom’s role 
in Europe, his own career had seldom taken him to 
Brussels: of his ministerial appointments, all but 
his second stint as home secretary predated British 
membership, and in the  1970s home secretaries 
had no call to travel to Brussels since none of what 
would subsequently become the justice and home 
affairs dimension of the integration process yet 
featured on the Community’s agenda. As  Jenkins 
himself confessed, ‘My [European] conviction was 
complete, but my experience was negligible’ (1).
(1) Jenkins, R., European Diary, 1977–81, Collins, London, 1989, p. 2.
François-Xavier Ortoli (on the right) hands over to Roy Jenkins (on the left), 6 January 1977.
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An effective communicator: Roy Jenkins at a press conference in 1977.
The second of Jenkins’s major achievements was 
his role in the launch of the European Monetary 
System (2). For it was the revitalisation of monetary 
integration that the incoming president fastened 
upon as the issue with which to reinvigorate the 
Community and it was with Jenkins’s Florence 
speech of October 1977 that the process that would 
eventually lead to the EMS began. It is true, of 
course, that the system launched in early 1979 bore 
little resemblance to Jenkins’s initial ideas. And it 
is still more true that nothing would have come of 
the proposal had the Commission president’s sug­
gestion not been picked up by Schmidt and Giscard 
(2) Interview with Michael Emerson, 26 July 2010; Ludlow, P., The Making of 
the European Monetary System: A Case Study of the Politics of the European 
Community, Butterworths, London, 1982; Mourlon­Druol, E.,  A Europe 
Made of Money: The Emergence of the European Monetary System, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, 2012.
permission to attend, and then to be treated on a par 
with his fellow participants. At the London Summit 
of May  1977, Jenkins was not given a microphone 
at the concluding press conference; 2 years later in 
Tokyo he was not invited to the pre­summit coord­
inating dinner for the European participants. But 
gradually such petty discriminations ebbed away, 
thanks largely to the fact that Jenkins was manifest­
ly of a stature and calibre to belong at such occasions. 
The value of his contributions progressively eroded 
the case against his participation. The place of the 
Commission president at G7, G8 and, more recently, 
G20 meetings has never since been challenged (1).
(1) Interview with Crispin Tickell, 21 August 2010; see also Garavini, G., ‘The 
battle for the participation of the Community in the G7 (1975–77)’, Jour­
nal of European Integration History, Vol. 12, No 1, 2006, pp. 141–158.
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reached its apogee with the Commission opin­
ion of January  1976 which had been disowned by 
the Member States and resented by the Greeks for 
stating publicly a number of misgivings about the 
consequences of rapid Greek membership widely 
shared in national capitals, and which had contin­
ued to surface intermittently in the Commission’s 
handling of the Greek membership talks in 1976 
and 1977  (1). Under Jenkins’s leadership, howev­
er, the Commission approach shifted to one where 
hesitation was replaced with a determination to 
bring the enlargement discussions to a rapid and 
positive outcome. To this end the Commission 
redis covered its expertise as a source of practical 
(1) Interview with David Hannay, 14 July 2011.
d’Estaing. The Commission could help air ideas 
on such matters, but the power to move from ideas 
to actual decisions belonged to the Member States 
alone. The mere fact that a major policy proposal by 
Jenkins had helped trigger an ultimately successful 
policy venture, however, underlined the powers of 
initiative that the Commission Presidency still re­
tained. In a period of low Commission morale, this 
was an important reminder.
His third success was the redirection of the Com­
mission’s role in the enlargement negotiations 
under way with Greece, Spain and Portugal. In the 
initial stages of the Greek talks, the Ortoli Com­
mission had become the mouthpiece for the many 
doubts about enlargement harboured, unvoiced, 
by the Member States themselves. This trend had 
‘The Parliament is not really a rewarding body to which to speak’: Roy Jenkins spoke openly enough about the strange 
and disagreeable feeling that speaking in front of the European Parliament initially gave him.
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Roy Jenkins arrives at the G7 summit in Venice in June 1980: gaining the right to attend such summits 
was one of the triumphs of his Presidency.
tenure to carry out a radical shake­up of the way in 
which the Commission functioned  (2). And such 
transformative intent persisted well into Jenkins’s 
second year in Brussels, with Commission reform 
being the principal theme of the awayday held by 
the president’s cabinet in the summer of 1978  (3). 
Actual success in altering the manner in which the 
Commission functioned was slow to arrive, how­
ever. Some useful changes were made: a central advis­
ory group was formed that would ultimately become 
the Forward Studies Unit and the patterns of brief­
ing within the upper reaches of the Commission do 
(2) Crispin Tickell papers, All Souls College, Oxford, box 1, folder ‘Reform of 
the Commission’.
(3) Crispin Tickell papers, All Souls College, Oxford, file 17, Record of East 
Hendred Meeting, 31 July 1978.
solutions to the technical problems thrown up 
by enlargement, as a mediator in delicate intra­ 
Community diplomacy and as an adviser to would­
be member state governments. The two meetings 
between Jenkins and  Konstantinos Karamanlis, 
the Greek prime minister, in January and Septem­
ber  1978 were crucial milestones in this transfor­
mation (1).
Alongside these important successes there were a 
number of disappointments. Of these, the first was 
the failure to have the intended impact on the way 
in which the Commission worked. It is clear that 
the incoming president had high hopes of using his 
(1) Karamouzi, E., Greece, the EEC and the Cold War, 1974–79, Palgrave Mac­
millan, Basingstoke, 2014 (forthcoming).
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in helping to find a temporary solution to the latter. 
But the awkwardness of a British Commission presi­
dent having to deal with a major stand­off between 
the United Kingdom and its partners cast a shadow 
over his final year in Brussels (1).
The final disappointment of Jenkins’s tenure was his 
decision not to seek a second term. To have a truly 
significant impact on the integration process, a Com­
mission president needs more than a single term in 
Brussels (2). Jenkins’s case, how ever, showed the dan­
(1) Jenkins, R., European Diary, 1977–81, Collins, London, 1989, in particu­
lar pp. 545–547.
(2) Prior to the Maastricht Treaty, the standard term of a Commission Presi­
dency was 4 years, not 5.
seem to have been transformed by the arrival of the 
high­calibre team that Jenkins brought with him 
from London. The Jenkins Presidency also com­
missioned the Spierenburg report. But the root and 
branch transformation originally envisaged was 
never attempted, let alone carried out.
Also disappointing was the way in which Jenkins’s 
tenure in Brussels did  not have the hoped­for 
positive effect on the debate about the United 
Kingdom’s place in Europe. Indeed, the United 
Kingdom’s European difficulties only seemed to 
worsen, with the Callaghan government opting out 
of the EMS, and the Thatcher government rapid­
ly embroiling the country in a bitter row about its 
budgetary contribution. Jenkins played a useful role 
On the quest for monetary integration: Roy Jenkins arriving at the Brussels European Council meeting of December 1977.
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Roy Jenkins in Strasbourg.
began the process of much­needed institutional 
revitalisation. His stature and intellectual contri­
bution highlighted how important the post could 
be. And the impact of both the EMS success and 
the G7 victory would endure long beyond 1980. But 
the petering out of his reform aspirations and the 
decision not to seek reappointment meant that his 
impact on the Community was not as fundamen­
tally transformative as it might have been.
Piers Ludlow
gers of appointing a major pol itical figure who still 
harbours domestic political ambitions. For once La­
bour lost the 1979 general election, Jenkins’s mind 
turned inexorably back to  British politics, plotting 
what ultimately became the launch of the Social 
Democratic Party (SDP) in 1981 (1). Inevitably this 
distracted him somewhat from his European duties. 
More seriously it also largely explains his decision 
not to seek reappointment.
In the history of Europe, therefore, Jenkins will 
remain an important Commission president who 
(1) Interview with David Marquand, 7 June 2011.
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Chapter 5  
The impact of the first 
enlargement
The year 1973 marked the European Community’s 
first encounter with the actual impact of enlarge­
ment. The debate about enlargement had been one 
of the main controversies of the preceding decade, 
repeatedly causing deep divisions between the six 
founding members (1). The long­delayed and highly 
complex membership negotiations with Denmark, 
Ireland, Norway and the United Kingdom had 
moreover been one of the key challenges facing the 
Community in the course of 1970 and 1971  (2). 
The successful conclusion of the membership ne­
gotiations in late 1971 brought the Community 
face to face for the first time with a phenomenon 
that would loom large in its subsequent develop­
(1) Ludlow, N. P., The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s: Nego­
tiating the Gaullist challenge, Routledge, London, 2006, esp. p. 133 et seq.
(2) Geary, M., An Inconvenient Wait: Ireland’s Quest for Membership of the 
EEC, 1961–73, Institute of Public Administration, Dublin, 2009; Ras­
mussen, M., ‘Joining the European Communities: Denmark’s road to EC 
membership, 1961–73’, PhD thesis, European University Institute, 2004; 
Furby, D. E., ‘The revival and success of Britain’s second application for 
membership of the European Community, 1968–71’, PhD thesis, Queen 
Mary University of London, 2009.
ment: the hazards of referendums. Not for the last 
time, the outcomes of these consultations had been 
mixed: while the voters of Denmark and Ireland 
approved their countries’ accession to the EEC and 
those of France indicated, albeit by a smaller mar­
gin than hoped, their readiness to see the Commu­
nity expand, the Norwegians refused to become 
the 10th Community member. This meant that the 
Community of six expanded to nine rather than 
10 Member States on 1 January 1973. While virtu­
ally everyone in Brussels was familiar, if not weary, 
with the issue of enlargement, the practical implica­
tions of accommodating three new Member States 
were, however, unfamiliar and posed a number of 
problems for the EEC as the period covered by this 
volume began.
This chapter will review these difficulties and the 
manner in which they were overcome at three levels: 
first, the political difficulties posed by Irish mem­
bership, and still more by Danish and British mem­
bership; second, the impact on Community policies 
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the 1975–76 dispute between the Irish government 
and the European Commission over the implemen­
tation of the 1974 directive on equal pay for men 
and women. By a strange twist of fate, this piece of 
legislation had been steered through the Council of 
Ministers by Ireland’s own commissioner, Patrick 
Hillery, but the Irish government had deemed it too 
costly to implement. Hillery and the Commission 
stood their ground on this, and the Irish were not 
granted the exemption they sought. The episode was 
widely seen as all but ruling out Hillery’s prospects 
of reappointment (1). Irish membership thus afford­
ed the Commission an early taste of the problems 
that could arise when extending the integration pro­
cess to a country that still fell some way short of the 
level of economic development attained elsewhere 
in the EEC. The southern European applicants, 
Greece, Spain and Portugal, discussed elsewhere in 
this volume, would later pose similar problems (2).
As far as Danish and British membership was con­
cerned, by contrast, the main political difficulties 
sprang from the persistence of a strong level of 
domestic opposition to the EEC. Euroscepticism 
was not a totally new phenomenon, of course. The 
sizeable Communist parties in both France and 
Italy opposed the integration process (although in 
Italy, in particular, this opposition soon faded), as 
had the German Social Democrats prior to 1959. 
But the 1973 enlargement did bring the problem 
of internal party political and public opposition 
to the EEC to a new level. In both Denmark and 
the United Kingdom, substantial factions within 
political parties that were likely to hold governmen­
tal office were either ambivalent about or hostile to 
their country’s membership. Furthermore, in both 
countries, the presence of a sizeable pool of voters 
sceptical about the merits of integration posed an 
enduring temptation to politicians to adopt a popu­
list anti­European stance. In both Denmark and the 
(1) Walsh, J., Patrick Hillery: The Official Biography, New Island, Dublin, 
2008.
(2) See Chapter 24, ‘The Mediterranean challenge’.
of the three new Member States; and third, and in 
greater detail, the administrative implications of 
Community enlargement. While some of the more 
ambitious aspirations of the British, in particular 
the idea of profoundly transforming the Commu­
nity from within, would soon fall by the wayside, 
the move from six to nine Member States undoubt­
edly encouraged major changes in the politics, pol­
icies and administrative arrangements of the Euro­
pean Community in general and the Commission 
in particular.
The political challenge 
of enlargement
The Irish posed the fewest problems as far as their 
commitment to European integration was con­
cerned. Community membership had been ap­
proved in the 1972 referendum with an overwhelm­
ing 83.1 % in favour and 16.9 % against. Both Fine 
Gael and Fianna Fáil, the two main political parties, 
solidly supported EEC membership. The fact that 
Jack Lynch’s Fianna Fáil government which had ne­
gotiated membership was replaced in March 1973 
by a Fine Gael government led by Liam Cosgrove 
thus in no way called into question Ireland’s place 
within the EEC. And there was little or no organ­
ised Euroscepticism beyond the fringe Sinn Féin 
movement.
The political difficulties posed by Irish member­
ship  instead sprang from the country’s economic 
underdevelopment. At the time it joined, the differ­
ential between Irish per capita GNP and the Com­
munity average was significantly greater than the 
income gaps between the six founding members. 
As a result, both Ireland’s immediate implementa­
tion of the existing acquis communautaire and its 
capacity to enact some of the bold moves towards 
greater integration being contemplated in the 
early 1970s were open to question. An illustration 
of the type of difficulties this could pose would be 
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tion from spilling over into their day­to­day engage­
ment with the EEC. The defeat of Edward Heath in 
the February 1974 general election rapidly removed 
from power the prime minister who had negotiated 
the United Kingdom’s entry into the EEC. Heath’s 
replacement, the Labour leader Harold Wilson, 
headed a party that had instructed its members to 
oppose the 1971 European Communities Bill in 
the House of Commons, and had fought the 1974 
election on a pledge to renegotiate the United King­
dom’s terms of entry and to seek their reapproval by 
the British population by means of a referendum. 
Fourteen months after accession, the United King­
dom seemed to be raising a serious question mark 
about its continued EEC membership (2).
In the event, Labour was able to honour both of its 
pledges while confirming the United Kingdom’s 
European membership — the outcome Harold 
Wilson had almost certainly desired all along. The 
British government quickly scaled back the extent of 
change it sought to the terms of entry and ultimate­
ly settled for, and recommended to its public, a se­
ries of modifications that altered little of substance. 
The United Kingdom’s European partners and the 
Commission also handled the whole affair with 
a degree of tact. The Commission appears to have 
taken heed of a note on the issue prepared by David 
Hannay, the head of cabinet of Christopher Soames, 
one of the two British commissioners, which was 
entitled ‘Renegotiation without tears’ (3). In this he 
advised against any strong public condemnation of 
the British move or any questioning of the legality 
of an attempt to reopen the substance of a member­
ship negotiation so recently concluded. Instead, the 
Commission should await the details of the United 
Kingdom’s exact requests, and then see what scope 
there was to accommodate them without the acces­
sion treaties being formally modified. Similar care 
(2) Wall, S., The Official History of Britain and the European Community — 
Volume II: From Rejection to Referendum, 1963–75, Routledge, London, 
2012, pp. 511–590. 
(3) Interview with David Hannay, 14 July 2011.
United Kingdom there were votes to be gained by 
‘Euro­bashing’ in a way that did not apply to any of 
the founding Member States. The entire European 
approach of the two new members would be pro­
foundly affected by these realities.
Despite their underlying similarities, however, 
the paths of Denmark and the United Kingdom 
soon diverged. In Denmark, the potential politi­
cal divisiveness of the European issue was curbed, 
almost paradoxically, by the establishment of the 
most advanced system of parliamentary scrutiny of 
European legislation in the Community (1). Almost 
uniquely, a great deal of Community legislation was 
discussed by the Danish parliament before it had 
been decided upon in Brussels, thus ensuring that 
Danish ministers had guaranteed parliamentary 
backing for the stance they adopted in Council de­
bates and minimising the risk of anti­European re­
bellions once the Council decision had been taken. 
Also of importance were the effectiveness of Danish 
interministerial coordination and the strong alli­
ance of interest that quickly developed between Co­
penhagen and the Commission. This alliance was 
grounded in the belief that an effective Commis­
sion could act as the protector of small countries’ 
interests against the excesses of the strong, but also 
owed much to the shared commitment of Brussels 
and Copenhagen to the common agricultural pol­
icy (CAP) and the effectiveness of Denmark’s first 
European commissioner, Finn Olav Gundelach. 
The overall consequence, however, was that Den­
mark’s early track record within the EEC showed 
little of the disruptiveness that might have been 
expected given the Eurosceptic tone of much of its 
domestic debate.
The British, by contrast, were much less successful 
in preventing their own misgivings about integra­
(1) Auken, S., Buksti, J. and Sørensen, C. L., ‘Denmark joins Europe: Patterns 
of adaptation in the Danish political and administrative processes as a re­
sult of membership of the European Communities’, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol. 14, No 1, 1975, pp. 1–36.
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portant aspects of the Community continued: the 
Callaghan government would opt out of the Euro­
pean Monetary System, while from 1979 onwards, 
the new Conservative government led by Margaret 
Thatcher would lead a vociferous campaign to se­
cure a budget rebate  (5). The United Kingdom’s 
lengthy career as a somewhat turbulent member of 
the Community had begun.
Providing some compensation for these political 
challenges, however, the 1973 enlargement process 
also brought a number of unquestionable politi­
cal benefits. First, and most simply, it significantly 
increased the size of the Community, and hence 
its political and commercial weight in the world. 
The enlarged Community had a population of 
256 million, making it significantly bigger than the 
United States, which had 212 million inhabitants 
(5) See Chapter 11, ‘The politics of the Community budget’. 
to take the heat out of the matter was shown on 
one of the key issues that the British raised, namely 
their budget contribution. Commission Secretary­
General Émile Noël, who chaired an internal com­
mittee designed to search for ways to respond to the 
United Kingdom’s demands, skilfully incorporated 
a former British Treasury official in his team, know­
ing full well that this would allow an unofficial but 
vital exchange of information between London and 
Brussels about what was and was not negotiable (1).
The Commission also kept a low profile during the 
1975 referendum campaign in the United King­
dom. The two British commissioners, Christopher 
Soames and George Thomson, threw themselves 
wholeheartedly into the campaign, giving speech­
es up and down the United Kingdom. Members of 
their staff provided help to the ‘Yes’ campaign, in 
particular by compiling factual information about 
Community policies designed to rebut some of 
the claims made by those campaigning against the 
EEC (2). A Welsh member of the Commission staff 
was also dispatched to Cardiff, ostensibly to inves­
tigate the possibility of setting up a representative 
office there, but in reality to contribute to the hard­
fought campaign in Wales (3). But widespread Eu­
ropean Commission involvement was avoided on 
the grounds that it might prove counterproductive. 
No non­British commissioners intervened in the de­
bate, President François­Xavier Ortoli, for instance, 
restricting himself to a positive public reaction to 
the result only once the voting was over and it had 
become clear that the British public had voted by a 
sizeable margin to remain within the EEC (4).
Despite its seemingly clear outcome, however, the 
1975 referendum failed to resolve the issue once 
and for all. Instead, British misgivings about im­
(1) Interviews with David Hannay, 14 July 2011, and Richard Hay, 10 August 
2010. See also Chapter 11, ‘The politics of the Community budget’. 
(2) Interview with Robert Jackson, 27 September 2011.
(3) Interview with Aneurin Hughes, 5 October 2010.
(4) British referendum: statement by François­Xavier Ortoli, President of the 
Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 6 June 1975. 
The three new members added substantially 
to the Community’s population.
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Impact of the enlargement 
on Community policies
Disentangling the exact contribution of any indi­
vidual Member State to a particular policy decision 
in a multilateral system like the European Commu­
nity is an almost impossible task. Furthermore, to 
the extent that national influences can be discerned, 
despite the Commission’s commitment to promote 
European as opposed to national interests and its 
pattern of collective decision­making, it makes 
more sense in a volume like this one to discuss them 
within each of the separate sections examining par­
ticular policy fields, rather than tackling the impact 
of Denmark, Ireland or the United Kingdom in a 
section on enlargement. This section will hence 
confine itself to a number of broader points.
The first would be to highlight the key change 
that did not happen — namely a root and branch 
transformation of the CAP. Radical alteration of 
the Community’s approach to agricultural support 
had long been something that many British govern­
ments had hoped to be able to do once inside the 
European Community. The possibility of effecting 
such change had indeed been an important incen­
tive behind both the 1961 application submitted 
by Harold Macmillan and that submitted in 1967 
by  Harold Wilson’s Labour government  (5). By 
1970–72, admittedly, Heath’s negotiators had be­
come well aware that to seek to attack the CAP 
before becoming a member of the EEC would be 
harmful, possibly even fatal, to their chances of ac­
cession. After two painful and humiliating rebuffs 
the British had learnt the hard way that if they were 
to get into the Community they would have to, in 
the words of Con O’Neill, the chief negotiator at 
official level, ‘swallow whole’ the acquis communau­
(5) Ludlow, N. P., Dealing with Britain: the Six and the First UK Application 
to the EEC, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p.  103; Parr, 
H., Britain’s Policy towards the European Community: Harold Wilson and 
Britain’s World Role, 1964–67, Routledge, London, 2006.
in 1973 (1). The Community’s gross domestic prod­
uct (GDP), while still lower, drew closer to that of 
the United States: EUR  989 billion compared to 
EUR  1  123 billion for the United States  (2). And 
its share of global trade was even more impressive: 
36.6 % of total world exports in terms of value in 
1973, and 35.7 % of total world imports, compared 
to US figures of 11.9 % and 12.1 % respectively (3). 
Second, it added credence to the EEC’s long­ 
standing claim to speak for Europe — or its west­
ern half at least. When the Community had been 
composed of only six countries and constituted a 
minority even of the non­Communist half of the 
continent, this had always been a somewhat difficult 
claim to swallow. With three additional states now 
included, and the remaining members of the Euro­
pean Free Trade Association (EFTA) closely linked 
through the free trade area accords that accompa­
nied the 1973 expansion, this now looked a more le­
gitimate, if still slightly inaccurate, self­image. And 
third, and perhaps most importantly, the expansion 
of 1 January 1973 brought to an end the long battle 
over Community membership that had so scarred 
the previous decade. If enlargement had its political 
costs, so too had ‘non­enlargement’ in the course of 
the 1960s. With eastern Europe still firmly under 
Communist domination and no immediate end in 
sight for the non­democratic regimes of southern 
Europe, the thorny question of which country to 
include in an integrating Europe seemed (wrongly) 
to have been definitively answered. The Commis­
sion’s enlargement task force, established to handle 
the 1970–72 negotiations, was disbanded, with no 
expectation that this decision would have to be re­
versed in the short term (4).
(1) Eurostat, EU integration seen through statistics, Office for Official Publica­
tions of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2006, p. 10.
(2) Eurostat, EU integration seen through statistics, Office for Official Publica­
tions of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2006, p. 11.
(3) ‘The competitiveness of European Community industry’, Document of the 
Commission’s services, 5 March 1982, p. 4.
(4) Interview with David Hannay, 14 July 2011.
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materialise lies beyond the scope of this section (4). 
It is worthwhile pointing out, however, that while 
the British were intent on CAP reform, they were 
not the only country to join the Community in 
1973. Denmark and Ireland, both of which had 
large farming populations, stood to do extremely 
well out of the agricultural policy. They hence had 
little incentive to alter its basic features. British pres­
sure for change, whether within the Commission or 
in the course of Council debates, was thus coun­
ter­balanced by Danish and Irish determination to 
defend the CAP. Paradoxically, enlargement may 
actually have cemented the pro­CAP status quo 
rather than weakening it.
One policy area that was boosted by enlargement 
was regional policy. To a large extent this reflects 
the fact, noted above, that with the inclusion of Ire­
land, the Community had significantly widened the 
gap between its richest regions and its poorest. The 
arguments in favour of a Community­level response 
to such disparity were strengthened as a result. Ad­
mittedly, the full implications of this change would 
only really become clear in the latter half of the 
1980s, by which time Ireland had been joined by 
three new Member States (Greece, Spain and Por­
tugal), all of which had per capita GNPs well below 
the Community norm. But even before these two 
enlargements, the full impact of which would only 
be felt after 1986, the arrival of Ireland bolstered the 
case for regional policy.
Somewhat more counter­intuitively, so too did the 
arrival of the United Kingdom, initially at least. 
Unlike the case of Ireland, this was not a reflec­
tion of the overall wealth of the country. Instead, 
British enthusiasm for regional policy sprang from 
their realisation that one way of supplementing the 
low levels of Community financial support that the 
(4) Ludlow, N.  P., ‘The green heart of Europe: the rise and fall of the CAP as 
the Community’s central policy, 1958–85’, in Patel, K. (ed.), Fertile Ground 
for Europe? The History of European Integration and the Common Agricul­
tural Policy since 1945, Nomos, Baden­Baden, 2009.
taire including, therefore, the CAP as it stood  (1). 
But such short­term pragmatism in no sense indi­
cated the disappearance of the long­term desire to 
alter the system. On the contrary, the expectation 
that future British governments would use their 
greater leverage from within to carry out the type 
of change that had been impossible from without 
remained intact throughout the early 1970s.
Nor was this expectation just a British delusion of 
grandeur. On the contrary, there is plenty of evi­
dence that one of the main arguments against Brit­
ish membership deployed by the French in the 1960s 
was precisely the threat which the United Kingdom 
might pose to the CAP, once inside the EEC  (2). 
And these same fears help explain why President 
Georges Pompidou had been so careful to make his 
agreement at The Hague in December 1969 on the 
enlargement of the Community conditional on the 
‘completion’ of the existing acquis — i.e. first and 
foremost the finalisation of the CAP  (3). France 
was determined to ensure that the CAP was already 
a fait accompli even before the United Kingdom 
joined.
As should become clear from the chapters devoted 
to Community policies, 1973–86 was not a period 
when either British hopes were fulfilled or French 
fears realised. A number of significant changes were 
made to the Community’s agricultural policy dur­
ing the years in question — the introduction of milk 
quotas in particular. But none of them amounted to 
the type of fundamental transformation to which 
the British had aspired. Large­scale CAP reform 
would not occur before the early 1990s, and again 
during the opening years of the 21st century. A full 
explanation of why profound change took so long to 
(1) O’Neill, C., Britain’s Entry into the European Community: Report by Sir 
Con O’Neill on the Negotiations of 1970–72, Frank Cass, London, 2000.
(2) Parr, H., ‘Saving the Community: the French response to Britain’s second 
EEC application in 1967’, Cold War History, Vol. 6, No 4, 2006.
(3) Ludlow, N.  P., The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s: Nego­
tiating the Gaullist challenge, Chapter 7, Routledge, London, 2006.
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idea of building a Community that mattered in 
foreign policy terms. Needless to say, much of this 
policy thrust was played out within the context of 
European political cooperation — and is as such 
beyond the scope of this volume. But it also had a 
direct impact on the European Commission, where 
Christopher Soames would prove an energetic ex­
ponent of a Commission able to play a significant 
role on the world stage. The single most dramatic 
example of this ambition was Soames’s May 1975 
visit to Beijing and the subsequent establishment of 
diplomatic relations between the People’s Republic 
of China and the EEC, a coup largely planned by 
the British commissioner and his immediate entou­
rage with minimal consultation of either the rest of 
the Commission or the Member States (2). 
The administrative impact 
of enlargement
Any enlargement poses a series of administrative 
challenges to a body like the European Commis­
sion. The arrival of the Danish, Irish and British was 
potentially particularly disruptive, in part because it 
was the very first such change, thereby obliging the 
Commission to devise from scratch the mechanisms 
needed to cope, but also because of the presence 
amongst the new Member States of a country such 
as the United Kingdom whose administrative tra­
dition was as well­established and as fiercely prized 
as were those, very different, primarily German and 
French traditions out of which the initial Commis­
sion structures had been formed. That the Irish also 
owed their administrative habits and structures 
primarily to the British model made the likely im­
pact of this administrative culture clash that much 
greater. This section will first discuss the new wave 
of recruits to arrive as a result of enlargement, before 
(2) Chenard, M. J., ‘The European Community’s opening to the People’s Re­
public of China, 1969–79: Internal decision­making on external relations’, 
PhD thesis, London School of Economics, 2012, in particular Chapter 3.
United Kingdom was likely to receive by means 
of  the CAP was to find new forms of Commu­
nity  expenditure out of which the British might 
expect to do better. Regional policy was seen as the 
most promising avenue, since there were a number 
of British regions that would be worthy candidates 
for substantial funding. It was hence no coincidence 
that the portfolio successfully secured by one of the 
first British commissioners, George Thomson, was 
regional policy. Thomson’s aims were very much 
in line with the wider aspirations of the Heath (1) 
government. Unfortunately for Thomson, how­
ever, the Heath government’s enthusiasm for this 
expenditure­related way out of the British budget 
quandary was not renewed under his successors. 
The governments led by Harold Wilson, James 
Callaghan and Margaret Thatcher all decided that 
the best way of addressing the size of the United 
Kingdom’s net contribution to the EEC budget was 
to limit the amount of money paid into Communi­
ty coffers rather than to boost the sums likely to be 
received by the United Kingdom.
Two further effects of enlargement are observable 
in trade policy and in foreign policy more gener­
ally. In relation to trade policy, the Danes and the 
British helped bolster, both inside the Commission 
and more generally within the Community system, 
the camp of those favouring liberal, free­trading 
solutions rather than policies of a more protection­
ist variety. During a period of acute economic cri­
sis, this was of some political importance, since it 
was precisely at such times that the siren voices of a 
more protectionist approach to trade were at their 
most alluring. The ‘class of ’73’, in other words, 
helped the EEC resist any large­scale retreat dur­
ing the 1970s and early 1980s from the liberalising 
approach to industrial trade that it had followed 
ever since 1958. As for foreign policy generally, the 
incoming British were very enthusiastic about the 
(1) Wall, S., The Official History of Britain and the European Community — 
Volume II: From Rejection to Referendum, 1963–75, Routledge, London, 
2012, pp. 511–590.
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sound knowledge of the nuts and bolts of the Com­
munity and a good range of contacts. He also had 
enough inside knowledge to choose carefully the 
portfolio to which he aspired, disregarding pressure 
from his government to bid for regional policy, and 
instead setting his sights on social policy. This was 
indeed the job he was given. And as a further feather 
in his cap, Hillery was made one of the five Com­
mission vice­presidents — something which was by 
no means automatic for an incoming commissioner 
from a small, new Member State (3).
Despite this promising start, however, Hillery’s 
first few months in Brussels proved difficult. At 
the heart of his difficulties was his choice as head 
of cabinet, Robin Fogarty, a diplomat and an­
other former member of the team that had negotiat­
ed Irish membership. Fogarty proved an unfortunate 
choice: first of all he had no French and no aptitude 
to learn it, which was a hazardous predicament, to 
put it mildly, within what was still a predominantly 
French­speaking institution. Second, he showed lit­
tle patience with the way in which the Commission 
operated, telling a journalist that he felt surrounded 
by ‘fools’, and urging his commissioner to press for 
Noël’s removal as secretary­general! And third, his 
relationship with Hillery himself and with the rest 
of his cabinet broke down. The last straw was an in­
cident in February 1973 when Hillery travelled, on 
Fogarty’s instructions, to a meeting with a Luxem­
bourgish minister, but to the wrong place and at the 
wrong time. When Hillery took his head of cabinet 
to task over this mistake, Fogarty threatened to re­
sign — and immediately saw his resignation accept­
ed. Edwin Fitzgibbon, previously the deputy head 
of cabinet, was promoted in his stead (4).
The Irish commissioner bounced back well, 
though, from these early difficulties. Social policy 
had traditionally been a field in which the Com­
(3) Walsh, J., Patrick Hillery: The Official Biography, New Island, Dublin, 
2008.
(4) Ibid.
moving on to review their impact on the manner in 
which the European Commission operated.
The first challenge to be overcome was that of mak­
ing openings for personnel from the new Member 
States. This was made less straightforward than 
it might have been by the agreement between the 
Member State governments that the recruitment of 
new Danish, Irish and British officials should come 
about without a very significant increase in the over­
all size of the Commission. The implication of this 
was that vacancies would have to be created, rather 
than the incomers simply being added to the exist­
ing staff. In order to accomplish this, a ‘golden hand­
shake’ scheme was put in place so as to encourage 
long­standing members of the staff to depart. The 
task of administering this was entrusted to Jean­
Claude Paye, previously Raymond Barre’s head of 
cabinet, who was asked to remain at the Commission 
for an additional 6 months so as to oversee, with 
Noël, the process of encouraging staff to apply for 
golden handshakes and of selecting whose applica­
tions to accept (1). In general this seems to have been 
done very efficiently. It also meant, as one German 
official recalled, that enlargement led to a drop in 
the average age of those working at the Commission, 
since many of those who were encouraged to leave 
were significantly older than the incoming staff from 
the new Member States (2).
Some outstanding individuals, 
but too few Brits
The Irish government blazed a trail that numerous 
future new Member States would follow by ap­
pointing as their first commissioner a figure who 
had played a central role in their membership nego­
tiations. Patrick Hillery had been foreign minister 
and as such had been the country’s chief negotiator. 
In the process he had inevitably acquired both a 
(1) Interview with David Hannay, 14 July 2011.
(2) Interview with Marcell von Donat, 23 July 2010.
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The Danish approach to the appointment of a com­
missioner was to look for a candidate with clout 
within the Commission rather than someone with 
strong ties to domestic politics. It is telling that Finn 
Olav Gundelach’s name was brought up by Com­
mission president Francois­Xavier Ortoli. This was 
well in accordance with the intentions of the gov­
ernment and the Foreign Ministry to seek a central­
ly placed and influential commissioner. As the then 
Danish ambassador to the EC said: ‘ … we knew 
the importance of the inner circle in the Commis­
sion’ (2). Gundelach had been trained in the Foreign 
Ministry’s European division and had served in the 
GATT as well as having been Danish ambassador 
to the European Communities in Brussels. He was 
strongly in favour of European cooperation, but was 
a moderate with regard to the supranational dimen­
sion of the integration process. Once nominated, 
Gundelach composed his cabinet independently 
with a mind to establishing himself as a force in his 
own right within the Commission. He did include 
people with sound agricultural expertise, but less as 
a reflection of Danish interests than as a way of in­
fluencing a key policy area in the Commission. His 
cabinet was generally designed to enhance the com­
missioner’s overall influence on general Commis­
sion policies and to exert influence over other Com­
mission portfolios also. As expected, he conducted 
his duties as commissioner independently of Danish 
politics and quickly developed into one of the strong 
commissioners with an influence that stretched well 
beyond his own briefs. As testament to this, Soames 
insisted that Gundelach deputise for him in the 
external relations field for the 6 months or so in 
1976 when the British commissioner was suffering 
from serious health problems (3). And Gundelach’s 
influence was further enhanced when he assumed 
responsibility for agriculture in the Jenkins Com­
mission  (4). Revealingly, Gundelach was chosen as 
one of the ‘Four Horsemen’, the inner group (also 
(2) Interview with Niels Ersbøll, 3 October 2011.
(3) Interview with David Hannay, 14 July 2011.
(4) Interview with Arne Larsen, 19 September 2011.
mission’s ability to make a difference had been 
limited. This, however, looked set to change, since 
the Paris Summit of October 1972 had called for 
‘vigorous action in the social field’ and invited 
the Commission to devise an action programme. 
Hillery thus had a mandate for action and would 
respond to it energetically, despite the worsening 
economic climate from late 1973 onwards. Particu­
lar priorities included promoting employment, im­
proving working conditions and pushing for equal 
pay and conditions for men and women. One posi­
tive development from an Irish point of view was 
the location in Dublin of one of the two new social 
policy agencies decided upon during this period: 
the Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions, which would be established 
in 1976 (1). In the Jenkins Commission, Hillery — 
who would subsequently become president of Ire­
land — would be replaced by Richard Burke, who, 
apart from a brief interlude at the start of the Thorn 
Commission, occupied the post until the appoint­
ment of the outstanding Peter Sutherland to the 
Delors Commission in 1985.
Elsewhere in the Commission the Irish appear to 
have established themselves rapidly and fairly ef­
fectively. Not all of the senior appointees proved 
total successes: the only Irishman, for instance, 
to be appointed a director­general, Seán Ronan in 
DG X (Information), left after only 4 years. But, by 
contrast, the next Irish director­general, Eamonn 
Gallagher, had a very marked impact upon the new­
ly established DG  XIV, responsible for fisheries. 
The Irish government’s policy of pressing for senior 
posts in DG VI (Agriculture) also bore fruit, with 
two Irish directors appointed. And rising through 
the ranks were a number of very able younger Irish 
officials, like David O’Sullivan and Catherine Day, 
both of whom would go on to hold very senior posi­
tions within the institution. 
(1) See box ‘The Commission and the agencies: a difficult start’ in Chapter 18, 
p. 354.
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advice from the delegation to the European Com­
munities in Brussels — most likely guided by the 
Commission’s Secretariat­General. The number of 
appointments, cabinet posts apart, was approximate­
ly 15. The key Commission policy areas to which the 
Danes contributed special expertise and interest 
were agriculture, fisheries and shipping. Agriculture 
in particular was a field where the Danish govern­
ment — somewhat in competition with the Irish and 
British — was eager to claim leading administrative 
positions. It did manage to have a Dane placed in a 
director’s post in the DG for Agriculture (2).
The British also applied themselves with some en­
ergy to the task of filling their share of posts within 
the Commission. Needless to say, the first priority 
was filling the two places around the Commission 
table reserved for the United Kingdom. Here British 
internal decision­making gave an encouraging in­
dication of the positive frame of mind with which 
the Heath government approached EEC member­
ship. In the course of discussions in London, at least 
one member of the government suggested that the 
United Kingdom should select lightweight figures 
for the Commission posts, reserving its outstand­
ing candidates instead for the British permanent 
representation and thereby strengthening the 
intergovernmental aspects of the Community over 
the supranational dimension  (3). This course of 
action was rejected. Instead the United Kingdom 
selected two strong commissioners, Christopher 
Soames, a former cabinet minister and ambassa­
dor to Paris, and George Thomson, another former 
minister and a prominent Labour pro­European, 
and even announced its choices early, in the hope, 
it was claimed, that this might encourage other 
countries to nominate outstanding individuals to 
the Commission (4). Both commissioners moreover 
secured important portfolios — external relations 
(2) Interviews with Bjarne Bladbjerg, 5 May 2011, and Ejner Stendevad, 
19 December 2011.
(3) The National Archives (UKNA), PREM 15 2077, Robert Armstrong to 
Edward Heath, 29 July 1971.
(4) UKNA, PREM 15 2077, Robert Armstrong to Edward Heath, 29 July 
1971; Geoffrey Rippon to Edward Heath, ‘British Members of the Euro­
pean Commission’, 7 February 1972. 
comprising Étienne Davignon and François­Xavier 
Ortoli) that the Commission president used as an 
informal sounding board (1). 
After Gundelach’s sudden death in 1981, the Da­
nish government selected a politician as the second 
Danish commissioner. Poul Dalsager, a social demo­
cratic MP and former minister of agriculture, con­
trasted with Gundelach’s approach by adopting a 
closer focus on agricultural issues. Former Finance 
Minister Henning Christophersen, who succeeded 
Dalsager in the Delors Commission, was also a pol­
itician, but in many other respects Christophersen’s 
appointment marked a return to a commissioner who 
was a force in his own right and — like Gundelach 
— together with his cabinet, a key ally for the Com­
mission president. Christophersen worked closely 
with Delors on the preparation of the Commission’s 
new work programme — parts of which were draft­
ed in Copenhagen — and was to become an impor­
tant pillar of the Delors Presidency. This held true 
also for the close relationship between Christopher­
s en’s cabinet, that of Delors and the Secretary­ 
General of the Council of Ministers from 1980, 
Niels Ersbøll, which heralded closer cooperation be­
tween the Council and the Commission.
The level of education of the Danish Commission 
officials was, with a few exceptions, confined to de­
grees in law, economics and political science from 
the universities of Aarhus and Copenhagen. A good 
number of them had been trained at the Danish 
Foreign Ministry or Finance Ministry, and many 
had experience of the Danish diplomatic delegation 
to the EEC. Practically all of them had occupied 
posts in the central administration in Copenhagen, 
and most cabinet staff would return to their nation­
al careers after several years at the Commission. The 
Danish officials were fluent in English and were also, 
as a rule, familiar with both French and German. 
There were very few cases of political appointees. 
Decisions on who to send to Brussels were taken 
by  the director of the Foreign Ministry based on 
(1) Jenkins, R., European Diary, 1977–81, Collins, London, 1989, p. 435.
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at university, rather than lawyers and economists 
like most of the officials of other nationalities  (4). 
Other more junior posts were then meant to be filled 
through competitions in the more normal way.
Some of the individuals who emerged from this pro­
cess would go on to enjoy lengthy and distinguished 
careers in the European Commission. Others per­
formed well in Brussels before moving on to success 
elsewhere. But the numerous positive stories should 
not be allowed to mask an underlying problem with 
British recruitment. Put simply, too few qualified 
Britons applied for posts (especially for the medium 
and junior A grade posts) in the course of the United 
Kingdom’s first few years as a Member State. As a 
result, the British struggled to fill the A grade posts 
allotted to them and built up a structural problem of 
under­representation in the European Commission 
that was to persist at least into the early 1980s  (5). 
This difficulty, although less acute than that suf­
fered by the Netherlands, was sufficiently serious 
to provoke a debate in the European Parliament in 
1978 and an exchange of letters between the Jenkins 
Commission and the British foreign secretary  (6). 
Neither Denmark nor Ireland, by contrast, struggled 
in the same way to attain the expected level of staff 
representation.
There are many explanations as to why this problem 
occurred. One persistent factor appears to have been 
the difficulty of identifying appropriate British can­
didates who had sufficient knowledge of French or 
of another Community language (7). Another more 
short­term element may have been the inaccurate 
guide to the equivalent grading between the British 
civil service and the Commission initially drawn up 
(4) See, for instance, Richard Hay’s recollections; interview with Richard Hay, 
10 August 2010.
(5) Willis, V., Britons in Brussels: Officials in the European Commission and 
Council Secretariat, European Centre for Political Studies and Royal Insti­
tute of Public Administration, London, 1983.
(6) ‘Debates of the European Parliament’, 14 June 1977, pp. 80–88; UKNA, 
FCO 30/4155, David Owen to Roy Jenkins, 6 April 1978; Roy Jenkins to 
David Owen, 25 May 1978; David Owen to Roy Jenkins, 31 August 1978. 
(7) This was the factor highlighted by Christopher Tugendhat in the European 
Parliament debate mentioned above, ‘Debates of the European Parliament’, 
14 June 1977, pp. 80–88.
and regional policy — and threw themselves into 
their new tasks with some enthusiasm, aided and 
abetted by high­calibre cabinets. Soames in par­
ticular gained a strong reputation, and was even 
spoken of seriously as a potential Commission 
president since it had been informally agreed that 
Ortoli would be succeeded by a Briton  (1). The 
emergence of Jenkins’s candidacy for the job, how­
ever, would prove fatal for his prospects. His 4­year 
term should, nonetheless, be considered a success, 
comprising not only policy coups like the opening 
to China referred to above, but also the remarkable 
feat of maintaining a good rapport with both the 
French government and the US authorities during 
the 1973–74 period when relations between Paris 
and Washington were highly strained (2).
The British were also entitled to fill a number of 
senior jobs elsewhere in the Commission hier archy. 
The choice of commissioners was thus followed 
swiftly by the selection of their cabinets and a hand­
ful of other very senior British officials, notably 
Christopher Audland, who became deputy secre­
tary­general. Filling such posts involved a detailed 
dialogue between the Commission, especially Émile 
Noël, and the British government. This advance 
party then played a major role, in conjunction with 
the ever­present Noël, in the identification of slightly 
less senior British officials, choosing normally from 
a list of potential recruits which had been drawn up 
by the British civil service. David Hannay, Soames’s 
head of cabinet, recalls delegating most of his nor­
mal functions to his deputy, Adrian Fortescue, for 
a 6­month period so that he could concentrate on 
the huge task of filling all the posts that had been set 
aside for the British (3). In each case, great care had 
to be taken to match the particular skills of the best 
British candidates with the specific vacancies that 
had been created. This was made all the more tricky 
by the fact that most British recruits were ‘general­
ists’, who had studied the classics, history or English 
(1) UKNA, PREM 16 859, Armstrong minutes on Harold Wilson–Christopher 
Soames meeting on 28 October 1974.
(2) Interview with David Hannay, 14 July 2011.
(3) Ibid. 
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The first and perhaps most obvious effect of en­
largement was the way in which the simultaneous 
arrival of so many new staff largely unfamiliar with 
the Commission’s way of working encouraged the 
institution to write down its method of operation. 
Christopher Audland was thus asked to head the 
team which drafted the first manual of procedures, a 
reference work that has been constantly updated and 
reissued ever since (3). This exercise also highlighted 
— and probably contributed to the reduction of — 
some of the administrative anomalies which had 
resulted from the merger, in the late 1960s, of the 
ECSC High Authority and the EEC and Euratom 
Commissions. This process had, at times, led to the 
coexistence within the new single Commission of 
different practices which had evolved independent­
ly in each of the three executives.
Another change, of particular importance to histo­
rians, was the way in which the newcomers altered 
both the circulation and the preservation of writ­
ten information within the Commission. Hannay, 
for instance, recalls the astounded, but delighted, 
reaction of a senior DG I (External Relations) offi­
cial when he was given detailed records of Soames’s 
conversations with visitors  (4). The British admin­
istrative tradition of taking extensive notes at most 
meetings, of disseminating such records quite wide­
ly and of making certain that at least one if not 
several copies of these records were preserved for 
posterity spread through the Commission rapidly if 
unevenly. It is no coincidence that the initiative lat­
er in the 1970s to establish what would become the 
Historical Archives of the European Union, housed 
in Florence, was very much the work of Audland (5). 
The British also succeeded in importing significant 
elements of their administrative culture of detailed 
preparatory briefing notes. This, however, appears 
(3) Interview with Christopher Audland, 8 August 2010. See also Audland, C., 
Right place — Right time, Memoir Club, Stanhope, 2004.
(4) Interview with David Hannay, 14 July 2011.
(5) Audland, C., ‘The historical archives of the European Union: Their opening 
to the public, management and accessibility’, Journal of the Society of Archi­
vists, Vol. 28, No 2, 2007, pp. 177–192.
by the British civil service, which had the effect of 
making it appear that Brussels jobs were much less 
well paid than they actually were  (1). And yet an­
other may have been the ongoing uncertainty that 
hung over the United Kingdom’s place in the EEC 
for much of the early period — something that is 
likely to have deterred would­be applicants attract­
ed to a long and stable career (2). This last factor is 
likely to have been at its most acute during 1974–75 
— i.e. the period of the renegotiation and the ref­
erendum — but did not disappear entirely there­
after. The Labour Party after all fought the 1983 
general election on a manifesto pledge to negotiate 
British withdrawal. For whatever reason, howev­
er, the impact of the British in Brussels is likely to 
have been mitigated by the fact that for virtually the 
whole of the period covered by this volume, there 
were fewer British employees in the Commission 
than there ought to have been.
Gradual change, but no revolution
The influx of Danish, Irish and British officials un­
doubtedly had an effect on the way in which the 
Commission worked. In the following pages, we will 
discuss the most significant changes that came about. 
But, as was the case above when trying to identify the 
impact of enlargement on the policy of the Commu­
nities, it is no easy matter to distinguish between the 
effects wrought by the newcomers and pre­existing 
patterns of change or external pressures for reform, 
neither of which had anything to do with the move 
from six to nine Member States. Some of the changes 
described might, therefore, have come about anyway 
even without enlargement, but the pace of change 
would probably have been slower. Furthermore, vir­
tually all the effects described fall into the category 
of gradual rather than revolutionary change.
(1) Willis, V., Britons in Brussels: Officials in the European Commission and 
Council Secretariat, European Centre for Political Studies and Royal Insti­
tute of Public Administration, London, 1983, pp. 27–28.
(2) Ibid., p. 36.
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of French as the main working language in the EEC. 
But for a number of reasons there was no Coperni­
can shift from a predominantly French­speaking to 
a mainly English­speaking working environment in 
the immediate aftermath of enlargement (4). For a 
start, the British were highly conscious of French 
sensitivities about this issue — it had been one of 
the subjects discussed between Georges Pompidou 
and Edward Heath in their celebrated May 1971 
summit (5) — and not only honoured their prom­
ise to select senior staff who were fluent French 
speakers, but also issued strict instructions to all 
the new Commission employees to be tactful and to 
eschew linguistic assertiveness from the outset  (6). 
Second, the position of French was so deeply en­
trenched, especially in crucial bastions like the Sec­
retariat­General, that no rapid shift was ever likely. 
Third, the Brussels of the 1970s was a much more 
French­speaking city than it would later become, 
lacking much of that international milieu which 
would allow subsequent generations of Eurocrats 
and their families to function almost exclusively 
in English. The incoming Danes, Irish and British 
thus had every reason to become accustomed to liv­
ing and working in a French­speaking environment. 
All of this meant that the short­term linguistic im­
pact of 1973 was the marginalisation of the other 
languages of the Community rather than a decisive 
shift from French to English. With that many more 
linguistic cultures jostling for space, the odds of 
any meeting adopting German or Italian as a lin­
gua franca lengthened significantly. French, though, 
would remain the leading language, with English 
established as the normal second choice  (7). Inter­
estingly, a more significant date for the longer­term 
linguistic balance would arguably be 1977 rather 
than 1973, because neither Roy Jenkins himself 
(4) Interviews with Marcell von Donat, 23 July 2010, Klaus Meyer, 20 October 
2010, and Nikolaus Vaulont, 20 August 2010.
(5) ‘Record of a conversation between the Prime Minister and the President of 
the French Republic in the Elysée Palace, Paris at 15.30 on Thursday 20 May 
1971’.
(6) Interview with David Hannay, 14 July 2011. 
(7) Interview with Nikolaus Vaulont, 20 August 2010.
to have been a change where 1977 and the arrival of 
Jenkins was an even more important milestone than 
1973. By the late 1970s, not only was the Commis­
sion president arriving at international meetings 
equipped with the range of speaking notes, back­
ground briefs, steering briefs and the like that any 
British minister would expect, but the same expect­
ations had spread and were being copied by com­
missioners from different administrative traditions. 
Ortoli’s paperwork for European Council meetings 
which he attended as vice­president in the Jenkins 
era was often noticeably better and more digestible 
than the preparatory materials he had taken to the 
Council meetings in his capacity as Commission 
president earlier in the decade (1).
A further change partly attributable to the pro­
cess of enlargement was the fact that Commission 
procedures became less formal. Some movement in 
this direction was likely to have occurred anyway, 
given broader societal changes across Europe as the 
1960s gave way to the 1970s and 1980s. But it was 
certainly the case that all three of the new admin­
istrative cultures being introduced into the Com­
mission mix tended to be less formal than those of 
the ori ginal six members. The Danes, Irish and Brit­
ish therefore strongly reinforced the trend towards 
more relaxed forms of address and slightly less stiff 
interaction between different levels of the Commis­
sion hierarchy (2). Some British officials also intro­
duced the custom of inviting their colleagues to din­
ner at home — a practice little seen prior to 1973 (3).
The final point to make is that the single most pre­
dictable administrative change, that in the language 
balance of the Commission, was not as important 
as expected. The arrival of the Irish and British ob­
viously did mean that English became an official 
Community language. In the medium term this 
would pose a serious challenge to the predominance 
(1) Compare the dossiers HAEC, BAC 81/1984/7 and  BAC 36/1984/100.
(2) Interview with Aneurin Hughes, 5 October 2010.
(3) Interview with Richard Hay, 17 August 2010.
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The translation services
The enlargement of the Community on 1 January 1973 
increased the number of its official languages to six, 
with Danish and English being added to Dutch, French, 
German and Italian. The structures of the directorate for 
‘Translation, documentation, reproduction, library’, which 
was part of DG IX (Personnel and Administration) and 
headed by the Italian Antonio Ciancio from 1970 to 
1984, were adapted accordingly: an English-language 
section and a Danish-language section were set up 
alongside the four existing divisions, as the 
Commission’s translation services had already been 
organised by official language for several years (1). 
These divisions, which were devoted to translation activity 
per se, were coordinated by a horizontal division entitled 
‘General Affairs’, including a planning office (which brought 
together all translation requests and sent them to the 
language divisions by order of priority), a terminology 
office (which helped translators in their everyday work and 
constantly entered terms in the Eurodicautom 
computerised terminology database) and a typing pool (2). 
In addition to these structures in Brussels, the Commission 
had had a Medium- and Long-Term Translation Service in 
Luxembourg since 1967 (3). 
Each language division was organised into groups, 
composed of about 10 translators and revisers 
(1) For information on the previous period, see Dumoulin, M., ‘The admin­
istration’, in Dumoulin, M., (ed.), The European Commission, 1958–72 
— History and Memories, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, Luxembourg, 2007, pp. 234–236.
(2) For more details, see the feature on the Commission’s translation services in 
Courrier du personnel, No 398, 20 December 1978, pp. 48–80.
(3) Since the STML ‘was destined to take on most of the work of the High Au­
thority’s translation service’ (EC Commission, Études sur la traduction et le 
multilinguisme. La traduction à la Commission: 1958–2010, Luxembourg, 
2009, p. 1), after the merger of the executive bodies of the three Communi­
ties it was made part of the Brussels directorate in a large trans­Ardennes 
service within DG IX in 1985.
specialised in one or more subject areas (energy, 
transport, etc.). This system created lasting working 
relationships between translators/revisers and the 
authors of the documents received and made it 
possible to distribute the work appropriately, taking 
account of each person’s strengths: ‘In the Danish 
division many people were trained translators, but there 
were also ... economists, lawyers and engineers; there 
was even an architect. There was always a colleague 
who could be consulted if someone had any doubts,’ 
Tove Blaabjerg Sørensen, head of group from 1975 to 
1990, recalls (4). In this way, the organisational set-up 
was characterised by effectiveness and mutual 
assistance and helped new colleagues to become part 
of the team quickly.
Although about 10 Danish-language revisers had been 
working in-house since January 1971 (5) — they had 
been responsible for revising the translations of the 
treaties produced by that candidate country — and 
there had been a small unit of English translators since 
the 1950s (6), the Commission had difficulty recruiting 
enough translators for these two languages in the first 
months after enlargement. At the end of 1973, it had 
355 translators in Brussels, including just 35 Danish 
translators and 58 English translators, out of the 80 
expected for each language by that date (7). But this 
problem was resolved quite quickly and staffing levels 
rose substantially over the years, with the result that, in 
(4) Interview with Tove Blaabjerg Sørensen, 14 June 2011.
(5) For further details, see ‘Danish is now an official international language’, 
Courrier du personnel, No 405, 14 September 1979, pp. 40–56.
(6) For further details, see ‘A visit to the Commission’s English translation di­
vision’, Courrier du personnel, No 401, 26 April 1979, pp. 34–43.
(7) EC Commission, Seventh General Report on the Activities of the European 
Communities in 1973, Luxembourg, 1974, p. 517.
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nor some members of the high­powered team that 
accompanied him to the Commission Presidency 
shared the exceptional French­speaking skills of the 
first cohort of Britons to arrive in Brussels. Much 
greater linguistic allowances had to be made for this 
second wave of British recruits. Even this genera­
tion, however, could not be faulted in its attempts 
to revive rusty school French, with struggles of this 
sort featuring prominently in Jenkins’s European 
Diaries and in the recollections of Hayden Phillips 
and David Marquand (7).
Generally speaking, the incorporation of three new 
nationalities into the European Commission was re­
markably smooth. It helped that so many of the first 
Danish, Irish and British arrivals were very com­
petent. It was also useful that so many came from 
those portions of the Danish, Irish and British civil 
service that had become convinced of the merits of 
EEC membership during the previous decade, and 
were hence solidly pro­European in their basic be­
liefs. They did not necessarily share quite the same 
degree of passionate Europeanism of some of the 
first generation of Eurocrats, but they were wholly 
certain that Denmark, Ireland and the United King­
dom belonged in the EEC and were determined to 
make a success of membership. As a result, they also 
recognised that the prospects of dramatically chang­
ing the administrative culture in Brussels were very 
slight. Instead change, if it came at all, would be 
gradual rather than dramatic, and spread out over 
the whole of the 1973–86 period and beyond.
Piers Ludlow, Jürgen Elvert 
and Johnny Laursen
1985, when the Dutchman Ivo Dubois was appointed 
head of the new Translation Directorate that brought 
together the Brussels and Luxembourg services 
from then on, it comprised nearly 1 100 linguists (1).
There was no shortage of work, as demand for 
translation had been growing incessantly every year, 
rising from 315 915 pages (2) translated and revised in 
1973, to 495 000 (3) in 1980 and 770 000 in 1986 (4). 
Up to the end of the 1970s, the main requesters or 
‘customers’ by far were DG VI (Agriculture) and the 
Secretariat-General, followed by DG VIII (Development), 
DG V (Social Affairs) and DG XIX (Budgets) (5).
The official arrival of the Greek language in the 
Community on 1 January 1981 had been carefully 
prepared by the Commission. The Translation 
Directorate had given its translators the opportunity to 
attend Greek language courses, including in Greece, for 
several years before enlargement, and since 1977 had 
had a small group of Greek translators and lawyer-
linguists to translate into Greek all the Community 
legislation, namely the treaties and the main secondary 
legislation, which amounted to 40 000 pages at that 
time (6). It showed the same foresight in the period 
before Spanish and Portuguese became official 
languages on 1 January 1986.
Pierre-Olivier Laloux
(1) EC Commission, Études sur la traduction et le multilinguisme. La traduc­
tion à la Commission: 1958–2010, Publications Office of the European 
Union, Luxembourg, 2009, p. 132.
(2) ‘Traduction, documentation, reproduction, bibliothèque  — Les grandes 
lignes de cette direction (IX­D) en 1977’, Courrier du personnel, No 392, 
14 July 1978, p. 59.
(3) EC Commission, Fourteenth General Report on the Activities of the Euro­
pean Communities in 1980, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, Luxembourg, 1981, p. 37.
(4) EC Commission, Twentieth General Report on the Activities of the Euro­
pean Communities in 1986, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, Luxembourg, 1987, p. 46.
(5) ‘Traduction, documentation, reproduction, bibliothèque — Les grandes 
lignes de cette direction (IX­D) en 1977’, Courrier du personnel, No 392, 
14 July 1978, p. 59.
(6) ‘La langue grecque est déjà entrée à la Commission’, Courrier du personnel, 
No 415, 27 June 1980, pp. 31–34. The work of revising the body of EU law 
in Greek continued until the mid­1980s.
(7) Interviews with Hayden Phillips, 17 August 2010, and David Marquand, 
7 June 2011.
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applied at meetings of Coreper and the College of 
Commissioners (2). The College of Commissioners did 
not use all the official languages at its meetings. 
Commissioners mostly spoke French and German, plus 
English from 1973 onwards. However, all the languages 
were always used at meetings of the Council of 
Ministers, summit meetings or European Councils (3). 
There were cases in which experts refused to take part 
in technical meetings at which a vote was taken or in 
meetings of working parties at the Commission if 
interpretation was not provided into and out of their 
language. 
Given the increase in the number of meetings and 
languages, with the resulting rise in the number of 
interpreters after the first two enlargements, the 
Commission decided, on 15 April 1981, to formally set 
up a Joint Interpreting and Conference Service on the 
basis of the service that had existed in this form since 
the Commission’s beginnings in 1958. The head of the 
former Directorate E for Interpreting and Conferences of 
DG IX, Renée Van Hoof — who had worked for the ECSC 
in Luxembourg until the Val Duchesse negotiations — 
managed to ensure that, from 1981 onwards, SCIC 
became independent from DG IX and was mentioned 
separately on the Commission’s organisation chart, 
under the direct authority of the president. She was later 
to become the first director-general, the first woman to 
rise to that rank. These arrangements came into force on 
1 May 1981. Two directorates were set up in SCIC —
Directorate A (General Affairs and Interpretation) and 
Directorate B (Conferences), plus the Training Division. 
The various interpreting units came under Directorate A. 
At that time 431 interpreters — not including the 1 117 
selected and approved freelance interpreters on the 
service’s register — covered 15 languages, seven of 
which had become official languages by then. Not all of 
them were EEC citizens (4). There were more women 
than men (55 %/45 %). Freelance interpreters covered 
29 % of the service’s needs, a figure which later rose to 
50 %. The number of meetings increased from 2 801 in 
1959 to 8 423 in 1980 and 9 894 in 1990. The number 
of interpreter days rose from 4 438 in 1959 to 75 472 
(2) E­mail from Noël Muylle to Vincent Dujardin, 19 June 2013.
(3) Informal interview with Noël Muylle, 19 June 2013.
(4) See Dumoulin, M., ‘The administration’, in Dumoulin, M., (ed.), The 
European Commission, 1958–72 — History and Memories, Office for Of­
ficial Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2007, 
pp. 244–245.
The challenge of the first enlargements 
for the Joint Interpreting and Conference 
Service (SCIC) 
Alongside the translation service, the interpreting 
service covered a completely different profession. 
Indeed, they were two separate directorates in DG IX 
(Personnel and Administration). This structural 
separation had existed since the institutions were set 
up. The task of SCIC was to translate the exchanges at 
meetings of the Commission, but also those of the 
Council, the Permanent Representatives Committee 
(Coreper), the European Investment Bank, the Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, as well as the summit meetings and 
subsequently the European Councils, none of which had 
its own interpreting service, which is why they used the 
Commission’s. In 1979, the Commission accounted for 
50.65 % of interpreter days, and the Council 40.25 %. It 
should be pointed out that the Common Assembly of 
the ECSC — which later became the European 
Parliament — and the Court of Justice had their own 
interpreting and translation services. 
Wherever possible, only interpreters with the status of 
officials were used for meetings of the College of 
Commissioners, Councils of Ministers or European 
Councils. In the initial years after the first enlargements, 
freelancers who passed strict tests were offered 
contracts as members of the auxiliary staff or ad hoc 
contracts for the languages for which the Commission 
did not yet have enough permanent interpreters 
(Danish, English or Greek). It is worth mentioning that, at 
that time, even countries that were not members of the 
EEC called on the services of SCIC, which started 
training interpreters in Chinese as early as 1979 (1).
SCIC’s policy was to offer a high-quality and effective 
service that met real needs. The use of languages in 
the meetings of the institutions varied widely, ranging 
from the possibility of using all languages to very 
restricted asymmetrical language arrangements. There 
was full language coverage at meetings of the Council 
of Ministers, but reduced language arrangements 
(1) See also Joint Interpreting and Conference Service, Office for Official Publi­
cations of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1995, p. 17.
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Nations, and took part in the world’s first experiment in 
teleinterpreting, which was organised by the National 
Aeronautics and Space Association (NASA)  between 
New York and Buenos Aires (2).
Permanent or freelance interpreters were allocated on 
the basis of their language combinations and the areas 
in which they had the greatest interest, or of their 
training. Quite a few of them had previously obtained a 
degree in law or economics. In order to prepare 
interpreters as well as possible for their future duties, 
SCIC set up a documentation unit and took part in the 
work of the Interinstitutional Working Party on 
Terminology and Documentation (GIIT). In addition, it 
went on to organise refresher courses for languages 
which had recently become official or to prepare for 
future enlargements.
In the 1960s, there were few university degree courses 
in interpreting in Europe and the rest of the world, and 
not enough graduates of such courses reached the 
standard required by the Commission. As a result of this 
lack of interpreters, SCIC introduced a 6-month training 
course in 1964. Participants were accorded the status 
of paid trainee. If they passed the training, they were 
offered short-term contracts as members of the 
auxiliary staff, which could be renewed after a further 
assessment. This training course, which was run by 
in-house professionals, was open to any applicant who 
had a university degree in any subject and who passed 
the aptitude test. As a result, by the time of the 1973 
and 1981 enlargements, about 35 % of SCIC staff had 
been trained in house, and SCIC cooperated with 
universities by offering them educational and financial 
assistance. The training courses were sometimes 
organised in other cities (Athens, Copenhagen, Florence, 
Hamburg, Lisbon, Madrid, etc.). The same approach was 
subsequently used for the accession of Spain and 
Portugal, in cooperation with the ministries of foreign 
affairs and education of those two countries (3).
 
Vincent Dujardin
(2) Informal interview with Noël Muylle, 19 June 2013. See also Joint Inter­
preting and Conference Service, Office for Official Publications of the Euro­
pean Communities, Luxembourg, 1995, p. 17.
(3) Informal interview with Noël Muylle, 19 June 2013.
in 1980. In order to fix the number of meetings 
organised at the Commission and their language 
coverage, keep costs under control and take account of 
the rooms available, SCIC introduced a system of 
arbitration between DGs organising meetings and the 
Secretariat-General. The Council of Ministers became 
the largest ‘user’ of SCIC, which had become the largest 
interpreting service in the world. By way of comparison, 
1 766 meetings were organised at the United Nations 
in New York in 1980, with 119 interpreters (1). 
After the second enlargement, the complexity of allocating 
interpreters led to the establishment of an ad hoc 
computerised system for this purpose (Safir, which was 
superseded by Pearl), which was the first time that this had 
been done in an international organisation. This was 
accompanied by an electronic calling system (Crystal), 
which staff interpreters could use to obtain information on 
their assignment schedule directly by telephone.
Although the organisational structure of SCIC was 
initially located in the Cortenbergh building, and later in 
the Berlaymont building, the meeting rooms were 
spread across other buildings in Brussels: Arlon, 
Brocqueville, Marais, Tour d’Ursel and Manhattan. The 
Commission decided to centralise its activity and built 
the first Centre de conférences Albert Borschette in 
1981. SCIC was closely involved in this and had 20 
meeting rooms installed that met the standards of the 
International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO).
In the 1970s, in order to keep costs under control, SCIC, 
like the UN, concluded an initial 5-year agreement with 
the International Association of Conference Interpreters 
(AIIC), laying down the working conditions of freelance 
interpreters and their remuneration at preferential rates. 
By way of example, a meeting requiring interpretation 
from seven languages into seven languages cost 
ECU 11 550, whereas a meeting requiring interpretation 
from five languages into three languages cost ECU 
3 300. Furthermore, SCIC became a member of the 
Inter-Agency Meeting on Language Arrangements, 
Documentation and Publications (IAMLADP), the 
advisory body of the language services of the United 
(1) ‘Création du service commun “Interprétation­conférences”’, Courrier du 
personnel, No 425, 12 August 1981, p. 33.
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Chapter 6  
An administrative culture 
in transition
The move from an administration with a mission 
(dear to Jean Monnet) to an administration that 
manages — along the lines of the national adminis­
trations — took place only gradually and was fraught 
with difficulty in the Commission because the Com­
mission was subject to particular constraints which 
did not exist at national level, such as the obligation 
to submit legislative proposals required by the trea­
ties (for example, annual agricultural prices or the 
achievement of the four freedoms).
Whether or not there was an administrative turn­
ing point is one of the major questions of the period 
between the arrival of the British and the appoint­
ment of Jacques Delors. Is it possible to pinpoint 
any changes in the Commission’s administrative 
culture in those years? It is not easy to answer 
that question since, if certain changes were merely 
superficial or were limited to the names used, 
others were initiated but did not really come to fru­
ition until after Jacques Delors’ departure or even 
after Jacques Santer’s term of office. Lastly, as is 
often the case, some reforms that were attempted but 
that came to nothing are hard to interpret without 
referring to the period that followed. In any event, 
the main watershed had already been achieved 
with the merger and the establishment of the single 
Commission in 1967–68. If the 1973 enlargement 
did usher in many major changes to organisation 
charts and staff, with the departure of 13 directors­ 
general, 40 directors, 80 heads of division and 
100 administrators, in terms of administrative cul­
ture those years were a period of slow transition or, 
from one perspective, a period of maturing. They 
were marked by a few adjustments, but no revolu­
tionary changes, resulting from the arrival of the 
British and a more general lack of political will to 
reform the institution. It should be pointed out that 
the administration was subject to many structural 
constraints: the framework and obligations set by 
the staff regulations, the need for the agreement of 
the Member States for the granting of posts and for 
any reform, and the need to comply with strict geo­
graphical balances.
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Commissioners for personnel 
and administration, 1973–88
Albert Borschette (1973 until his death on 
8 December 1976) — also responsible for 
competition. 
‘I did not agree to take responsibility for policy on 
personnel and administration in order to engage in 
management, but rather to pursue a policy’ (3).
François-Xavier Ortoli (9 December 1976 to 
January 1977) — at the same time as being 
president.
Christopher Tughendat (1977–80) — also 
responsible for the budget and financial control.
Michael O’Kennedy (1981–82), who resigned and 
was replaced by Richard Burke (1982–85) — also 
responsible for the Statistical Office, the 
Publications Office and the Interpreting and 
Conference Service.
Henning Christophersen (1985–88) — also 
responsible for the budget and financial control. 
DG IX as the driving force
In those years, the two directors­general of DG IX 
(known then as Personnel and Administration) 
were both French, and their tenure was charac­
terised by a high degree of continuity. The Ortoli 
Presidency stated its intention to ‘take control’ of 
that directorate­general, no doubt so as to counter 
the supposed (or potential) British influence over 
administrative issues. Pierre Baichère was appoint­
ed director­general in 1973. In 1981, when direct­
ors­general were changed again, DG IX remained 
the preserve of the French following the appoint­
ment of Jean­Claude Morel. But the situation was 
no longer what it had been in 1973: alongside the 
new French director­general there was a new depu­
ty director­general — a post that had been created 
on that occasion — the Briton Richard Hay who, 
(3) Courrier du personnel, No 241a, 9 February 1973, p. 3.
While it is true that Roy Jenkins commissioned the 
Spierenburg report in 1978 (1), its effects were very 
limited beyond its diagnosis that there was insuffi­
cient management. The only difference in this case 
was that, unlike the very many other reports that 
had been written from 1961 onwards, this report 
was published and therefore did not remain a pure­
ly internal document. In reality the legacy of Émile 
Noël continued to have a significant impact on the 
administration until the 1980s. 
The question arose of what kinds of change and re­
form to promote in a Community administration 
that had gradually consolidated its practices since 
the 1960s. Thus, since 1967, the single Commission 
had been in a phase that was described by David 
Coombes  (2) in 1970 as one of ‘bureaucratisation’, 
in other words one in which a common culture of 
bureaucracy was emerging in the Commission, 
with a move away from Jean Monnet’s model of an 
administration pursuing a mission and/or Walter 
Hallstein’s model of a charismatic administration. 
That movement was accompanied by an attempt to 
introduce management, in other words techniques 
and practices that appeared to have been brought in 
from the business sector. But this was not without 
its problems, given the tension between this new ap­
proach and the bureaucratic model. That movement 
was not peculiar to the Commission, since nation­
al administrations were subject to exactly the same 
tension during that period, albeit to quite differing 
degrees, as a result of the introduction of the theor­
ies of ‘new public management’. The Commission 
must be seen in the context of the changes that the 
Member States’ administrations were undergoing at 
much the same time.
(1) See box ‘Proposals of the Spierenburg report’, p. 177.
(2) Coombes, D., Politics and Bureaucracy in the European Community: A Por­
trait of the Commission of the EEC, Political and Economic Planning, Allen 
& Unwin, London, 1970.
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Baichère and ENSAE in the case of Morel — and 
they were appointed director­general at almost the 
same age — Baichère at 48 and Morel at 49.
And yet there were many differences between the 
two directors­general and their actual role in the 
system. They differed in their leadership style, with 
Baichère being more traditional and Morel more 
enterprising and imaginative. They also differed 
in their relations with the Secretariat­General, 
which, particularly since the creation of the single 
Commission, had become the main administrative 
player. Under Baichère, DG IX was not in charge of 
the most sensitive issues. According to Morel’s as­
sistant: ‘Émile Noël had accepted that Morel would 
gradually take on all these sensitive matters, which 
had not been the case before, provided that one of 
his right­hand men, Eduard Brackeniers (3), was in­
volved as well … ’. However, the appointing author­
ity was put back in the hands of the director­general 
in 1981. As a result, the nature of relations with the 
Secretariat­General changed gradually: DG IX was 
no longer a mere underling but had to wait until 
Noël’s departure before it could take full charge of 
the administration. Lastly, the two men differed in 
their attitude to the introduction of change. While 
Baichère may not have been a promoter of change, 
Morel advocated broader, more reformist thinking, 
based on the reports produced by Spierenburg and 
then Ortoli in 1980 (4), some of whose more radical 
proposals (such as the separation of grade and func­
tion) had the potential to produce major changes in 
the Community civil service in 1982.
It should be noted that DG IX was the subject of 
criticism within the Commission itself. The direct­
(3) Appointed head of division responsible for coordination. See interview 
with Philippe Petit­Laurent, 19 July 2010.
(4) ‘Report of the group of members of the Commission set up to study the 
implementation of Part Three of the Spierenburg report’, 28 February 
1980. See EC Commission, Fourteenth General Report on the Activities of 
the European Communities in 1980, Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities, Luxembourg, 1981, p. 30, and HAEC, COM (80) 
Minutes No 550, meeting of 5 March 1980, which elaborated considerably 
on the objectives of the Ortoli report and its implementation.
logically enough, took over from Morel when he left 
in 1986. In fact, this DG had begun to be shared 
between the French and the British as early as 1973, 
when Jeremy Baxter was appointed director for per­
sonnel after holding the same position in the British 
Post Office.
In 1973, Baichère replaced the Italian Lamberto 
Lambert, who had been in office since 1969 and 
who fell victim to the changes of staff that followed 
the first enlargement in 1973  (1). Pierre Baichère, 
who had a background as a senior French civil ser­
vant, spent some time working at the High Author­
ity in Luxembourg, as a member of the cabinet of 
the Frenchman Pierre­Olivier Lapie, and later as 
director for the budget, before entering the single 
Commission as director for the research budgets 
in DG  XIX (Budgets), under the authority of 
Lambert, who was the director­general of that DG 
until 1969. 
Jean­Claude Morel, who also hailed from the 
French civil service, having graduated as an en­
gineer from the École nationale de la statistique 
et de l’administration économique (ENSAE, the 
Paris­based gradu ate school of economics, statis­
tics and finance), worked in DG II (Economic and 
Financial Affairs) from 1963, moving up through 
the ranks to be appointed deputy director­general. 
However, when he went to work in DG IX in 1981, 
that DG had not been his first choice, as his assis­
tant, Philippe Petit­Laurent (2), recalled.
Consequently, between 1973 and 1986, the two 
directors­general for personnel and administration 
had quite similar profiles, as they had both gradu­
ated from the French grandes écoles — the École 
nationale d’administration (ENA) in the case of 
(1) Pierre Bockstael, who had been his assistant since 1969, recalled his depar­
ture: ‘He left at the time of enlargement, when a number of directors­ 
general  left the Commission. That was a shame because he was one of the 
major figures in the Commission’s administration’ (interview with Pierre 
Bockstael, 7 July 2010).
(2) See interview with Philippe Petit­Laurent, 19 July 2010.
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office for shorter periods, the bureaucratic culture 
was a shared reference point for Commission offi­
cials, who had a tendency to protect themselves, not 
against users but against interference by the Mem­
ber States. Jenkins referred to this in his speech to 
staff on 12 November 1980: ‘We cannot expect our 
officials to be contented indefinitely with European 
ideals and the principles of a worthy cause: the 
people who work for the Commission also deserve 
to have the prospect of a career and a really satisfying 
job’ (4). In that same year Michel Crozier, a French 
sociologist, was invited by DG IX to a major con­
ference on ‘future developments in bureaucracy!’ (5).
The incorporation of officials from the High Au­
thority also led to substantial adjustments: that was 
the view of Baichère, who used the following quite 
revealing expression when interviewed in the Cour­
rier du personnel: ‘The officials of the ECSC and 
Euratom felt a bit as if it was the children who were 
eating the parents!’ (6).
The introduction of management must be seen 
against the background of this process of bureauc­
ratisation. This period of transition or maturing was 
characterised by gradual organisational adjustments 
that were carried out in three stages. First, there was 
an old ‘Staff’ division in Directorate A (Personnel). 
Its name had been changed regularly, but in 1975 
it became ‘Establishment, organisation and evalu­
ation’, Division No  3 (after those devoted to the 
Staff Regulations and Recruiting) and then, in 
1978, for reasons of ‘linguistic precision’, the ‘Man­
agement and organisation, and establishment’ divi­
sion, with the term ‘management’ having the unusu­
al and convenient characteristic of being identical in 
all six Community languages.
(4) HAEC, BAC 75/1984/37, pp. 3–4.
(5) Courrier du personnel, No 416, 29 July 1980, pp. 13–20.
(6) Courrier du personnel, No 319, 10 April 1974, p. 12.
or­general of the Legal Service relayed this criticism 
in a note of February 1979 entitled ‘Problèmes ad­
ministratifs’  (1): ‘DG  IX poses several problems: 
1. The functions are not well defined. It is the em­
bodiment of excessive centralisation and bureaucra­
tisation, while at the same time seeming to be over­
influenced by the heads of cabinet. 2. It is too large 
and should be divided. 3. It is quite hard to find 
highly qualified officials to fill the most senior posts. 
4. For a long time it was used as a place for sidelining 
officials who were thought to be “accident­prone”. 
The effects of this policy can still be felt.’
Pierre Baichère fought hard to prevent any separa­
tion between administration and personnel and 
managed to preserve the unity of DG IX. He drew 
attention to this topic in a note dated 11 January 
1977 at the time of the arrival of Roy Jenkins, stat­
ing that a separation of this kind carried with it the 
risk of a ‘fragmentation of personnel policy’ (2). 
Opening up to new methods 
of management
The departure of Walter Hallstein, the charismatic 
head of the EEC Commission, together with the end 
of the High Authority and its model of an admin­
istration pursuing a mission, led to what has been 
described as the ‘bureaucratisation’ of the Commis­
sion (3). What counted under Hallstein was loyalty. 
With an expanded organisation and presidents in 
(1) HAEC, BAC 40/1986/42, Note from Claus­Dieter Ehlermann to Nick 
Stuart, 26 February 1979. 
(2) HAEC, BAC 17/1986/364, ‘Administration and personnel unit should be 
kept in DG IX’, 11 January 1977. The decisive argument seems to have been 
that ‘this would be all the more serious since the administration staff are the 
section of our staff which makes the most demands and has the highest rate 
of trade­union membership … it is clear that the trade unions will seek to 
take advantage of this new division of DG IX’.
(3) According to Coombes, D., Politics and Bureaucracy in the European Com­
munity: A Portrait of the Commission of the EEC, Political and Economic 
Planning, Allen & Unwin, London, 1970. He goes too far when he claims 
that the Hallstein Commission ‘was clearly not a bureaucracy’ (p.  299), 
since the first EEC Commission was able to be both governmental (politi­
cal) and bureaucratic (and hierarchical).
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being disguised behind pseudo­managerial bab­
ble’ (4). To be more specific, it could be thought, as 
suggested by Anne Stevens, that human resources 
management was seen merely as a way of designing, 
applying or even circumventing binding rules (5). 
This focus on management was strengthened by 
the accession of the United Kingdom but was not 
caused by it. Training in management techniques 
had already existed for several years at l’Institut 
européen d’administation des affaires (Insead, the 
European institute of business administration) in 
Fontainebleau or the Comité national de l’organi­
sation française (CNOF) in Paris. The Commission 
had contacted Louvain university on this question 
as early as 1969, as we shall see later on. The only de­
velopment was that the Commission used a greater 
variety of management training institutes: for ex­
ample, it started using the Institute for the Devel­
opment of Human Resources in Brussels from 1974 
onwards. In those early years there was also a cer­
tain amount of interest in fact­finding missions to 
London: accordingly, in 1974 two officials from the 
‘Recruitment’ division paid a visit to the civil ser­
vice to study the ‘development of new recruitment 
and selection techniques’ (6). But this interest soon 
waned when it was realised that the techniques that 
had been seen there were not transferable, with the 
two officials concerned drawing the following con­
clusion: ‘overall, we are quite disappointed by our 
visit to Britain’.
Management was still considered to be distinct 
from substantive issues. However, in words if not 
in actions there were the first signs of a new link 
between management and substantive issues, in 
(4) Interview with Philippe Petit­Laurent, 19 July 2010. 
(5) ‘Une simple amélioration ou une modernisation radicale? La réforme de 
l’administration de la Commission européenne’, Revue française d’admin­
istration publique, Nos 105 to 106, 2003, pp. 81–94. Anne Stevens is a pro­
fessor at Aston University, Birmingham, United Kingdom.
(6) HAEC, BAC 17/1986/371, Note from Van Den Eede to Yves Desbois, 
10 March 1975.
Second, in June 1980, the set­up was adapted with 
the establishment of the ‘Careers’ division (in 
Directorate A) and the creation of an independ­
ent ‘Management and organisation’ sector, which 
was hived off from the Personnel Directorate and 
placed under the responsibility of the director­ 
general in order to stress its special nature, in line 
with the Spierenburg and Ortoli reports. For one of 
the members of this division, Maria Pia Filippone, 
this was  ‘a signal to Parliament of the importance 
that the Commission attaches to this type of activi­
ty’. As a matter of fact, it was a response to a growing 
concern of the Parliament: ‘The budgetary problems 
related to staffing had already started — staffing had 
to be limited and staff had to be used more effec­
tively. In order to use staff more effectively, manage­
ment had to be bolstered: that was how this whole 
process began; it was an issue that we had not been 
aware of beforehand’ (1).
The third stage came about in 1986: a new ‘Coordi­
nation and Resources’ directorate was set up when 
Richard Hay became director­general (2), and Edu­
ard Brackeniers was put in charge of it. So it was 
not until that year that a directorate was devoted to 
management, on an equal footing with the original 
Personnel Directorate.
But during that period of nearly 15 years, manage­
ment had yet to be translated from words into ac­
tions. It was necessary to go through the motions. 
As Brackeniers  put it, management was a ‘nice’ 
idea  (3). Some went even further, referring to it as 
‘mystification’, like Petit­Laurent: ‘“Management 
and organisation” was somewhat based on intellec­
tual mystification, with the usual unscrupulous acts 
(1) Interview with Maria Pia Filippone, 8 July 2011.
(2) When Jean­Claude Morel became director­general of budgets, Philippe 
Petit­Laurent, one of his assistants, followed him to that DG but returned 
in 1989 as director of personnel in the ‘old’ Directorate A.
(3) Interview with Eduard Brackeniers, 26 April 2011.
174 The European Commission 1973–86 — History and Memories of an Institution
The Poullet report of November 1972 was commis­
sioned from the Université catholique de Louvain 
(UCL), specifically its Association universitaire de 
recherche en administration (AURA), with Profes­
sor Edouard Poullet, assisted by Gérard Deprez (3) . 
Since 1969, AURA had been responsible for gradu­
ally installing the PPBS (planning, programming, 
budgeting system) at the Commission  (4). Gérard 
Deprez recalled the state of mind in this task force 
when it started its investigation in 1970: ‘At the 
time we were convinced that the introduction of 
modern management methods in the Commission 
could radically improve its position in the Commu­
nity’s institutional system’ (5).
When the team from UCL carried out their inves­
tigation, they lost their illusions. Deprez put it this 
way: ‘And yet, while the programme was being im­
plemented, we realised that the vast majority of the 
members of the organisation were far from sharing 
our optimism and accepting that our analysis was 
sound. When we criticised the fragmentation of 
the activities carried out and the lack of any real 
priority in either the objectives or the allocation of 
resources, the response was either that the treaties 
imposed constraints or that the political situation 
had to be taken into account. When we stressed 
the need to set precise objectives before embarking 
on specific measures, we were told that clear objec­
tives could hamper rather than facilitate progress in 
certain policies. When we highlighted the need to 
make a better choice of the instruments to be used 
to achieve certain objectives, we were told in no un­
(3) He was a doctoral candidate in sociology at UCL, who was awarded  a 
doctorate for his thesis entitled ‘La Commission des Communautés 
européennes. Essai sociologique sur une organisation captive’, Centre de 
recherches sociologiques, Institut de sciences politiques et sociales, UCL, 
1974. Indeed, Gérard Deprez points out in the introduction to his thesis 
that ‘[their] concerns were not primarily scientific, but rather managerial, 
in nature: the aim of the AURA task force was not to conduct a sociological 
analysis of the Commission’s problems, but rather to provide a programme 
of assistance, while sticking to the terms of the contract’, p. I.
(4) PPBS is the budget drafting procedure launched in the United States in 
1963. PPBS was introduced to DG IX in 1969 and was later extended to all 
DGs following a decision taken on 14 October 1970.
(5) Deprez, G., ‘La Commission des Communautés européennes. Essai soci­
ologique sur une organisation captive’, PhD thesis, UCL, 1974, p. II.
other words policy. The subject of management was 
first put on the agenda of the meeting of directors­ 
general following an initiative from a British dir­
ector­general in 1976. In a note written in English 
in February 1976 by Raymond Le Goy, who worked 
in the area of transport, to Émile Noël, he asked for 
a meeting on the subject of management  because 
‘past a certain point in size and complexity, it be­
comes a crucial par ameter for policy’ (1). The initial 
attitude of Noël, who chaired these meetings, was to 
refer the issue to the director­general for personnel 
and administration (2). Management was not (yet) 
considered to be an issue that a secretary­general of 
the institution should be dealing with. The Com­
mission was still coloured by a traditional view of 
the senior civil service as a ‘public authority’, and 
this was reflected in the way (staff) management was 
confined to a single DG, thereby demonstrating its 
strictly sectoral nature. The idea that management 
formed an integral part of the Commission’s pol­
icy work had yet to gain traction, but the directors­ 
general did start to discuss the subject at that time. 
They did not take on board their new managerial 
role until much later, and heads of unit did not 
come to this realisation until even later still.
The scant impact of studies 
and reports
Initially the reports on the reform of the adminis­
tration remained internal Commission documents 
only. In a second phase launched by Roy Jenkins, 
they were made public, for example the Spierenburg 
report in 1979.
(1) HAEC, BAC 17/1986/50, Note from R. Le Goy to E. Noël, 10 February 
1976.
(2) HAEC, BAC 17/1986/50, Note from Émile Noël to Pierre Baichère, 17 Feb­
ruary, P.144/76: ‘It would be preferable if you took the initiative of organ­
ising a special meeting of this kind yourself and if you prepared and chaired 
the meeting. That would be far more in keeping with your responsibilities.’
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retirements (4). Nevertheless, the report threw light 
on the comparatively low importance attached to 
management by heads of division and specialised 
services, with only 27 % of them considering it to 
be a priority and just 13 % of them stating that they 
would like to attend a management seminar. The 
final assessment was as follows: ‘The group feels 
that, as long as the institution’s departmental heads 
continue to be concerned essentially with structures 
rather than behaviour, the management function in 
the modern sense of the word cannot be effectively 
carried out’ (5).
However, screening was essentially a process, a reg­
ular exercise which was continued, in various forms, 
throughout these years, in each DG. Responsibility 
for screening was given to the ‘Establishment, or­
ganisation and evaluation’ division, which was set 
up to this end in 1975 and was renamed ‘Manage­
ment and organisation, and establishment’ in 1978. 
With screening in mind, the head of this division, 
Pierre Bockstael, attended management training 
courses, in particular at the General Commission 
on the Scientific Organisation of Labour (CEGOS), 
and led missions to London (Manpower Planning 
Model), Canada (Public Service Commission in 
Ottawa), the firm Volvo and the Swedish employers’ 
confederation. In 1976, the Lambert  report (6) on 
officials’ careers was written. It advocated long­term 
planning and a single career for all grades in each 
category (apart from A3, A2 and A1) (7). 
The objective of the Spierenburg report was quite 
different. The Commission, after a weekend sem­
(4) As a matter of fact this was the primary objective assigned to the exercise by 
Commissioner Borschette in his instructions to the director­general (note 
to Pierre Baichère, 30 August 1974). ‘The objective of the screening, for the 
moment, is to reduce the number of A posts by at least 30, but if possible by 
between 40 and 50’ (HAEC, BAC 18/1986/30, p. 1).
(5) HAEC, BAC 84/1986/553, ‘Report on the organisation and operation of 
the departments of the Commission submitted by the Screening Group’, 
30 June 1974, p. 18.
(6) Lamberto Lambert was Director­General of DG  IX (Personnel and Ad­
ministration). 
(7) At that time administrators’ careers began in the starting grade, A7; the 
‘upper’ grades were reserved for heads of division (A3), directors (A2) and 
directors­general and deputy directors­general (A1).
certain terms that it was necessary to take account 
of governments’ demands and that the Commission 
had very little margin for manoeuvre’ (1).
The result was a rather sterile dialogue between 
members of the Commission who were convinced 
that their institution had to operate under specific 
constraints and external consultants who took the 
view that some of the objections raised were due 
to ‘people’s resistance to changes that might affect 
them directly in their work and status’ (2). 
Consequently, very little can be attributed to the 
Poullet  report. Perhaps the main change of note 
was the development of posts of deputy director­ 
general responsible for the internal management 
of their directorate­general, with the director­ 
general concentrating his or her activity on key 
internal coordination issues. But this process was 
quite slow, and the tendency remained for deputy 
directors­general to be given responsibility primar­
ily for specific subjects or sectors. There were six of 
them in 1970, 13 in 1973 and 19 in 1981 and 1986.
Another ‘internal’ procedure implemented from 
1974  onwards was screening. A  screening group 
was set up that year, chaired by Jeremy Baxter, dir­
ector for personnel: it comprised six officials, 
plus the chairman. About 10 experts were con­
sulted, including the Canadian researcher Hans 
J. Michelmann (3). Once again there was a certain 
mismatch between the ambitious methodology of 
the process (including questionnaires, statistics on 
the work of services and interviews), the conclu­
sions that there were ‘quite a few negative factors’ 
and the results, which were limited to a reduction 
in the number of specialised services and a few early 
(1) Deprez, G., ‘La Commission des Communautés européennes. Essai soci­
ologique sur une organisation captive’, PhD thesis, UCL, 1974, page III.
(2) Ibid., page IV.
(3) In 1978, he wrote the first book entirely devoted to the Commission’s ad­
ministration: Organisational Effectiveness in a Multinational Bureaucracy: 
The case of the Commission of the European Communities, Saxon House, 
Farnborough, 1978.
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Once the report was published, on 24 September 
1979, responsibility for its implementation was 
given to Vice­President Ortoli, as if the president 
who had commissioned it was no longer interest­
ed in it. In the view of Petit­Laurent: ‘When the 
Spierenburg report came out in 1979, the then 
president, Roy Jenkins, a little perniciously, could 
think of nothing better ... than to make sure that 
his predecessor Ortoli was left holding the baby, be­
cause Jenkins had no interest whatsoever in mun­
dane administrative matters’ (1). In 1980, the Ortoli 
(1) It should nevertheless be pointed out that Ortoli had been commissioned 
by Hallstein back in 1961 to write a first report on the Commission’s staff. 
That report was highly critical of the recruitment of the first staff at the 
Commission and advocated a far more flexible system of employment rather 
than careers.
inar at Comblain­la­Tour in September 1978, had 
commissioned a ‘group of renowned, independent 
people from outside the Commission’ to produce a 
report in order to examine the issues of organisation 
and staffing. 
The report was intended for publication from the 
moment it was commissioned. That at least was an 
innovation. The composition of the group was an­
nounced on 23 January 1979: it was to be chaired 
by Ambassador Dirk Spierenburg and include the 
trade unionist Karl Buschmann, the senior French 
civil servant and former director for finances of the 
High Authority Paul Delouvrier, the former mem­
ber of the Commission Giuseppe Petrilli and the 
dir ector of the United Kingdom’s Institute for 
Fiscal Studies, Dick Taverne.
At the end of 1978, the Commission set up an investigative committee to look into its structures, operating methods and staff 
policy. The reflection group, consisting of Karl Buschmann, Paul Delouvrier, Giuseppe Petrilli and Dick Taverne, was formed in January 
1979 with the Dutch ambassador and former vice-president of the ECSC High Authority, Dirk Spierenburg, in the chair.  Presented 
to Roy Jenkins on 24 September 1979, the Spierenburg report, entitled ‘Proposals for reform of the Commission of the European 
Communities and its services’, was intended to improve efficiency and coordination in the work of members of the Commission and 
advocated the appointment of a single vice-president, a reduction in the number of commissioners to one per Member State and fewer, 
but larger, units under directors-general with more authority. (Cartoon, Courrier du personnel, No 412, 28 March 1980, p. 13.) 
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Proposals of the Spierenburg report 
• Strengthening of the screening group
• Creation of a central staff register 
• Description of jobs in the light of the tasks of 
the units
• Better system of staff reporting
• Organisation of joint competitions with other 
European institutions
• Transfer from category B to category A
• ‘Right and duty’ mobility
• Continued emphasis on training, especially 
management training
• Ad hoc selection committee for appointment to 
A3 posts
• Recruitment of specialised staff from outside 
as temporary staff 
report (1) was devoted to the implementation of the 
Spierenburg report. 
Very few of the bold proposals in the Spierenburg 
report went on to be implemented at the end of the 
Jenkins Commission. Actually, for him this was a 
question of tactics, above all: he wanted to show 
the Council that the Commission was intent on re­
form, and in this way ease the approval of budget 
headings, as shown by his speech to Commission 
staff a year after the report was submitted: ‘Now 
that we have taken the initiative to reform our­
selves, the least that we can expect is to be granted 
the very modest resources needed to accomplish 
our task’  (2). As far as the implementation of the 
report was concerned, ‘there was little more than 
follow­up meetings where we examined lists of re­
forms, only to find that we had made no progress on 
any of them, with a few exceptions’ (3), according to 
Petit­Laurent. Mention should nevertheless be made 
of the 15  % reduction in the number of divisions 
and specialised services, with a total of 50 being cut. 
In addition, the report had the virtue of reviving the 
debate on relations with the national civil services. 
(1) Interview with Philippe Petit­Laurent, 19 July 2010.
(2) HAEC, BAC 75/1984/37, Meeting between the President of the Commis­
sion and the staff, 12 November 1980, p. 13.
(3) Interview with Philippe Petit­Laurent, 19 July 2010.
The Spierenburg report stresses the importance of 
mobility. It is a factor that provides incentives, ensures 
renewal both in terms of personnel and departments 
and offers a better overview, while at the same 
time helping to improve morale by renewing interest 
in work. Yet there are major obstacles to mobility: the 
tendency to prefer tradition to change and the lack of 
transparency in procedures for recruitment or filling 
posts means that genuine mobility opportunities are 
few and far between. (Courrier du personnel, No 409, 
17 December 1979, p. 38.)
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Certain guarantees were proposed in exchange: in­
ternal competitions would be open to established 
officials only, and temporary staff could not be es­
tablished. 
The Spierenburg report proposed a change in the 
approach to relations with the national civil servic­
es, which were no longer willing to send the Com­
mission ‘experts who continue to be paid by their 
home governments but receive a daily subsistence 
allowance’  (2). And yet this latter approach pre­
vailed because the 1980 system led to the intro­
duction of seconded national experts (SNEs), who 
started to be given this title in 1988 under Delors. 
Unlike 1974, this new system removed the reci­
procity of exchanges, since Commission officials 
were no longer seconded to the administrations of 
the Member States.
The 1982 ‘turning point’ 
and the failure of the planned 
sweeping reform of the 
European civil service
In the wake of the Spierenburg and Ortoli reports, 
in 1981–82 the new director­general, Jean­Claude 
Morel, wishing to make his mark, tried unsuccess­
fully to conduct a more comprehensive reform of 
careers in the European civil service. This provoked 
quite a strong reaction in the Commission, and 
there were signs of opposition to this proposal at the 
meeting of directors­general on 10 May 1982. The 
subject of the meeting was the separation between 
grade and job. After an introduction by Christo­
pher Audland, each director­general spoke on the 
subject: only two directors­general were in favour, 
seven were against and six were sceptical.
(2) Ibid., p. 39. 
Exchanges with national 
administrations
When Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom 
joined the Community, officials from those coun­
tries had the chance of a short­term placement in the 
Commission for the first time. In April 1974 and 
then in May 1976 the Commission gave its approval 
in principle to a new exchange scheme for officials. 
As a result, in the period up to 1979, 33 national of­
ficials from eight Member States did a placement in 
the Commission (lasting on average for 13 months), 
whereas 11 Commission officials did a placement in 
the administrations of five Member States, each for 
an average period of 6 months. 
One of the recommendations of the Spierenburg re­
port took over this measure, emphasising the ‘intro­
duction of outside experience to the Commission’. 
The authors justified this for historical reasons: 
‘In the earlier days of the Community, staff were 
recruited at all levels, and therefore brought with 
them experience acquired in other walks of life 
which was very valuable to the Commission. Now 
that the European civil service is becoming more 
stable, and staff are making their life’s career in the 
service of the Commission, this advantage is lost. 
If the Commission is not to become increasingly 
divorced from experience of the world outside, it is 
essential that it should be able to benefit from a cur­
rent of staff having such experience’ (1).
(1) HAEC, BAC 88/2004/112, ‘Proposals for reform of the Commission 
of the European Communities and its services’ (Spierenburg report), 
24 September 1979, p. 35. It proposed that, within 4 years, the proportion 
of temporary staff should be 20 % of the total number of A4/A5 officials 
(200  temporary staff). It also recommended that the provisions of Art­
icle  29(2) of the staff regulations of officials of the European Communi­
ties (Regulation No 31 of the EEC Treaty, OJ 45, 14.6.1962), which was 
intended for grades A1 and A2, should be extended to A3 staff, with a 
strict upper limit of 2 %, in other words that external recruitment should 
be permitted at grade A3 (head of division) level. This measure, which was 
supported by François­Xavier Ortoli at an ad hoc meeting on 16 January 
1980, was given  a very cool reception by Baichère, who exclaimed: ‘20  % 
without rigged competitions? How can you choose?’ Noël summarised the 
proposal in the following way: ‘External (lateral entry) recruitment without 
a competition.’ ‘Rigged competitions’ are competitions organised solely to 
establish previously identified temporary staff as officials.
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ered ‘that a comprehensive reform of the staff regu­
lations is pointless and that a radical reform would 
also be very risky’  (2). The director­general of the 
Legal Service thought that there was a risk that the 
Council would take this opportunity to call into 
question the fundamental principles of the Euro­
pean civil service, not to mention the discretionary 
powers that the trade unions would exercise in the 
new system. Carlo Facini took the view that ‘it is 
totally unrealistic to think that careers can be man­
aged by the Commission using the criterion of ef­
fectiveness alone’. The Danish director­general Ole 
Bus Henriksen was more positive about the single 
career: he wanted to see a ‘cost–benefit analysis’ of 
the measures that were advocated. 
Only three directors­general spoke out in support 
of the single career: John Roderic Steele, Daniel 
Strasser and Athanase Andreopoulos, who consid­
ered that ‘only a revolutionary reform can remoti­
vate staff’. Thus, support for the reform came from 
the new Member States in addition to the Danish 
director­general, but there were also opposing views 
among the French, with Émile Noël on one side, as 
the guardian of the temple, and Jean­Claude Morel 
and Daniel Strasser, on the other, wanting to see 
the system transformed. Strasser’s arguments were 
the exact opposite of Noël’s: the director­general of 
budgets took the view that ‘separating grades and 
jobs was the only way of introducing some flexibil­
ity into a profoundly reactionary system’ (3) and he 
wanted to see an end to the categories and the dis­
tinctions between administrative, linguistic, scien­
tific and technical staff.
This reform did not come to fruition. In retrospect, 
it appears, in a way, to have been ahead of its time 
and, and in any event, ahead of the thinking within 
the Commission. Philippe Petit­Laurent  summed 
up this episode in the following way: ‘In the 1980s, 
there were not enough people outside fighting for 
(2) Ibid.
(3) Ibid.
But there was a really heated exchange at a meeting 
held on 13 July 1982, when the ‘Commission staff 
policy’ guidance document was discussed. On that 
occasion Noël opened the discussion and went on 
the offensive. He began by attacking the contro­
versial nature of the document and its unjustified 
criticism of the Commission: ‘It is ridiculous to call 
on the Commission to spend more time discussing 
matters of principle when it has been waiting for 
18  months for a document from DG IX on staff 
policy.’ The secretary­general refused to condone 
the ‘unacceptable criticism of the insufficiently 
“consistent and transparent” management of the 
directorates­general’, and went on to say: ‘DG IX 
should not believe that its word is gospel.’ He was 
totally opposed: ‘The new career system that is ad­
vocated is like using a sledgehammer to crack a nut’ 
because ‘the problem of a separation between grade 
and job arises only for A1, A2 and A3  staff’. Ac­
cordingly, he proposed limiting the use of the Art­
icle 50 procedure by taking advantage of the possi­
bility offered by Article 51 of putting certain A1 or 
A2 officials in a lower­level job (as had been done 
when the executives were merged in 1967–68) and 
introducing a single career with advancement from 
A5 to A3 (principal administrator, head of divi­
sion and adviser): ‘These few limited arrangements 
would achieve the desired aim without completely 
changing a career system which works satisfactorily 
for 95 % of staff’ (1). 
Most of the directors­general who spoke after Émile 
Noël agreed with him. For example, Fernand Braun 
took the view that the French system of grade/job 
separation could not be applied in the Commission. 
Manfred Caspari was ‘totally opposed to an  un­
interrupted mandarin­style career, which would 
make the system wide open to constant pressure 
from the trade unions for transfers from one cate­
gory to the next’. Claus­Dieter Ehlermann consid­
(1) HAEC, BAC 17/1986/50, DG IX document on the meeting of direct ors­
general held on 13 July 1982 to discuss the guidance document on Commis­
sion staff policy.
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justments and gradual acceptance of management. 
All in all, with the accession of Spain and Portugal, 
it was apparently not anticipated that there would 
be any urgent need to reform the administration: 
indeed, it is strange that there were no more reports 
on this subject until the end of Delors’ term of of­
fice. The arrival of Richard Hay as head of DG IX 
and of Commissioner Christophersen in 1986, to­
gether with the departure of Émile Noël, resulted 
in the application of more professional methods to 
administration and personnel, with the Commis­
sion gradually ceasing to manage human resources 
like a family. The first signs of this tendency could 
be seen in September 1985 when objectives were 
set for each service under the Commission’s annual 
work programme. The whole process was designed 
to make sure that officials were better informed of 
these objectives and supported them more fully (2).
Michel Mangenot
(2) EC Commission, Twentieth General Report on the Activities of the Euro­
pean Communities in 1986, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, Luxembourg, 1987, p. 45.
these ideas ... the people on the inside did not have 
strong enough convictions and, above all, ... the insti­
tution felt vigorous, the trade unions felt sufficiently 
strong and ... there were not enough Member States 
pushing in that direction’ (1). This takes us back to 
the many constraints that the Commission worked 
under in the area of administration and personnel. 
Its reform remained a highly limited process. Fol­
lowing the consultation procedures with the trade 
unions and staff associations, the reform of the staff 
regulations had to be negotiated with the Member 
States, and with the Parliament as far as staffing 
levels were concerned. The status quo was preserved 
at that time because of the potential danger of the 
Council and the Parliament interfering with the 
Commission’s internal organisation.
Within the Commission, Noël was also apparent­
ly quite opposed. The only legacy of administrative 
reforms in those years was a few organisational ad­
(1) Interview with Philippe Petit­Laurent, 19 July 2010.
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Living conditions for European officials did not 
change significantly compared with the 1960s  (2). 
With some exceptions, most officials and their 
families lived in or around Brussels. In about 1980, 
60 % lived in the 19 municipalities of greater Brus­
sels and 40 % outside Brussels (some in the immedi­
ate outskirts of the city, some much further afield). 
At the beginning of 1981 a total of 8 694 officials 
worked in Brussels, of whom 2 337 (26.8 % ) were 
Belgian. On the basis of the average family coeffi­
(2) Dumoulin, M. in collaboration with Conrad, Y., ‘Like strangers in the city? 
European officials in Brussels’, in Dumoulin, M., (ed), The European Com­
mission, 1958–72 — History and Memories, Office for Official Publications 
of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2007, pp. 241–272. 
cient of 2.75 calculated in 1980 by DG IX (Person­
nel and Administration), the number of working 
officials and their family members totalled some 
17 500 persons (3). 
To this figure must be added the number — a sta­
tistic that is poorly documented — of officials al­
ready entitled to a full pension, provided they had 
worked for 35 years (4). This system, which appeared 
(3) L’Europe à Bruxelles. Étude des aspects économiques, sociaux, culturels et 
urbanistiques de la présence des institutions des Communautés européennes à 
Bruxelles, Centre d’études et de recherches urbaines, Brussels, 1982, p. 29.
(4) The number of officials drawing a pension as of 1 September 1979 was 816. 
Commission’s reply to written question No  396/79 by Lord O’Hagan, 
OJ C 282, 12.11.1979, p. 18. 
Chapter 7  
‘It was European Brussels, 
not Belgian Brussels’(1): 
life for European officials 
outside the institutions
(1) Interview with Aneurin Hughes, 5 October 2010. 
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granted. They were followed by the Italians, French 
and Germans, who together represented around 
65 %. Thus, practically none of the other national­
ities, apart from a small number of Dutch, availed 
themselves of the measure (6). 
Places of residence of European 
officials (7) 
Of the 250 municipalities outside Brussels 
chosen by Eurocrats as a place of residence, the 
most popular were Overijse, Tervuren/Tervueren, 
Kraainem and Wezembeek-Oppem, but Hoeilaert, 
Rhode-Saint-Genèse/Sint-Genesius-Rode and 
Waterloo were also high on the list. These were 
mainly the choice of the higher-level officials or 
of those who chose their place of residence on 
the basis of their children’s school. Within greater 
Brussels, European staff settled chiefly in the 
east and south-east of the city in areas where 
they could find new housing, green spaces, 
attractive surroundings and good 
communications. The Schuman area, including 
Etterbeek and part of Schaerbeek/Schaarbeek, 
attracted a large proportion of unmarried 
officials, new arrivals and many trainees. Officials 
of all grades and nationalities and their families 
gravitated towards the municipalities of Woluwe-
Saint-Pierre/Sint-Pieters-Woluwe, Woluwe-Saint-
Lambert/Sint-Lambrechts-Woluwe and, to a 
lesser degree, Ixelles/Elsene, Auderghem/
Oudergem and Watermael-Boitsfort/Watermaal-
Bosvoorde. The municipality of Uccle/Ukkel 
particularly attracted grade A officials, including 
many French and Italians who were no doubt 
influenced in their choice of residence by the 
proximity of the Lycée français. In the other 
municipalities there were a few European 
Community officials, mainly Belgians.
(6) HAEC, ‘Report from the Commission to the Council on the utilisation 
of sums available for granting building loans to officials of the European 
Communities over the period 1 January 1979 to 31 December 1979’, 
COM(80) 404 final, 16 July 1980.
(7) L’Europe à Bruxelles. Étude des aspects économiques, sociaux, culturels et 
urbanistiques de la présence des institutions des Communautés européennes à 
Bruxelles, Centre d’études et de recherches urbaines, Bruxelles, 1982, p. 44.
to favour women but was in fact discriminatory, 
was amended in the 1980s. The point is worth mak­
ing if only because the number of officials reaching 
pensionable age increased as time went by and a 
substantial proportion of them decided to establish 
their main residence in Brussels or its outskirts.
Whether unmarried — and a relatively high pro­
portion of temporary staff and officials of the Com­
mission were not married (1) — or married, with or 
without children, officials had to find somewhere to 
live. The prevailing impression given is that ‘south­
ern Europeans lived in the city centre, northern 
Europeans in the suburbs’ (2). In fact, during this 
period French, Italian and British officials pre­
ferred the suburbs that had grown during the 
city’s second expansionary phase (Auderghem/ 
Oudergem, Uccle/Ukkel, Watermael­Boitsfort/ 
Watermaal­ Bosvoorde, Woluwe­Saint­Lambert/Sint­ 
Lambrechts­Woluwe, Woluwe­Saint­Pierre/Sint­Pie­ 
ters­Woluwe) (3). Did they settle there temporarily 
or permanently? A valuable indicator gives some 
guidance in answering this question. Since 1972, 
officials had been able to obtain housing loans at re­
duced rates (4). It was a highly successful measure; 
as of 1 June 1974, there were 494 outstanding loan 
applications (5). In 1979, information provided by 
the Beamtenheimstättenwerk, one of the financial 
institutions to which the officials repaid their debt, 
showed that since the measure had been introduced 
the Belgians were the national group to benefit most 
from it, accounting for 23.6  % of the total loans 
(1) L’Europe à Bruxelles. Étude des aspects économiques, sociaux, culturels et 
urbanistiques de la présence des institutions des Communautés européennes à 
Bruxelles, Centre d’études et de recherches urbaines, Brussels, 1982, p. 29.
(2) Interview with Marcell von Donat, 23 July 2010. L. Lederer, a British offi­
cial, in a letter published in the Brussels daily newspaper Le Soir on 7 June 
1978 made the same observation. See also Willaert, D. and Koelet, S., ‘De 
Europese aanwezigheid in de Vlaamse Rand’, in Degadt, J. et al., De inter­
nationalisering van de Vlaamse Rand rond Brussel, Academic and Scientific 
Publishers, Brussels, 2012, pp.  44–70, and more specifically pp.  46–49 
(‘Europeanen in de Vlaamse Rand tijdens de periode 1961–2008’).
(3) Caillez, J., Schuman­City. Des fonctionnaires britanniques à Bruxelles, 
Academia Bruylant, Louvain­la­Neuve, 2004, pp. 30–31.
(4) This benefit would subsequently be abolished.
(5) Commission’s reply to Written Question No 89/74 by Mr Della Briotta, in 
OJ C 90, 29.7.1974, p. 18.
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in 1789’  (4). To cite one official: ‘The real Bruxel­
lois viewed us with distrust … They didn’t like us 
because they thought we would push up rents and 
land prices, as well as cleaners’ wages’  (5). Objects 
of mistrust and often of envy, European officials, 
or Eurocrats — a word that entered the French lan­
guage in 1965 (6) and rapidly took on a pejorative 
connotation — illustrate the principle that every so­
ciety ‘divides its immigrants and labels them, estab­
lishing with each (artificial) group a precise social 
distance’ (7). 
The distorted view of the social status of European 
officials also led the public authorities to take dis­
criminatory measures against them. An example 
was the ‘grave rights’ case in 1979. As the Belgian 
minister of the interior explained in a circular to 
the provincial governors calling for an end to this 
state of affairs, ‘in some municipalities the author­
ities charge European Community officials a much 
higher fee for grave rights than the charge levied on 
other  inhabitants’  (8). Then there was a case that 
arose in 1983. Five Brussels municipalities imposed a 
tax on ‘persons who are not registered in the popula­
tion registers … and who are owners or tenants of ac­
commodation used as a secondary residence or who 
use it without payment’. On the basis of the Treaty of 
8 April 1965 and the Protocol on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the European Communities, officials 
were exempted from registering in the population 
registers. The Commission referred the case to the 
Court of Justice, which in March 1986 ruled that 
the Kingdom of Belgium had failed to fulfil its obli­
gations and ordered it to pay the costs (9). Certainly, 
public opinion and that of some public authorities 
(4) ‘Ce que nous coûtent les “Européens”’, Belgique No 1, No 328, 18 January 
1973.
(5) Interview with Marcell von Donat, 23 July 2010. 
(6) Rey, A., Le dictionnaire historique de la langue française, Le Robert, Paris, 
2010.
(7) Gatti, E., ‘Defining the expat: the case of high­skilled migrants in Brussels’, 
Brussels Studies, No 28, 31 August 2009, p. 10. 
(8) Minister of the Interior circular of 28 March 1979 in Moniteur Belge, 
28 September 1979. 
(9) Judgment of 18 March 1986 in Case 85/85 Commission v Belgium [1986] 
ECR 1149.
This finding is at variance, if only partially, with the 
notion that European officials lived in Belgium but 
did not put down roots because the provisional na­
ture of their work location discouraged them from 
settling permanently, and it indirectly poses the 
question of integration in the country. 
‘Eurocrats: a privileged 
and dissatisfied group’ (1)
In 1976 the Commission considered that ‘com­
plaints that officials in Brussels are not well inte­
grated into their surroundings are out of date’  (2). 
The facts show that the issue of integration was still 
open. Admittedly, each official was different in this 
respect and, furthermore, many of the difficulties 
observed below were in line with the experience of 
other international bureaucracies, whether in Gene­
va or elsewhere. However, despite this obvious fact, 
Belgian public opinion turned against European of­
ficials. The public took little interest in European is­
sues in a context of economic crisis and the political 
and institutional crisis affecting relations between 
the language communities in Belgium (3). Mistrust 
was often combined with envy, partly owing to the 
rapid establishment of European and international 
institutions in Brussels, including the Secretari­
at­General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisa­
tion (NATO). This jealousy arose from exaggerat­
ed ideas of privileges and immunities. Quite apart 
from the numerous press articles about officials’ 
salaries and tax exemptions, a good illustration of 
this are the myths surrounding the ‘EUR’ number 
plate, commonly supposed to give its holders exorbi­
tant privileges ‘that we thought had been abolished 
(1) Scotto, M., ‘Les eurocrates: des privilégiés mécontents’, Le Monde, 8 Octo­
ber 1983. 
(2) Commission’s reply to Written Question No  514/76 by Mr Seefeld, 
OJ C 294, 13.12.1976, p. 52.
(3) Favell, A., ‘Bruxelles: capitale européenne au cœur d’un état­nation éclaté’, 
Europe: régions et communautés contre les nations, Panoramiques, No  49, 
2000, pp. 110–115.
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turbulence of the time was reducing their purchas­
ing power, at least three other reasons for dissatis­
faction can be singled out. The first has already been 
mentioned, namely the uncertainty of officials as to 
whether they were to stay in Brussels temporarily 
or permanently. The other two were more work­ 
related. First, most officials were fully committed to 
their work and complained that the Commission 
and, consequently, its officials were regularly made 
into scapegoats by national governments and the 
media. Second, they complained that the agenda 
was too often dictated by budgetary constraints, 
meaning that short­termism often prevailed over 
longer­term reflection.
However, it would be wrong to limit the review of 
the life of officials to what might have been thought 
and said about the gloomy climate that prevailed for 
much of the period. At the same time, this mood, 
and the general distrust with which they were re­
ceived, raises the as yet unexamined question of 
their social integration (7).
Needless to say, such negative experiences were far 
from universal. For many, the Belgian capital was 
appreciated for its scale, its accessibility and its qual­
ity of life. As one official put it: ‘I found Brussels a 
very pleasant and easy place to live in; perhaps less 
exciting than London but easier because London is 
so big’ (8). Or to quote a second: ‘As a place to live, 
[Brussels was] not exciting but very, very pleasant, 
with lots of interesting things going on’  (9). An­
other spoke for many in highlighting the quality 
of the food: ‘Living in Brussels was agreeable and 
eating in Brussels was agreeable!’ (10). The fact that 
the traffic problems were much less acute than they 
have since become also added to the appeal, as did 
property prices that were substantially lower than in 
(7) Abélès, M. and Bellier, I., ‘La Commission européenne: du compromis cul­
turel à la culture politique du compromis’, Revue française de science poli­
tique, Vol. 46, No 3, 1996, p. 435.
(8) Interview with Robert Jarrett, 14 October 2010.
(9) Interview with Richard Hay, 10 August 2010.
(10) Interview with Roy Pryce, 19 September 2011.
gives food for thought. To quote the Courrier du 
personnel: ‘We are not liked because we’re not un­
derstood. We are not understood because people 
don’t know us’  (1). The issue prompted numerous 
statements to press bodies and agencies, for example 
by the director­general of DG IX (Personnel and 
Administration) (2), exercising the right to reply; 
the flood of recriminations about the ‘status’ of of­
ficials and the supposed consequences of this status 
in terms of living conditions prompted individual 
and collective reactions from the Commission. ‘The 
popu lation  of the host country ... has an atavistic 
tendency to criticise and malign others,’ wrote one 
official (3). Was he an isolated case or was he saying 
aloud what many of his colleagues thought privately? 
In the autumn of 1981, a trade union representing 
staff members of the European institutions, the Syn­
dicat des fonctionnaires des institutions européennes 
(SFIE), conducted a survey among Commission staff 
employed in Brussels. Altogether 2 300 staff mem­
bers responded, of whom 60 % said that they would 
like to leave Brussels (4). Although caution must al­
ways be exercised in using surveys, this result con­
firms the malaise that had already been pointed out 
both by the Union Syndicale and by the European 
Civil Service Federation (FFPE) (5). 
This malaise was not only due to hostile public opin­
ion, whether openly expressed or not, or to MEPs’ 
complaints about ‘Berlaymargot’ or jargon, i.e. 
‘euro­babble’, the ‘obscure, hollow and pseudo­ 
technical language often [hiding] deficient or super­
ficial thought’ (6). Setting aside the strikes expressing 
the discontent of officials who felt that the monetary 
(1) Courrier du personnel, No 401, 26 April 1979. 
(2) These rights of reply were addressed in particular to the weekly magazines 
Pourquoi Pas? (September 1981) and The Bulletin (April 1982) and the 
newspaper Le Monde (October 1983), etc. 
(3) Courrier du personnel, No  415, 26 April 1979. The text is signed by 
E. Perrone. 
(4) ‘Six fonctionnaires européens sur dix souhaitent quitter Bruxelles’, La 
Libre Belgique, 18 January 1982.
(5) ‘Une caste de privilégiés’, Courrier du personnel, No  414, 23 May 1980, 
pp.  33–37; ‘La FFPE répond au Pourquoi Pas?’, Courrier du personnel, 
No 422, 23 March 1981, pp. 54–56. 
(6) Written Question No 524/79 by Lord O’Hagan to the Commission of the 
European Communities, OJ C 275, 31.10.1979, p. 18.
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like seeking friends among the other inhabitants of 
the city or the neighbours, whatever their nation­
ality. For this reason we often preferred to remain 
with people of our own nationality, simply because 
we had spoken in other languages the other 6 days 
of the week and wanted a rest on our one free day.’
But the difficulty of integration might also have 
been due to the feeling of being an immigrant. 
In the words of one Italian official: ‘In the 1970s 
Brussels was physically, geographically, far from my 
native country. There was no motorway, telephone 
connections weren’t easy. Phone conversations were 
expensive. Flights were not frequent and, above all, 
you couldn’t find products we now take for grant­
ed and can find in the supermarkets, from pasta to 
mozzarella. They didn’t exist. We felt as if we really 
were living in a foreign country, immigrants’ (3).
Some nice negotiations 
and discussions at home
‘Some Danes preferred to only have contact 
with other Danes. But I had, as part of my work, 
close contacts with colleagues from other 
Member States. And I invited them home, and 
we had some nice negotiations and discussions 
at home. It was always very great fun to meet 
them outside the meetings. And I had many 
friends among them. So that was one part of 
my work. Then I had contacts with third 
countries, in particular the English-speaking 
countries: the Australians, the New Zealanders 
and so on. Well I also had close contacts with 
these people, when it could be done without 
political consequences’ (4).
The second category of officials were those who 
forged links in one way or another. The form and 
nature of these links varied considerably, but they 
generally had one point in common. Friendships 
were generally made with other European offi­
(3) Interview with Giancarlo Chevallard, 25 November 2010. 
(4) Interview with Hans Jørgen Bendixen, 5 December 2011.
most major European cities. A significant propor­
tion of those interviewed in the making of this vol­
ume referred highly positively to the quality of their 
accommodation, whether rented or purchased. And 
less anecdotal, and perhaps still more revealing, is 
the fairly sizeable percentage of non­Belgian Com­
mission staff who chose to remain in Belgium and 
often within Brussels after they had ceased to work 
for the Commission.
Breaking down prejudices
‘One of the wonderful things about the 
Commission is that working there gets rid of all 
your prejudices. You come across lazy Germans, 
unassuming French people, enormously 
hard-working and precise Italians, unassuming 
Brits. You work with all kinds of people, and you 
all work together. You don’t give a second 
thought to the nationality of the person working 
next to you’ (1).
A ‘European ghetto’?
Although behaviour differed from one individual 
to another, at least two categories of officials can 
be distinguished. The first category was that of of­
ficials who had to take on very heavy workloads 
and felt that the little free time they had left had to 
be devoted first and foremost to their families  (2). 
For these officials, socialising took second place. As 
one of them explained eloquently: ‘Integration in 
the life of the city wasn’t very complete. The fact of 
having a pretty demanding job at the Commission, 
and being with colleagues of other nationalities, not 
only from Monday to Friday since we often went in 
to work on Saturday as well ... meant that on the 
only remaining day (Sunday) we didn’t really feel 
(1) Interview with Margaret Brusasco­Mackenzie, 8 August 2011.
(2) Interview with Horst Krenzler, 20 August 2010: ‘All the posts I held were 
demanding:  I didn’t have time for a social life. Any remaining time had to be 
dedicated to the family and immediate colleagues.’ Interview with Michael 
Emerson, 26 July 2010: ‘I had a young family so, basically, it was go to work, 
have a sandwich for lunch and then go home, the countryside, the garden.’ 
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Still more important was the increasing involve­
ment of Commission staff in clubs and associations. 
In 1973, there were 42 leisure and sports clubs. Four 
years later there were 45, with a total of 2 000 mem­
bers. Over half of them were sports clubs, confirm­
ing the words of one interviewee who said that sport 
played an important role in social life (9). One of 
the oldest associations was the horse­riding club, 
set up in September 1961 at the Royal Étrier Club 
in Uccle/Ukkel. It had 500 members in 1986. An­
glers were catered for at Court­Saint­Étienne where 
their club, which was founded in 1974, hired a 
1.5 ha pond. Also in 1974, the Community bought 
an extensive property in Overijse which became a 
multi­purpose sports centre open to officials of the 
Council, the Commission and the ESC. 
While some sporting activities, such as the partici­
pation by a team from the European Communities 
Flying Club in the Paris–New York–Paris race in 
June 1981 or the Sail for Europe adventure (10), were 
well publicised as a way of promoting the European 
ideal, others, such as tennis or swimming, were prac­
tised informally with colleagues or took the form of 
competitions organised by Belgian amateur sports 
federations. Eurobowling, Euro­volley and the 
European Communities Squash Club, which was 
created in 1975 doubtless as a collateral effect of the 
United Kingdom’s accession, are just a few examples 
of the opportunities available to play sports with 
representatives of other social and professional cir­
cles and forge friendships with them. Playing one or 
more sports in the company of colleagues or people 
(9) Interview with Aneurin Hughes, 5 October 2010. 
(10) In the context of the information campaign surrounding the first European 
elections in June 1979, a small group of people aspired to bring European 
integration to the attention of a wider public through sport, in this case sail­
ing. Former director in the European Parliament’s information office and 
co­founder in 1976 of the Sail for Europe association Guy Vanhaeverbeke 
recalled: ‘What did a group of eccentrics say to itself? We must find some 
way of associating the Union’s image with something less bureaucratic, tech­
nocratic, diplomatic … we shall design a boat, we shall put in it a crew of nine 
(there were nine countries in the Union), boys and girls, and we shall launch 
them into a very big international sporting event …  ’ (interview with Guy 
Vanhaeverbeke, 7 April 2011). And so it was that the yacht Treaty of Rome 
took part in the famous Whitbread Round the World Race in 1977–78 and 
carried the European colours to a highly creditable third place.
cials  (1), since ‘we really felt like foreigners in con­
tacts with Belgians’ (2). Even if officials appeared to 
have numerous and highly amicable relations with 
Belgians  (3), ‘“Community” social life’  (4) can be 
generally illustrated by the ‘garden’ metaphor sug­
gested by one interviewee: ‘From the point of the 
general sociability of Belgian society compared with 
American society, I’m tempted to compare it with 
a walled garden. This certainly has the advantage 
… that you always feel that you’re at home, except 
that there is no ceiling. But in the same context in 
the US there are no walls, the gardens communicate 
with each other, the dogs, the children, everything 
communicates. So there is a kind of sociability cata­
lyst present that is more evident’ (5).
‘We were mostly “communautaires”’
‘We weren’t in Belgian society very much, unless 
you call going to the opera being in society. We 
did do operas, concerts, theatres and things. Our 
friends however were mostly “communautaires”, 
whether of the permanent representations, or of 
the Commission, or of the Parliament. There 
were any amount of social occasions with them, 
some quite serious, some not serious at all’ (6).
In addition to these initial considerations, it should 
be pointed out that social integration began at work. 
The cafeteria was for a long time particularly highly 
prized as an internal venue for socialising (7). The 
small restaurants near the Berlaymont provided an 
opportunity to verify that lunchtime was ‘a serious 
matter at that time’ (8). 
(1) Interviews with Horst Krenzler, 20 August 2010, Aneurin Hughes, 5 Octo­
ber 2010, and Marcell von Donat, 23 July 2010.
(2) Interview with Ivo Dubois, 7 April 2011. 
(3) Interview with Horst Krenzler, 20 August 2010 concerning Franz Frosch­
maier, for example. See also interview with John Pearson, 19 February 2011.
(4) Interview with Roy Pryce, 19 September 2011. 
(5) Interview with Guy Van Haeverbeke, 7 April 2011. 
(6) Interview with Christopher Audland, 8 September 2010.
(7) Interviews with Giancarlo Chevallard, 25 November 2010, and Horst 
Krenzler, 20 August 2010: ‘When we had time, we would talk to colleagues 
and go and have a coffee together’ (translated from German).
(8) Interview with Aneurin Hughes, 5 October 2010; Johnson, S., Stanley I 
presume?, Fourth Estate, London, 2010, p. 158. 
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The role of schools
The number of children of officials registered at 
the European schools in Brussels, while signifi­
cant (2  700 on average at Uccle/Ukkel between 
1973 and 1984), was regarded as well below ex­
pectations (5). One reason was doubtless that offi­
cials could choose between the education offered 
at official Belgian schools, which were non­fee­ 
paying, the European schools and ‘national’ schools 
such as the Lycée français, the British School or 
the Deutsche Schule. Parents opting for one of 
the latter often did so for practical reasons rather 
than adherence to their national culture. ‘We had a 
house built in Tervuren because it was very near the 
Deutsche Schule,’ says one official, adding: ‘It was 
a homogeneous environment’ (6). Education in the 
European schools was not without problems, the 
main one being ‘the quality of the teachers, which 
was a matter of concern to us,’ according to one per­
son interviewed (7). The choice of teachers was not 
decided on by the school or its head. The teachers 
were sent by the Member States. This led one father, 
who was dissatisfied with the choice in question, to 
call it ‘one more example of the failure of the inter­
governmental method’ (8).
Apart from this question of the selection of teach­
ers, the prevailing impression is that the European 
school was an unusually valuable experience, for par­
ents as well as pupils. Many of them, whether they 
were acting as a parent representative or a volunteer 
helping to organise a sports or cultural activity, 
found that the school offered a unique opportunity 
for socialising (9). It was an opportunity, too, to ex­
perience at first hand the enthusiasm or reluctance 
of different cultures at the school when it came to 
cooperating in such activities. ‘The difference be­
(5) Courrier du personnel, No 458, p. 46.
(6) Interviews with Horst Krenzler, 20 August 2010, and Klaus Meyer, 20 Oc­
tober 2010.
(7) Interview with Almut da Fonseca Wollheim, 22 September 2011.
(8) Interview with Antonio Marchini­Camia, 6 December 2011.
(9) Interview with David Marquand, 7 June 2011.
who belonged to the ‘European village’ in Brussels 
also offered the opportunity to mix business with 
pleasure, i.e. to ‘make many useful contacts’ in the 
words of Horst Krenzler, who often played tennis 
with Martin Schulze, the ARD correspondent in 
Brussels  (1). In the European microcosm that was 
Brussels, the place and role of journalists has to be 
taken into account. As reported by Marcell von 
Donat, ‘My wife was an editor at the ARD TV 
studio in Brussels. This meant that our circle of ac­
quaintances expanded to include people from the 
world of journalism’ (2). Some of the associations set 
up by European officials were cultural and artistic 
in nature. From November 1975, they often met at 
the Europa Club, which had just been established 
at Avenue de Cortenberg/Kortenberglaan  66. 
However, this was not the only meeting place. The 
‘International Club Château Sainte­Anne’ was also 
frequented by Commission officials willing to pay 
the very high membership subscription (3). And fi­
nally, in addition to institutionalised clubs and as­
sociations there were informal leisure activities. In 
the words of one Welsh official, ‘I had lots of Irish 
friends, with whom I used to go for a drink after 
work. The pubs — the Drum and the Corkscrew — 
were close to the European Commission … We had 
a very good group of friends; some of us would sing 
together. I was involved a lot in that social side.’ 
The Brussels Hash House Harriers
‘Well they’re either described as drinkers with a 
running problem, or runners with a drinking 
problem. You meet once a week and you go 
running for about 10, 12 kilometres, and then 
you go and drink beer or whatever. The Hash 
House Harriers was very good from a social 
point of view because it was mixed and very 
international, not just Commission people, local 
Belgians, and we’d go out running in little 
villages, which often had their own breweries’ (4).
(1) Interview with Horst Krenzler, 20 August 2010.
(2) Interview with Marcell von Donat, 23 July 2010.
(3) Created in 1969 as a business club offering restaurants, sports facilities and 
meeting rooms, the club had a swimming pool, inaugurated in 1970, and a 
multi­purpose sports facility which opened in 1974.
(4) Interview with Aneurin Hughes, 5 October 2010. 
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tween the national cultures [was very interesting]. 
The Brits all thought it was far too nose­to­the­
grindstone academic with not enough out­of­school 
activities of the sort that you’d expect. That the 
broader formation was neglected. The French all 
thought that there were far too many out­of­school 
activities which were frivolous nonsense and there 
should be more nose to the grind’ (1).
(1) Interview with David Marquand, 7 June 2011.
Surprises at the European 
schools (2)
‘There were amusing situations. The children 
had to learn several subjects in another 
language. This gave rise to some odd situations. 
In one class, for example, the children had to 
learn the Marseillaise in English. When they 
went home they talked about towns and rivers 
with names their parents had never heard of.’
(2) Interview with Almut da Fonseca Wollheim, 22 September 2011.
Given the number of officials and the high percentage of female staff within their ranks, the Commission has a large number of social 
obligations, particularly towards families. This is why it set up a day nursery and after-school care facilities in the 1960s. The other 
institutions quickly expressed their desire to group together the various social facilities in a single building, which would be open to 
all the institutions. From September 1974, a complex in Boulevard Clovis/Clovislaan would house the social infrastructure (including 
the day nursery, after-school care and other social amenities) available to staff of the Commission, the General Secretariat of the 
Council and the Economic and Social Committee (SEC(74) 2858).
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Nine new European schools in 1978 
The first European school, which opened in 1953 
in Luxembourg, did not acquire official status until 
12 April 1957. The regulations for the European 
Baccalaureate followed on 15 July of the same 
year. What was to become, in 1959, the Uccle/
Ukkel European School opened in 1958 at Rue du 
Trône/Troonlaan 2 in Brussels, in a building no 
longer standing. It was followed, at the instigation 
of Étienne Hirsch, the President of the Euratom 
Commission between 1959 and 1962, by 
European schools associated with the setting-up 
of the Euratom research centres (Mol and Varese 
in 1960, Karlsruhe in 1962 and Bergen the 
following year). The annex to the Uccle/Ukkel 
school, which opened in 1974 in Woluwe-Saint-
Lambert/Sint-Lambrechts-Woluwe, became 
independent in 1976. The school in Munich, for 
children of staff of the European Patent 
Organisation, which was created by a protocol of 
15 December 1975, opened its doors in 1977. In 
1978 a school was set up in Culham in the United 
Kingdom to meet the schooling needs of the 
children of staff associated with the 
implementation of the JET programme.
Jacques Delors meets the pupils of the primary section of the European School in Woluwe Saint-Lambert/Sint-Lambrechts-Woluwe. 
‘The head of primary, Mr Mittler, was ... a German, very strict, very serious, but with a common sense attitude. And a committed 
European ... One day, ... the parents proposed putting flags outside the school to represent all the nationalities there. 
Mr Mittler hesitated before replying: “I’ve had enough of flags in my lifetime.”’ (Interview with Almut Da Fonseca-Wollheim, 
22 September 2011.)
190 The European Commission 1973–86 — History and Memories of an Institution
tion that had a viewpoint on European issues, a left­
wing viewpoint … There was a real need to encour­
age people to think at European level about what 
should and should not be done rather than uncrit­
ically accepting everything the Commission pro­
posed’ (8). Another very active group was the ‘Eur­
ope group’, which was something like the section of 
officials of the European federalist movement (9). 
Other pro­European militants, while they wrote for 
publications such as Europa in Beweging or Europe 
en marche, were also involved in religious activities 
such as the Foyer catholique européen (European 
catholic centre) (10), the Secretariat of the European 
Protestant Churches (11) or the European ecumen­
ical group, which would gradually give rise to the 
European Ecumenical Commission for Church and 
Society (12).
This plethora of activities sometimes included ini­
tiatives that led to unexpected developments. In 
March 1968, at a time when DG VIII (Develop­
ment) was based in Rue du Marais/Broekstraat, 
the Europe–Third World Association was created, 
chaired first by Charles Van der Vaeren and then 
by Eduard Weimar. The aim was to ‘finance, with 
a contribution from officials, micro­projects in de­
veloping countries. The Europe–Third World Asso­
ciation then grew throughout the Commission  … 
There were around 1 000 members. We had a very 
reasonable budget that enabled us to finance be­
tween 10 and 20 small projects a year. And we had 
good support from the Commission … In some 
cases, we used our contacts in delegations for infor­
mation and monitoring’ (13).
(8) Interview with Martin Vasey, 20 October 2010.
(9) Interview with Paolo Ponzano, 27 September 2010. 
(10) Interview with Eduard Weimar, 21 July 2010.
(11) Interview with Elias Verploeg, 26 September 2011. 
(12) Interview with Helmut von Verschuer, 11 and 12 October 2010.
(13) Interview with Eduard Weimar, 21 July 2010.
A plethora of activities
While the role of the school was important, so too 
was frequently that played by social activities — 
including activities outside the ‘European village’ 
— by spouses, particularly officials’ wives. Some 
improved their French, or broadened their hori­
zons even further by learning Dutch (1). Others 
got  involved in charity work in order to build 
bridges with Belgian society (2), or joined Femmes 
d’Europe, the association of officials’ wives (3). In 
the words of one of them, ‘I met other women who, 
like me, had young children and preferred to talk 
about the arts. The conversation wasn’t about our 
husbands, cooking, the common market ... We 
weren’t just officials’ wives. So I was in a different 
environment’ (4).
The social life of the ‘colourful mix’ (5) that charac­
terised European officials also took the form of 
other activities shared with ‘soulmates’ (6). While 
they were not in a majority by any means, some offi­
cials were very active in numerous small groups com­
mitted to certain issues. Some of these were national 
political groups. This was the case with the ‘small 
group of people who belonged to the SPD, or were 
close to the SPD … [Eberhard] Rhein, [Hans] Beck, 
[Franz] Froschmaier … This small group even had 
organisational status,’ according to one of its mem­
bers  (7). Others opted for activities more directly 
relating to European integration. At the end of the 
1960s, a group of young journalists and officials set 
up the Agenor group, which was ‘more than a study 
or discussion group, since we launched a publica­
(1) Interview with Marcell von Donat, 23 July 2010.
(2) Interview with Roy Pryce, 19 September 2011.
(3) Audland, C., Right place — Right time, The Memoir Club, Weardale, 2004, 
p. 260. 
(4) Comment by Mrs Carpentier during the interview with Michel Carpentier, 
22 October 2010. 
(5) Interview with Marcell von Donat, 23 July 2010.
(6) Interview with Ivo Dubois, 7 April 2011. 
(7) Interview with Claus­Dieter Ehlermann, 8 October 2010. 
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the general public, providing a permanent contact 
between choir members who were Community offi­
cials and non­‘European’ members (2). This observa­
tion highlights the fact that the quality of cultural 
life in Brussels, of which these choirs formed a part, 
greatly increased during these years. Many officials 
welcomed this and regularly attended concerts or 
performances at La Monnaie/De Munt, including 
those of Maurice Béjart’s Ballet of the 20th Century. 
Art lovers increasingly had a wealth of exhibitions 
to choose from thanks to the knock­on effect of 
the Europalia festival, which started in 1969 and 
provided a showcase throughout Belgium for all as­
pects of the culture of a particular country of the 
European Community (3). 
Jakus’s words illustrate above all the fact that 
European or Community sociability was an experi­
mental construction. In their daily work, European 
officials were torn between the building of a com­
mon culture, resulting in real compromises, and the 
realisation that cultural differences still had value. 
This meant ‘recognising the other and accepting 
that their ways conditioned the existence of the 
whole’  (4). But the challenge was also for officials 
and their families to be able to leave their ‘European 
village’ and for the inhabitants of Brussels to realise 
that the presence of ‘invaders may have kept Brus­
sels from a certain degree of provincialism, leading 
to stagnation and apathy’ (5). 
Michel Dumoulin
(2) ‘Paulo majora cantamus’, Courrier du personnel, No  415, 27 June 1980, 
pp. 55–56. 
(3) The countries represented in these years were Italy (1969), the Netherlands 
(1971), the United Kingdom (1973), France (1975), Germany (1977), 
Belgium (1980), Greece (1982) and Spain (1985). 
(4) Abélès, M. and Bellier, I., ‘La Commission européenne: du compromis cul­
turel à la culture politique du compromis’, Revue française de science poli­
tique, Vol. 46, No 3, 1996, pp. 454–455.
(5) ‘Nid de lobbies, d’eurodéputés … et de journalistes’, Le Soir, 28 March 1986, 
p. 20. 
European sociability: 
an experimental construction
While it is not feasible to list all the types of social 
activities engaged in by officials, some more com­
ments should be made on their lives outside the 
institutions, however closely linked the two ap­
pear to be. In 1980, Jean Jakus, who conducted the 
European Community choirs, explained that these 
choirs built bridges between the Community and 
(1) Interview with Helmut von Verschuer, 11 and 12 October 2010 (translated 
from German).
The school and local church, 
meeting points
‘The European school was a meeting point for 
parents … There was also a parents’ association 
and pupil exchanges at weekends … between 
families. Then there were our Belgian 
neighbours and the local church, in which we 
were actively involved. There was an association 
called “Groupe de familles chrétiennes du 
Fond’Roy”, of which we were among the founder 
members. It consisted of a Catholic couple, a 
Protestant couple and three couples of mixed 
faiths. In the winter months we organised 
monthly conferences attended by 200 to 
300 people. We would listen to talks by 
well-known personalities of different faiths, 
followed by a meditation in accordance with the 
religion in question. We even managed to get 
the Chief Rabbi of Belgium to give a talk to a 
Christian audience for the first time in his 
life’ (1).

Part Three 
The Commission 
and the changing 
Community system
Europe on the march: keeping the institutional wheels turning was often hard work.  
Cartoon by Plantu from 1986 on the Community institutions, reproduced in  
Plantu, Le douanier se fait la malle. 20 ans de dessins sur l’Europe, Le Monde Éditions,  
Paris, 1992, p. 1.
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So much of the Commission’s effectiveness, morale 
and reputation is tied up with its interaction with 
the rest of the European Community system that a 
detailed look at how these vital interinstitutional re-
lationships developed is an absolute necessity in any 
history of the Commission. This third part of the 
volume will therefore examine closely the evolution 
of the relations between the Commission and the 
Council pyramid, including both the Per manent 
Representatives Committee (Coreper) and the new-
ly launched European Council, those between the 
Commission and the European Parliament and the 
manner in which the budgetary process changed in 
the course of the period between 1973 and 1986. 
A character sketch of Gaston Thorn is also includ-
ed, as is a brief look at the interaction between the 
Commission and some of the lesser-known Euro-
pean institutions.
Each of the main institutional chapters will seek 
to combine a sketch of how interaction between 
the Commission and the other main Community 
structures functioned on a day-to-day basis, an ap-
preciation of the importance of this relationship 
and an analysis of how it evolved during the years 
between 1973 and 1986. For the period covered by 
this volume was one in which the idea of institu-
tional reform was a near constant topic of debate, 
with several major alterations in the Community 
system actually occurring and still others contem-
plated. Such changes took diverse legal forms. For-
mal treaty change was much talked about but slow 
to appear. The 1975 Brussels Treaty did introduce 
a series of relatively small changes to the budgetary 
process and brought into being the Court of 
Auditors. But a wider-scale revision of the Commu-
nity decision-making process would only arrive, in 
treaty form, with the Single European Act of 1986. 
A background rumble of discussion about the ne-
cessity of treaty change would thus be a feature of 
almost all of the years covered by this volume, with a 
crescendo of interest occurring in the early 1980s as 
the institutional system struggled to cope with the 
ongoing economic crisis afflicting western Europe. 
This debate about treaty change would arguably 
reach a climax with the European Parliament’s pub-
lication of the Draft Treaty on European Union of 
14 February 1984 — a document closely associated 
with that tireless campaigner for radical European 
reform, Altiero Spinelli (1). This foreshadowed im-
portant aspects of both the Single European Act 
itself and subsequent European treaties.
(1) Draft Treaty establishing the European Union, OJ C 77, 14.2.1984, p. 33.
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Diagnoses but few cures: the Tindemans, Committee of Three and Spierenburg reports
One distinctive feature of the debate about 
institutional reform during this period was the 
proliferation in the course of the 1970s of reports 
on how the Community functioned and how this 
operation might be improved. Three in particular 
deserve to be looked at more closely: the Tindemans 
report, the study of the Committee of Three and the 
Spierenburg report.
The earliest and most ambitious was the report on 
‘European union’ that the December 1974 European 
Council commissioned from one of its members, 
Leo Tindemans, the Belgian prime minister. This was 
submitted to the European Council in December 
1975. Quite deliberately Tindemans sought to avoid 
utopianism. The covering letter to his fellow leaders 
stated clearly: ‘My proposals do not directly concern 
the final phase of European development. They state 
the objectives and the methods whereby Europe can 
be invested with a new vitality and current obstacles 
can be overcome’ (1). He thus side-stepped the 
rather more radical views, including the 
establishment of a European government which 
would supersede the Commission, outlined in the 
Commission’s report of June 1975. The suggested 
(1) ‘European Union, Report by Leo Tindemans, Prime Minister of Bel-
gium, to the European Council’, Bulletin of the European Communi-
ties Supplement, No 1, 1976, p. 6.
changes the Belgian prime minister proceeded to 
outline, however, were far-reaching. They included a big 
push towards the effective coordination of European 
foreign policy, the revitalisation of internal targets such 
as economic and monetary union and a common energy 
policy, measures designed to revive popular enthusiasm 
for European integration, including the abolition of 
internal border controls, and a range of institutional 
changes conferring additional powers on the Parliament 
and Commission and speeding up decision-making 
within the Council of Ministers (2).
The response of Europe’s political leaders was 
unenthusiastic, however. Tindemans’ ideas were 
discussed, notably at the The Hague Council of 
November 1976. The foreign ministers and the 
Commission were asked to report quarterly about 
progress towards European union. But no concrete 
forward steps were taken. Harold Wilson’s retrospective 
conclusion that the European Council’s discussions had 
‘led nowhere’ was not far off the mark (3).
The non-implementation of the Tindemans report 
helped shape the approach taken by both subsequent 
review teams. The Committee of Three, inevitably 
(2) Ibid.
(3) Duff, A. N., ‘The report of the Three Wise Men’, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, Vol. 19, No 3, 1981, p. 238.
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dubbed the Three Wise Men, asked by the Brussels 
European Council of December 1978 to prepare a 
report on possible political reform, deliberately ruled 
out anything that might entail institutional change, 
seeking instead ‘specific proposals … which may be 
implemented swiftly’ (1). Among the improvements 
advocated by Barend Biesheuvel, Edmund Dell and 
Robert Marjolin were the clearer setting of priorities by 
the European Council, a greater role for the Council 
Presidency, assisted by the Council Secretariat, in 
coordinating and expediting the work done by the 
various Council formations, and more effective 
reporting by each Presidency to the European 
Parliament (2). Specifically ruled out, by contrast, was 
one provision that Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the main 
initiator of the review, was widely believed to have 
hoped for, namely the appointment of a European 
Council president who would hold the post for several 
years (3). 
The Spierenburg review also sought to avoid any radical 
change. The idea of an external report specifically 
focused on the European Commission emerged out of 
the dissatisfaction of Roy Jenkins and his entourage 
with multiple aspects of the Commission’s operation (4). 
(1) HAEC, BAC 88/2004/112, Council of the European Communities, 
‘Report on European institutions presented by the Committee of Three 
[Barend Biesheuvel, Edmund Dell and Robert Marjolin] to the European 
Council, October 1979’, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, Luxembourg 1980, p. 3. 
(2) Ibid.
(3) Edmund Dell attributes the cool French reaction to the final report to its 
rejection of Giscard d’Estaing’s idea. Dell, E., ‘The report of the Three Wise 
Men’, Contemporary European History, Vol. 2, No 1, 1993, p. 56. 
(4) Crispin Tickell papers, All Souls College, Oxford, file 17, ‘Meeting at East 
Hendred’, 31 July 1978.
The task of preparing it was entrusted to a team led 
by Dirk Spierenburg, a Dutch diplomat and former 
member of the High Authority. Their 
recommendations included a reduction in the 
number of commissioners and their portfolios, the 
rationalisation of many of the Commission’s 
sub-units, including a reorganisation of 
directorates-general, the appointment of a powerful 
vice-president, responsible for internal coordination, 
a limiting of the role of cabinets and an overhaul of 
the Commission’s approach to staffing designed to 
facilitate mobility between different posts and to 
make the pattern of promotions fairer and more 
predictable (5). Some of these last measures were 
carried out. But the bolder moves suffered the same 
fate as those outlined in the other two reports, 
namely non-implementation due to a combination 
of hostility and inertia. As Tindemans reflected 
wistfully in a 1980 European Parliament debate on 
the subject of Community reform, ‘Are we perhaps 
in the process of building up a library of forgotten 
reports? If I was of the mandarin class, I would 
propose writing a book entitled “Remembrance of 
past reports” or perhaps publishing a dictionary of 
wasted European ideas’ (6).
(5) HAEC, BAC 88/2004/122, Spierenburg, D., ‘Proposals for reform 
of the Commission of the European Communities and its services’, 
report drawn up at the request of the Commission by five independent 
individuals under the chairmanship of Dirk Spierenburg, 24 Septem-
ber 1979. 
(6) HAEC, Archive of speeches, Leo Tindemans to the European Parlia-
ment, 18 June 1980.
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Well before the negotiation of the Single Euro-
pean Act, however, a series of major changes had oc-
curred, without formal modification of the treaties. 
Some, like the move to directly elect the European 
Parliament (EP) — a change agreed at the very end 
of 1974 but only implemented in 1979 — consti-
tuted the belated realisation of possibilities left open 
by the Treaty of Rome. Article 138 had recognised 
that a move from an indirectly to a directly elect-
ed parliament could occur but had not specified 
when; the 1974 decision did not therefore require 
a new treaty base. Others, like the second key insti-
tutional change agreed in December 1974, namely 
the establishment of a European Council, had no 
formal treaty grounding at all. Retrospective treaty 
acknowledgement of the European Council’s very 
existence would only come in 1986 with the Single 
European Act. And yet, despite this lag between 
actual change and the formal recognition of such 
change, the European Council, as Chapter 8 will 
demonstrate, would quickly emerge as a major new 
interlocutor of the Commission, with the ability of 
successive Commission presidents to act effectively 
at European Council level becoming an ever more 
important determinant of their impact and influ-
ence. In the 1973–86 period, as in the Commu-
nity’s formative years, formal treaty change was only 
one, highly imperfect, measure of the actual evolu-
tion of relationships between the different parts of 
the developing Community system.
At the root of this process of change was a blend 
of idealism, the need to accommodate the new 
demands of the Community’s expanding policy 
agenda and, especially towards the end of the period 
under review, the hope of fixing an institutional 
system that was perceived as being under intoler-
able strain. Idealism was perhaps most visible in the 
move to direct elections. This had long been a pri-
ority for some, with successive Italian governments 
having shown particular enthusiasm for the idea. 
But the impetus behind the reform was increased 
by the growing importance of Community rhetoric 
about ‘democracy’ in the 1970s. This had become 
an important part of the Nine’s collective stance 
at the Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe between 1973 and 1975, and it became 
still more crucial to European discourse and self- 
identity when dealing with the wave of change and 
instability that swept southern Europe in the mid-
dle portion of the decade. If the Community collec-
tively, and the EC Member States individually, were 
to stand firm in their determination to press Greece, 
Spain and Portugal to consolidate their fledgling 
democratic regimes, it was important that the EC 
itself was seen to practise what it preached. Crucial 
too were the hopes that the direct involvement of 
the European public in the selection of their EP rep-
resentatives would begin to bridge the gap between 
European structures and European citizens. Fur-
thermore, most Member States regarded the direct 
elections to the European Parliament as an essen-
tial counterweight to the creation of the European 
Council.
Also important in explaining institutional change 
— and perhaps still more the debate about institu-
tional change — was the expansion of the Commu-
nity’s policy agenda. Several of the new policy areas 
were not regarded, by all Member States, as suitable 
to be handled in the same way as the customs union 
or the common agricultural policy (CAP). As a 
result, institutional arrangements were devised, 
for foreign policy cooperation, for instance, or for 
monetary affairs, that departed from the standard 
pattern of institutional cooperation set out in the 
Treaty of Rome. This in turn created an incentive 
to establish a wider institutional framework which 
would incorporate these different policy areas and 
different institutional arrangements and guarantee 
a degree of coherence — hence the debate, most 
famously associated with the Tindemans report of 
1975, about ‘European union’. Major steps in this 
direction were, it is true, very limited during the 
years covered by this volume: many of the ideas 
advanced by the Tindemans report were left un-
implemented. But constant discussions continued, 
reinforcing the sense that the existing institutional 
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framework would have to change, even if neither 
the timing nor the extent of this alteration could be 
predicted with any certainty.
A final spur to change came from the context of 
crisis. For by the early 1980s, many had drawn the 
conclusion that the Community system as it existed 
was not ideally suited to respond to Europe’s press-
ing economic and political needs. Gaston Thorn, 
as Commission president, spoke for instance very 
frankly and openly about Europe’s crisis and the ex-
tent to which interinstitutional paralysis contributed 
to this malaise (1). The perceived need for reform, in-
cluding treaty reform, thus formed the backdrop to 
the EP’s deliberations on the Spinelli draft treaty, to 
the Member States’ discussions in the Dooge Com-
mittee and then finally to the vital decision taken at 
the Milan European Council in 1985 to convene the 
intergovernmental conference that would draft the 
Single European Act. Mounting pressure for large-
scale institutional change was thus a leitmotiv of the 
1973–86 period, even if much of the realisation of 
this change would occur only after 1986. 
Throughout all of this debate about change the 
Commission had an important and distinctive 
voice. As will be explained below, it adopted con-
sistent positions in favour of both a greater use of 
majority voting in the Council of Ministers and 
an increase in the European Parliament’s powers. 
Likewise, it made clear its views on the desirability 
of a move towards a much fuller European Union, 
(1) HAEC, Archive of speeches, Speech of Gaston Thorn to the European Par-
liament, 12 January 1981.
submitting a substantial document on this topic 
in 1975, which envisaged, among several possible 
outcomes, the establishment of a European govern-
ment to entirely replace the Commission  (2). And 
it took within its stride the emergence of the Euro-
pean Council, an institutional change which could 
have been construed as a major threat to the Com-
mission’s position. In the early 1980s, furthermore, 
Thorn would adopt a persistent rhetorical line about 
the necessity of treaty revision, would welcome the 
EP draft treaty and would ensure that the Commis-
sion was represented first by Frans Andriessen and 
later by Carlo Ripa di Meana on the Dooge Com-
mittee, where once more the need for substantial 
treaty change was underlined. Needless to say, how-
ever, this Commission desire for reform, while clear-
ly articulated throughout the period covered by this 
volume, could only reach fruition in a context where 
the Member States too were of the opinion that the 
institutions and treaties of the Community needed 
substantial reform. It was thus only at the very end 
of this period, at the intergovernmental conference 
convened to produce what would become the Single 
European Act, that the Commission was finally 
able to see many of its long incubated ideas begin 
to be implemented. Most observers agree, however, 
that the role of Jacques Delors and of Émile Noël, 
the Commission’s representative on the key drafting 
committee, was crucial in shaping a great deal of the 
final treaty (3).
Piers Ludlow
(2) ‘Report on European Union’, COM(75) 400 final, 25 June 1975, Bulletin of 
the European Communities Supplement, No 5, 1975.
(3) Jean de Ruyt, for instance, talks about the ‘determining role’ of Jacques 
Delors in De Ruyt, J., L’Acte unique européen, Éditions de l’université de 
Bruxelles, Brussels, 1989, p. 70.
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The Commission’s role in negotiating the Single European Act:  
an account by Paolo Ponzano
The arrival of Jacques Delors at the head of the 
Commission coincided with the Commission 
playing an unprecedented role as the driving force 
in institutional matters during what was to be a 
unique episode in the history of European 
integration.
In the face of the United Kingdom’s misgivings 
about treaty change and the Franco–German 
attempt to propose a new Fouchet plan, Jacques 
Delors played a decisive role both in the decision, 
taken by a simple majority, to convene an 
intergovernmental conference (according to 
Delors’ memoirs, an idea of François Lamoureux) 
and in the solutions reached at the Milan European 
Council, which were included in the Single 
European Act:
(a)  the objective of abolition of internal frontiers, 
which was included in the second paragraph of 
Article 8a of the Single European Act;
(b) extension of majority rule;
(c)  application of the ‘differentiation’ principle as 
the quid pro quo for the introduction of the 
majority vote to allow adoption of the 300 
legislative acts in the White Paper; this 
principle, which was included in paragraph 4 of 
Article 100A of the Single European Act, 
allowed the minority Member States in the 
Council to maintain stricter national rules 
where justified by legitimate reasons of 
protection of public health and of the 
environment (recalling the imperative 
requirements of the Cassis de Dijon judgment) 
if confirmed by the Commission following a 
Community procedure;
(d)  the introduction of the principle of economic 
and social cohesion in respect of the 
economically weaker countries, enabling them 
to adapt more easily to Community competition 
resulting from the completion of the internal 
market.
While it is an exaggeration to claim that 90 % of 
the provisions of the Single European Act were 
drafted by the Commission services that assisted 
President Delors in negotiating it, there is no doubt 
that the Commission, under Delors’ leadership, 
played a decisive role in this negotiation, enabling 
it to achieve almost all its objectives both on the 
institutional front (extension of majority voting, 
increased involvement by the European Parliament 
in the legislative process) and in terms of policy 
content (introduction in the treaty of the White 
Paper principles on the abolition of internal 
frontiers; achievement of the fundamental 
freedoms and implementation of accompanying 
policies; extension of Community powers to the 
policy areas of research, environmental protection 
and economic and social cohesion; extension of 
social policy powers to protection of workers at 
the workplace; etc.).
With regard to the extension of majority voting, it 
should be pointed out that from 1985 there was a 
significant increase in the number of majority 
decisions at the Council and that reaching 
unanimous decisions became easier and faster 
thanks to the restored ‘deterrent’ of majority 
voting. Consequently, President Delors’ ingenious 
idea of introducing in the treaty the substantial 
objective of completing the internal market — an 
objective that all the Member States subscribed to 
— enabled real progress to be made on the 
institutional front while rendering the practice of 
consensus arising from the Luxembourg 
compromise virtually obsolete.
Paolo Ponzano, 1 July 2013
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Gaston Thorn: 
an embattled visionary
Few Commission presidents have arrived in Brus-
sels with as much experience and inside knowledge 
of how the European Community system worked 
as Gaston Thorn. As prime minister of Luxem-
bourg in the mid-1970s he had participated in, and 
even chaired, meetings of the European Council. 
A former foreign minister, he had also acquired ex-
tensive expertise about how the Council of Min-
isters functioned. And as a member of the Euro-
pean Parliament since 1959 he was well acquainted 
with the operation of the Strasbourg Assembly. His 
well-established role as one of the most active mem-
bers of the international liberal movement also gave 
him contacts and allies in many of the European 
governments with which he would have to deal. 
Nor did he lack the linguistic skills necessary for 
the job, since he had excellent English, French and 
German.
Counterbalancing such advantages, however, were 
the difficult circumstances in which he inherited 
the job of European Commission president in Jan-
uary 1981. His own appointment had been a dif-
ficult one, secured only in the face of determined 
opposition from French President Valéry Giscard 
d’Estaing  (1). Within his Commission he would 
have to come to terms not merely with a former 
president, François-Xavier Ortoli, but also with one 
of his chief rivals for the Commission Presidency, 
Étienne Davignon. The Belgian commissioner had 
only been denied the top job because of internal 
party political manoeuvring within the Belgian 
(1) The Financial Times, 16 June 1980.
Thorn’s inheritance was not an easy one …  (Published in 
Courrier du personnel, No 421, 12 February 1981, pp. 8–9).
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government, and would continue to be regarded 
as the strong man of the Commission throughout 
the 1981–85 period. Furthermore, the allocation of 
portfolios among the members of Thorn’s Commis-
sion had been settled only after one of the longest 
and hardest fought ‘nights of the long knives’ (1).
Even more fundamentally, the general economic 
and political context of the early 1980s was pro-
foundly discouraging. Western Europe showed lit-
tle sign of escaping from the economic downturn of 
the 1970s. East–West relations, meanwhile, were in 
the grip of what some were calling a second Cold 
War. The Community itself was still struggling to 
establish a modus vivendi between the Commis-
sion, the Council of Ministers, the still relatively 
(1) See Chapter 11, ‘The politics of the Community budget’. Concerning the 
‘night of the long knives’, see section 2.1, ‘The commissioners’.
new European Council and the now directly elected 
European Parliament. Thorn’s own opening speech 
in Strasbourg had candidly acknowledged the on-
going institutional malaise (2). In such circumstanc-
es, restoring the Commission’s driving role, which 
was clearly Thorn’s aspiration — and which lay at 
the heart of his view of how the Community system 
ought to work — would be no easy task (3).
Matters were made still worse by an extraordinary 
run of misfortune that seemed to afflict the new 
Commission. Adrien Ries, Thorn’s initial choice 
as head of cabinet, the vital right-hand man of any 
European commissioner, and in particular the presi-
dent, resigned within days because of health diffi-
culties; his replacement, Fernand Spaak, was then 
murdered after a mere 6 months in the job (4). Finn 
Olav Gundelach, one of the heavyweights amongst 
the commissioners, and the man charged with the 
vital task of keeping control over agricultural ex-
penditure, collapsed with a heart attack and died 
in January 1981 (5). Then, in May, the new French 
presi dent, François Mitterrand, recalled ano ther 
of the more prominent commissioners, Claude 
Cheysson, to become his foreign minister  (6). The 
man nominated in Cheysson’s stead, Edgard Pisani, 
was a first-rate figure in his own right. The disrup-
tion caused by the change of personnel remained 
very real nonetheless.
Beset by these difficulties, Thorn struggled to stay in 
control of events. Part of the problem lay within the 
Commission itself, where too many of Thorn’s col-
leagues seemed intent on testing the limits of presi-
dential authority and collective responsibility  (7). 
(2) HAEC, Archive of speeches, Speech by Gaston Thorn to the European Par-
liament, 12 January 1981.
(3) Thorn’s view of how the Community should work was set out very clearly in 
his talk ‘Union européenne ou déclin: être ou ne pas être?’, HAEC, Archive 
of speeches, Jean Monnet Lecture to the European  University Institute, 
24 May 1984.
(4) Interview with Michel Vanden Abeele, 30 November 2010; The Financial 
Times, 20 July 1981.
(5) The Financial Times, 14 January 1981.
(6) The Financial Times, 26 May 1981.
(7) Interview with Christopher Tugendhat, 17 August 2010.
Gaston Thorn speaks to the press in 1982. 
The Commission president was often very candid about 
the crises facing the Community.
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The phenomenon of individual commissioners 
acting as quasi-independent ‘barons’, answerable 
to  no one but themselves, was not entirely new. 
Indeed, in a Community system where individual 
commissioners owed their appointment to backing 
from their national government rather than selec-
tion by the Commission president, any president 
was likely to have some difficulties in maintaining 
full control. But the problem was to reach its apo-
gee in the early 1980s, with several of Thorn’s col-
leagues clearly feeling neither loyalty nor deference 
to their president  (1). Also troublesome was the 
ever-growing assertiveness of a European Parliament 
frustrated that the introduction of direct elections 
in 1979 had not resulted in a rapid increase of its 
powers. By February 1983, MEPs were threatening 
to dismiss the entire European Commission unless 
(1) The Financial Times, 21 April 1981.
the ongoing impasse over the Community budget 
was rapidly resolved (2). A strong speech by Thorn 
helped avert an immediate crisis, but not before the 
potential pitfalls of managing day-to-day relations 
with a power-hungry European assembly had been 
publicly revealed (3).
The biggest difficulty, however, sprang from the 
deterioration in Thorn’s standing among his fel-
low European leaders. In the summer of 1981, the 
Commission president had staked a great deal of 
his authority on a proposal designed to settle the 
festering budgetary row. In this he had suggest-
ed accompanying measures to address the prob-
lem of the United Kingdom’s contribution to the 
budget with measures designed to limit the runa-
way expenditure on agriculture, and with a mod-
(2) The Financial Times, 8 February 1983.
(3) The Financial Times, 9 and 10 February 1983.
Gaston Thorn in Brussels in February 1983.
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est increase in the overall size of the Community 
budget  (1). The compromise package, however, 
had been roundly rejected by the European Coun-
cil. Instead, the Member States, with Germany 
and  France to the fore, would turn to ever more 
intergovernmental methods of bilateral consulta-
tion in their efforts to settle the issue, a trend that 
Thorn deplored and denounced but could do little 
to reverse  (2). Neither these bilateral efforts nor 
(1) Schwabe, K., ‘Gaston Thorn’ in Harst, J. (van der) and Voerman, G. (eds), 
The Presidents of the European Commission: From Hallstein to Barroso, John 
Harper, London, 2014 (forthcoming).
(2) Gaston Thorn’s strongest denunciation of this method came in his speech 
to the European Parliament on 15  December 1983  (HAEC, Archive of 
speeches).
those led by the Presidency immediately broke the 
deadlock. On the contrary, the shambolic Athens 
Council in December 1983 only underlined how 
hard it was to find a solution. But the fact that it 
was ultimately the French Presidency that devised 
the compromise agreement reached at Fontaine-
bleau in June 1984 did underline the extent to 
which the Commission in general, and Thorn in 
particular, had been sidelined from the most press-
ing issue of the day. Admittedly, the final package 
deal agreed at Fontainebleau bore more than a pass-
ing resemblance to Thorn’s ill-fated proposals sub-
mitted 3 years earlier. Mitterrand too had ultimate-
ly been pushed to the conclusion that the British 
budgetary problem could only be solved within the 
The Commission president together with Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. 
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context of a wider-ranging combination of budget- 
ary reforms and alterations to the way in which 
the CAP functioned. However, the worrying fact 
remained that the Commission president had be-
come a marginal figure in the discussions that led 
up to the final deal.
Needless to say, the Thorn years were not without 
their achievements. Prominent among these was 
the gradual advance of the enlargement negoti-
ations with Spain and Portugal. Progress in these 
talks was slow and halting, with Spain in particular 
posing huge problems for both the common agricul-
tural policy and the common fisheries policy. The 
final breakthrough, furthermore, would occur in 
June 1985 under the Delors Presidency, rather than 
Thorn’s. But the Luxembourger deserves credit for 
maintaining the pressure to move forward, despite 
the difficulties encountered. 
Another important advance was the negotiation 
of the Lomé III settlement with the Commu-
nity’s  partners in Africa, the Caribbean and the 
Pacific. The Commission also responded sensibly to 
the worrying situation in 1983 when expenditure 
threatened to outstrip income by making the nec-
essary savings on non-compulsory expenditure and 
averting an overall budgetary shortfall. The tighten-
ing up of the milk quota system was an important 
step towards regaining some control over the CAP 
budget. The Thorn years were also characterised 
by a high level of Commission activity designed to 
tackle the serious crisis confronting the European 
steel industry, and by equally energetic Commission 
efforts to forge an effective partnership with the 
European electronic and computer industry. These 
last have been credited by some analysts with cre-
ating a partnership between the Commission and 
industry that would help launch the single market 
project in the mid- to late 1980s (1). The fact, how-
ever, that both steel policy and contacts with Europe’s 
(1) Sandholz, W. and Zysman, J., ‘1992: Recasting the European bargain’, 
World Politics, Vol. 42, No 1, 1989, pp. 95–128.
high-technology sector were mainly attributable 
to Davignon and not to Thorn personally rather 
underlines the questions about the Commission 
president’s personal authority discussed above.
Gaston Thorn presided over the European Com-
mission during an extremely difficult period for 
the European Community. His limited success in 
establishing himself as a strong leader is therefore 
partially attributable to the almost insurmountable 
nature of the problems he was confronted with. 
He also inherited the job in unpropitious circum-
stances and was to suffer an early run of misfor-
tune. He deserves credit, furthermore, for helping 
to ensure that the next president would inherit a 
Commission full of ideas about how to push Eur-
ope forward, even if uncertain how to guarantee 
that such ideas would be carried out. The successes 
of the Delors period were partly built on the foun-
Work to do: Gaston Thorn confronts the mounting 
paperwork in front of him.
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dations laid during the preceding half decade. At 
the time, however, there was little sense of forward 
movement in the integration process. This helps 
explain the mounting frustration both in Brussels 
and elsewhere — and in particular Thorn’s forceful 
but ultimately futile condemnation of what he per-
ceived as intergovernmentalism. As Delors would 
demonstrate, working with this trend rather than 
against it would prove a much more effective route 
to renewed success. 
Piers Ludlow
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Chapter 8  
Relations with the European 
Council
One of the major institutional innovations to occur 
during the 1973–86 period was the institutionali-
sation of European summitry and the birth of the 
European Council  (1). This replaced the previous 
pattern of occasional and infrequent gatherings 
of the heads of state or government of the Mem-
ber  States — three such gatherings between 1958 
and 1969 — with a schedule based on three meet-
ings each year. The exact legal status of the Euro-
pean Council, it was true, remained ambiguous 
until the 1986 Single European Act. But long before 
this date, the pattern of frequent meetings between 
the most senior politicians in each of the Member 
States had become regularised and had begun to 
have a decisive effect on the manner in which the 
Community was governed. It is hence important to 
establish how the Commission interacted with this 
new entity.
(1) Mourlon-Druol, E., ‘Filling the EEC leadership vacuum? The creation of 
the European Council in 1974’, Cold War History, Vol. 10, No 3, August 
2010, pp. 315–339.
The Commission’s initial reaction to French Presi-
dent Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s suggestion for a 
European Council was surprisingly conciliatory. 
Given some of the Commission’s earlier misgivings 
about one-off European summits and its fear that 
such assemblies could take over the leadership role 
to which it aspired, the notion of replacing ad hoc 
summits with regular European Council meetings 
could easily have been construed as a threat  (2). 
Exactly this point was made by Belgium, Luxem-
bourg and the Netherlands (the Benelux states) 
with the discreet support of the Commission dur-
ing the negotiations that followed Giscard d’Es-
taing’s pro posal (3). The Commission itself was less 
open about its fears. It did express the hope that the 
new entity would be a Council, and not a new body 
(2) Ludlow, N. P., ‘An opportunity or a threat? The European Commission and 
The Hague Council of December 1969’, Journal of European Integration 
History, Vol. 9, No 2, 2003, pp. 11–25.
(3) According to an oral account by Émile Noël related to Paolo Ponzano be-
hind the scenes, the Ortoli Commission encouraged the Benelux states to 
adopt this stance.
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‘that might overshadow the existing institutions’. It 
also opposed the institution of a separate secretariat 
to serve the new body (1). But the suggestion by Al-
tiero Spinelli that the Commission respond with an 
institutional counter-proposal of its own was reject-
ed by the majority — as François-Xavier Ortoli put 
it in a speech to the European Parliament, it would 
be foolish to try to save the Commission to the detri-
ment of the Council (2). Furthermore the Benelux 
states enjoyed some success in the subsequent negoti-
ations in rendering Giscard d’Estaing’s ideas more 
Community-oriented (communautaire). Émile Noël, 
(1) HAEC, COM(74), Minutes No 314, second part, meeting of 28 October 
1974.
(2) Badel, L. and Bussière, É., François-Xavier Ortoli: L’Europe, quel numéro de 
téléphone?, Descartes & Cie, Paris, 2011, p. 153.
who represented the Commission on the committee 
planning the European Council, was hence able to 
adopt a conciliatory position, especially once it be-
came clear that the French president’s original in-
tention of marginalising the role of the Commis-
sion president in European Council meetings 
enjoyed little support amongst the Member 
States  (3). If the new body was able to inject some 
much-needed vitality and sense of purpose into a 
Community struggling to come to terms with the 
global economic downturn, the Commission was 
(3) Noël’s views would later be expressed publicly. He did acknowledge the 
potential danger of ‘intergovernmentalism’.  But he concluded: ‘Despite a 
few disappointments, the European Council’s 4-year track record is clearly 
positive.’ Noël, É., Les rouages de l’Europe: comment fonctionnent les insti-
tutions de la Communauté européenne, 2nd edn, Fernand Nathan-Labor, 
Paris/Brussels, 1976, pp. 45–63.
very ready to welcome its creation and participate in 
its work. This was all the more the case given the 
parallel progress made towards direct elections to 
the European Parliament (1).
Learning how to make use of the European Coun-
cil, however, was something that would take the 
Commission some time. To some extent this was 
a matter of procedure. The Commission thus grad-
ually discovered the importance of setting out its 
views in writing to the members of the European 
Council prior to their meetings, often in the form 
of a brief memorandum. Close consultation with 
the Member State holding the Council Presidency 
(1) HAEC, COM(74), Minutes No 320, meeting of 11 December 1974.
Present at the creation: the Élysée dinner in September 1974, at which Valéry Giscard d’Estaing  canvassed his fellow leaders 
about the idea of regular summits.
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also proved its value. And on those occasions when 
the European Council debated issues that had dir-
ect implications for existing Community policies, 
it would normally fall to the Commission to fol-
low up the guidance provided by the heads of state 
or government with detailed legal proposals  (2). 
As Delors was to emphasise to MEPs: ‘The Com-
mission has a right of initiative. But a distinction 
needs to be made according to whether we exercise 
it within a specific institutional framework or in a 
more general political context. Within a specific in-
stitutional framework, our duties are to give effect 
to what has formally been decided by the Euro-
(2) Noël, É., Les rouages de l’Europe: comment fonctionnent les institutions de 
la Communauté européenne, Fernand Nathan-Labor, Paris/Brussels, 1976, 
pp. 51–52.
very ready to welcome its creation and participate in 
its work. This was all the more the case given the 
parallel progress made towards direct elections to 
the European Parliament (1).
Learning how to make use of the European Coun-
cil, however, was something that would take the 
Commission some time. To some extent this was 
a matter of procedure. The Commission thus grad-
ually discovered the importance of setting out its 
views in writing to the members of the European 
Council prior to their meetings, often in the form 
of a brief memorandum. Close consultation with 
the Member State holding the Council Presidency 
(1) HAEC, COM(74), Minutes No 320, meeting of 11 December 1974.
Present at the creation: the Élysée dinner in September 1974, at which Valéry Giscard d’Estaing  canvassed his fellow leaders 
about the idea of regular summits.
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played his part in relaunching the idea of Euro-
pean monetary integration with his Florence speech 
in October 1977. He was therefore very much en-
gaged in all of the European Council negotiations 
that would lead to the establishment of the Euro-
pean Monetary System (EMS). Fourth, the success 
of his efforts to win a place at G7 summits meant 
that he was also deeply involved in all European 
Council discussions designed to coordinate the 
stance of European representatives prior to the an-
nual global summits. Finally, and most fundamen-
tally, he was someone whose stature and expertise 
were so clear that it was inevitable that he became 
an important figure in top-level meetings  (4). A 
man often described as ‘the best prime minister the 
United Kingdom never had’ was very much at home 
amongst national leaders  (5). But despite fitting in 
so well, and despite his undoubted impact, Jenkins 
was ultimately hamstrung by serving only a single 
term, and by the way that so many of his later Euro-
pean Councils were dominated by bickering about 
the British budget contribution. This limited the 
scope to discuss anything else and proved particu-
larly awkward and embarrassing for a British Com-
mission president (6).
Gaston Thorn ought to have been immediately 
comfortable in Europe’s most senior decision- 
making forum. As Luxembourgish prime minister 
he had been present at the creation of the European 
Council and had attended many of the subsequent 
summits. But the advantages that this familiarity 
might have given him were outweighed by his ideo-
logical conviction that the European Council ought 
not to be as central to the Community’s operation 
as it had become. His very first speech to the Euro-
pean Parliament as Commission president was some 
indication of this, identifying the direct elections to 
(4) Interviews with Crispin Tickell, 21 August 2010, and Michel Vanden 
Abeele, 30 November 2010.
(5) See Lewis, P., ‘Roy Jenkins, 82, dies; Helped start centrist British party’, The 
New York Times, 6 January 2003.
(6) A reality that Jenkins acknowledged: Jenkins, R., European Diary, 
1977–81, Collins, London, 1989, p. 546.
pean  Council or by amendment to the treaty’  (1). 
But given the nature of European Council meetings 
and the emphasis on personal conversation between 
the key figures, the Commission’s impact was signif-
icantly affected by the personality and standing of 
its main representative, the Commission president. 
And here the track record over the 1975–86 period 
was somewhat mixed.
Ortoli was not particularly well suited for the task. 
In part this reflected the inevitable difficulty for a 
French Commission president in making his mark 
in a forum where Giscard d’Estaing was a dominant 
figure and also the leader most sceptical about a 
prominent Commission role. Ortoli had been close 
to Georges Pompidou but was much less well con-
nected to his successor  (2). But Ortoli’s standing 
was also a factor: his recent biographers character-
ise him as a strong president of a weak Commis-
sion (3). Amongst the heads of state or government 
he seems to have carried much less authority than 
he did within his own institution. So while the first 
Commission president to attend European Council 
meetings was able to make periodic contributions to 
discussions, he did not become a prominent figure 
within the new forum.
Roy Jenkins was rather different. For a start, it 
quickly became clear that establishing an influential 
position within the European Council was one of 
his priorities. Second, he was appointed with strong 
backing from both of the key figures in the Euro-
pean Council of the time, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing 
and the German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, and 
while relations with the former were variable, Roy 
Jenkins’s rapport with Schmidt remained close 
throughout his Presidency. Third, he had a personal 
stake in one of the key items on the agenda of many 
of the European Councils of the late 1970s, having 
(1) Speech by Jacques Delors to the European Parliament, Bulletin of the Euro-
pean Communities Supplement, No 2, 1989, p. 60.
(2) Badel, L. and Bussière, É., François-Xavier Ortoli: L’Europe, quel numéro de 
téléphone?, Descartes & Cie, Paris, 2011, p. 150.
(3) Ibid., 2011, pp. 128–141.
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he also developed a highly effective dialogue with 
Niels Ersbøll, the secretary-general of the Council 
of Ministers (4). This dialogue gave him insight into 
all of the likely national positions before the Coun-
cil began, and allowed him to discuss his priorities 
and expectations with the in dividual responsible for 
writing up the draft conclusions in advance of each 
meeting. Hard work was also central to the techni-
cal expertise that Delors accumulated on all of the 
key subjects debated, a reservoir of knowledge that 
meant that it was to the Commission president that 
the heads of state or government would invariably 
turn whenever they needed a solution to a problem 
they had not anticipated or were unsure as to the 
likely outcome of any given decision. This central 
role was reinforced by the excellent relations that 
Delors was able to form with Chancellor Kohl, the 
single most powerful member of the Council dur-
ing the latter half of the 1980s, the more distant, but 
still fruitful, relationship with François Mitterrand, 
a good rapport with Felipe González of Spain and 
a succession of Italian prime ministers, and a rela-
tionship with Margaret Thatcher that only broke 
(4) Interview with Jacques Delors, 11 March 2011.
the European Parliament as the only major institu-
tional advance of the 1970s, and passing over the 
European Council’s creation in silence (1). His sub-
sequent behaviour only confirmed this attitude. He 
did admittedly try to get the heads of state or gov-
ernment’s approval for his June 1981 plan to solve 
the budgetary impasse through a major increase in 
the Community’s budget. But once this was reject-
ed out of hand, he lapsed into a pattern of deploring 
the European Council’s power and lamenting the 
stifling effect that he believed it was having on the 
integration process  (2). He continued to attend 
European summits of course. But as recalled by 
David Williamson, who was present at several 
European Council meetings in the early 1980s as a 
member of the British delegation, Thorn contribut-
ed little even when the agenda turned to issues like 
the budget or the CAP where a Commission presi-
dent ought to have been a major player  (3). The 
Luxembourgish president could hence claim little of 
the credit when the impasse over the British budget-
ary question was finally broken at the Fontainebleau 
Council of 1984.
This last breakthrough did mean that Jacques De-
lors arrived at a highly propitious moment for pro-
gress at European Council level. But it was not just 
good fortune that made the new French president 
of the Commission the most effective European 
Council operator of any Commission president to 
date. Equally important were his assiduous prepar-
ation for each top-level meeting, his technical mas-
tery of most of the Council’s subject matter, a good 
rapport with the other main players and a flair for 
identifying both the content and the timing of com-
promise proposals designed to break deadlock. De-
lors’ work rate before each Council was formidable: 
not only did he endlessly rehearse possible scen-
arios and outcomes with members of his cabinet, but 
(1) HAEC, Archive of speeches, Speech by Gaston Thorn to the European Par-
liament, 12 January 1981.
(2) HAEC, Archive of speeches, Speech by Gaston Thorn to the European Par-
liament, 15 December 1983.
(3) Interview with David Williamson, 14 July 2011.
Unhappy birthday: the 25th anniversary celebrations of the Treaty of Rome 
were overshadowed by serious disagreements amongst the Ten.
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the sole factor that made Delors such an effective 
president of the European Commission, but it was 
undoubtedly one of the most significant assets he 
was able to play upon. 
Piers Ludlow
down completely at the very end of the decade. Such 
personal links, when combined with Delors’ exper-
tise, level of prepar ation and political nous, enabled 
the Commission president to spot the clever com-
promises that could bridge seemingly incompatible 
national positions. Mastery of the Council was not 
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Chapter 9  
Relations with the Council
9.1. The Council 
of Ministers
Relations with the Council in the period 1973–86 
were multifaceted and affected the Commission 
directly, with quite significant Council involvement 
in each of the Commission’s activities and even in 
its composition. We shall concentrate here on the 
institutional dimension of the relationship between 
the Commission and the Council, seen as a single 
institution. While a single institution is what the 
Council was in legal terms, in functional terms it 
consisted of several configurations and bodies, in-
cluding Coreper  (1), which we shall discuss later. 
After describing how the Commission was repre-
sented at the Council, we shall focus on two aspects 
in which significant and, in fact, interdependent 
changes occurred at this time: relations with the 
(1) The Permanent Representatives Committee (Coreper) is responsible 
for preparing the work of the Council. Coreper has two configurations: 
Coreper I, consisting of the deputy permanent representatives, covering 
most legislative matters, and Coreper II, consisting of ambassadors and 
dealing with political, economic and institutional matters.
Council Presidency and relations with the Coun-
cil’s General Secretariat. 
Efforts to maintain single representation 
of the Commission at the Council
The Commission was represented at the Council in a 
quite straightforward way: commissioners took part 
in meetings of the Council of Ministers. The Com-
mission was represented in Coreper by the Secretar-
iat-General. Between 1973 and 1986 there were two 
divisions in the Secretariat-General — ‘Relations 
with the Council I’ and ‘Relations with the Coun-
cil II’, which monitored the work of Coreper I and 
Coreper II respectively. However, since the deputy 
secretary-general traditionally represented the Com-
mission in Coreper II, it was the person responsible 
for ‘Relations with the Council I’, with the rank of 
director since 1981 (Henri Étienne), who represent-
ed the Commission in Coreper I. 
In Council working parties, the Commission was 
represented by members of the directorates-general. 
The directors-general often attended Coreper 
9
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tives Committee regarding the organisation of work 
should go through the Secretariat-General, which 
could then carry out the necessary coordination’ (2).
The Presidency: a new source 
of political impetus
In the period from 1973 to 1986 there were two sali-
ent moments in the Commission’s relations with the 
Presi dency: first, 1979–80, in the wake of the report of 
the Three Wise Men (3) on the reform of the European 
institutions  (4), and, second, the 1984 French Presi-
dency, which changed the procedures in force from the 
Fontainebleau Council meeting onwards. 
Shortly before the publication of the Three Wise 
Men’s report, Noël drafted a general memo on re-
lations with the Council, focusing on the Commis-
sion’s concerns about developments. From January 
1979, he had noticed ‘a constant expansion of the 
role of the Council Presidency (at every level) and 
… the insistence by Member States on tight control 
over the tasks entrusted to the Commission’. He 
went on to say that ‘within the Council set-up, the 
Presidency’s role is now complementary to that of 
the Commission. For instance, it is the Presidency 
which presents the compromises that the Commis-
sion is unable to put forward itself either because 
they are too far removed from its initial views or 
(unfortunately in some cases) because they are ques-
tionable from the point of view of Community 
rules.’ He cited as an example: ‘the French Presiden-
cy’s management since the beginning of January in 
the monetary compensatory amounts case’, which 
was ‘a good example of potential abuse’, adding, 
(2) HAEC, COM(75) Minutes No 360 of the meeting held on 19 November 
1975, p. 38.
(3) See the introduction to Part Three.
(4) HAEC, BAC 88/2004/112, Biesheuvel, E., Dell, E. and Marjolin, R., ‘Re-
port on European institutions presented by the Committee of Three to the 
European Council, October 1979’, Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities, Luxembourg 1980, in line with the task entrusted 
by the European Council of considering ‘adjustments to the machinery and 
procedures of the institutions’.
meetings, at which two representatives could be 
present, as they did meetings of ministers, depend-
ing on the agenda. In addition, cabinet members 
accompanied commissioners to Council of Minis-
ters’ meetings, but could not take the floor. On the 
other hand, Commissioners were advised not to at-
tend Coreper meetings, and cabinet members were 
actually barred from attending (save in exceptional 
circumstances).
Failure to comply with these rules inevitably caused 
tension. In an incident on 9 December 1983, Com-
missioner Christopher Tugendhat arrived in per-
son to represent the Commission in Coreper I, 
thus obliging Henri Étienne, also attending on be-
half of the Commission, to leave the room because 
the Commission representation had reached the 
maximum permitted size with the presence of both 
the head of cabinet and the director-general. Henri 
Étienne, representing the Secretariat-General, thus 
had to give up his seat to the head of cabinet of a 
resourceful commissioner. This incident provoked 
a sharp response from Émile Noël, who criticised 
the head of cabinet of the commissioner con-
cerned for a compromise reached at the expense of 
the Secretariat-General  (1). In his memo to Noël, 
Henri Étienne drew a bitter conclusion, describing 
the incident as a humiliation: ‘The fact is that some 
cabinets and directorates-general do not want the 
secretariat involved at all and think that it should 
give up its seat.’
However, the Secretariat-General was determined to 
point out that it was the indispensable intermediary 
in relations with the Council. In 1975, for instance, 
it was stated at a Commission meeting that ‘the 
Commission confirmed the arrangements which 
had hitherto applied and gave instructions that all 
official communication or contact with the presi-
dents of the Council and the Permanent Representa-
(1) HAEU, Émile Noël papers (EN) 605, Personal memo from Émile Noël 
to Mr Lever, P.1105/83, 20 December 1983, concerning the incident in 
Coreper.
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His recommendation to President Jenkins was less 
trenchant: this risk only really existed if the ‘big 
Member States wanted to take advantage of the in-
creased possibilities open to the Presidency’, which 
would ‘result in a shift in the Community’s internal 
political balance and in its institutional balance’ (2).
The Commission was haunted by the risk of a re-
turn to the Directoire, in the form of a big Member 
State’s Presidency. The advent of the first British 
(2) Ibid.
Making the institutional system function smoothly was a challenge throughout the 1973–86 period. 
(Illustration published in Courrier du personnel, No 402, 14 June 1979, p. 25.)
‘however, the very tough response by small and 
medium-sized countries to such abuse is a reason-
able guarantee that it will not spread’ (1).
This was a fairly explicit reference to the alliance 
between the Commission and the small (and 
medium-sized) Member States on the question of 
compliance with Community practices. For the 
Commission secretary-general viewed the role of the 
Council Presidency as a kind of adulterating force. 
(1) HAEC, BAC 40/1986/27, Memo by Émile Noël dated 26 January 1979 on 
Commission/Council relations.
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tage of the Council Presidency. The first trialogue 
on budgetary matters took place on 30  June 1982 
between the three presidents — of the Parliament, 
the Council and the Commission. From 1983, 
whenever conflicts arose, the Presidency embarked 
on mediation and political arbitration between the 
Commission and certain national delegations, such 
as Denmark in relation to the common fisheries 
policy that same year.
The year 1984 marked the second change of direction 
in relations between the Commission and the Presi-
dency. Traditionally it was the government of the 
Member State holding the Presidency that came to 
Brussels to visit the Commission, with the latter then 
informing it of its priorities. From the 1984 French 
Presidency onwards, it was the Commission mem-
bers who had to visit the capital city in question to 
hear the Presidency’s priorities. In 1989, these negoti-
ation priorities became the Presidency’s programme. 
The fact that the Commission had to do the travel-
ling was a good example of the symbolic transfer of 
leadership and the shift in the balance of power. 
This was underlined by the two new institutional 
ideas put forward by President François Mitterrand 
at the European Council meeting in Fontainebleau 
in June 1984. He started by proposing discussions 
on the best way of ensuring more continuity for the 
Community Presidency. The expression he used — 
Community Presidency (rather than Council Presi-
dency) — is misleading and seems to have been in-
spired by the spirit of the French Fifth Republic and 
its institutions. The Commission wondered about 
the meaning of this reference: ‘It may be that this 
statement was made as a result of the declarations 
by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and the opposition. 
In any case, the Commission has no problem with 
troika-style formulas. Other suggestions (such as 
an elected president of the European Council) be-
long to the future … ’ (2). It was in 1984 that former 
(2) HAEC, BAC 81/1984/17, Steering brief for the Fontainebleau European 
Council of 25 and 26 June 1984, Brussels, 21 June 1984, containing propos-
als by President Mitterrand concerning the institutions and the European 
Union.
Presidency in the first half of 1977, just as the Jenkins 
Commission was taking office, fuelled certain fears 
in this respect within the Commission. According 
to Pierre Bockstael, the Foreign Office had issued 
an instruction ‘not to work on Commission docu-
ments’. Bockstael  says: ‘It was awful when the Brit-
ish had the Presidency because they were very well 
prepared. It was often very irritating for me because, 
when I had to go and defend issues at the Council, I 
would go to the permanent representation to prepare 
the meeting with the group chair. The documents 
which the Commission submitted to the Council 
were of course always the basic documents, because 
they had been proposed by the Commission. The of-
ficials in the British per manent representation spent 
their entire time redrafting these documents to suit 
them and trying to get our agreement. They rewrote 
everything and turned it into Presidency documents. 
It was not until after the Presidency was over that a 
British official who chaired the group told me: “We 
had instructions to work, not on the Commission 
documents, but on the Presidency proposals.” And 
hence to weaken the Commission and, of course, the 
voting process. These were no longer Commission 
proposals. And this instruction came from the For-
eign Office’ (1).
The 1979 report played a part in the reorganisation 
of relations between the Council Presidency and 
the European Parliament, henceforth to be elected 
by direct universal suffrage. The President of the 
European Council could from then on address the 
European Parliament and, by a strange twist of fate, 
the first to do so was Margaret Thatcher in Stras-
bourg at the end of 1981. The political coupling of 
the Commission and the Parliament (the Commis-
sion had been accountable to the Parliament since 
1952) was disrupted to some extent by the arrival of 
a third partner which seemed to want nothing to do 
with Strasbourg. 
The institutional triangle became official and was 
enshrined at the start of the 1980s, to the advan-
(1) Interview with Pierre Bockstael, 7 July 2010.
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Voting practice (3)
Voting in the Council was used pragmatically, 
avoiding sensitive issues for which a Member State 
might request a unanimous decision when a 
majority vote would be sufficient from a legal point 
of view.
Some 30 cases of abstention were recorded 
between the 1966 Luxembourg compromise and 
1981. Moreover, in 13 cases the compromise was 
directly invoked or very important national 
interests were invoked to block a vote. During this 
time, there was a record period of 3½ years 
without any decisions adopted on a majority vote. 
The recurring tension in the run-up to each 
prospective vote led to an increasingly systematic 
invoking of the Luxembourg compromise. This was 
reflected in a broader interpretation and wider use 
of the Luxembourg compromise, the acceptance of 
the practice of ‘protest voting’ (4) and the gradual, 
de facto relinquishing of the tour de table at the 
Council. This happened, for instance, in the case of 
British opposition to the use of a vote in relation to 
fisheries in July 1977, and also when Denmark 
expressed the same kind of opposition in 1981 
(see table ‘Cases in which the Luxembourg 
compromise was invoked’, page 219).
Between 1975 and 1981, there were around 10 (5) 
cases of Member States invoking very important 
national interests to block the voting process 
(fisheries, external relations, etc.) (see table ‘Cases 
in which the Luxembourg compromise was 
invoked’, page 219). In three of these cases, the 
disputed decision was adopted a little later by a 
qualified majority, either at the level of the Council 
or by means of the written procedure. 
Filippa Chatzistavrou
(3) HAEC, BAC 391/2003/68, Memo by reflection group attached to the 
Commission Secretariat-General, UE (82) 19 rev., Brussels, 22 March 
1982, on qualified-majority voting in the Council. Research carried out by 
Filippa Chatzistavrou. 
(4) The term ‘protest vote’ appears as such in the Secretariat-General memo re-
ferred to above (see previous note). Increasing recourse to the Luxembourg 
compromise was making the voting process more and more difficult. Thus 
when a vote was held, it became an act of ‘protest’.
(5) A Secretariat-General document (note by Giuseppi Ciavarini Azzi to 
François Lamoureux dated 30 October 1986) refers to nine cases. Another 
memo by the Commission Secretariat-General on qualified-majority voting 
at the Council (HAEC, BAC 391/2003/68, Memo by reflection group at-
tached to the Commission Secretariat-General, UE (82) 19 rev., Brussels, 
22 March 1982) states that the Luxembourg compromise was invoked in 
15 cases during that period. The difference in number is due to a difference 
in identification of the acts. 
French President Giscard d’Estaing in fact proposed 
electing the European Council president by direct 
universal suffrage for 5 years.
The second institutional proposal tabled in Fon-
tainebleau was to set up a ‘permanent secretariat for 
political cooperation’, which the Commission feared 
might be located within the Council General Sec-
retariat. Sceptical, it made the following suggestion 
to President Thorn in a steering brief: ‘Despite our 
reservations on this point, if the Commission inter-
venes it should adopt a positive, albeit cautious, ap-
proach.’ This idea is in fact nearly as old as European 
political cooperation itself. However, the establish-
ment of such a secretariat had been blocked since 
1972 because of a dispute over its location. An other 
internal document, this time a speaking brief, was 
more critical, expressing fears that ‘this secretariat, 
under the authority of the president of the Euro-
pean Council, could soon become the hub through 
which all important decisions would have to pass, 
which might well disrupt the institutional structure 
of the Community and upset the precarious balance 
between intergovernmental and Community struc-
tures in the overall European integration process’ (1).
However, it would be too simplistic to conclude 
that the European political system was being re-
organised on an intergovernmental footing. Thus, 
while the Presidency was wresting more power from 
the Commission, it was at the same time beginning 
to become ‘communitarised’, in other words it was 
moving away from its initial profile of a simple inter-
governmental counterweight.  This trend was made 
possible by the existence of the Council’s General 
Secretariat, which, the Commission was pleased to 
note in 1979, had ‘contributed usefully to bestowing 
a European dimension on the Presidency’s work’ (2).
(1) HAEC, BAC 81/1984/17, Speaking brief for the Fontainebleau European 
Council of 25 and 26 June 1984, Brussels, 21 June 1984, containing pro-
posals by President Mitterrand to give the European Council a permanent 
secretariat for political cooperation (see note No 3).
(2) HAEC, BAC 40/1986/27, Memo by Émile Noël on Commission/Council 
relations, 26 January 1979.
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those of the Commission, without discounting the 
risk of real competition: ‘The Council Secretariat 
has a large staff (1  700 officials), but this must be 
compared with the 8 500 officials of the Commis-
sion … Only a small number of staff members are 
involved in policymaking. If I remember correctly, 
the Council’s Directorate D (Science, Technology, 
Energy) comprises only about 15 A grade officials, 
hence the equivalent of a very average-sized director-
ate in the Commission. Turning the Council into 
a structure capable of competing with or replacing 
the Commission in terms of expertise would re-
quire a veritable institutional revolution’ (2). 
The Council Secretariat was, therefore, in the 
Commission’s view, the lesser evil and a way of 
Euro peanising the Council and its Presidency. So, 
when it came to discussing changes in the role of 
the Council secretary-general, the Commission 
was not opposed to raising his or her profile. In line 
with the Three Wise Men’s report, talks were held 
to prepare the ground for the European Council 
meeting in Venice in June 1980 on the basis of a 
proposal by German Secretary of State Klaus von 
Dohnanyi, who wanted to give the Council secre-
tary-general a more political profile along the lines 
of a German secretary of state, making him or her 
a kind of alter ego in Brussels of the Council presi-
dent, and someone who might be induced to chair 
Coreper. 
Several of the ministers who examined this pro-
posal in Varese on 8 February 1980 expressed res-
ervations: the French minister saw in it a ‘source 
of political conflict’, while his British counterpart 
feared a ‘new centre of power’. The reaction of Com-
mission Vice-President Finn Olav Gundelach was 
more positive, however: thus according to the min-
utes of the meeting, ‘he highlighted the fundamen-
tal need for the Community and the Commission 
to have a strong Council. He stressed the fact that 
(2) HAEC, BAC 40/1986/27, Memo by Émile Noël dated 26 January 1979 on 
Commission/Council relations.
The Council’s General Secretariat: 
between complementarity 
and misgivings
Relations with the Council’s General Secretariat 
could be described as complementary but marked 
by misgivings about the emergence of a parallel and 
potential rival administration. Noël summarised 
the options in the abovementioned 1979 memo: ‘In 
order to cope with these increased responsibilities, 
the Presidency could have recourse to its national 
administration or to a European administration: 
the Council Secretariat’  (1). The preferred option 
was soon made clear: ‘We at the [Commission] 
Secretariat-General consider that the second for-
mula is by far the better.’ 
He goes on to draw a quite precise comparison be-
tween the resources of the Council Secretariat and 
(1) It is significant that Noël speaks of ‘Council Secretariat’ rather than 
‘Council General Secretariat’. The Secretariat of the European Coal and 
Steel  Community (ECSC) Council was given the status of General Sec-
retariat as far back as 1954, whereas the EEC Commission Executive 
Secretariat only became the Secretariat-General in 1967 with the merger, 
the High Authority having adopted this title in 1960.
Jacques Delors chairs a meeting of the Economic and Financial Council in his 
capacity as French minister of finance in 1984.  To his left is Neils Ersbøll, the 
secretary-general of the Council. Their collaboration would prove even more 
central once Delors became president of the Commission a few months later.
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this need was being increasingly felt now that the 
Community had to cope with new policy areas that 
were much broader and more dynamic than those 
entrusted to it initially by the treaties. He felt that 
it should be possible to implement the German sug-
(1) Note from Giuseppi Ciavarini Azzi to François Lamoureux, 30 October 
1986.
gestion concerning the Council secretary-general 
without causing rivalry between the institutions set 
up by the treaty’ (2).
(2) HAEC, BAC 40/1986/27, Commission note for the file, Brussels, 14 Feb-
ruary 1980.
Cases in which the Luxembourg compromise was invoked (1) 
Member State Council Date Subject
Ireland Agriculture 23.6.1975 following 
mention in Coreper on 
14.6.1975
Veterinary matters
Ireland General Affairs 13.12.1976 Conservation and management of 
fisheries resources
United Kingdom Fisheries 18.7.1977 Ban on fishing Norway pout
France General Affairs 2-4.4.1978 Euratom/USA relations
United Kingdom Fisheries 25.9.1978 Framework agreement with Norway
United Kingdom General Affairs 16-17.10.1978 Fisheries agreement with third 
countries
France Budget 20.11.1978 1979 budget
United Kingdom Fisheries 19.2.1979 Fisheries agreements between EEC 
and Canada, Sweden and Norway
Denmark Fisheries 27.10.1981 Conservation measures for fisheries 
resources
Greece External relations 4.5.1982 Export credit scheme
United Kingdom Agriculture 10-11.5.1982 1982 agricultural prices
Denmark Fisheries 21.12.1982 Common market organisation
Greece External relations 24.6.1983 Export credit scheme
Denmark Fisheries 30.6.1983 Provisional quotas for Member 
States and Norway
Denmark Fisheries 11-12.7.1983 Fishing in the North Sea in 1983
Greece Agriculture 26-27.9.1983 Dry grapes and figs scheme
Germany Agriculture 13-16.5.1985 Prices for cereals and colza in 
1985/86
Germany Agriculture 11-12.6.1985 Prices for cereals and colza in 
1985/86
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ber 1981  which marked the end of Coreper’s role 
in this respect. 
Relations between Ersbøll and 
Delors
‘ … I had an excellent relationship with Mr 
Ersbøll, who was a first-rate civil servant … I 
submitted ideas to him, since we had the right 
of initiative, and then I made sure that the 
General Affairs Council met in good time to 
prepare the European Council debates properly. I 
used to give Mr Ersbøll 3- and 4-page 
documents on each issue. When he had finished 
touring the capitals, Mr Ersbøll used to come 
and see me and describe the reactions of the 
rotating Presidency and the other Member 
States. It was my job to make sure that the 
machinery was well-oiled — the Commission, 
which could not go beyond its remit, the General 
Affairs Council, the rotating Presidency, the 
preparation of European Council meetings 
— not to mention trying to limit the European 
Council to the broad lines, except in the case of 
financial horse-trading’ (2).
From 1982, in close cooperation with each presi-
dent of the European Council and the Commission 
president, Ersbøll drew up the draft conclusions. It 
was with Jacques Delors that relations became very 
close, to the point that the two formed a veritable 
tandem before each European Council meeting.
Michel Mangenot
(2) Interview with Jacques Delors, 11 March 2011.
At a second meeting on 17 March 1980, the minis-
ters again discussed the proposal by von Dohnanyi, 
whose memo on the new role of the secretary- 
general had been modified in a bid to veil the pol-
itical nature of the new duties proposed. While the 
ministers were becoming less sceptical provided 
the secretary-general was no longer asked to chair 
Coreper, Gundelach continued to pledge the Com-
mission’s support for the plan: ‘Reiterating the 
views put forward in Varese, he urged the ministers 
to recognise the significance of the suggestion by 
von Dohnanyi. After underlining the need to re-
lieve the secretary-general of administrative tasks, 
he expressed the fear that the kind of rapporteur 
role suggested by Pierre Bernard-Reymond (the 
French Secretary of State for European Affairs) 
would mean a watering-down of the German 
proposal’ (1).
On 26 September 1980, a compromise was reached 
on the role of the Council secretary-general, who 
was given the official task of assisting the Council 
in general and the Presidency in particular, during 
a 5-year term of office. On 8 October 1980, Nico-
las Hommel, the discreet Luxembourgish diplomat 
who had served as secretary-general since 1973, 
was replaced by the Dane, Niels Ersbøll, a former 
secretary of state and, before that, the first Danish 
permanent representative. He consolidated the role 
of the General Secretariat, which began to assert it-
self in the decision-making process, in particular in 
the context of preparing European Council meet-
ings, starting with the one in London in Novem-
(1) HAEC, BAC 93/1999/148, Memo from the Secretariat-General to the 
Commission members, SI(80) 215, 19 March 1980.
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9.2. The Commission 
and Coreper: between 
cooperation and rivalry 
In the Communities with nine Member States, the 
responsibilities of both the Council and the Com-
mission increased. A series of new tendencies thus 
emerged: the proliferation of specialised Councils 
and informal ministerial meetings, a significant rise 
in the number of issues to be dealt with in Coreper, 
the need to resort ever more frequently to restrict-
ed sessions in the Council and in Coreper, and the 
need to better define the agenda on the basis of cur-
rent priorities. In this quest for efficiency, how the 
Commission and Coreper cooperated was of para-
mount importance.
As early as the Paris Summit of 19 to 21 October 
1972, it was decided that the Council would take 
practical steps to improve its decision-making pro-
cedures (see table ‘Proposals to improve working 
methods at Council level, 1972–73’, page 222). The 
Council wanted to give Coreper more freedom in 
the decision-making process within the Council 
and better involve the Commission in its work (1). 
(1) See the notes of the Secretariat-General to the members of the Commis-
sion concerning: the 682nd Coreper meeting on 12  April  1973, HAEC, 
SEC(73) 1522, 17 April 1973; the 685th Coreper meeting on 10 May 1973, 
HAEC, SEC(73) 1852, 14 May 1973; and the 691st Coreper meeting on 
20 June 1973, HAEC, SEC(73) 2419, 21 June 1973 (HAUE, Émile Noël 
papers (EN), File  No  444, ‘Relations with the Council’, 1973). During 
these discussions, two possibilities emerged: the organisation of policy dis-
cussions on general issues before the presentation of specific proposals by the 
Commission, or policy discussions on the most important proposals before 
they were sent to Coreper and the working groups. This idea was present-
ed by the Belgian Ambassador Joseph Van der Meulen on 20 March 1973 
(HAEC, SEC(73) 1279, 30 March 1973, p. 7, point F). The second part of 
the idea was also proposed by Émile Noël to Coreper on 12 April 1973.
Among other proposals, it was suggested that the 
General Affairs Council (foreign ministers) should 
become the core around which the work of other 
Council configurations was organised. Through its 
two weekly meetings (Coreper I on Wednesdays and 
Coreper II on Thursdays), Coreper was an interface 
between national and Community interests  (2). It 
was responsible for preparing Council meetings, 
with the exception of the Agriculture Councils. 
These were prepared by the Special Committee on 
Agriculture (SCA), with Coreper only giving an 
opinion on the SCA’s work (3). Coreper also grad-
ually acquired more autonomy in its preparatory 
role at working group level. At ministerial level, it 
lightened the work of the Councils (4). The ‘A’ item 
procedure, which had become part of Commu-
nity practice in 1962, expanded considerably as the 
Community’s powers increased. The governments 
responded to the working groups submitting an in-
creasing number of ‘A’ items to Coreper (5) by giv-
ing more flexible instructions to their permanent 
representatives. By giving them a stronger negotiat-
ing hand, the chances of agreement being reached 
at this level were improved (6). In other words, the 
permanent representatives were given greater lati-
tude so that only items that involved positions of 
(2) The case of the directive on free movement of doctors is a good example of 
the key role played by Coreper. Faced with a Belgian delegation that was 
maintaining a general reservation, the Belgian permanent representative, in 
liaison with the Commission, invited the Secretary-General of the Belgian 
Health Ministry to Coreper to confront him with the position of the other 
eight Member States. The safeguard clause proposed by the Commission 
in the event of a massive influx of doctors from other Member States was 
accepted and the directive was adopted, with Belgium abstaining (HAEC, 
SEC(74)  5205 of 20 December covering the 753rd Coreper meeting of 
18 December 1974).
(3) Veterinary matters remained supervised by Coreper.
(4) At the time, Coreper I had to monitor the work of 20 or so working groups.
(5) The ‘A’ item practice de facto reduced the Commission’s ability to appeal to 
the Council against a unanimous Coreper decision. 
(6) 276th meeting of the Council on 4 and 5 February and 288th meeting of 
the Council on 4 and 5 June 1974, HAEU, Émile Noël papers (EN), File 
No 2556, ‘Relations with the Council’, 1975.
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Proposals to improve working methods at Council level, 1972–73 
The role of Coreper 
vis-à-vis the 
Commission
At the beginning of its term of office, the Commission presents to the Council 
and the European Parliament a general programme covering common, existing 
and new policies. The programme specifies the cases where the Commission has 
recourse either to specific provisions of the treaty or to Articles 235 or 236 of the 
EEC Treaty. The programme makes it possible to highlight the interdependence 
between the various common policies and enables the Parliament and the Council 
to commit themselves in principle to implementing it. 
Coreper can decide to speed up work on long-outstanding Commission proposals.  
Debates are organised in Coreper (or in the Council) on important Commission 
initiatives with a view to identifying the views of the governments before the 
competent working groups start examining the proposals in detail.
Standing rapporteurs are appointed for proposals that are very technical (Émile 
Noël supported this proposal).
The role of Coreper 
vis-à-vis the 
Council of Ministers
Coreper prepares all the Councils.
The Council’s agenda must focus on key political issues that are mature 
enough for a decision to be taken (also a Commission proposal). The permanent 
representatives take part in all specialised Councils.
Council meetings take place more frequently and more regularly given the higher 
number and larger volume of dossiers to be dealt with. As with the regular 
meetings of agriculture and finance ministers, the Council should set a minimum 
frequency for meetings involving specialised ministers, in particular for common 
policies that are under development (Commission proposal).
Informal ministerial meetings should be revived. 
The role of Coreper 
vis-à-vis the 
working groups
Coreper scrutinises progress made in the working groups every 2 months so that it 
can pass on any guidelines.
A first reading takes place in Coreper before the working groups start examining a 
dossier. 
The working groups are given a deadline for examining a dossier, and the dossier is 
raised in Coreper when that deadline expires (proposal by Émile Noël). 
a political nature and that were ripe for a decision 
were discussed in the Council (1). 
(1) Until that time, the permanent representatives depended largely on their 
attachés, who were members of the working groups, and it was difficult for 
them to intervene usefully back in their Member States until a first discus-
sion had taken place at their level. If the competent ministers were reluctant 
to come to Brussels, their interventions carried less weight and they could 
count on the understanding of their colleagues to postpone the discussion. 
This idea was sanctioned at the Paris Summit of De-
cember 1974 (2), with a view to strengthening the 
political role of the Council. The Member States 
proposed that each General Affairs Council should 
start with a restricted discussion involving the min-
(2) In the final communiqué of the Paris Summit, point 7 states, among other 
things, that ‘ … each Member State will take the measures it considers ne-
cessary to strengthen the role of the permanent representatives … ’, HAEC, 
BAC 23/1979/223, SEC(74) 5026, 12 December 1974.
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by the Irish foreign minister Garret FitzGerald it 
proposed better coordination between the Com-
mission and the Council, and Coreper in particu-
lar. 
Despite highlighting the spirit of cooperation, it 
was clear that on some subjects the views of the 
Commission and of the Council could not be rec-
onciled. The Commission rapidly found itself hav-
ing to deal with cases where the working groups 
would neglect some of its proposals owing to ex-
pert reservations or where the chair of Coreper 
would use its prerogatives to push matters of in-
terest or curb others. There was also broad agree-
ment that the proper functioning of Coreper was 
hampered by the pursuit of consensus arising from 
the Luxembourg compromise, which was a practice 
Festive end-of-year meeting of Coreper I, 18 December 1981.
isters and the presidents of the Council and of the 
Commission. In the week preceding each Council 
meeting, Coreper had to hold a meeting with the 
president of the Commission in order to draw up 
the agenda and identify the main questions on 
which the Council would focus. 
For the Commission, the increase in Coreper’s de-
cision-making powers was not seen as a measure 
likely to simplify procedures. Via its deputy secre-
tary-general, Klaus Meyer, the Commission em-
phasised repeatedly that Coreper was not a polit-
ical body and that it was not accountable to any 
parliament. Coreper was the ultimate instrument 
for coordination, but only the Commission could 
ensure the coherence of the system. The Council 
acknowledged this position and in a memorandum 
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dency itself or by the competent departments of the 
General Secretariat of the Council, often in direct 
cooperation with Commission departments. 
The pursuit of consensus forced the Commission 
Secretariat-General to make more use of its coordi-
nation function within Coreper I (3). This strength-
ened the Commission’s legislative role in areas of 
Community competence in relation to Coreper  II 
since majority decision-making was more prevalent 
(3) In the special meetings with Coreper I or II, the Commission would try 
first of all to identify, for each Council, which decisions could be voted on 
or unblocked through abstention (in the spirit of paragraph 6 of the Paris 
Communiqué). 
that had a bearing on all levels of the Council (1). 
Indeed,  Presidency compromises were emerging 
as an alternative to the Commission’s proposals, 
and majority decisions remained exceptional until 
1985 (2). Compromises were the product of a sub-
tle game between the Council Presidency and the 
Commission. They were drawn up by the Presi-
(1) HAEC, BAC 88/2004/112, ‘Report on European institutions presented 
by the Committee of Three to the European Council, October 1979’, Of-
fice for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg 
1980, p. 24: ‘ … Majority votes as such are not possible in Coreper and sub-
ordinate groups. These forums must find some more informal consensus 
method of reaching their due share of solutions … ’.
(2) In early March 1986, Jacques Delors reiterated a proposal to the president 
of the Council with a view to amending the Council’s rules of procedure. 
Under the proposal, the Council would be able to proceed to voting at the 
request of the Commission. The proposal was discussed at ambassador level 
(Coreper  II) on 9  April  1986 but was rejected by some of the delegations 
(see the Council Presidency’s note of 1986 on amending the Council’s rules 
of procedure with regard to decision-making). The rules of procedure of 
24 July 1979 were finally amended on 20 July 1987. They allow for the pos-
sibility afforded by the above proposal on the condition that ‘the majority of 
the members making up the Council agree to it’ (see Articles 2(2)(b) and 5(1) 
of the rules of procedure adopted by the Council on 20 July 1987 on the basis 
of Article 5 of the treaty of 8 April 1965 (87/508/Euratom, ECSC, EEC)).
in technical committees (1). The Commission was 
perfectly aware that Coreper played a key role in 
the examination of its proposals. Coreper was the 
body with the power to decide whether to initiate 
or speed up work so that the working groups could 
examine specific Commission proposals. The Com-
mission invested heavily in its relationship with 
Coreper in order to gain support from the perma-
nent representatives in favour of its proposals. 
The Commission was represented in Coreper by the 
Secretariat-General and the competent director-
ates-general. The deputy secretary-general — first 
Klaus Meyer, then Christopher Audland — repre-
sented the Commission in Coreper II.  
The secretary-general took part in certain meetings 
and working lunches concerning the most impor-
tant dossiers. The Secretariat-General therefore 
played a prominent part in the coordination of 
Commission positions within Coreper but not ne-
cessarily for negotiating in the place of the direct-
orates-general. The Secretariat-General ensured 
consistency and continuity in relations with Corep-
er. The director responsible for relations with the 
Council represented the Commission in Coreper I. 
The two competent units ‘Relations with the Coun-
cil  I’ and ‘Relations with the Council  II’ (Henri 
Étienne and Umberto Stefani) prepared the meet-
ings between the Commission and Coreper and 
drafted the minutes of the weekly meetings (called 
SI notes). Only the notes that were included on the 
Commission’s agenda and were therefore discussed 
in the weekly meetings of heads of cabinet were 
overseen by Émile Noël himself. It was also notice-
(1) At the time, Coreper I was in charge of agriculture and fisheries policy, cus-
toms union and the internal market, trade matters and so-called ‘flanking 
policies’ (transport, competition, taxation, social policy). In 1975, research 
and atomic matters also came within the remit of Coreper  I. Coreper  II 
dealt with political and institutional dossiers such as political cooperation, 
external relations and economic policy, where the Commission played only 
a very limited role. Paolo Ponzano notes that, in the 1970s, the General Sec-
retariat, in its capacity as overall coordinator, ended up intervening in more 
than half of the dossiers discussed in Coreper I (Dossier note ‘30 years of 
Coreper in brief ’, SG-PA1- PP/frw (09) D/2703, 3 April 2009, provided by 
Paolo Ponzano). 
 Christopher Audland (second from the left) meeting with Coreper II as deputy secretary-general 
representing the Commission, a position which he held from 1973 to 1981.
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able, during these years, that the directors-general 
themselves participated more frequently in the 
meetings, especially those of Coreper II.
The Antici Group
The Antici Group, which was made up of one 
official from each permanent representation, the 
General Secretariat of the Council and the 
Secretariat-General of the Commission (2), played 
an extremely useful role in the functioning of 
Coreper. It also turned out to be an effective tool 
for contact between the Commission and Coreper.
Émile Noël used the group to send information or 
messages relating to the Commission’s position to 
the permanent representatives and to keep 
abreast of the position of the Member States on 
the most sensitive issues.
Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi
The directorates-general took part in Coreper I or 
II depending on the dossiers entered on the agen-
da. The two divisions ‘Relations with the Council I’ 
and ‘Relations with the Council II’ processed the 
information they received from the various cabinets 
and the information relating to dossiers that were 
already before the Council. They had to check with 
the departments involved that the Commission’s 
views had been solidly set out and that the various 
departments had coordinated their respective posi-
tions. They handled any friction between the direct-
orates-general and the Secretariat-General. During 
the period concerned, directors-general clearly par-
ticipated more in meetings, especially in Coreper II 
meetings. 
In addition to the official meeting, there were also 
other types of meeting between Coreper and the 
Commission, namely meetings that were held in 
restricted session and were devoid of procedural 
(2) See section 3.1, ‘The Secretariat-General’.
in technical committees (1). The Commission was 
perfectly aware that Coreper played a key role in 
the examination of its proposals. Coreper was the 
body with the power to decide whether to initiate 
or speed up work so that the working groups could 
examine specific Commission proposals. The Com-
mission invested heavily in its relationship with 
Coreper in order to gain support from the perma-
nent representatives in favour of its proposals. 
The Commission was represented in Coreper by the 
Secretariat-General and the competent director-
ates-general. The deputy secretary-general — first 
Klaus Meyer, then Christopher Audland — repre-
sented the Commission in Coreper II.  
The secretary-general took part in certain meetings 
and working lunches concerning the most impor-
tant dossiers. The Secretariat-General therefore 
played a prominent part in the coordination of 
Commission positions within Coreper but not ne-
cessarily for negotiating in the place of the direct-
orates-general. The Secretariat-General ensured 
consistency and continuity in relations with Corep-
er. The director responsible for relations with the 
Council represented the Commission in Coreper I. 
The two competent units ‘Relations with the Coun-
cil  I’ and ‘Relations with the Council  II’ (Henri 
Étienne and Umberto Stefani) prepared the meet-
ings between the Commission and Coreper and 
drafted the minutes of the weekly meetings (called 
SI notes). Only the notes that were included on the 
Commission’s agenda and were therefore discussed 
in the weekly meetings of heads of cabinet were 
overseen by Émile Noël himself. It was also notice-
(1) At the time, Coreper I was in charge of agriculture and fisheries policy, cus-
toms union and the internal market, trade matters and so-called ‘flanking 
policies’ (transport, competition, taxation, social policy). In 1975, research 
and atomic matters also came within the remit of Coreper  I. Coreper  II 
dealt with political and institutional dossiers such as political cooperation, 
external relations and economic policy, where the Commission played only 
a very limited role. Paolo Ponzano notes that, in the 1970s, the General Sec-
retariat, in its capacity as overall coordinator, ended up intervening in more 
than half of the dossiers discussed in Coreper I (Dossier note ‘30 years of 
Coreper in brief ’, SG-PA1- PP/frw (09) D/2703, 3 April 2009, provided by 
Paolo Ponzano). 
 Christopher Audland (second from the left) meeting with Coreper II as deputy secretary-general 
representing the Commission, a position which he held from 1973 to 1981.
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taken (2). Following François-Xavier Ortoli’s impe-
tus, preparatory meetings between the president of 
the Commission and Coreper II were introduced. 
The president of the Commission was accompa-
nied in these meetings by the secretary-general and 
sometimes by one or more other members of the 
Commission. In exceptional cases, the meetings 
could be held with only the heads of delegation, the 
presi dent of the Commission, the secretary-general 
of the Commission and the general secretary of the 
Council attending. The Secretariat-General consid-
ered that commissioners and members of their cab-
inets should only exceptionally take part in Coreper 
meetings or in its working lunches. In the 1970s, 
Étienne Davignon was one of the first to depart 
from this rule, often negotiating with Coreper I on 
external trade policy and the steel crisis plan. The 
trend then intensified, thereby indirectly confirm-
ing the growing weight of Coreper (3).
These informal meetings were designed to involve 
the Commission in the Council’s preparatory 
work, signalling intensified relations. Their pur-
pose was to take stock of progress made, explore 
any difficulties and enable a frank and open polit-
ical discussion to take place before the issues arrived 
in the Council. The Secretariat-General prepared 
these discussions between the president of the 
Commission and Coreper with the help of the 
commissioners’ cabinets. Émile Noël himself cen-
tralised preparations for these meetings. By means 
of ‘Meyer notes’ (4), the president of the Commis-
sion could automatically include important items 
on the Commission’s agenda. These meetings were 
aimed at preparing the preliminary meeting of the 
(2) Note on the lunch of the deputy permanent representatives with Presi-
dent Ortoli on 19 June 1974, HAEU, Émile Noël papers (EN), File No 474, 
‘Coreper’, 1974. Only permanent representative Émile Cazimajou came out 
against the procedures suggested by President Ortoli. Since deputy perma-
nent representatives were great suppliers of ‘A’ items compared with ambas-
sadors, Cazimajou considered that their affairs needed to be depoliticised 
and dealt with at their level so that they could remain autonomous and not 
be dependent on the ambassadors.
(3) Ponzano, P., ‘Relations between Coreper and the European Commission’, Il 
Diritto dell’Unione Europea, 5th year, No 1, 2000, pp. 30 and 35.
(4) Drafted by Deputy Secretary-General Klaus Meyer.
A topography of the Commission’s relations with Coreper
Type of meeting Frequency Other persons attending 
the meetings on behalf 
of the Commission
Objectives
Restricted Council or 
preliminary session of the 
foreign affairs ministers 
with the participation 
of the president of the 
Commission and the 
commissioners concerned 
Before the 
meeting of 
the General 
Affairs 
Council
Secretary-general
(for the Council: 
ministers/state 
secretaries, permanent 
representatives, an 
official)
President of the 
Commission, permanent 
representatives, 
secretary-general or 
deputy secretary-general 
Scrutiny of the agenda — 
discussion of thorny political 
issues which are not on the Council 
agenda or are of explicitly political 
aspects
This type of preliminary meeting is 
prepared 5 days beforehand at a 
brief meeting
Preparatory meeting 
between the president 
of the Commission and 
Coreper II
On a date 
in advance 
of the 
Council 
Secretary-general Preparation of the preliminary 
meeting of the foreign affairs 
ministers and of the Council: 
discussion on the work programme 
of the current Presidency and 
of the next semester, on the 
preparation of the European 
Council
Meeting of the president 
of the Commission and the 
commissioner concerned 
with Coreper I or  II. 
Meeting of the president 
of the Commission and the 
Coreper chair. 
Special Coreper meeting 
(very restricted) with 
the president of the 
Commission
On a case-
by-case 
basis 
The commissioner 
concerned
Specific dossier: to explain the 
intentions of the Commission, 
focusing on the issues likely to be 
discussed at ministerial level
Restricted meeting of 
ministers, preparatory 
meeting of ministers 
with the participation 
of the president of the 
Commission
If needed, 
on an ad 
hoc basis
Deputy secretary-general Any subject that needs to be 
discussed within a limited circle, or 
unofficial meeting to discover the 
lay of the land
Working lunches of 
Coreper I or II with 
the president of the 
Commission
One week 
before the 
Council
Secretary-general, 
director responsible for 
the ‘Relations with the 
Council I’ division
Preparation of the Council 
Coreper working lunch 
Exchange of views of 
ambassadors or Coreper II 
meeting on a specific issue 
Informal meeting with the 
chair of Coreper I or II
Twice a 
month
Secretary-general, deputy 
secretary-general, director 
responsible for the 
‘Relations with the Council 
II’ division
Director responsible for 
the ‘Relations with the 
Council I or  II’ division
Preparation of the next ministerial 
meeting, examination of the 
dossiers likely to be included on the 
Council agenda 
Preparation of the Coreper 
meeting and testing of Presidency 
compromises
concerns (1) (see table ‘A topography of the Com-
mission’s relations with Coreper’, page 227). The 
work of Coreper ended 10 days before the Council 
meeting to allow for extensive coordination within 
the governments. The Commission therefore took 
part in Coreper restricted meetings where partici-
pants discussed problems linked to the functioning 
of the decision-making process within the Council, 
in particular at the level of working groups, ad hoc 
groups and Coreper. 
It was indeed important to develop practical mech-
anisms to ensure discretion but also to raise govern-
ments’ awareness of the Community dimension of 
problems and of the role to be played by the Euro-
pean institutions. The idea was for the president 
of the Commission to be a kind of ‘key auxiliary’ 
for the success of the work carried out in Corep-
er. François-Xavier  Ortoli introduced the custom 
of inviting the ambassadors to a working lunch to 
discuss the most important issues. In July 1974, 
he suggested that Coreper as a whole, i.e.  both its 
components, take part in what he called conférences 
d’État-major (top-management sessions) to evaluate 
pending cases and rank them by order of priority. 
He also suggested similar meetings between him-
self, or Émile Noël, and the deputy permanent rep-
resentatives. In the same spirit, Émile Noël sowed 
within the Council the seeds of the idea that the 
General Secretariat and the Commission depart-
ments could, at the beginning of each Council 
Presidency, take stock of the action to be under-
(1) At the discussions on improving decision-making procedures, it was de-
cided that meetings between Coreper and a commissioner could become 
a periodic occurrence as some specialised Councils would in future meet 
at regular intervals (Memo to President Ortoli of 15  July  1974, HAEU, 
Émile Noël papers (EN), File No 143 ‘Coreper’, 1974). The need to main-
tain the confidential nature of all Council meetings, and especially of this 
type of meeting, was recognised fairly swiftly (summary of the guidelines of 
the meeting of 20 June 1974 between the president of the Commission and 
Coreper, HAEU, Émile Noël papers (EN), File No 474 ‘Coreper’, 1974). At 
a lunch, the Commission could confidentially submit a non-paper and the 
Council could then deliver an oral communication on the same subject. 
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taken (2). Following François-Xavier Ortoli’s impe-
tus, preparatory meetings between the president of 
the Commission and Coreper II were introduced. 
The president of the Commission was accompa-
nied in these meetings by the secretary-general and 
sometimes by one or more other members of the 
Commission. In exceptional cases, the meetings 
could be held with only the heads of delegation, the 
presi dent of the Commission, the secretary-general 
of the Commission and the general secretary of the 
Council attending. The Secretariat-General consid-
ered that commissioners and members of their cab-
inets should only exceptionally take part in Coreper 
meetings or in its working lunches. In the 1970s, 
Étienne Davignon was one of the first to depart 
from this rule, often negotiating with Coreper I on 
external trade policy and the steel crisis plan. The 
trend then intensified, thereby indirectly confirm-
ing the growing weight of Coreper (3).
These informal meetings were designed to involve 
the Commission in the Council’s preparatory 
work, signalling intensified relations. Their pur-
pose was to take stock of progress made, explore 
any difficulties and enable a frank and open polit-
ical discussion to take place before the issues arrived 
in the Council. The Secretariat-General prepared 
these discussions between the president of the 
Commission and Coreper with the help of the 
commissioners’ cabinets. Émile Noël himself cen-
tralised preparations for these meetings. By means 
of ‘Meyer notes’ (4), the president of the Commis-
sion could automatically include important items 
on the Commission’s agenda. These meetings were 
aimed at preparing the preliminary meeting of the 
(2) Note on the lunch of the deputy permanent representatives with Presi-
dent Ortoli on 19 June 1974, HAEU, Émile Noël papers (EN), File No 474, 
‘Coreper’, 1974. Only permanent representative Émile Cazimajou came out 
against the procedures suggested by President Ortoli. Since deputy perma-
nent representatives were great suppliers of ‘A’ items compared with ambas-
sadors, Cazimajou considered that their affairs needed to be depoliticised 
and dealt with at their level so that they could remain autonomous and not 
be dependent on the ambassadors.
(3) Ponzano, P., ‘Relations between Coreper and the European Commission’, Il 
Diritto dell’Unione Europea, 5th year, No 1, 2000, pp. 30 and 35.
(4) Drafted by Deputy Secretary-General Klaus Meyer.
A topography of the Commission’s relations with Coreper
Type of meeting Frequency Other persons attending 
the meetings on behalf 
of the Commission
Objectives
Restricted Council or 
preliminary session of the 
foreign affairs ministers 
with the participation 
of the president of the 
Commission and the 
commissioners concerned 
Before the 
meeting of 
the General 
Affairs 
Council
Secretary-general
(for the Council: 
ministers/state 
secretaries, permanent 
representatives, an 
official)
President of the 
Commission, permanent 
representatives, 
secretary-general or 
deputy secretary-general 
Scrutiny of the agenda — 
discussion of thorny political 
issues which are not on the Council 
agenda or are of explicitly political 
aspects
This type of preliminary meeting is 
prepared 5 days beforehand at a 
brief meeting
Preparatory meeting 
between the president 
of the Commission and 
Coreper II
On a date 
in advance 
of the 
Council 
Secretary-general Preparation of the preliminary 
meeting of the foreign affairs 
ministers and of the Council: 
discussion on the work programme 
of the current Presidency and 
of the next semester, on the 
preparation of the European 
Council
Meeting of the president 
of the Commission and the 
commissioner concerned 
with Coreper I or  II. 
Meeting of the president 
of the Commission and the 
Coreper chair. 
Special Coreper meeting 
(very restricted) with 
the president of the 
Commission
On a case-
by-case 
basis 
The commissioner 
concerned
Specific dossier: to explain the 
intentions of the Commission, 
focusing on the issues likely to be 
discussed at ministerial level
Restricted meeting of 
ministers, preparatory 
meeting of ministers 
with the participation 
of the president of the 
Commission
If needed, 
on an ad 
hoc basis
Deputy secretary-general Any subject that needs to be 
discussed within a limited circle, or 
unofficial meeting to discover the 
lay of the land
Working lunches of 
Coreper I or II with 
the president of the 
Commission
One week 
before the 
Council
Secretary-general, 
director responsible for 
the ‘Relations with the 
Council I’ division
Preparation of the Council 
Coreper working lunch 
Exchange of views of 
ambassadors or Coreper II 
meeting on a specific issue 
Informal meeting with the 
chair of Coreper I or II
Twice a 
month
Secretary-general, deputy 
secretary-general, director 
responsible for the 
‘Relations with the Council 
II’ division
Director responsible for 
the ‘Relations with the 
Council I or  II’ division
Preparation of the next ministerial 
meeting, examination of the 
dossiers likely to be included on the 
Council agenda 
Preparation of the Coreper 
meeting and testing of Presidency 
compromises
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foreign affairs ministers and conducting an initial 
‘political’ review of the agenda of the formal meet-
ing of the General Affairs Council. The discussions 
at Commission level thereby acted as a filter. The 
items reviewed and earmarked for discussion were 
then brought up in the preliminary ministers’ 
meeting and related to the work of future Council 
meetings. During these unofficial encounters, the 
president of the Commission could personally 
examine stalled dossiers and work out, together 
with the permanent representatives, how to give 
them some momentum. He could request a General 
Affairs Council or a specialised Council, or ask for 
work to be speeded up at expert level so that a deci-
sion could be reached more quickly. He could also: 
request that an item be placed on the agenda of the 
upcoming Council to enable the commissioner 
concerned to present his position; choose to bring 
it up in a restricted ministerial meeting; or even re-
serve the right to bring an action against the Coun-
cil for failure to act if the political dialogue came to 
nothing  (1). Exceptionally, he could also make it 
possible to identify the elements of a political com-
promise, which would be formalised later.  
The way in which the Commission took part in the 
contacts organised in the margins of the Council 
depended not only on the nature of the agenda but 
also on the style of the president. Owing to his car-
(1) The Commission could request that an item be placed on the provisional 
agenda of the Council, even against the unanimous opinion of the Com-
mittee (Article  2 of the EEC Council’s provisional rules of procedure of 
25  January 1958). The Council adopted the agenda by a simple majority. 
This practice would be formalised a little later (see note (2), p. 224, and 
note (2), p. 230).
Émile Noël (right), together with the ambassadors and deputy permanent representatives, played a key role under the 
Ortoli Presidency by establishing contacts at the highest level between Coreper and the Commission. 
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tory work was crucial for advancing the Commu-
nity interest.
The new round of discussions on how to improve 
the functioning of the Council revived the idea 
that Coreper’s role had taken on excessive propor-
tions  (3). In 1979, the report of the Three Wise 
Men proposed clearly delimiting Coreper’s ‘piv-
otal role between the Community apparatus on 
the one hand and the Member Governments on 
(3) See the conclusions of the European Council of December 1980 (Conclu-
sions on the report of the Three Wise Men, point B on the ‘Report on 
European institutions’), HAEC, BAC 40/1986/28, SI(80) 892, 5 Decem-
ber 1980.
Roy Jenkins (centre) at a working lunch with the members of Coreper, which he considered a platform 
for diplomatic debate rather than a decision-making forum. 
eer as a senior civil servant and as a politician (1), 
François-Xavier Ortoli cultivated the relationship 
between the Commission and Coreper. In contrast 
to President Ortoli’s tendency towards diplomatic 
activism, Roy Jenkins, who was more political, con-
sidered that Coreper was not the legitimate partner 
of the Presidency of the Commission. He saw 
Coreper lunches as ‘tennis matches’ between diplo-
mats in search of illusory leadership  (2). For his 
part, Gaston Thorn, who had a strong political 
background, also felt ill at ease in these diplomatic 
circles. Jacques Delors, in turn, engaged fully in 
relations with Coreper, considering that prepara-
(1) Badel, L. and Bussière, É., François-Xavier Ortoli: l’Europe, quel numéro de 
téléphone, Descartes & Cie, Paris, 2011.
(2) Jenkins, R., European Diary, 1977–81, Collins, pp. 187, 212, 219, 321, 519, 
563–4 and 583.
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bated (3). Going with this trend, the Commission 
pushed for a greater spirit of cooperation. Under 
the Thorn Presidency it developed a dual strategy. 
On the one hand, it supported Coreper’s commit-
ment to monitoring more closely the work of the 
Council groups in order to prevent its proposals 
from getting stuck at this level. On the other hand, 
in the event of political disagreement in Coreper 
meetings, it invoked its declaration of 1979, which 
stated that the appropriate forum for discussing 
political issues was the Council (4). Its goal was to 
try to reserve any substantive discussions for the 
informal ministerial meeting and then, if neces-
sary, for the General Affairs Council.
Filippa Chatzistavrou
(3) This kind of thinking was found, for example, in the draft European Act 
(the Genscher–Colombo plan). See the reply to the questions posed to the 
president (of the Commission) on European union at the meeting of the 
Institutional Committee of the Parliament on 29  April  1982 (HAEC, 
BAC 391/2003/69).
(4) The declaration stated that, where serious political objections were raised by 
one or more delegations in the Committee, the Commission would favour 
an extension of the deliberations to enable the Council to be consulted. 
HAEC, BAC 386/1991/142, Note from H. Étienne addressed to the mem-
bers of the Commission, SI(81) 332, 15 April 1981, on the 1026th meeting 
of Coreper I on 14 April 1981.
the other’  (1). The Commission, for its part, was 
mindful that, in order to function properly, the 
Council undoubtedly needed a Coreper that was 
effective, both in preparing Council meetings and 
in monitoring the work of the groups. Under the 
Jenkins Presidency, and as early as March 1978, a 
list of proposals that were pending in the Council 
was drawn up twice a year and circulated within 
the Commission. This was the early stages of the 
idea of a legislative programme, which would be 
formalised a little later in 1981. In 1979, the for-
mal adoption of the Council’s rules of procedure 
confirmed the influence of Coreper in the deci-
sion-making process (2). But in the 1980s, fears 
about the relative imbalance of Coreper’s weight 
compared with other institutions were exacer-
(1) The report proposed that the permanent representatives should enjoy ‘a 
status, and a freedom in negotiation within suitably framed instructions’ 
(p. 49). According to the Three Wise Men, Coreper, which was considered 
as a ‘check-point’, was destined to occupy even more of a central position 
than the General Affairs Council. The report emphasised that some of its 
control had been lost to new ‘high-level’ bodies, but that it should still be 
capable of regaining ‘an overview function in the technical phases of work, 
rather like that which the European Council occupies at the political level’ 
(p. 57). HAEC, BAC 88/2004/112, ‘Report on European institutions’ or 
‘Report of the Three Wise Men’, October 1979.
(2) From then on, the ‘A’ items procedure appeared in the Council’s rules of 
procedure. The rules stipulated that there had to be unanimity in the Coun-
cil and that the Commission had to give its approval in order for an item 
on the agenda to be addressed under the ‘A’ item procedure (Article 2(6) 
and (7) of the rules of procedure adopted by the Council on 24 July 1979 
on the basis of Article 5 of the Treaty of 8 April 1965 establishing a single 
Council and a single Commission of the EC (79/868/ECSC, EEC, Eur-
atom)). The right of the Commission to appeal to the Council against a 
unanimous decision of the Member States at Coreper level and, therefore, 
to oppose its inclusion as an ‘A’ item, would now be formally provided for. 
However, cases where the Commission requested a decision at Council level 
on a dossier where the Member States had been in unanimous agreement 
in Coreper were very rare in practice (see File Note, Secretariat-General — 
Directorate D, Relations with the Council, PP/ev/2001-168, 30 April 2001, 
Annex 1, BAC).
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Chapter 10  
Relations with the European 
Parliament
The Commission has long felt there to be a basic 
alliance of interest between itself and the Euro-
pean  Parliament. Virtually all the Commission 
presidents, and many other commissioners as well, 
have assured the Strasbourg Assembly of the good-
will that they bore towards the Parliament, of the 
importance they attached to seeing its powers grow 
and of the importance which they would attribute 
to the Parliament’s views. Thus in January 1973 
François-Xavier Ortoli declared: ‘We are convinced 
that we will be all the more able to act effectively 
... since the Commission … will have the advantage 
of a more detailed and richer dialogue with your 
House’ (1).
Four years later, Roy Jenkins adopted a similar 
tone, pledging that his Commission would ‘work 
most closely with the Parliament. No doubt we 
shall have disputes, but we are on the same side.’ He 
(1) HAEC, Archive of speeches, Speech by François-Xavier Ortoli to the 
European Parliament, 16 January 1973.
also undertook personally to give the lead in estab-
lishing closer links with the assembly  (2). Gaston 
Thorn struck a more emotional note, placing great 
emphasis on his own past relations with the Parlia-
ment. He opened his first speech as Commission 
president by saying: ‘Everyone here will understand 
that I find it difficult to hide what I feel as I stand 
in this chamber today. I was elected with you in 
June 1979 and, with 10 years as a member of this 
House and four terms as president of the Council 
behind me, I see so many familiar faces as I look 
around’ (3). 
His underlying promise to do everything in his 
power to improve relations between the Commis-
sion and the European Parliament was all but iden-
tical to those delivered by his predecessors, however. 
(2) HAEC, Archive of speeches, Speech by Roy Jenkins to the European 
Parliament, 11 January 1977.
(3) HAEC, Archive of speeches, Speech by Gaston Thorn to the European 
Parliament, 12 January 1981.
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and its hope that a more effective, directly elected 
parliament would address this vulnerability. But 
many within the Commission also believed that if 
the institution could generate strong Parliamentary 
backing behind some of its proposals, these would 
be much less likely to be blocked or watered down 
in the Council of Ministers. This idea had been 
present in Brussels since at least the mid-1960s — 
Walter Hallstein was looking to precisely this phe-
nomenon when he chose to tell Strasbourg about 
the controversial proposals that helped trigger the 
empty chair crisis before he informed the Council 
of Ministers — but it became particularly attractive 
from a Commission point of view in a period like 
the 1970s and early 1980s when decision-making 
at Council level was notoriously slow. A clear demo-
cratic mandate behind a Commission proposal 
might serve to cut through the impasse amongst 
Member State representatives.
Actually translating this noble aspiration for better 
Commission–Parliament relations into practice, 
however, proved more awkward than might appear 
from the lofty prose of Commission presidents’ 
speeches. Ortoli’s 1975 assessment of the state of 
Commission–Parliament relations was brutally 
frank. ‘At present the Commission’s commitment 
to the European Parliament is not always suffi-
cient, and its action within this organisation does 
not always provoke the desired impact. Too often, 
consultation with the European Parliament is con-
sidered as an indispensable formality at a legal level 
and often the Commission’s position vis-à-vis the 
European Parliament is inspired by a state of mind 
which is too bureaucratic. To date the Commission 
has rather insufficiently exploited the latent polit-
ical powers of the European Parliament and has 
not really endeavoured to put all their energy at the 
Community’s disposal’ (3).
(3) HAEC, BAC 39/1986/758, ‘Tentative de collaboration plus dynamique 
avec le Parlement européen’, Communication by President Ortoli to the 
members of the Commission, 27 February 1975.
Nor did Jacques Delors, another former MEP, break 
with this tradition. His opening speech hoped for 
‘frank dialogue’ between the Commission and the 
Parliament and underlined the importance which 
he attached to the presentation of the new Com-
mission to the Strasbourg Assembly: ‘This act be-
fore the representatives of the citizen’s Europe goes 
hand in hand with the individual act of loyalty per-
formed by each commissioner before the Court of 
Justice as symbolising the Community as an entity 
in law.’ His Commission would, he promised, be 
‘a driving force and a generator of proposals’. But 
in the process ‘[i]t will respond to the appeals and 
hopes of those of you in this Parliament who keep 
the European flame alive. It will do so by giving ser-
ious consideration to your resolutions, opinions and 
pronouncements and helping to make the essential 
leap forward which will widen our horizons and re-
inforce our action’ (1).
This enthusiasm for good relations between the 
Commission and the Parliament, and for the latter 
to gain in power, made logical sense. In an era when 
the European  Community as a whole was placing 
ever greater emphasis on the importance of democ-
racy — as a fundamental value of the Community, 
as a norm to be expected of all would-be members 
and as a cause to be promoted — it became vital for 
the Commission to be able to highlight the extent 
to which it too was subject to democratic control. 
It is no coincidence that the phrase ‘democratic 
deficit’ was first coined in the late 1970s by David 
Marquand, a British  academic who had briefly 
served in the Jenkins Commission as a special ad-
viser responsible for relations between the Commis-
sion and the European Parliament (2). As someone 
who had worked at the interface between Brussels 
and Strasbourg, Marquand would have been well 
aware of both Commission sensitivity on this issue 
(1) HAEC, Archive of speeches, Speech by Jacques Delors to the European 
Parliament, 14 January 1985.
(2) Marquand, D., Parliament for Europe, Jonathan Cape, London 1979, p. 64 
et seq.
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at Parliamentary question time. In response, the 
Commission had to give an undertaking that a 
greater number of its members would be present in 
Strasbourg, that absences from the Parliament 
would be kept to the strict minimum and that ei-
ther Jenkins himself or Ortoli, his predecessor and 
vice-president, would always be there for question 
time (2). Commission representation at Parliamen-
tary committees was also irregular, despite these 
being held in Brussels rather than Strasbourg. Nor 
were all commissioners entirely comfortable even 
when they were present. Ortoli had little back-
ground as a Parliamentary operator, having spent 
most of his career prior to his arrival at the 
Commission as an official rather than a politician. 
(2) HAEC, COM(78) Minutes No 473, second part, meeting of 10 May 1978.
Frequent attendance at the Parliament was an un-
welcome additional duty in the already busy time-
tables of most commissioners, made more onerous 
still by the poor transport links between Brussels 
and the Alsatian capital. As noted by one of the 
briefing notes prepared for Jenkins in advance of a 
Commission meeting due to discuss how frequent-
ly Commissioners could be expected to be in Stras-
bourg, ‘many of them [your colleagues] find Parlia-
ment a bore … ’ (1). Partly as a result, the attendance 
record of Commissioners at plenary sessions was 
far from total, a nadir being reached in May 1978 
when MEPs formally complained about the ab-
sence of several of the commissioners whose exper-
tise was needed to answer many of the points raised 
(1) HAEC, BAC 39/1986/758, Hayden Phillips brief for Jenkins, undated 
(but clearly circa June 1977).
President Ortoli talking to the French MEP Georges Spénale in June 1976.
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ing extensive correspondence between Jenkins and 
EP presidents Emilio Colombo and then Simone 
Veil (4). By 1979, moreover, it had been flanked by 
another, rather more embarrassing, argument in-
volving the Jenkins Commission and the European 
Parliament, this time centred on commissioners’ 
expenses. Triggered by British press revelations 
about the extravagance of External Affairs Com-
missioner Wilhelm Haferkamp’s trip to China in 
October 1978, the expenses scandal ultimately had 
few lasting effects (5). But the way in which it was 
allowed to trouble Commission–Parliament rela-
tions, despite the apparent determination of the 
Jenkins Commission to maintain a cooperative 
relationship, underlined that there was nothing 
automatic about harmonious Brussels–Strasbourg 
relations.
This underlying reality was to become even more 
apparent from 1979 onwards when the new, dir-
ectly elected Parliament decided to resort to the 
budgetary weapon in its efforts to win additional 
powers  (6). Strasbourg’s main target in this dis-
pute was not of course the European Commission 
itself, but rather the Council of Ministers, which 
had the final say in all budgetary matters, and still 
more the Member States themselves. It was only 
through a collective decision by the latter, after all, 
that the elected but still comparatively powerless 
Parliament could be granted the new powers that 
it believed it deserved. But the principal victim of 
this trial of strength between the parliamentar-
ians and the national governments was the Com-
mission, whose programmes and administration 
were directly affected by delays, both threatened 
and real, to institutional agreement on the budget. 
Both Jenkins and Thorn tried hard to make clear 
(4) HAEC, BAC 9/1986/102, Multiple documents.
(5) Jenkins, R., European Diary, 1977–81, Collins, London, 1989, pp. 373–
374, 396–397, 399–400, 411 and 427–428.
(6) See Chapter 11, ‘The politics of the Community budget’.
Jenkins, who had been a highly effective Parlia-
mentary speaker and debater within a British con-
text, was quite open about how alien and uncom-
fortable he initially felt the European Parliament to 
be. ‘The Parliament is not really a rewarding body 
to which to speak. There is of course the linguistic 
difficulty and the fact that the Chamber is often 
pretty empty … and these difficulties are com-
pounded by the extraordinary proliferation of the 
photographic industry in Strasbourg, so that not 
only are you liable to have moving television camer-
as producing film that is hardly ever used, but you 
also have flashlight photographers who come and 
photograph you the whole time you are on your feet 
— and even when you are not’ (1). The unpublished 
draft of the Commission president’s diary also in-
cluded the additional concluding line: ‘God knows 
what is done with them [all these photographs] un-
less there is an acute demand in Greenland for 
photographs of the Danish commissioner’  (2). 
David Marquand has confirmed Jenkins’s ongoing 
frustrations with dealing with the Parliament and 
disappointment at its failure to live up to his initial, 
unrealistic expectations (3).
There was also a long-running dispute between the 
Commission and the European  Parliament about 
the flow of information between Brussels and 
Strasbourg. At issue was the level of information 
that the Commission could be expected to provide 
to the assembly about its response to Parliamentary 
votes and resolutions. The Commission was ready 
to accede to Parliament’s initial request and sup-
ply this information in writing rather than merely 
briefing orally. But it drew the line at translating a 
detailed monthly account of what had happened in 
response to each Parliamentary resolution into all 
six working languages of the EP. The affair hence 
rumbled on from 1977 right up until 1980, involv-
(1) Jenkins, R. European Diary, 1977–81, Collins, London, 1989, p. 63.
(2) Manuscript copy of the European Diary, Jenkins papers, East Hendred (ac-
cessed by kind permission of Lady Jenkins), p. 78.
(3) Interview with David Marquand, 7 June 2011.
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your election by direct universal suffrage, recur-
ring quarrels of form and substance have strained 
relations between our two institutions. The same 
point was made at the recent European Council in 
Luxembourg, which deplored the permanent state 
of interinstitutional strife. The new Commission’s 
first concern, therefore, was to get to grips with this 
problem. We did so at an informal meeting held be-
fore we actually took up office’ (2).
(2) HAEC, Archive of speeches, Speech by Gaston Thorn to the European 
Parliament, 12 January 1981.
their sympathies for Parliament’s basic position (1). 
It was, however, undeniably the case that the re-
current budgetary squabbles helped aggravate the 
climate of interinstitutional disagreement that the 
former Luxembourgish prime minister denounced 
upon becoming Commission president but proved 
unable fully to resolve: ‘I am struck by the fact 
that in recent years, and more particularly since 
(1) Jenkins, R., European Diary, 1977–81, Collins, London, 1989, p. 537. For 
Gaston Thorn’s position, see for example his first speech to the European 
Parliament as President of the European Commission, 12 January 1981.
Gaston Thorn and Piet Dankert, President of the European Parliament, are all smiles in 1982.  But relations between the 
two institutions were not always easy during the early 1980s.
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mission were eager to change but were prevented 
from doing by the lack of consensus amongst the 
Member States. It would ignore, moreover, the 
wide variety of efforts that the Ortoli, Jenkins, 
Thorn and Delors Commissions would make to 
improve links with the Parliament. These began in 
1973 with the decision to create a specific Commis-
sion portfolio for relations with the European Par-
liament, a responsibility initially given to the Ital-
ian commissioner and vice-president, Carlo 
Scarascia Mugnozza. This post, not intended to 
absolve other members of the Commission from 
their responsibilities vis-à-vis Strasbourg, was in-
stead designed to ensure that there was one person 
who had an oversight of the Commission’s interac-
tion with the Parliament and had the duty to high-
light any changes that needed to be made. Once 
This interinstitutional tension would be thrown 
most sharply into relief in 1979 and again in 1984 
when the Parliament refused to approve the 
Community’s draft budget and threatened the 
Commission with a vote of censure. It would hence 
only be at the very end of the period covered by this 
volume, when the Parliament did acquire substan-
tial new powers through the Single European Act, 
that a fully harmonious relationship between 
Strasbourg and Brussels would, temporarily, be 
regained.
To dwell exclusively on the difficulties of the rela-
tionship would be unfair, however, especially as the 
single biggest source of mutual frustration was an 
overall institutional balance within the European 
Community that both the Parliament and Com-
Leo Tindemans, the Council president, Piet Dankert and Gaston Thorn toast the June 1982 agreement on the budget. Their relief indicates 
how problematic the issue had become.
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the 1975 reforms that brought into existence the 
Court of Auditors and increased the oversight cap-
acities of the Parliament in budgetary affairs. It 
also undertook to make maximum use of the new 
concertation procedure introduced as part of these 
reforms (1). Roy Jenkins threw his weight behind 
the Parliament’s efforts to hold both the Council 
of Ministers and the European  Council to ac-
count, telling an informal meeting of the EC for-
eign ministers of his belief that both the Council 
president and the head of state or government pre-
siding over each European Council meeting should 
be ready to report regularly to the Parliament. 
When the French foreign minister objected, not-
ing that there was nothing about this in the Treaty 
of Rome, Jenkins retorted by pointing out that 
(1) HAEC, BAC 39/1986/758, SI(76) 133/3, 20 February 1976.
created, this position would endure for the whole of 
the 1973–86 period, being held successively by 
Richard Burke, Lorenzo Natali, Frans Andriessen 
and Grigoris Varfis. Also important in facilitating 
dialogue between the institutions was the continu-
ation, throughout the period covered by this vol-
ume, of the tradition of holding Commission meet-
ings in Strasbourg rather than in Brussels whenever 
the Parliament was in plenary session. This did not 
entirely eliminate the problems connected with 
commissioners’ attendance at Parliament debates 
— hence the difficulties noted above — but it did 
make it substantially easier for commissioners to be 
present at the major EP events and to build strong 
links with the key parliamentarians.
The Commission also made clear its backing for 
Parliament’s long-running campaign to acquire 
new powers. Ortoli’s Commission thus welcomed 
A major step towards direct elections: Parliament adopts the Patijn report in January 1975.
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break  the institutional impasse afflicting the 
Community, praised the Parliament for its ‘more 
daring … approach’ (2). And it would be Delors, of 
course, who would ultimately have an important 
hand in taking the first substantial step towards 
the granting of new powers to Strasbourg with his 
efforts to ensure that the 1985 relaunch included 
(2) HAEC, Speech archives, Speech by Jacques Delors to the European 
Parliament, 14 January 1985.
A 1977 demonstration in front of the Berlaymont calling both for direct elections and a single currency.
there was nothing about the European Council in 
the Treaty of Rome either (1). Both Gaston Thorn 
and Jacques Delors were complimentary about the 
draft treaty on European Union drawn up by 
the  European Parliament in February 1984. De-
lors, reviewing all of the various efforts made to 
(1) Roy Jenkins’s cabinet papers, All Souls College, Oxford (accessed by kind 
permission of Crispin Tickell),  record of informal meeting of foreign min-
isters, Echternach, 25 October 1980.
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universal suffrage has twofold significance: it is the 
first step towards European union and it repre-
sents a decisive choice in favour of a new institu-
tional balance based on democratisation. Direct 
elections to Parliament will naturally lead to ques-
tions about the strengthening of its powers, espe-
cially its legislative and budgetary powers. These 
questions will be answered in the context of Euro-
pean Union’ (4). 
As a result, both the Ortoli and Jenkins Commis-
sions mounted an energetic campaign in support 
of the rapid implementation of the Paris decision. 
Ortoli told the Strasbourg Assembly of his view 
that, with the commitment to hold direct elections, 
‘Europe had made a decisive choice on the road to 
democracy … To set to work on the Europe of to-
morrow by introducing democratic machinery is 
beyond doubt the most effective way of tackling the 
construction of Europe. The thrusting dynamism 
thus engendered is bound to play — and I believe 
(4) HAEC, BAC 36/1984, Memo on ‘Élection du Parlement européen au suf-
frage universel direct’ for the press conférence of President Ortoli, 11 July 
1975.
An end to European conflict? The Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung cartoonist takes a positive 
view of the first direct elections.
institutional reform as well as the setting of the 
single market target. Neither he nor Parliament it-
self was entirely happy with the resulting Single 
European Act, fearing that it might not go far 
enough in altering the Community’s institutional 
balance (1). But such was the subsequent impact of 
the 1986 treaty change that Delors, with hind-
sight, would identify it as his favourite European 
treaty (2).
Perhaps the single most revealing strand of shared 
Commission and Parliamentary enthusiasm, 
though, was their joint efforts to push for and then 
implement direct elections to the Strasbourg As-
sembly. Commission support for this idea stretched 
back beyond the period covered by this volume. 
The writings of Walter Hallstein, the first presi-
dent of the European Commission, for instance, 
make quite clear that this was a step that he strong-
ly supported, and Jean Rey, the second president, 
would also distinguish himself as an enthusiastic 
backer of this advance  (3). But faced with total 
deadlock on the issue among the Member States, 
there was little that the Commission could actual-
ly do to further this cause. It would thus only be 
with the favourable decision on the principle of 
direct elections taken by the Nine at the Paris 
Summit of December 1974 that Commission en-
thusiasm could begin to have a concrete effect. A 
document dating from the following summer 
underlined the Commission’s determination to see 
the timetable towards direct elections adhered to 
and set out clearly why the Commission had so fa-
vourable a view of this development: ‘The Com-
mission believes that the commitment made by the 
heads of government in Paris last December con-
cerning elections to the European Parliament by 
(1) HAEC, Speech archives, Speech by Jacques Delors to the European 
Parliament on 11 December 1985, during the debates which took place be-
tween 9 and 13 December 1985.
(2) CVCE, Interview with Jacques Delors, Paris, 16 December 2009. 
(3) EC Commission, Third General Report on the Activities of the Communities 
1969, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Lux-
embourg, 1970, Annex, p. 520.
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had been set aside in the Community budget for 
this purpose (2). These were employed largely for a 
non-partisan information campaign designed to 
familiarise the European public with the prospect 
of direct elections and to provide them with factual 
information that would help them make their party 
political choice.
The June 1979 direct elections did therefore consti-
tute a major milestone for the Commission as well 
as for the Parliament itself. Internal discussions 
had made it quite clear that the Commission recog-
nised that it would have to play greater heed to the 
new Parliament than it had done in the past, that it 
would have to make greater efforts to consult Stras-
bourg and that it would have to improve its proce-
dures so as to be more responsive to Parliamentary 
(2) HAEC, BAC 39/1986/728 and BAC 39/1986/750.
will continue to play — an extremely positive role 
in ensuring subsequent progress in the building of 
Europe by reinforcing European legitimacy, and 
at the same time giving added weight to the meas-
ures implemented in Europe’s name … ’ (1). Jenkins 
meanwhile not only pledged from the very outset of 
his Presidency to treat the Parliament as if it were 
already directly elected, but oversaw the start of 
practical preparations for the elections. The records 
of his cabinet thus contain not merely a succession 
of papers commissioned to reflect on the chan-
ges to the Community’s institutional balance that 
direct elections would bring, but also the minutes 
of a joint Commission–European Parliament li-
aison body that met from mid-1977 onwards to 
discuss how best to organise the multinational elec-
tion campaign and how to allocate the funds that 
(1) HAEC, Archive of speeches, Speech by François-Xavier Ortoli to the Euro-
pean Parliament, 14 January 1975.
Election night: Finn Olav Gundelach is one of those following the results of the first direct elections with interest.
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which the Parliament was conducting its campaign 
for new powers. Fundamentally, however, the Com-
mission was well aware that the positive implications 
of greater Parliamentary legitimacy outweighed any 
short-term inconvenience. The Commission thus 
hoped that the new Parliament would increase the 
legitimacy of the Community, ‘broaden the basis of 
popular support for the Community’s institutions 
and create a greater sense of involvement in [their] 
policies’ (3). The new Parliament might well prove a 
more awkward partner to work with and would ex-
ercise greater pressure on the Commission to play its 
full role, but its arrival constituted a real opportun-
ity to regain forward momentum in the integration 
process.
Piers Ludlow
(3) HAEC, Archive of speeches, Speech by Roy Jenkins welcoming Simone 
Veil as President of the European Parliament, 18 July 1979.
pressure and better able to respond quickly to the 
greater demands that were likely to be posed by an 
elected assembly. As Jenkins noted, the Commission 
approached the new Parliament ‘with a mixture of 
respect and apprehension’  (1). A series of adminis-
trative reforms followed, including the establish-
ment of a Parliamentary Affairs Group within the 
Commission made up of senior officials appointed 
by each commissioner  (2). It would take time, of 
course, for the Commission to adapt fully to the new 
realities. One factor, for instance, behind the Parlia-
ment’s rejection of the 1979 draft budget may have 
been the fact that some of the directorates-general 
involved were still more used to heeding the views of 
the Council of Ministers than those of Strasbourg. In 
the years that followed there would also be periodic 
frustration within the Commission at the manner in 
(1) Jenkins, R., European Diary, 1977–81, Collins, London, 1989, p. 375.
(2) HAEC, BAC 39/1986/759, SEC(79) 1163/2, 16 July 1979. See also memo 
from Émile Noël to the directors-general, SEC(79) D/11941, 23 October 
1979, in the same file.
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Chapter 11  
The politics of the Community 
budget
On one level, the Commission’s responsibility for 
drawing up and winning approval for the Com-
munity’s budget was a very unglamorous and hum-
drum task. DG  XIX, the directorate-general pri-
marily responsible for this task, was never regarded 
as a particularly exciting or high-profile part of the 
Commission. The budget portfolio, meanwhile, 
was not considered an especially desirable responsi-
bility by members of the Commission. Christopher 
Tugendhat, who held this responsibility through-
out his 8 years as commissioner, recalls that when 
he first arrived in Brussels in 1976 the job he was 
given was widely regarded as ‘boring and unimpor-
tant and small beer’ (1). Indeed, the very fact that he 
was allowed to take this portfolio as the more junior 
British commissioner at a time when the senior one, 
Roy Jenkins, held the Commission Presidency, was 
(1) Interview with Christopher Tugendhat, 17 August 2010.
a strong indication that neither his colleagues nor 
the onlooking Member States regarded the budget 
job as being of immense significance. 
On the other hand, the overall size of the Com-
munity budget, and its distribution, both between 
policy areas and between Member States, has always 
been a highly political and deeply sensitive issue, 
with major knock-on effects on the Commission’s 
capacity to pursue its multiple policy objectives. 
The budget has also been an issue regarded as being 
of great importance by all the Member States, both 
those likely to pay more into Community coffers 
than they would receive by way of Euro pean fund-
ing (net contributors) and those liable to receive 
more than they paid in (net beneficiaries). It was 
no accident that the single most serious crisis of the 
Community in the 1960s, the empty chair crisis of 
1965–66, had been triggered following a disagree-
ment between France and its partners about budg-
11
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As the 1970s began, the Commission seemed to 
have taken a major step forward in terms of budget-
ary independence. Part of the package deal conclud-
ed at the The Hague  Summit in December  1969 
was an agreement to press ahead with a system 
of Community financing that would introduce 
a substantial range of ‘own resources’ — in other 
words, revenue that would automatically accrue 
to the Community. Such own resources had long 
been a major objective of the Commission since 
they would significantly lessen the institution’s de-
pendence on money allocated to the Community 
by the Member States and could be seen as a signifi-
cant step in the direction of a more federal system. 
The way in which the Luxembourg Treaty of 1970 
put in place three different types of own resources 
deriving from customs receipts, agricultural levies 
and a cut of each Member State’s value added tax 
(VAT) was therefore seen as an important advance. 
No longer would every penny that the Commis-
sion spent come from national budgets and hence 
depend wholly on the willingness of the Member 
States to allocate money to European goals. How-
ever, as would become clear over the subsequent 
decade and a half, this beneficial change was ac-
companied by four other developments, each one 
of which would make the Commission’s budgetary 
position distinctly harder to manage.
The first factor that had the potential to complicate 
the Community’s budgetary position was the likely 
evolution of the common agricultural policy. De-
tails of how the CAP developed over the  1973–
86 period are covered in Chapter 16 of this volume. 
What mattered from the budgetary point of view, 
however, was the fact that the greater part of agri-
cultural spending was compulsory — in other words 
the amount spent on agricultural support would 
automatically rise or fall according to market condi-
tions, without either the Commission or the Mem-
ber States being able to control the exact amount 
that it cost — and that it was likely to rise substan-
tially, with no upper limit to the sums that might be 
involved. Both the precious level of independence 
etary questions and, in particular, the procedure 
for financing the common agricultural policy  (1). 
To add further to the significance of the issue, de-
cision-making over the Community budget was 
also perceived as a testing ground — if not a bat-
tle-ground — for the evolving balance of powers 
between the different Community institutions. 
The Commission thus regarded some degree of au-
tonomy in terms of income as a major step towards 
the acquisition of greater political independence, 
the Council of Ministers saw its control over Com-
munity income and Community expenditure as an 
important means of control over the Commission 
and the European Parliament believed that gaining 
some degree of ‘power of the purse’ constituted the 
most likely route to end its comparative powerless-
ness within the Community institutional system. 
Yet despite their somewhat divergent interests, the 
nature of the budgetary approval process meant that 
without agreement between the three institutions, 
the Community budget could not be agreed. 
The main focus of the chapter that follows will be 
this more political dimension of the budget. The 
exact division of the budget between different sec-
tors, and the way in which this division evolved in 
the course of the 1973–86 period, is the subject of 
the figures below. Brief mention will be made of the 
successive commissioners holding the budgetary 
portfolio. But the real interest of the subject lies in 
the way in which the budget became entangled with 
the wider political fortunes of the Community at 
multiple moments in the 1970s and 1980s. It is on 
these moments — occasions, moreover, when the 
Commission’s position was more determined by the 
views of its president or the College as a whole than 
by the commissioner nominally responsible for the 
budget — that this overview will concentrate. 
(1) Subsequently, the confrontation would turn into what is undoubtedly a 
more widely known disagreement about voting rules. But the origin of the 
conflict concerned the Community budget and the balance of the Com-
munity’s priorities in terms of agriculture and other sectors. See Ludlow, 
N. P., The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s: Negotiating the 
Gaullist Challenge, Routledge, London, 2006, pp. 49–70.
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amount into Community coffers by way of cus-
toms receipts and agricultural levies. Furthermore, 
as it had a relatively small agricultural sector, it 
was likely to receive much less in the form of CAP 
subsidies than other Member States. The entirely 
predictable result was that it would quickly be-
come one of the largest net contributors, if not the 
largest, to the EC budget. For a country whose per 
capita GNP was below the Community average by 
some margin for most of the period covered by this 
volume, that was not a very acceptable state of af-
fairs. And yet recognising the difficulty was much 
easier than solving it. To compensate the British 
would not only mean revisiting an arrangement to 
which the United Kingdom had signed up when 
joining the EC, thereby setting an awkward prece-
dent for future enlargements, but might also seem-
ingly sanction the principle of juste  retour — the 
that the Commission felt that it had attained by 
means of the own resources system and the hard-
won degree of influence over budgetary affairs 
which, as will be discussed below, the European Par-
liament had acquired, were hence highly vulnerable 
within a budget where the single largest item was 
liable to expand in a fashion that was possible nei-
ther accurately to predict nor to control.
A second underlying problem was the issue of 
the United Kingdom’s budgetary contribution. 
Even before the British entered the Community 
in 1973, it had been recognised that the planned 
system was not to their advantage. The United 
Kingdom imported much more than most Mem-
ber States from outside the Community — and 
for a variety of reasons wanted to continue to do 
so — thereby paying a disproportionately large 
Budget Commissioner Christopher Tugendhat addresses MEPs in 1980. The ongoing row over 
the British budgetary contribution made his role very testing.
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nity should  evolve  had  been softened, in their 
budgetary dimension at least, by the realisation 
that the Community budget was relatively small 
and that the fiscal position of most Member States 
was comparatively strong. From 1973 onwards, the 
onset of recession dramatically altered this posi-
tion. With government budgets under pressure 
across Europe, a rising Community budget — 
pushed upwards by the growing cost of the CAP 
if nothing else — was always likely to attract sig-
nificant criticism. For most of the 1970s and the 
first half of the 1980s, the Commission would 
hence find itself confronted in every budgetary 
discussion with an array of Member States eager to 
contain EC expenditure and each acutely aware of 
the consternation back home which would greet a 
substantial increase in the Community budget. In 
such a context, winning support for any new forms 
of European expenditure would not be easy.
During the Ortoli Commission the budget port-
folio was held by Claude Cheysson, the junior 
French commissioner. Given, however, that 
Cheysson also held the development brief, and 
for that reason gained a reputation of seldom 
being in Brussels but instead travelling extensively 
through the developing world, the relatively low 
status of the budget job was confirmed  (1). This 
did not mean, however, that the Ortoli years were 
uneventful from a budgetary point of view. Rather 
the reverse, indeed, since the period not only saw 
a first round of argument over the British budget-
ary contribution, but also involved a further treaty 
change. Such high political matters, however, were 
likely to be handled by the Commission as a whole, 
or by the president and his advisers, rather than 
falling primarily to whoever held official responsi-
bility for budgetary matters.
(1) The intensity of Cheysson’s travel schedule was confirmed by a contem-
porary joke: ‘What’s  the difference between God and Cheysson? God 
is everywhere, Cheysson is everywhere except  Brussels.’ Interview with 
Hayden Phillips, 2 February 2011.
idea that each country should obtain monetary 
support from the Community in proportion to 
the amount that it had put into the EC budget. 
This was an idea strongly opposed by most Mem-
ber States and by the European Commission. An 
impasse had hence been created that would prove 
extremely hard to break.
A third potential complication facing the Com-
mission as it sought to use its powers to shape the 
Community budget was the new power in budget-
ary matters acquired by the European Parliament 
— another result of the Luxembourg Treaty of 
1970. At the level of general principle, the Com-
mission was in favour of this development; greater 
EP scrutiny was seen as an appropriate corollary 
to the Commission’s greater financial independ-
ence. But in practice, working with a new and 
more assertive Parliament would not always be 
easy, especially as the MEPs were clearly intent 
on using their limited budgetary authority as le-
verage in their quest to obtain further powers and 
influence in other areas of Community activity. 
Furthermore, the 1970 agreement had also given 
the Parliament the right to flank Commission ex-
penditure proposals with their own suggestions for 
non-compulsory expenditure. Such parliamentary 
spending priorities would not necessarily fit easily 
with those of the Commission. As a result,  both 
the Jenkins and  Thorn Commissions would have 
distinctly more choppy relations with the Euro-
pean Parliament over budgetary issues than previ-
ous Commissions.
The final factor which would make the Commu-
nity budget much harder to agree during the 
1973–86 period than had been the case previous-
ly was the general economic downturn that was 
to afflict Europe from 1973 onwards. Budgetary 
negoti ations have always been hard fought and 
sensitive affairs, regardless of the economic cli-
mate. But for most of the Community’s formative 
period, the clashes between different national in-
terests and different visions of how the Commu-
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a number of conditions that would ensure that it 
never proved effective. So eager, however, was Har-
old Wilson to wrap up the renegotiation, so as to 
be able to proclaim it a success in the run-up to the 
1975 United Kingdom referendum on EEC mem-
bership, that the ineffectiveness was overlooked. 
The issue dropped off the radar for a few years — 
helped by the transitional arrangements that meant 
that the United Kingdom was still not paying in as 
much as would otherwise have been the case, and 
by a temporary slowing of the rise in CAP expend-
iture — but as would become clear under the next 
two Commission Presidencies, the underlying dif-
ficulties had not been resolved.
Another development of importance during the 
Ortoli period was a further revision of the treaty 
rules on budgetary matters. The 1975 Brussels 
Treaty was a logical follow-up to the Luxembourg 
Treaty signed 5 years earlier. Had the Commis-
sion’s original proposals been accepted, they would 
have introduced new provisions for raising the ceil-
ing on Community expenditure, permitted the 
Community as a whole to raise loans and increased 
the scrutiny powers of the European Parliament. 
In the event, however, only this last aspect of the 
Commission’s draft won sufficient approval from 
the Member States. The treaty also increased the 
level of budgetary control by creating an independ-
ent Court of Auditors. Both of these developments 
would create difficulties for the Commission in the 
years ahead.
The Jenkins years saw the coming together of all 
four of the underlying problems affecting the 
budgetary process. The ructions over the ques-
tion of the British budgetary contribution, which 
would so disrupt both the latter half of the Jenkins 
Presidency and almost all of the time that Thorn 
was Commission president, are of course closely 
associated with the new and abrasive approach to 
the United Kingdom’s European policy shown by 
Margaret Thatcher once she became prime minis-
ter in 1979. The new British leader certainly affect-
The context in which the tricky issue of the British 
budgetary contribution first arose was the renego-
tiation of the United Kingdom’s terms of accession 
demanded by Harold Wilson’s Labour government 
in 1974. Often viewed as a somewhat farcical ex-
ercise that produced little real change, the re-
negotiation did permit a first serious attempt by the 
Commission to discuss the problem of the United 
Kingdom’s contribution. Asked by the Council to 
investigate the issue, the Commission established a 
high-level working group, somewhat coyly entitled 
Groupe  d’études économiques et financières dans 
la Communauté élargie  (GEEF), in June 1974 (1). 
The sensitivity of the issue was underlined by the 
committee’s membership: chaired by Ortoli’s head 
of cabinet, Philippe de Margerie, and with a fur-
ther member of the same cabinet, Denis Gautier- 
Sauvagnac, nominated as rapporteur, the group 
also included Émile Noël, Ugo Mosca, the direct-
or-general of DG  II, Franz Froschmaier, the head 
of cabinet to Wilhelm Haferkamp, and, crucially, 
Richard Hay, a member of Christopher Soames’s 
cabinet and a former Treasury official. As he ac-
knowledged in an interview, his function was in 
part at least to ensure a channel of communication 
both with the British commissioners, who were 
otherwise kept at arm’s length from proceedings, 
and with his erstwhile colleagues back in Lon-
don  (2). The work of this group then fed through 
into the production of a paper that the Commis-
sion submitted to the Council in early 1975  (3). 
The paper largely confirmed that the issue was real, 
albeit one the exact extent of which was impossible 
accurately to predict, and outlined a first attempt 
at a solution. Unfortunately, from a British point 
of view, the corrective mechanism proposed by the 
Commission and agreed upon at the Dublin Euro-
pean Council meeting in 1975 was made subject to 
(1) HAEC, BAC 36/1984/107, Cabinet files of President Ortoli, ‘Compte-ren-
du par Denis Gautier-Sauvagnac de la première réunion du Groupe 
d’études économiques et financières dans la Communauté élargie’ (GEEF), 
5 June 1974. 
(2) Interview with Richard Hay, 17 August 2010.
(3) HAEC, COM(75) 40, 30 January 1975.
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of  account in 1976, the final year of the Orto-
li Presi dency, but by 1980, Jenkins’s final year in 
Brussels, it had more than doubled to 11 291.9 mil-
lion (3). This seriously worsened the British budget-
ary predicament. The general backdrop of recession 
and budgetary retrenchment ruled out any hope of 
resolving the question of the British budget contri-
bution by means of increasing total Community 
expenditure and flanking the CAP, out of which 
the British did not do well, with other types of ex-
penditure from which the United Kingdom might 
benefit more. This possibility had been extensively 
discussed in the early stages of British membership 
and was at least one reason for the government of 
Edward Heath’s enthusiasm for a Community re-
gional policy. But by the end of the decade, it was 
no longer politically feasible to resolve the British 
problem in this fashion. Some form of redistri-
(3) See Figure 1.
ed the style and the manner of the confrontation. 
But the fundamental question of how to rectify 
a problem that the British had been complaining 
about ever since they joined would have had to 
have been confronted by whoever was prime min-
ister as the 1970s came to an end, since 1979 saw 
the termination of the various transitional arrange-
ments which had lessened the amount that the new 
Member State had to contribute. James Callaghan 
had raised the issue with Jenkins before he lost the 
general election and would have been compelled to 
pursue it had he been re-elected (2). Also aggravat-
ing matters was the sharp rise in CAP expenditure. 
Spending on the European Agricultural Guarantee 
and Guidance Fund had been 5 587.1 million units 
(1) In the book by Daniel Strasser, the different units of account (MUA = mil-
lion units of account; MEUA  =  million European units of account; 
MECU  =  million European currency units) are used without being up-
dated, in order to ensure consistency with the financial documents prepared 
every year by the Community institutions.
(2) Jenkins, R., A Life at the Centre, Macmillan, London, 1991, p. 492.
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Figure 1 — CAP expenditure and total expressed in MUA (1973–77), MEUA (1978–80) and 
MECU (1981–86) (1)
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carried the day, and the British foreign secretary, 
Peter Carrington, who accepted the arrangement 
and was able to sell it, not without difficulty, to his 
reluctant prime minister. In essence what had been 
agreed was a mechanism to cap the British contri-
butions for  1980 and  1981 at a level substantially 
lower than they would otherwise have been, and to 
provide a formula by which these costs would in-
stead be borne by the other Member States. In the 
meantime the Commission was given a  ‘mandate’ 
to search for a more durable solution to the prob-
lem. In other words, the May 1980 deal was not a 
solution that altered the fundamentals of the dis-
pute. Crispin Tickell, Jenkins’s head of cabinet, de-
scribed the arrangement as ‘a 2-year truce’ (5). Re-
sponsibility for finding a longer-lasting settlement 
would now fall to the Thorn Commission.
The Jenkins years were also marked by a new level of 
interinstitutional tension over the budget. The first, 
and less important, manifestation of this was the row 
that broke out between the Commission and the EP 
over the Commission’s ‘extravagant’ expenses. Also 
involved was the recently created Court of Audi-
tors, which produced a critical report in July 1979. 
The latter provoked another round of embarrassing 
press stories and obliged Jenkins himself to defend 
the Commission’s behaviour before the Parlia-
ment (6). Ultimately, the furore died down with few 
lasting consequences. But a warning shot had been 
fired about the EP’s readiness to use its oversight 
powers. It was thus not a total surprise when later 
that year a much more serious dispute broke out be-
tween the Parliament, the Council of Ministers and 
the Commission over the EC budget — a row that 
would culminate in the Parliament’s rejection of the 
draft budget on 13 December 1979 (7). This was to 
prove the first of a succession of bruising encounters 
(5) Crispin Tickell papers, All Souls College, Oxford, file 20, ‘Settlement of 
the British budgetary issue reached at the General Affairs Council of 29 and 
30 May 1980’, Tickell note, 29 July 1980.
(6) Jenkins, R., European Diary, 1977–81, Collins, London, 1989, pp. 373–374, 
508.
(7) Ibid., pp. 537–540.
bution within the existing budgetary parameters 
would have to be found instead.
Commission expertise and mediation would be 
fundamental to any solution of this sort. But pro-
viding such advice would not be easy. For a start, 
handling such a delicate affair would be particular-
ly problematic for a Commission led by a Briton. 
Jenkins himself acknowledged this difficulty: ‘at 
the end of 1979 and in 1980 … I could be accused 
of playing a British hand and putting my full force 
and attention behind it. I believed that this was in 
the general European interest, but I doubt if this 
view of my motives was taken in Paris, and perhaps 
not in some of the other capitals either. I noticed a 
strain in my relations even with the Belgian gov-
ernment, and with some Commission colleagues 
too’  (1).   The fact that the budgetary portfolio 
was held by the other British commissioner made 
matters more awkward still. In the event, how-
ever, the Commission was able to play a major role 
in finding a temporary solution to the issue of the 
British budget contribution. First it submitted a 
paper to the Council in September 1979 confirm-
ing that there was indeed a problem (2). A month 
later, and again on the eve of the Dublin Summit 
in late November, it outlined a number of possible 
solutions  (3). Then, in the light of the bitter ex-
changes about the subject at the European Council 
meeting, it submitted two further communications 
on the issue in the first months of 1980 (4). And fi-
nally, both Jenkins himself and Émile Noël played 
important roles in the marathon General Affairs 
Council meeting on 29 and 30  May where a deal 
was finally struck, although credit for the break-
through should also be shared with Emilio Colom-
bo, the Italian foreign minister, who ably chaired 
the discussions, the German state secretary, Klaus 
von Dohnanyi, whose compromise solution finally 
(1) Jenkins, R., A Life at the Centre, Macmillan, London, 1991, p. 492.
(2) HAEC, COM(79) 462 final, 12 September 1979.
(3) HAEC, COM(79) 620 final, 14 November 1979, and COM(79) 680 final, 
21 November 1979.
(4) HAEC, COM(80) 50 final and COM(80) 147 final, 20 March 1980.
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Thorn’s strategy for dealing with the budgetary 
problem was a bold one — arguably too bold. 
Conscious not only that a permanent solution 
to the British budgetary question still needed to 
be found, but also that the ceaseless rise of CAP 
expenditure threatened to overwhelm the whole 
Community budget structure, he decided to use 
the ‘mandate’ that the Commission had been 
given to propose a complete overhaul of Com-
munity revenue and expenditure. As he told the 
European Parliament when presenting his Com-
mission’s work programme for his first year in of-
fice, ‘I  cannot accept it as an article of faith that 
the current ceiling on budgetary resources is sacro-
sanct’ (2). On 24 June 1981, he thus presented the 
European Council with a comprehensive package 
of measures, designed to break the impasse. These 
included plans to stimulate the European market 
and promote the free movement of labour, ideas to 
contain the growth in CAP spending, an increase 
in expenditure in both social and regional policy, 
and an additional budgetary transfer to the United 
Kingdom designed to address the British budgetary 
anomaly. All of this would have implied the end to 
the Community’s self-imposed ceiling for the EC 
budget of 1 % of total GNP (3).
Unfortunately, few of the Member States reacted 
favourably to the Commission president’s propos-
als. The success of a package deal within a Euro-
pean context depends upon each of the Member 
States deciding that the positive aspects of the plan 
outweigh the negative ones. In this instance, how-
ever, the reverse appears to have occurred, with al-
most all of the Ten able to fasten on to some facet of 
the proposal that they disliked. Rather than break-
ing the deadlock, Thorn’s gambit had deepened it. 
(2) HAEC, Archive of speeches, ‘Presentation of the General Report for 1980 
and programme of the Commission for 1981’, Address by Gaston Thorn, 
President of the Commission of the European Communities, to the Euro-
pean Parliament, Luxembourg, 11 February 1981.
(3) Schwabe, K., ‘Gaston Thorn’ in Harst, J. (van der) and Voerman, G. (eds), 
The Presidents of the European Commission: From Hallstein to Barroso, John 
Harper, London, 2014 (forthcoming).
between the new, directly elected Parliament and 
the other Community institutions over the budget-
ary process.
The ongoing sensitivity of the budgetary issue was 
apparent from the very start of the Thorn Presi-
dency, with the question of who should hold the rel-
evant portfolio becoming the most fraught issue of a 
famously difficult and lengthy ‘night of the long 
knives’. According to press reports, Thatcher herself 
personally intervened with the Commission presi-
dent to thwart his attempt to divide the job and 
place special responsibility for overseeing a restruc-
turing of the budget with Michael O’Kennedy — 
the Irish commissioner — rather than with Chris-
topher Tugendhat (1). This battle would set the tone 
for a 4-year period in the course of which the dis-
pute over how the EC should be financed would be-
come the single most divisive issue on the Commu-
nity’s agenda.
(1) The Financial Times, 9 January 1981.
In December 1979, President Jenkins became the first 
Commission president to see the draft of the budget rejected 
by the newly directly elected European Parliament.
251Chapter 11 — The politics of the Community budget 
The budgetary deadlock had a debilitating effect on 
the rest of the Thorn Presidency. This was perhaps 
most evident at European Council level, where suc-
cessive meetings were dominated by the increasing-
ly ill-tempered dispute. The Athens Council of De-
cember 1983 represented a nadir, with widespread 
talk of a Community crisis  (2). But relations be-
tween Thorn and his fellow European Council 
members were also strained to near breaking point. 
(2) ‘Athens European Council, 4–6 December: no communiqué or decision’, 
HAEC, BAC 81/1984/13, note BIO (83) 510, EC press release, 6 Decem-
ber 1983. ‘Despite intense preparations during the 6 months between the 
Stuttgart and Athens European Councils, the 10 heads of state or govern-
ment, meeting in Athens on 4 December, broke up 2 days later without 
achieving any progress on any of the Community’s vital problems. They 
failed to reconcile their differences over the reform of the common agricul-
tural policy, thus stalemating any possibility of decision on revitalising the 
Community and the accession of Spain and Portugal.’
True, the plan had not been rejected out of hand, 
with the European Council deciding to set up a 
committee to suggest ways in which the scheme 
could be modified. But when even a much- 
modified version of the Commission’s plan was 
unable to win the backing of the London European 
Council in November  1981, Thorn’s prospects of 
settling the budgetary dispute seemed to have 
failed. Furthermore, the new president’s credibility 
as a source of a viable solution had been seriously 
damaged in the process (1).
(1) Schwabe, K., ‘Gaston Thorn’, in Harst, J. (van der) and Voerman, G. (eds), 
The Presidents of the European Commission: From Hallstein to Barroso, John 
Harper, London, 2014 (forthcoming).
An increase in the percentage of VAT receipts going to the EEC was seen as part of the solution to the budgetary problems. 
Reaching agreement on this was not easy.
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British commissioner (2). Equally seriously, the an-
nual budgetary discussions between the institu-
tions became so acrimonious that in June 1982 the 
three presidents — Gaston Thorn, Piet Dankert 
and Leo Tindemans — had to sign a ‘treaty’ stipu-
lating exactly which categories of expenditure the 
Parliament was entitled to modify, and which by 
contrast remained untouchable (3). 
Even after this apparent breakthrough, however, 
difficulties continued. In early 1983, for instance, 
MEPs objected strongly to the Commission’s pro-
posed supplementary budget, designed to transfer 
back to the United Kingdom some of its budgetary 
contributions  (4). And in 1984 there was another 
(2) Interview with Christopher Tugendhat, 17 August 2010.
(3) The Financial Times, 1 July 1982.
(4) The Financial Times, 17  January, 25  January, 27  January, 8  February and 
10 February 1983.
Presidential accord: Leo Tindemans, Piet Dankert and Gaston Thorn sign the June 1982 agreement on the Community budget.
In the aftermath of the Athens failure, the Com-
mission president denounced the intergovernmen-
tal methods that the national leaders were resorting 
to in their quest for a solution and deplored a situ-
ation in which the proposed solution advanced by 
the Commission was flanked by multiple alterna-
tive suggestions made by individual Member 
States  (1). At a less elevated level, the rapport be-
tween the Commission and the European Parlia-
ment was also adversely affected by the battle over 
the budget. Tugendhat recalls the way in which his 
dialogue with parliamentarians was hurt by 
Thatcher’s unpopularity amongst MEPs and their 
consequent sense that the best way they could hit 
back at the British prime minister and punish her 
for her perceived obstinacy was by attacking the 
(1) HAEC, Archive of speeches, Speech by Gaston Thorn, President of the 
European Commission, following a meeting of the Athens European 
Council, Strasbourg, 15 December 1983.
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The European Court of Auditors 
The European Court of Auditors has officially been 
the independent body responsible for auditing all 
of the Community’s finances since 25 October 
1977, when it began to operate. The Court of 
Auditors was established by the treaty of 22 July 
1975 and replaced the Audit Board, which had 
been responsible since 1957 for the external audit 
of EEC and EAEC finances, and the auditor of the 
ECSC. The usual practice is that the Court, based 
in Luxembourg, is composed of one member from 
each Member State, appointed by the Council 
after consultation with Parliament. Its members, 
who are generally drawn from national external 
audit institutions and appointed for a renewable 
term of 6 years, elect one of their number as 
president; the first president was Michael N. 
Murphy from Ireland. 
After every financial year the Court prepares an 
annual report on the general budget of the 
Communities. The annual report, which also 
contains the reactions by the Community 
institutions to the Court’s comments, has been 
published in the Official Journal since 1977.
Revenue 
Although at the outset the budget of the Commu-
nities was exclusively funded by financial contribu-
tions from the Member States using a distribution 
key, since the 1971 financial year it has been partly 
funded by own resources, pursuant to a Council 
decision of 21  April  1970. These amounts, which 
are collected by the Member States and then paid 
to the Communities, accounted for half of revenue 
as early as 1973 and have been increasing annual-
ly; they consist of agricultural levies in the form of 
customs duties on imports of agricultural products 
from non-member countries, levies on sugar and 
isoglucose arising also from the operation of the 
CAP and customs duties resulting from the appli-
cation of the common customs tariff to the cus-
toms value of goods imported from non-member 
countries. VAT (calculated on a harmonised base 
and levied at a maximum rate of 1 %) has been add-
ed to the revenue from these three sources since 
confrontation between the Parliament and the 
Commission, with the draft budget once again 
voted down by MEPs (1). The question of the British 
budget contribution thus blended with the continu-
ing interinstitutional wrestling match for power be-
tween the EP and the Council of Ministers and the 
ongoing struggle to contain agricultural expend-
iture to make the passage of each annual budget a 
decidedly hazardous affair.
The final solution of the British budget contribu-
tion at the Fontainebleau Summit of June  1984 
came too late for Thorn’s Commission. It would 
be his successor Jacques Delors, and not the former 
Luxembourgish prime minister, who would bene-
fit from the end of this long-running dispute. Fur-
thermore, the main architect of the eventual com-
promise would be the French Presidency, rather 
than the Commission, despite the usefulness of a 
succession of Commission background papers. The 
intergovernmental methods denounced by Thorn 
produced the breakthrough: a formula for a British 
budgetary rebate that has lasted until the present 
day. They also slightly increased the percentage of 
VAT receipts that were transferred to the Commu-
nity, temporarily lessening the shortage of overall 
funds affecting the EC. What really mattered, 
however, was the general lesson conveyed by this 
long-running affair about the need for far-reaching 
budgetary reform. EC progress would be all too 
hard to come by with so much time being lost each 
year in battles between the institutions over the 
budget. The need for what would eventually be-
come the two key components of the Delors I pack-
age of 1988 — namely the move towards multi-
annual financial perspectives and an overall raising 
of the ceiling for Community expenditure — had 
become obvious in the course of the  period be-
tween 1979 and 1986.
(1) The Financial Times, 14 December 1984.
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NB: For the trend in EAGGF guarantee expenditure, see Figure 1, p. 248.
Source: Strasser, D., The Finances of Europe, 3rd English edition, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 
Luxembourg, 1992, appendices.
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Figure 2 — Expenditure trend expressed in MUA (1973–77), MEUA (1978–80) and MECU 
(1981–86)
1979, marking an end to the contributions from 
the Member States. 
Although the own resources system was intended 
to grant the Communities greater financial inde-
pendence, it nonetheless led to much more restrict-
ed room for manoeuvre than before. The balanced 
budget, which was enshrined in Article 199 of the 
EEC Treaty, could now only be achieved by varying 
the rate of VAT, whereas under the system of contri-
butions from the Member States the total amount 
of the contributions could simply be adjusted to 
match the budgeted expenditure. 
At the beginning of the 1980s, uncontrolled agri-
cultural expenditure, the impasse caused by the 
‘British problem’ (see above for details), a fall in the 
income from own resources and the expansion of 
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Expenditure
With the exception of expenditure linked to the 
European Social Fund (ESF) and the European 
Development Fund (EDF), for which it laid down 
a specific modus operandi, the EEC Treaty did not 
include any specific provision relating to the man-
agement of the financial interventions that the 
Commu nity institutions were called on to make. 
However, the institutions’ room for manoeuvre was 
far from absolute. That was the case, for example, 
certain policies, while necessary, put an unavoid-
able strain on the Community budget, which was 
in deficit for the 1984 and 1985 financial years. The 
agreement reached at the Fontainebleau European 
Council meeting on 24 June 1985 raised the max-
imum rate of VAT to be mobilised to 1.4 %, which 
provided a temporary solution to the problem. 
However, it was thanks to the Brussels agreements 
of 11, 12 and 13 February 1988 that a lasting solu-
tion was found, i.e. a system combining financial 
contributions (based on GNP) and own resources.
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with expenditure linked to administrative  opera-
tions (staff costs, infrastructure costs,  etc.). ‘Cal-
culated in great detail and with a high degree of 
accuracy’ (1), it accounted for a minuscule share of 
total Community expenditure (approximately 5 %), 
with on average two thirds being associated with 
the Commission. 
The same applied to EAGGF ‘Guarantee’ section 
expenditure and repayment to the Member States 
of 10 % of the amounts paid as own resources. Since 
the amounts were the result of a payment obligation, 
they were set almost automatically. In the case of the 
agricultural market guarantee policy, this binding 
mechanism finally resulted in the major budgetary 
difficulties referred to above. 
The figures given above are taken from the book by 
Daniel Strasser, The Finances of Europe (2). They show 
(1) Strasser, D., The Finances of Europe, 3rd English edn, Office for Official Pub-
lications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1992, p. 155.
(2) Ibid.
clearly that the period from 1973 to 1986 was char-
acterised by a steady, widespread increase in expend-
iture. The agriculture sector is worthy of attention 
because the amount of expenditure associated with 
the EAGGF ‘Guarantee’ section accounted for some 
two thirds of all spending. It was therefore by far 
the largest budget heading. The other large budget 
‘blocks’ concerned the social and regional sectors 
(included under the heading ‘Structural Funds’; the 
ERDF was added from 1975), the energy/research/
industry/transport sector and co operation. 
It should be noted that the expenditure figures 
until 1980 relate to implementation (utilisation of 
payment appropriations). From 1981, they relate to 
adopted commitment appropriations.
Piers Ludlow 
and Pierre-Olivier Laloux
Part Four 
The Commission 
at work: policies 
and actions
In this poster, the common market was presented as an opportunity for greater consumer 
choice. Commission activity in this field was growing, notably through the actions of the 
Directorates-General for Internal Market and for Competition, which sought to remove 
non-tariff barriers to trade and to crack down on cartels impeding the distribution of 
products across the Community.
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Introduction
The years 1973–86 lay between two phases of strong 
progress: the 1960s, which saw the rapid implemen-
tation of the Treaty of Rome, and the second half 
of the 1980s, which followed on from the Single 
European Act and led to the Treaty of Maastricht. 
Consequently, the perception we have of the period 
in question suffers from the comparison with these 
two phases and it is often seen as a time of inaction 
or stalemate. The following chapters show that this 
is a short-sighted and largely unjustified view of 
things. 
The period was definitely not without its difficul-
ties. The crisis in the international monetary system 
and the energy crisis, followed by a collapse in eco-
nomic growth and a series of sectoral crises, prompt-
ed both societies and countries to adopt a defensive 
attitude, making initiatives at Community level 
more difficult to undertake: this was unavoidably 
reflected in the Commission’s activity. At the inter-
national level there was also mounting tension, in 
trade and in relations with developing countries, as 
well as in the situation in the Middle East and in 
East–West relations. However, the Commission did 
much more than simply monitor and analyse these 
new trends: fresh common policies were launched, 
older ones were revamped or reworked and a greater 
consistency of its overall action gave rise to a global 
vision of an increasingly political nature.
The Ortoli years were marked by a twofold trend: 
the lead given by the Member States at the Paris 
Summit in October 1972 called for new initiatives, 
which were made more difficult to implement by 
the crisis. A number of policies were nevertheless re-
launched or redeployed, such as social policy, trans-
port policy and development aid. Others, such as re-
gional policy and environment policy, were created. 
The second half of the 1970s saw moves to bring 
greater consistency to this range of policies. This 
was prompted by a worsening of the world econom-
ic crisis, which was by then viewed as a long-term 
phenomenon, prompting a change to an econom-
ic model essentially imported from the English- 
speaking world. However, the Commission also had 
to take account of input from the European Parlia-
ment and the Court of Justice of the European Com-
munities (CJEC). The Jenkins and Thorn years were 
thus characterised by more dynamic and consistent 
action by the Commission. Its 1978 action plan (1) 
(1) See Chapter  12, ‘Devising a strategy: the internal market and industrial 
policy’. 
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expressly linked completion of the single market 
to the renewal of economic and industrial struc-
tures, research and development policy and social 
policy. In the following years, this global vision was 
further consolidated and, at an internal level, the 
transport, energy, environment and regional pol-
icies can be considered a part of this. The same can 
be said of the development of the Commission’s ac-
tion in the international sphere: the relaunch of the 
internal market was closely linked to the reopen-
ing of multilateral trade negotiations within the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
and cooperation policy to general political consid-
erations. 
In all these areas, the Commission took full advan-
tage of its power of initiative. Where it had seemed 
for a time to be at a disadvantage in relation to the 
Member States, it took action to increase its exper-
tise and resources in order to play a greater role: 
this was the case with monetary issues and political 
cooperation. Consequently, practically all of the ac-
tions taken which were central to the renewed im-
petus of the second half of the 1980s can be traced 
back to the preceding years. The inherently political 
turning point of 1985 can only be properly under-
stood against this backdrop. 
Éric Bussière
263
Chapter 12  
Devising a strategy: the internal 
market and industrial policy
Very early on in the work of the Commission, a 
debate arose on the respective roles of the market 
and industrial policy intervention. Should market 
forces be left to operate freely? Or should funda-
mental economic trends be accompanied by flank-
ing policies, if possible at Community level? If so, 
should this mean that, under certain conditions, 
certain types of aid could be exempt from competi-
tion policy rules (1)? Over the years, the Commis-
sion’s interventions had extended into new areas, 
not always with a clear sense of direction, which 
sometimes gave the impression ‘that there was no 
(1) Bussière, É, ‘An improbable industrial policy’, in Dumoulin, M. (ed.), 
The European Commission, 1958–72 — History and Memories, Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2007, 
pp. 457–470.
policy’  (2). For instance, it tended to make fre-
quent use — too frequent, in the eyes of the busi-
ness community — of the infringement procedure 
in competition matters. A period of crisis marked 
by an economic downturn and the challenging of 
existing structures and methods forced a complete 
restart. This resulted in the signing of the Single 
European Act in 1986, which streamlined a wide 
range of policies under one overarching vision. It 
confirmed the market logic while pursuing inter-
connected and targeted policies of intervention. 
The aim was to bring about a structural shift in 
the European economy, which had become urgent 
because of external competitive pressure from the 
United States and Japan. 
(2) Interview with Étienne Davignon, 14 September 2010.
12
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Towards a new dynamic
Some elements of this new vision had their roots in 
earlier years. The 1970 Colonna memorandum had 
already tried to link the completion of the internal 
market to the pursuit of industrial policy objectives 
as a prerequisite for the emergence of global-scale 
European companies. It already listed the granting 
of aid to certain sectors and the use of national pro-
curement programmes as instruments to stimulate 
industrial restructuring. This comprehensive ap-
proach was endorsed by the Paris Summit in Oc-
tober 1972, but the action programme proposed by 
Commissioner Altiero Spinelli, adopted in Decem-
ber 1973, did not yield any concrete results. Plans 
to integrate major national industrial programmes 
under a Community umbrella, for example in the 
fields of aerospace and uranium enrichment  (1), 
came to nothing. The failure of the Unidata project 
in the IT field epitomised this impasse, which re-
vealed differences of opinion within the Commis-
sion itself and diverging interests between Member 
States  (2). The overall outcome of the mid-1970s 
was disappointing. Neo-protectionism within the 
common market itself was rife, the prevailing mood 
was in favour of renationalising economic policies 
and the global position of the European advanced- 
technology industries slipped. The Commission, 
subject to pressures from Member States and pub-
lic opinion, was not able to counteract these trends, 
particularly in crisis-hit sectors ‘where a number of 
discriminatory national policies were accepted on 
social grounds’ (3). 
When Roy Jenkins took office as Commission pres-
ident, European citizens were much more aware 
of the depth of the crisis than in 1973. As the old 
Keynesian recovery methods failed wherever they 
were tried, priority was now given to renovating in-
dustrial structures at European level and no longer 
at national level alone. This gave the Commission 
an opportunity to make a fresh start in a favour-
able intellectual climate. The vision that emerged 
after the first few years of crisis was a comprehen-
sive one. The Commission’s action programme for 
1978 brought together the relaunch of economic 
and monetary union (EMU), the completion of the 
single market and a series of structural and social 
policies under one comprehensive vision, thus strik-
ing a balance between market dynamics and target-
ed intervention (4). This new synthesis was typified 
(1) Interview with Ernesto Previdi, 12 July 2011.
(2) Griset, P., ‘Nous ne vieillirons pas ensemble. Unidata et la coopération 
industrielle franco-allemande au début des années 1970’, in Bussière, É., 
Dumoulin, M. and Schirmann, S. (eds), Milieux économiques et intégration 
européenne au XXe siècle. La crise des années 1970: De la conférence de La 
Haye à la veille de la relance des années 1980, ‘Euroclio’ collection, Vol. 35, 
PIE-Peter Lang, Brussels, 2006, pp. 287–314.
(3) Interview with Étienne Davignon, 14 September 2010.
(4) HAEC, COM(78) 52, 14 February 1978, p. 26 and annex, p. 4.
The impressive range of powers of Vice-President 
Étienne Davignon. (Published in Courrier du personnel, No 431, 
18 March 1982, p. 5.)
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by the concept of positive adjustment — granting 
aid for restructuring then a return to the market — 
which was applied in rescuing crisis-hit sectors  (1). 
Even the hardiest defenders of market liberalism 
accepted certain types of intervention, especially 
those aimed at Europeanising technology, through 
an active approach to standards  (2). Nonetheless, 
Étienne Davignon, commissioner for the internal 
market, customs union and industry from 1977 
onwards, thought this whole policy dovetailed with 
the treaty’s fundamental pragmatism: ‘We had to go 
back to a goal that we had aimed for but had failed 
to achieve’ (3). 
The organisation chart adopted by the Commis-
sion in 1977 allowed the internal market and in-
dustrial policy to be considered under one over-
arching vision, in contrast to what had existed 
since 1973. The merger of the relevant directorates- 
general (DGs) meant a return to a situation previ-
ously known to Fernand Braun, the new director- 
general, under Commissioner Guido Colonna di 
Paliano (4). It enabled the two DGs to consolidate 
their unity of vision in the handling of complex 
matters in sustained dialogue with the DGs re-
sponsible for external relations (on GATT-related 
issues), for economic and financial affairs, under 
Ortoli’s authority, and for competition. This con-
cern for coherence continued when the Thorn 
Commission took office in 1981. The internal mar-
ket portfolio changed hands from Étienne Davi-
gnon to Karl-Heinz Narjes, who was also entrusted 
with industrial innovation and the customs union, 
while Davignon was put in charge of industrial af-
fairs, energy and scientific research. Importantly, 
industrial affairs and the internal market contin-
ued to be covered by the same DG (DG III), still 
(1) Van Laer, A., ‘Quelle politique industrielle pour l’Europe? Les projets des 
Commissions Jenkins et Thorn (1977–84)’, in Bussière, É., Dumoulin, M. 
and Schirmann, S. (eds), Milieux économiques et intégration européenne au 
XXe siècle. La relance des années quatre-vingt (1979–92), CHEFF, Paris, 
2007, p. 14.
(2) Interview with Heinrich von Moltke, 8 December 2011.
(3) Interview with Étienne Davignon, 14 September 2010.
(4) Interview with Heinrich von Moltke, 8 December 2011.
led by Braun and now under the joint authority of 
Davignon and Narjes  (5). This structural continu-
ity was matched by the continuity of objectives that 
characterised this whole period: the completion of 
the internal market was the precondition for and 
key to Europe’s industrial revival, which had to be 
supported by targeted interventions. 
In the same vein as the 1978 action programme, 
the ‘Report on some structural aspects of growth’, 
published in June of the same year, stated that ‘se-
cure, unhampered access to a continental-size mar-
ket ... remains one of the main sources of impetus 
for industrial change’  (6). In October 1981, a new 
communication from the Commission, entitled ‘A 
(5) Interview with Étienne Davignon, 14 September 2010.
(6) HAEC, COM(78) 255, 22 June 1978, quoted by Van Laer, A., ‘Quelle poli-
tique industrielle pour l’Europe? Les projets des Commissions Jenkins et 
Thorn (1977–84)’, in Bussière, É., Dumoulin, M. and Schirmann, S. (eds), 
Milieux économiques et intégration européenne au XXe siècle. La relance des 
années quatre-vingt (1979–92), CHEFF, Paris, 2007, p. 14.
Cover page of the magazine 30 jours de l’Europe on the third 
industrial revolution in Europe (March 1980).
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Community strategy to develop Europe’s industry’, 
elaborated on the same comprehensive idea (1). The 
aim was to create a genuine European industrial 
space by developing a single set of standards and 
opening up public tenders. This framework would 
be used to boost investment in new technologies by 
grouping procurement orders as part of an indus-
trial  policy pursued at Community level. This 
strategy was again set forth by the Commission at 
a special Council meeting held in September 1983 
to discuss strengthening the international competi-
tiveness of European business, and was eventually 
incorporated in the economic union programme 
adopted at Fontainebleau in June 1984  (2). The 
Delors Commission programme, endorsed by the 
Council meetings in Brussels on 29 and 30 March 
1985, largely followed in the latter’s footsteps.
The internal market 
and industrial strategy
The completion of the internal market was the 
first prong of this comprehensive programme. It 
was vast in scope, dealing with the free movement 
of persons — in their professional capacity — ser-
vices and goods, but also with the legal environment 
in which businesses operated. In many respects the 
Commission’s progress had been stalling for sev-
eral years, especially in lifting technical barriers to 
the free movement of goods. The method of har-
monising national technical regulations, which 
had been applied from the very beginning, ran up 
against difficulties due to the growing complexity 
of products and the Member States using regula-
tions to neo-protectionist ends  (3). Member States 
(1) HAEC, COM(81) 639, 29 October 1981. 
(2) Van Laer, A., ‘Quelle politique industrielle pour l’Europe? Les projets des 
Commissions Jenkins et Thorn (1977–84)’, in Bussière, É., Dumoulin, M. 
and Schirmann, S. (eds), Milieux économiques et intégration européenne au 
XXe  siècle. La relance des années quatre-vingt (1979–92), CHEFF, Paris, 
2007, pp. 21–22.
(3) Interview with Michel Stavaux, 19 July 2011. 
had not been able to use customs duties since 1968 
and had replaced them with a host of non-tariff bar-
riers (technical barriers to trade) in order to limit 
imports to their domestic markets. This made the 
Commission’s task difficult. The draft directives 
resulting from harmonisation procedures run by 
dozens of working groups of national officials and 
experts were very detailed because ‘every comma had 
its history and its reason, such as protecting a local 
industry or stopping others from entering a certain 
market’. Since the final Council decision was taken 
by unanimity, ‘everybody had to be either satisfied 
or dissatisfied for there to be an agreement’ (4). The 
Commission dealt with neo-protectionist measures 
not only by appealing to reason and issuing repeat-
ed warnings, but above all by launching litigation 
procedures against several Member States at the 
same time, referred to as high-impact operations, 
and by pursuing non-contentious solutions through 
meetings with national government departments, 
known as package meetings. These actions, under-
taken with the support of the European Parliament, 
were occasionally successful but failed to reverse the 
trend. 
The well-known Cassis de Dijon judgment of the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities of 
20 February 1979 gave the Commission the lever 
to bring about a real paradigm shift. The Court 
considered that restrictions to the free movement 
of goods could be authorised only in exceptional 
cases justified by the protection of public health, 
the protection of consumers or reasons of general 
interest. It introduced the principle of the mutual 
recognition of regulations (technical rules, proce-
dures, certificates, etc.) between Member States in 
the absence of binding common rules. Under this 
principle, goods legally produced and traded in 
one Member State could be sold without any fur-
ther checks in any other. Commission departments 
drew Davignon’s attention to the potential impact 
(4) Interview with Daniele Verdiani, 3 December 2010.
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of this decision, even though some officials were 
wary of upsetting Member States. Davignon none-
theless decided to make this principle the basis of 
a new policy following a memorable speech to the 
European Parliament in Strasbourg in September 
1979 (1). A year later, the Commission adopted an 
‘interpretative communication on the consequenc-
es of the Cassis de Dijon judgment’, which allowed a 
return to the border-opening dynamic: ‘Our inter-
pretation of the Cassis de Dijon case-law consisted 
in reversing the burden of proof … This completely 
altered the approach taken by the Commission’ (2).
From then on, the Commission worked on the 
basis of the mutual recognition principle laid down 
by the Court of Justice. It abandoned the detailed 
regulations of the 1970s in favour of a new approach 
to harmonisation, limited by essential health and 
safety requirements. At the same time, it referred 
to the European technical standards issued by the 
Euro pean standardisation bodies CEN  (Euro pean 
Committee for Standardisation) and Cenelec 
(European Committee for Electrotechnical Stand-
ardisation) or, in the absence of such standards, to 
national standards (under the reference to stand-
ards procedure). In so doing, the Commission aban-
doned its previous approach aimed at creating uni-
form ‘euro products’, and favoured the preservation 
of traditional national products and, thus, national 
consumer identities. But through the work of the 
main European standardisation bodies, the Com-
mission also aimed to ‘quickly bolster European 
standardisation capabilities’, especially vis-à-vis the 
United States (3). 
The Commission’s two main political objectives 
thus came together: the creation of a single Euro-
pean market and the emergence of major industri-
(1) Interview with Daniele Verdiani, 3 December 2010; Written contribution 
by Alfonso Mattera Ricigliano, provided on 19 September 2012.
(2) Interview with Étienne Davignon, 14 September 2010.
(3) EC Commission, Eighteenth General Report on the Activities of the Euro-
pean Communities in 1984, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, Luxembourg, 1985, p. 86.
al players able to spread their standards on a glo-
bal scale, especially in the fast-moving technology 
sector. The immediate result of this new approach 
was a substantial cut in the regulatory workload: ‘a 
whole series of directives, which had been held up in 
the Council for several years without any progress 
being made, disappeared altogether’ as they had be-
come redundant  (4). In addition, the Commission 
was able to replace the highly detailed directives 
on the freedom of establishment of professional 
people and the mutual recognition of diplomas by 
a single directive of 1988 on the mutual recognition 
of higher-education diplomas for studies of at least 
3-years’ duration. The Commission also managed 
to improve its efficiency by securing Council agree-
ment to a directive on the provision of information 
about technical standards and regulations which 
allowed potential new barriers to trade to be identi-
fied and eliminated before they came into force (5). 
By mid-1984, on the basis of the progress made in 
less than a year, the Commission was able to claim 
that ‘the completion of the internal market is again 
within reach if we pursue our policy with determi-
nation’ (6). In his memoirs, Jacques Delors stressed 
that, by replacing harmonisation with the principle 
of mutual recognition, the Cassis de Dijon judgment 
enabled Objective 1992, namely an internal market 
without frontiers, to be met (7).
The choice to act on structures was also prompted 
by the experiences of the 1960s. The European level 
had to assert itself against interventionist policies 
at national level which led to distortions of com-
petition contrary to the treaty, over-investment 
and duplication. For any action to be effective, it 
(4) Interview with Étienne Davignon, 14 September 2010.
(5) EC Commission, Eighteenth General Report on the Activities of the Euro-
pean Communities in 1984, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, Luxembourg, 1985, p. 85 (Directive 83/189/EEC).
(6) Van Laer, A., ‘Quelle politique industrielle pour l’Europe? Les projets des 
Commissions Jenkins et Thorn (1977–84)’, in Bussière, É., Dumoulin, M. 
and Schirmann, S. (eds), Milieux économiques et intégration européenne au 
XXe siècle. La relance des années quatre-vingt (1979–92), CHEFF, Paris, 
2007, p. 14.
(7) Ibid.
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had to be taken at Community level, and had to 
be comprehensive: ‘when devising a policy, e.g. in 
support of the textile sector, it should include an 
external element, a social element, a competition 
element and a regional element’  (1). These areas of 
intervention were interdependent, involved direct-
orates-general with potentially different cultures 
and had to converge in dynamic compromises: ‘If 
an industry was not restructured, there would be no 
reason whatsoever for external protection. But if an 
industry was determined to restructure itself with 
the support of governments, we could protect it for 
a certain length of time’ (2).
The Commission proceeded by seeking to scale up 
certain sector-specific interventions to Community 
level. It targeted sectors affected by the crisis of the 
1970s in their very structure and existence. Thus, 
under the ‘Davignon plan’, the restructuring of the 
steel industry was gradually taken in hand from 1977 
onwards. The first task was to coordinate the appli-
cation of lower production quotas, minimum prices 
and restrictions of imports from outside Europe, all 
of which needed to include a social element. A de-
cisive step was taken when, in October  1980, the 
(1) Interview with Michel Stavaux, 19 July 2011.
(2) Interview with Daniele Verdiani, 3 December 2010.
Commission declared that there was a manifest cri-
sis within the meaning of Article 58 of the ECSC 
Treaty and imposed mandatory quotas. National 
initiatives in this area were made subject to a code on 
aid, while Community support was granted for eco-
nomic conversion. The Davignon plan was supposed 
to end in 1985 but was extended to 1988, when the 
companies were returned to the market. This type 
of action could not be undertaken without the sus-
tained involvement of the industry, which is why the 
European steel industry association (Association eu-
ropéenne de la sidérurgie, Eurofer) was set up in late 
1976 (see box, page 269–270). Similar policies were 
launched for the textile and shipbuilding industries, 
but they were less detailed as the Commission’s legal 
basis in these fields was weak. For the textile indus-
try, the Commission relied on the multifibre agree-
ments negotiated under the GATT. These allowed 
the sector to be placed under temporary protection 
while receiving several types of aid (3). In the same 
way as for the steel industry, the purpose of this aid 
was to en able companies to face up to international 
competition. It was not meant to become perma-
nent, but was aimed at ‘achieving a point where it 
would no longer be necessary’ (4).
(3) Van Laer, A., ‘Quelle politique industrielle pour l’Europe? Les projets des 
Commissions Jenkins et Thorn (1977–84)’, in Bussière, É., Dumoulin, M. 
and Schirmann, S. (Eds), Milieux économiques et intégration européenne au 
XXe siècle. La relance des années quatre-vingt (1979–92), CHEFF, Paris, 
2007, p. 16.
(4) Interview with Étienne Davignon, 14 September 2010.
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Eurofer
When the impact of the crisis in the steel industry 
started to be strongly felt, the Commission, in choosing 
to come to the rescue of the ailing sector, took care to 
avoid the errors of the past. A decade earlier, in an effort 
to tackle the first worrying signs of overproduction, the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) High 
Authority had resorted to secretly encouraging the 
establishment of a European cartel modelled on the 
International Steel Entente (EIA) of the inter-war years, 
without, however, providing the business associations 
with the support needed for success. Company heads 
had been disappointed by this lukewarm attitude and 
had turned their backs on the Community, seeking 
refuge with their respective governments. These tried, as 
best they could, to protect their industries against 
competitors within the common market through 
employment protection schemes and other hidden 
subsidies that flouted the spirit of the treaties. This 
resulted in a resurgence of national egoisms and nearly 
led to the Europe of solidarity being rendered powerless.
Aware of this danger, Henri Simonet and his successor 
Étienne Davignon did not want to repeat these errors. In 
order to avoid a complete free-for-all between the nine 
national producer groups, within these groups and 
between group member companies and outsiders, they 
set out to involve the corporate world as closely as 
possible in the restructuring effort (1). To that end, the 
steel industry club (Club des sidérurgistes), tainted with 
the image of a secret society representing big capital, 
was asked to reform itself in order to act as single 
spokesman for the main steel producers in the 
European Economic Community in their contacts with 
the Commission and its DG for Industry. The revamp 
was completed on 9 December 1976, when the articles 
of incorporation were finalised. Like the EIA before it, 
the not-for-profit association chose to have its 
headquarters in Luxembourg. However, since the new 
body dealt with Commission departments on a daily 
basis, it was not long before it decided to establish its 
secretariat-general in the Belgian capital.
The governance and oversight of Eurofer’s activities was 
conducted by a board of 19 directors, chaired by one 
member elected for a standard 2-year term. Day-to-day 
business was handled by a team of some 20 full-time 
staff members divided into four directorates, which 
became six from mid-1979 onwards. In carrying out their 
tasks, they were assisted and guided by some 
(1) Interview with Giacomo Giacomello, 6 October 2010.
15 standing committees, which led lives of their own 
within Eurofer. These were convened on both a regular 
and an ad hoc basis to discuss any topic on which the 
steel industry might act collectively (external relations, 
general objectives, social issues, transport, scrap, etc.). In 
addition, working groups of Eurofer and Commission 
experts prepared files to be discussed at ECSC 
Consultative Committee meetings or during contacts 
between national producer groups’ chairpersons and 
Davignon.
The actual anti-crisis policy, notably the setting of sales 
prices and the establishment of quarterly production 
programmes, came under the remit of the steering 
committee, which was composed of the ‘sales managers 
of all participating companies at the most senior 
level’ (2). The committee collected and collated all useful 
sales and order data sent to it by half a dozen 
subcommittees working on each of the individual 
products covered by the Eurofer agreements (long 
products, wire rods, coils, mining sheet metal, etc.). On 
(2) Luxembourg steel grouping, crisis management agreement in force 
from 1 January 1981.
Commissioner Étienne Davignon faced with the steel crisis 
in Europe (March 1979).
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although the steel industry was not always candid with 
its interlocutors in Brussels, who in the same way 
continued to distrust factory bosses during the 1970s 
and 1980s. According to Maurice Schaeffer, the director 
responsible for steel in DG III, ‘the Commission wanted 
to uphold its independence from the industry’. This 
even meant that ‘while Davignon was receiving 
suggestions from Eurofer, which were often well 
founded’, he and his aides ‘were also carrying out 
studies to keep a check on Eurofer’ (2).
Charles Barthel
(2) Interview with Maurice Schaeffer, 11 April 2011.
(3) Interview with Étienne Davignon, 14 September 2010.
(4) See Chapter 13, ‘Research: towards a new common policy’, on these topics.
In the early 1980s, Community action expanded 
strongly into the area of high-technology indus-
tries. This move was part of a comprehensive vi-
sion which, according to Étienne Davignon, had a 
substantial political element to it: ‘There absolutely 
needed to be a positive dimension, and therefore 
I was very much in favour of having a second pil-
lar’ (3). The Commission took action in the form of 
a series of programmes, the first of which, launched 
from 1976 onwards, were limited in size. They be-
came much more ambitious from 1983–84 onwards 
with the Esprit programme targeted at the IT in-
dustry, with a budget of ECU 750 million, and later 
with the RACE and BRITE programmes. These 
programmes combined the common market logic 
with scientific research, which would contribute 
notably to establishing common technical stand-
ards, essential to the development of a European 
industry. They brought together academics and in-
dustrialists, whereas until 1984 the Commission 
had tried to win Member States over to the idea of 
grouping their procurement orders, in particular in 
the IT and telecommunications sectors, in order to 
spark the emergence of European industrial groups 
large enough to meet this demand (4). 
Whether dealing with aid measures for sectors 
under threat or support for new technologies, all of 
these policies were pursued in permanent and close 
that basis, it established the steel industry’s common 
positions and tactics in its dealings both with customers 
and with the various task forces of the Commission. It 
would obviously have been no use to try to stem the 
collapse of the steel markets without maximum 
coordination between the policies pursued by the private 
sector and the public guidelines handed down by the 
Community authorities (1).
Overall, cooperation between the senior echelons of the 
Commission and Eurofer seems to have worked fairly 
well. This was a point on which almost all agreed, 
(1) Interview with Michel Stavaux, 19 July 2011.
Cover page of Euroforum on the rise of new technologies in 
Europe (1980).
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consultation with industrialists. In certain sectors, 
the dialogue often resulted from industrialists chal-
lenging the Commission. But it was also initiated 
by the Commission encouraging industrialists to 
get together at Community level to back its pro-
jects. The setting-up of the European Round Table 
of Industrialists (ERT) in 1983 was the outcome of 
a joint initiative by Ortoli and Davignon. It would 
go on to support the implementation of the internal 
market for a number of years (1). 
The dynamic of the Single 
European Act
The completion of the internal market was the cor-
nerstone of the programme presented by Jacques 
Delors to the European Parliament on 14 January 
1985. In his speech, Delors hinted at a political 
shift: ‘Is it over-optimistic to announce a deci-
sion to eliminate all frontiers within Europe and 
to implement it? ... Those who have nothing to 
propose are soon forgotten or held in contempt. 
Those who do not have the means to match their 
ambitions are rapidly reduced to tagging along be-
hind’ (2). However, this shift had little bearing on 
the objectives. The substance of those pursued by 
the Commission for many years would be main-
tained, as evidenced by the Commission’s internal 
market consolidation programme of June 1984 
and the targets that it set itself for 1985 (3), both 
of which documents were drawn up on the initi-
ative of Commissioner Narjes (4). They show that 
the aim was to make a step change similar to that 
(1) Interview with Étienne Davignon, 14 September 2010; Van Apeldoorn, 
B., Transnational Capitalism and the Struggle over European Integration, 
Routledge, London, 2002, p. 224; Cowles, M. G., ‘Setting the agenda for 
a new Europe: the ERT and EC 1992’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 
Vol. 33, No 4, 1995, pp. 521–526.
(2) Speech by Jacques Delors to the European Parliament on 14 January 1985, 
quoted by Alfonso Mattera Ricigliano in his written contribution of 
19 September 2012.
(3) HAEC, BAC 224/1994/25, COM(84) 305, 4 June 1984.
(4) Vignon, J., ‘Sept ans pour construire le vrai Marché commun’, Economie 
prospective internationale, No 25, 1986, pp. 6–23. 
which led to the customs union in the 1960s. This 
would be achieved by abolishing formalities at in-
ternal borders, making technical and tax regula-
tions converge, setting up a single legal framework 
for businesses and ensuring the free movement of 
persons and capital. 
The main innovation of Objective 1992 lay in its 
political nature and the effect this had in stimulat-
ing and guiding Commission departments to en-
sure its implementation. This political dimension 
was strongly conveyed by Arthur Cockfield, the 
new commissioner in charge, in an internal letter 
of 21 January 1985 which refers to an ‘important 
window of opportunity’ to complete the internal 
market  (5). In a more detailed memorandum of 
1  February 1985, he pointed out that the Com-
mission bore responsibility to the people of Europe 
and that it should clearly explain what the objec-
tive was. In effect, the narrative was reversed from 
the past: it was now less about lifting obstacles and 
more about building a large free-trade market that 
(5) HAEC, BAC 224/1994/27, Memo from A. Fortescue to Fernand Braun, 
Friedrich Klein and Ole Bus Henriksen, 21 January 1985.
Étienne Davignon (fifth from left) and François-Xavier Ortoli 
(third from left) attend the launch of the European Round Table of Industrialists 
(7 April 1983).
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would bring a new dynamic: ‘We must capture the 
imagination of our people’ (1).
The decision taken by the Commission on 27 Feb-
ruary 1985 to present the programme for the com-
pletion of the internal market in the form of a 
White Paper confirmed the political nature of the 
exercise. Its rationale was explained by Cockfield 
in a short letter to the three main directorates- 
general concerned: the White Paper was to present 
the Commission’s views on what needed to be done 
regardless of the foreseeable objections from Mem-
ber States. The customs union had been achieved 
through the political will of the founders in the 
1960s; the Community now had to show the same 
resolve when it came to completing the internal 
market (2).
The way in which Cockfield spread the new dy-
namic among his departments shows how much 
it was at the heart of the new Commission’s pol-
itical agenda. He acted with speed, put his staff 
under constant pressure and pursued the internal 
market operation with ‘a kind of mathematical 
logic’  (3). As early as 21  January 1985, he invited 
Fernand Braun, Ole Bus Henriksen (DG XV (Fi-
nancial Institutions and Taxation)) and Friedrich 
Klein (Customs Union Service) to a restricted 
meeting for which he asked each of them to draft 
an exploratory paper  (4). On 22  January, Rolf 
Möhler (DG III) sent his first thoughts to Fernand 
Braun  (5). A meeting on 24  January produced a 
joint short paper by Cockfield and Narjes which 
was sent to Delors’ private office on 25 January (6). 
On 1 February, Cockfield urgently ordered the 
(1) HAEC, BAC 224/1994/27, Memo from Arthur Cockfield, 1 February 
1985.
(2) HAEC, BAC 224/1994/31, Memo from Arthur Cockfield to Fernand 
Braun, Friedrich Klein and Ole Bus Henriksen, 28 February 1985.
(3) Interview with Michel Petite, 24 November 2011.
(4) HAEC, BAC 224/1991/27, Memo from A. Fortescue to Fernand Braun, 
Friedrich Klein and Ole Bus Henriksen, 21 January 1985.
(5) HAEC, BAC 224/1994/31, Memo from Rolf Möhler to Fernand Braun, 
22 January 1985.
(6) HAEC, BAC 224/1994/27, Short paper by Arthur Cockfield and Karl-
Heinz Narjes, 24 January 1985.
circulation of a 6-page memo in which he mapped 
out his ideas on the course of action to be taken (7). 
On 28 February, following the Commission meet-
ing of the day before at which the decision to draw 
up a White Paper was taken, he again brought to-
gether Braun, Henriksen and Klein to agree on 
the document’s main strands. DG III was put in 
charge of coordinating the drafting. To that end, 
as early as 19  March, Fernand Braun convened a 
meeting between the representatives of the 10 dir-
ectorates-general concerned. They were asked to 
have their contributions ready by 29  March and 
an interdepartmental meeting was scheduled for 
mid-April for a first review. In DG III, Fernand 
Braun encouraged his staff and, if necessary, even 
chased them up to meet the deadlines  (8). The 
White Paper’s general structure was completed in 
time and sent for feedback to the DGs concerned 
on 24 April. 
This means that it took just over 3 months to de-
cide on the overall organisational framework of 
the process of completing the internal market. The 
speed with which it was done made for a political 
shift, albeit one which was anticipated and wished 
for by Commission departments and which could 
not have been achieved without drawing on the 
wealth of reflection work conducted over the pre-
vious years. In a memo to his colleague Henriksen 
responding to various draft proposals for directives 
on alcohol taxation, Braun clearly stated his opposi-
tion to harmonisation being referred to as the only 
means to achieve free movement between Member 
States. Instead, as already set out in the June 1984 
Commission programme for the internal market, 
he suggested reducing the need for making laws uni-
form (9). As the process got under way, Braun per-
fectly summed up the spirit that was now guiding 
(7) HAEC, BAC 224/1994/27, Memo from Arthur Cockfield, 1 February 
1985.
(8) HAEC, BAC 224/1994/31, Memo from Fernand Braun to his depart-
ments, 3 April 1985.
(9) HAEC, BAC 224/1994/24, Memo from Fernand Braun to Ole Bus Hen-
riksen, DG XV, 19 November 1984.
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the Commission in a reminder sent to his staff on 
25 March: ‘I do not expect from you a mere digest of 
the measures already included in last year’s internal 
market consolidation programme ... the key element 
of your contributions should rather take the form 
of an overview of all the actions to be completed by 
1992’ (1).
The comprehensive nature of the new policy initi-
ated in January 1985 was explained by Rolf Möhler 
in his exploratory paper of 22 January. The objective 
went ‘beyond the mere lifting of border formalities’ 
and had to ‘include all other obstacles to the func-
tioning of a single internal market’, the free move-
ment of products, services, capital and persons, 
and the implementation of a European policy on 
inter-company cooperation. However, when flesh-
ing out the programme, account had to be taken of 
the action timetable laid down by the Commission 
(1) HAEC, BAC 224/1994/31, Memo from Fernand Braun to his depart-
ments, 3 April 1985.
in June 1984 (2). Cockfield spelled out the method 
more precisely in his memo of 28 February: the idea 
was not to seek uniformity between national rules, 
but to pursue pragmatic solutions that enabled the 
stated objective to be met at lower cost and in less 
time. 
Raising public awareness of the expected benefits 
from meeting Objective 1992 was a key part of the 
political information campaign that supported it. 
The ‘cost of non-Europe’ had been communicated to 
the public for several years, in particular through the 
Albert and Ball report drawn up on the initiative of 
the European Parliament in 1982, which calculated 
this cost as 2 % of the Community’s gross domes-
tic product (GDP) (3). The approach taken in 1985 
was not so much aimed at gauging the overall cost 
(2) HAEC, BAC 224/1994/31, Memo from Rolf Möhler to Fernand Braun, 
22 January 1985. Möhler also pointed out that ‘the proposals on the inter-
nal market put forward by Mr Dekker (the Philips chairman) at a confer-
ence [a bit earlier] organised at the CEPS should be looked at in detail’. 
(3) HAEC, BAC 224/1994/31, DG III, Note for the file by T.-L. Margue, 
DG III, 17 April 1985. 
‘For the final time and on general demand, I will talk to you about the Single Act’: cartoon by Plantu on the Single European Act (1986).
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of non-Europe from a macroeconomic perspective, 
which was deemed too uncertain; instead, it tried to 
assess case by case the costs companies incurred due 
to various types of barriers when operating within 
the Community. In Cockfield’s view, the purpose 
was to demonstrate and educate. To President De-
lors, this also fitted into the comprehensive vision of 
a revamped European project encompassing curren-
cy, research, goods and persons from the ‘ultimate 
perspective of European union’ (1). 
The Commission’s White Paper, which was com-
pleted in the space of 3 months, was adopted by 
the Milan European Council of June 1985, 2 weeks 
after it had been transmitted to the latter. It sought 
to have three types of frontier removed by 31  De-
cember 1992: physical frontiers (customs frontiers, 
including border controls), technical frontiers 
(through the application of the principle of mutual 
recognition) and fiscal frontiers. To achieve this, it 
(1) HAEC, BAC 224/1994/31, Note for the file from T.-L. Margue, DG III, 
to MEP Christopher Jackson, 8 July 1985; Cecchini, P., Catinat, M. and 
Jacquemin, A., 1992, Le défi: nouvelles données économiques de l’Europe sans 
frontières, preface by Jacques Delors, Flammarion, Paris, 1988, p. 22.
The automobile industry: from the 
American to the Japanese challenge
The automobile industry has always been at the forefront 
of European integration. Not only did it participate 
indirectly in the negotiation of the treaties, but it also 
played a pioneering role in setting up a European 
association representing its largest firms, namely the 
Committee of Common Market Automobile Constructors 
(CCMC), the precursor to the current European Automobile 
Manufacturers’ Association (EAMA). The committee was 
set up in 1972 at the direct request of Robert Toulemon, 
the then director-general for industrial affairs, in order to 
allow the Commission to deal directly with the large 
European multinationals without including the American 
firms represented in the Liaison Committee of Automobile 
Manufacturers (CLCA), established in 1958. Ever since the 
EEC was founded, European car manufacturers had turned 
to the Commission to seek agreements that would help 
them in their unequal battle with the larger and financially 
more powerful American car industry. This American 
challenge was the concern of the day when the CCMC was 
established in Paris on 18 May 1972 on the initiative of 
Pierre Dreyfus, the chief executive officer (CEO) of Renault, 
the French publicly owned company. The CCMC’s main goal 
was to develop European safety and environmental 
standards by setting up a European supranational agency, 
the Bureau technique des véhicules. The aim was to 
prevent American standards from being imposed on the 
European market. This obviously meant deepening the 
internal market, which the Commission would not achieve 
until the Single European Act was implemented.
The Commission played a major role in tackling the 
competitive challenges from the United States and Japan 
thanks to the initiatives by Altiero Spinelli and François-
Xavier Ortoli, who very soon met with Giovanni Agnelli, the 
CCMC’s new chairman. He and his brother Umberto would 
become the staunchest advocates of the European cause 
and would go on to plead firmly for a European industrial 
policy along the lines of the ECSC, with the Commission in a 
central role. In 1974, Spinelli suggested to Ortoli that the 
automobile sector be made a showcase for the policy he 
had presented in May 1973. In December 1974, DG III 
followed this up by starting to work on an industrial policy 
centred on the conversion of the sector using social and 
regional aid and European Investment Bank (EIB) loans, and 
providing for the establishment of a European automobile 
institute. This resulted, in late 1976, in a communication 
conferring a pivotal role on the social partners (the CCMC 
and the European Metalworkers’ Federation) in an effort to 
complement and streamline, at European level, the Member 
States’ industrial policies, which had been guided until then 
by the pursuit of national champions. 
A visit by Commissioner Spinelli and his team to the Airbus factories 
in Toulouse (1974).
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The key measure proposed by the Commission was the 
coordination of national research programmes coupled with 
the provision of public aid similar to that granted to other 
sectors. The Belgian commissioner Étienne Davignon laid 
down the roadmap for this policy in collaboration with 
industrialists, who stressed the need for technical 
harmonisation, joint research funding and retail competition 
through freedom of pricing. In June 1981, this comprehensive 
vision crystallised in the Commission’s position on the 
European automobile industry, which was prepared by the 
DG III teams led by Fernand Braun and Paolo Cecchini at the 
express request of the European Parliament. This position, 
which was hailed as a masterpiece by industrialists, was the 
result of a long, hard effort across Commission departments: 
while DG III led the interdepartmental group for the 
automobile industry, central planks of this industrial policy 
were dealt with by several other directorates-general. Europe 
and the European Community thus showed their 
determination to respond to the strategy deployed by the 
United States and Japan to limit their mutual competition at 
the expense of the EEC industry.
A DG III internal memo penned by Jean-François Marchipont 
stated that the restructuring of the automobile sector was on 
the right track thanks to merger agreements aimed at 
producing national champions and industrial cooperation 
agreements on major investments, in particular for the 
automation of production lines. These measures were to 
solve the crux of the European problem, namely a cost of 
production that was 30 % higher than in Japan. Employment 
in the European automobile industry had been growing until 
1979, but was now starting to feel the effects of Japanese 
competition, which, for the first time, led to permanent and 
temporary lay-offs in all Member States except 
Germany. Marchipont concluded that the average 
common external tariff of 10.9 % was not enough to 
thwart the Japanese manufacturers’ strategy to target 
the Community market following the voluntary import 
restriction agreement signed between Japan and the 
United States on 1 May 1981. External pressure thus 
became the linchpin for the Commission’s preferred exit 
strategy from the crisis and a political matter of the 
highest order. Countries with domestic manufacturers 
such as France, Italy and the United Kingdom were still 
able to unilaterally limit imports to their markets, but 
could not stop imports reaching markets of consumer 
countries within the EEC without breaking internal 
market rules. There was therefore an urgent need for a 
Community agreement, which the Council had asked for 
on several occasions with the support of the Benelux 
countries and Germany. The Commission decided to 
monitor car imports and Commissioner Haferkamp 
asked the Japanese to practise self-constraint to avoid 
a major trade conflict between the three leading 
economies of the western world. In 1983, an informal 
political agreement was concluded which capped 
Japanese exports to the Community at 1981 levels. The 
agreement, which ran until the end of 1986, provided for 
ex post monitoring by the Community. This meant that, 
as far as the Commission was concerned, industrial 
policies and the survival of the European industrial base 
in the automobile sector took precedence over consumer 
interests.
Sigfrido Ramírez-Pérez
François-Xavier Ortoli faces national resistance to his policy for relaunching the 
single market. (30 jours d’Europe, 2 February 1973.)
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proposed a legislative programme combining de-
regulation, which was now possible under the new 
approach, and a set of 300 directives making up the 
new framework for the single market. The Milan 
European Council followed President Delors’ view 
that implementing this package would also require 
changes to the treaty to enable the Council to adopt 
the bulk of the programme by qualified majority. 
The Single European Act was concluded in Lux-
embourg in December 1985. The Commission 
played an essential role in the drafting of the treaty’s 
economic and institutional sections by setting up a 
working group under Jacques Delors (1). The Single 
European Act defined the internal market as ‘an area 
without internal frontiers’ ensuring ‘the free move-
ment of goods, persons, services and capital’  (2). It 
linked this objective to the implementation of a 
series of parallel flanking policies. In particular, it 
incorporated research and technological develop-
ment policy into the treaty in order to ‘strengthen 
the scientific and technological basis of European 
industry’ and to enable undertakings to exploit the 
(1) Delors, J. and Arnaud, J.-L., Mémoires, Plon, Paris, 2004, p. 218.
(2) Article 8a, second paragraph.
‘internal market potential’  (3). The roll-out of this 
vast programme was made possible by Article 100a 
of the Single European Act, which introduced qual-
ified majority voting for harmonising national leg-
islation. 
Thus, in terms of overall set-up, the relaunch of the 
1970s and 1980s very much followed on from the 
founding years, when the internal market and eco-
nomic structural dynamics came together in a single 
vision. The area of activity expanded, but the debate 
on the extent of intervention continued. Some of-
ficials who had worked under Guido Colonna di 
Paliano and went on to occupy leading positions in 
the 1980s contributed to this continuity. Owing to 
external pressures in the form of shifts in the inter-
national economy and to the difficulties faced by 
Europe in the 1970s and 1980s, a new approach in 
terms of the method used and the political nature 
of the debate became necessary and possible. This 
resulted in the Single European Act.
Éric Bussière
(3) Van Laer, A., ‘Quelle politique industrielle pour l’Europe? Les projets des 
Commissions Jenkins et Thorn (1977–84)’, in Bussière, É., Dumoulin, M. 
and Schirmann, S. (eds), Milieux économiques et intégration européenne au 
XXe siècle. La relance des années quatre-vingt (1979–92), CHEFF, Paris, 
2007, pp. 42–44.
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Chapter 13  
Research: towards a new 
common policy
Research policy is one of the areas where the Euro-
pean venture made the most progress between 1973 
and 1986. Almost non-existent to begin with, ex-
cept in the nuclear sector, it grew to become a fully 
fledged common policy under the Single European 
Act. In 15 years, the funds allocated to Community 
research policy increased substantially, its areas of 
intervention diversified and it steadily gained legiti-
macy. And the driving force behind the process was 
the Commission (1). 
(1) For details on EEC research policy during this period, see in particular Edler, 
J., Institutionalisierung europäischer Politik. Die Genese des Forschungspro-
gramms BRITE als reflexiver sozialer Prozeβ, Nomos Universittätsschriften, 
Politik, No 109, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2000; Guzetti, G., A Brief History 
of European Union Research Policy, Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities, Luxembourg, 1995; Sandholtz, W., High-Tech 
Europe — The Politics of International Cooperation, Studies in International 
Poli tical Economy, University of California Press, Berkeley/Los Angeles/
Oxford, 1992; Sharp, M. and Shearman, C., European Technological Collab-
oration, Chatham House papers, No 36, The Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, London/New York/Andover, 1987; Stremmel, J., Die Forschungs- 
und Technologiepolitik der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Aachener Studien 
Sozialwissenschaften, No 6, Aachen, 1988; Van Laer, A., ‘Vers une politique 
industrielle commune. Les actions de la Commission européenne dans les 
secteurs de l’informatique et des télécommunications (1965–84)’, PhD the-
sis, UCL, Louvain-la-Neuve, 2010. Besides these works, this chapter is based 
on the Commission’s archives, publications issued at the time and testimony 
obtained for the purposes of this history from those involved.
It has to be said that the technological, economic and 
political context impelled Europe’s decision-makers 
towards cooperation on research. Progress in lead-
ing-edge technologies now required investment on 
a scale that was often beyond the capacity of any 
individual country. European standards were need-
ed for the new products so as to avoid new barriers 
to trade. And the economic crisis and the decline 
of certain traditional industries made the develop-
ment of new sectors a matter of urgency. There was 
great concern over the backwardness of Europe’s 
economy compared not only with the United States 
but also with Japan (2). Moreover, the United States 
seemed less and less inclined to share technologies 
with its European allies (3). 
(2) Although some economists contested the very existence of this technology 
gap, it featured prominently in mainstream debate, for example, Patel, P. 
and Pavitt, K., ‘Is western Europe losing the technological race?’, Research 
Policy, Vol. 16, 1987, pp. 59–85.
(3) See Van Laer, A., ‘The European Community and the paradoxes of 
American economic diplomacy: the case of the IT and telecommunications 
sectors’, in Patel, K. K. and Weisbrode, K. (eds), Europe and America in the 
1980s: Old Barriers, New Openings, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, 2013, pp. 105–132.
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But opting for cooperation within Europe was not 
always the obvious choice. Alliances with American 
or Japanese partners could offer access to their tech-
nologies and markets. Moreover, in industry, the rise 
of the multinationals was making it increasingly hard 
to define a ‘European company’: could the European 
subsidiary of an American enterprise be considered 
European? And European cooperation did not neces-
sarily involve the Community; if Euro pean countries 
wanted to cooperate, they could also do so through 
intergovernmental agreements. Nevertheless, the 
Commission played a major part in setting up Euro-
Community resources allocated to support research, by objective and by type of 
action, 1974–87 (ECU)
During the period under study, the share of 
the total Community budget that was 
devoted to research did not increase 
spectacularly, but the areas funded became 
much more diversified. Although nuclear 
research was still very much the predominant 
element in Community research policy in the 
early 1970s, non-nuclear energy, the 
environment, and health and safety began to 
receive growing attention. Then, starting in 
the 1980s, the Community considerably 
expanded its support for information 
technology and telecommunications, 
industrial technology, biotechnology and raw 
materials. Cross-cutting measures, such as 
mobility for researchers, were also boosted. 
At the outset, support for research was 
mainly through direct actions, in other words 
research carried out by the Joint Research 
Centre (JRC), but in time most research came 
to take the form of indirect actions. Funded in 
full or in part by the Communities, the 
research was actually done by external 
bodies (it later came to be known as 
shared-cost actions when part-funding 
became the rule in the 1980s).
1974 1980 1987
Total amount allocated to support research
(% of Community budget)
77 556 162
(1.53 %)
317 891 000
(2.03 %)
740 149 875
(2.04 %)
By objective
Horizontal actions — 5 849 000 31 728 000
Nuclear 53 501 663 248 238 000 325 282 875
Non-nuclear energy, environment, health and 
safety
19 719 855 35 240 000 125 259 000
Development, transport and food technology — 209 000 720 000
Information and telecommunications technologies 2 203 413 — 124 500 000
Industrial technology, biotechnology and raw 
materials
— 9 625 000 125 220 000
Other 2 131 231 18 730 000 20 533 200
By type of action
Direct action 67 067 306 132 400 000 193 111 000
Indirect/shared-cost action 10 488 856 185 491 000 547 038 875
Source:  Community budgets published in the Official Journal (commitment appropriations). The table only shows commitments under the chapter ‘Re-
search expenditure’, because the budgets as they were published do not allow research commitments under other chapters to be identified. Thus, 
for example, IT research subsidies were rather to be found in 1980 in the chapter on industry expenditure.
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pean cooperation on research within the Commu-
nity, even if it was not under its sole responsibility. 
As the new Community policy became more firm-
ly established, it also needed direction. Over this 
period,  the areas of intervention diversified con-
siderably. Although nuclear research continued to 
occupy an important place, the prolonged crisis af-
fecting the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom) and the emergence of new economic and 
social concerns prompted the Commission to pro-
pose new areas of intervention. These were mainly 
areas where it had launched new Community initi-
atives, such as energy, industry or the environment. 
The choice of target areas did not give rise to any 
fundamental debate. On the other hand, tension 
persisted between basic and applied research. There 
were also differ ences of opinion on what shape co-
operation should take: should it involve coordinat-
ing national policies  or should there be a genuine 
integrated common policy?
A flimsy foundation: 
the burden of Euratom’s past 
and declarations of intent
From the mid-1960s, the Commission had tried sev-
eral times to launch Community research initiatives 
outside the sectors provided for in the treaties (nu-
clear, agriculture and steel), in particular to help 
European industry to close the technological gap 
with its American competitors. But despite resolu-
tions in favour of the principle, the Council did not 
actually approve many projects. The main practical 
outcome of these first initiatives by the Commission 
was the creation in 1970 of European Cooperation 
in the field of Scientific and Technical Research 
(COST), a framework for the conclusion of inter-
governmental research agreements, which also in-
volved the participation of non-Community coun-
tries. COST was not a Community structure, even 
though the Commission serviced the secretariat.
While the Commission was trying to extend the 
scope of the Community’s powers in the field of re-
search, the only area where it did have wide-ranging 
responsibilities — namely that of nuclear energy — 
had for some years been sliding into a serious cri-
sis. Because of the Member States’ widely differing 
attitudes and interests regarding the nuclear sector, 
no common policy was possible. One of the main 
bones of contention was the choice of reactor type. 
Keen to preserve its military and energy independ-
ence, France had opted for natural uranium reac-
tors and wanted Euratom to do the same. The other 
Member States preferred to build enriched uranium 
reactors using technology and fuel supplied by the 
Americans. In 1967, the Council failed to approve 
the 5-year plan for the Joint Nuclear Research 
Centre (JNRC) because of a lack of consensus on 
what it should be doing. So the JNRC had to oper-
ate with monthly provisional budgets and under the 
constant threat of widespread redundancies or even 
complete abolition. The JNRC’s staff came out on 
strike and some even went on hunger strike. 
1973: a new start?
With the accession of the new Member States in 
January 1973, the Commission was enlarged and 
portfolios were redefined. Altiero Spinelli and his 
DG  III (Industrial Affairs and Technology) re-
tained responsibility for industry and technology 
(including indirect nuclear research), but research, 
science and education now came under the new 
commissioner, Ralf Dahrendorf, with a new dir-
ectorate-general, DG XII. Dahrendorf was also in 
charge of the JNRC and the Directorate-General 
for Scientific and Technical Information and In-
formation Management. The two men took very 
different approaches. As a convinced federalist, 
Spinelli had tried in vain over the years to create 
strong Community institutions to support re-
search. With his new responsibilities, Spinelli con-
tinued to concern himself with applied research, 
for instance in the computer industry. Dahrendorf, 
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on the other hand, focused on basic research. He 
launched the idea of a European scientific area (1), 
which would in large part be based on the coor-
dination of national research policies rather than 
on strictly Community initiatives. The case of the 
European Science Foundation demonstrates their 
differing viewpoints. In 1970, Spinelli had pro-
posed creating a European Science Foundation at 
Community level to stimulate European coopera-
tion in basic research. The Member States felt this 
was far too federalist. Dahrendorf, by contrast, was 
in favour of creating the foundation as a European 
association of national research organisations out-
side the Community framework, and it was in this 
form that it eventually came into being in 1974. 
(1) The idea was taken up again 20 years later by Commissioner Antonio 
Ruberti, and even later by Philippe Busquin.
Ralf Dahrendorf left the Commission in Novem-
ber 1974, to be replaced by Guido Brunner.
The Commission’s scientific and technological pol-
icy programme of August 1973, which the Council 
approved a few months later, was based on a number 
of principles which the director, Manfredo Macioti, 
summed up as follows: ‘Do not do everything (pri-
orities); do not centralise everything (use national 
potentials); develop a policy not as an objective in 
itself, but rather as a means to achieving the various 
objectives of the Community (sectoral approach); 
and achieve a balance between social concern (env-
ironment, health, urban development, etc.) and eco-
nomic objectives (industrial technology)’ (2). A new 
committee of senior national officials, the Scientific 
and Technological Research Committee (CREST), 
was set up at the beginning of 1974: it was to serve 
as the Commission’s official intermediary in its con-
tacts with the Member States’ research ministries 
before proposals were submitted to the Council. 
The reform of the Joint Nuclear Research Centre, 
agreed at the beginning of 1973, marked the end of 
a lengthy crisis. It was decided that the JRC’s pro-
grammes (the ‘N’ for ‘nuclear’ was now dropped) 
should be geared towards public service work (in 
particular nuclear safety) rather than towards in-
dustrial projects. The Essor reactor installed at 
Ispra  was handed over to the Italian government. 
The centre could now undertake research in other 
areas outside the nuclear field on the basis of Article 
235 of the EEC Treaty, and in the following decade 
its non-nuclear activities mostly concerned the env-
ironment and non-nuclear energy. The JRC was also 
asked to expand its activities in support of Commu-
nity policies. This approach would subsequently 
remain at the heart of the JRC’s activities, even if 
‘in the 1980s the Commission’s other directorates- 
general did not have the impression that science and 
(2) Macioti, M., ‘Science and technology in the common market: a progress 
report’, Research Policy, No 4, 1975, p. 305.
Magazine cover on the Ispra Joint Research Centre, 
February 1981.
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technology could really help them’ (1). During this 
period, the JRC focused especially on normative re-
search in support of the internal market: harmonis-
ing tests, quality controls, etc. 
(1) Interview with Jean-Pierre Contzen, 11 July 2011.
In 1974, the JRC was completely reorganised. A 
new director-general and six new directors were ap-
pointed and the directorate-general’s headquarters 
were transferred from Ispra to Brussels, ‘closer’ to 
the ‘bodies with which the JRC had to interact’ (2). 
(2) Interview with Gianluigi Valsesia, 10 February 2011.
External view of the Joint European Torus (JET), in the Culham Science Centre (United Kingdom). The JET is a ‘tokamak’, 
a device for studying nuclear fusion. Construction started on the JET in 1979 and it produced its first plasma in 1983. The JET was 
then the largest tokamak in the world. It was set up as a joint undertaking, financed by Euratom (80 %), the United Kingdom (10 %) 
and participating laboratories (10 %).
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Quite a few scientists at the centre had to adapt to 
working in non-nuclear sectors, and did so without 
too much difficulty. However, the freeze on recruit-
ment that had been accepted in return for keeping 
on all the existing personnel would, in the medium 
term, result in an ageing staff (1).
The JRC’s management and staff were to experience 
a number of disappointments over the following 
years, notably the installation of the Joint Euro-
pean Torus (JET) at a national site (Culham) and 
the Member States’ refusal to back a very large-scale 
nuclear experiment known as Super-SARA. But 
with its continued existence no longer under threat, 
the centre developed new strengths. For example, it 
became a pioneer in the field of remote sensing from 
space and was even accepted in the mid-1970s as one 
of the principal investigators on NASA’s first Land-
sat missions (2).
Outside the nuclear sector, the Commission man-
aged to secure the launch of a number of joint re-
search programmes (on raw materials, energy, 
medicine, social policy, the environment, urban 
planning and development aid policy), although 
the funds allocated were very modest. For its entire 
research policy (including nuclear research), the 
Community had a budget of 1 or 2 % of the total 
sum spent by the Member States (3). Nevertheless, 
these small-scale programmes appeared to consti-
tute a springboard for more ambitious projects, as 
Heinrich von Moltke, head of division in the DG 
for Industrial Affairs and Technology, commented: 
‘We did what we had to at the time, in other words 
create new schemes where it was felt that the treaties 
might apply, especially in the field of research and 
technology. There were no instruments, we had to 
create them. This involved the laborious Article 235 
procedure … All these policies were created from 
(1) Interviews with Luigi Massimo, 22 July 2011, and Jean-Pierre Contzen, 
11 July 2011.
(2) Interview with Jean-Pierre Contzen, 11 July 2011.
(3) EC Commission, ‘The common policy in the field of science and techno l-
ogy’, HAEC, COM(79) 281, 23 May 1979.
a few existing bits and pieces that we then tried to 
generalise’ (4).
Recourse to Article 235 sometimes involved a rath-
er circuitous approach: when Jean-Pierre Contzen, 
director in DG XII at the time, had to defend the 
Commission’s first medical research programme 
before the Permanent Representatives Committee 
(Coreper) in the early 1980s, at a time when health 
did not come within the Community’s remit, he had 
to argue that the objective was economic, namely to 
help the Member States reduce the cost of their so-
cial security systems (5). By contrast, the Commis-
sion’s efforts to coordinate national programmes, 
strongly promoted by Commissioner Dahrendorf, 
produced very little in the way of results. The Com-
mission continued trying to establish this kind of 
coordination, but with no success, and officials 
gradually lost faith in this approach.
A change of scale 
and strategic programming, 
1977–84
At the beginning of 1977, a new Commission took 
office. Guido Brunner retained responsibility for 
science and research, while Étienne Davignon was 
put in charge of industrial affairs, the internal mar-
ket and the customs union. A few months later, the 
Commission announced a major change in its com-
munication ‘Common policy in the field of science 
and technology’: ‘By a common research policy for 
the next 4 years, we do not simply mean the con-
tinuation of a traditional, somewhat esoteric science 
policy, but rather the scientific and technological 
basis for any European policy. The situation is seri-
ous. The signs of an economic crisis become increas-
ingly evident. The boundless faith in continuous 
linear growth has been shaken; the limits to growth 
(4) Interview with Heinrich von Moltke, 8 December 2011.
(5) Interview with Jean-Pierre Contzen, 11 July 2011.
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are gradually emerging.’ Community research pol-
icy was thus firmly put at the service of economic 
growth. But the Commission was quite aware of the 
obstacles it faced: ‘The more interesting, practical-
ly applicable and important technological projects 
are for national industry, the more reluctant are 
the Member States to set aside their national self- 
interest’ (6).
Faced with the severe crisis in steel, textiles and 
shipbuilding, Davignon and his departments began 
by concentrating mainly on setting up Commu-
nity  schemes to foster the restructuring of these 
‘old’ industries. But in its ‘Report on certain struc-
tural aspects of growth’ in June 1978, the Com-
mission recalled that the Community also had to 
play an active role in promoting growth, both by 
completing the common market and by stimulating 
innovation, the main source of growth. Stimulating 
innovation meant not only encouraging research 
but also fostering the development and marketing 
of research results  (7). ‘It was vital for there to be 
(7) EC Commission, ‘Report on some structural aspects of growth’, HAEC, 
COM(78) 255 final, 22 June 1978.
(1) Interview with Manfredo Macioti, 20 July 2011.
(2) Interview with Hendrik Tent, 5 April 2012.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Ibid.
(5) Interview with Herbert Allgeier, 4 November 2010.
(6) EC Commission, ‘The common policy in the field of science and technol-
ogy’, HAEC, COM(77) 283, 30 June 1977.
The new DG XII in search of its role
Since the merger of the executives of the EEC, the ECSC 
and Euratom in 1967, scientific affairs had been in the 
hands of DG III, which also dealt with industrial affairs 
and technology. In 1973, a separate Directorate-
General for Research, Science and Education, DG XII, 
was created. To begin with, this did not prevent other 
departments, such as those responsible for industry or 
energy, from retaining control of research in their fields. 
The Directorate-General for Research, Science and 
Education tried to forge a coordinating role for itself (for 
instance via the interdepartmental Committee for 
Research and Development that was set up in 1975), 
and even to take over responsibility for these activities. 
Looking back, some former officials in DG XII think this 
institutional activism went too far: ‘We were 
manoeuvring in an attempt to grab hold of and gather 
up every crumb we could without any interdepartmental 
negotiation, in effect trying to be everywhere at once, 
losing sleep in order to do things that were frankly 
ridiculous’ (1). Some tensions were probably inevitable 
between the new cross-cutting directorate-general for 
research and the sectoral directorates-general. As 
Hendrik Tent — a former long-serving official in DG XII 
— pointed out, the weight of a directorate-general in 
the Commission depended largely on the make-up of 
its policies, its budget and its human resources. For 
DG XII, all three grew considerably from the end of the 
1970s onwards (2). ‘But,’ as Tent also noted, ‘its 
influence depends above all, of course, on the 
Commission itself and on its commissioner, and whether 
he has any real influence’ (3). And in that respect, too, 
the fate of DG XII was about to change when, in 1977, 
it came into the hands of Étienne Davignon, generally 
considered one of the most powerful members of the 
Commission.
One notable feature of DG XII was that most of its 
officials were scientists who were specialists in their 
field, with highly specific knowledge and networks. Many 
of them had come from the JRC. Research staff enjoyed 
a special status under the 1962 staff regulations. The 
commissioner in charge of DG XII also had wider powers 
than the others in terms of human resources 
management, at the expense of his colleague 
responsible for personnel, a fact that inevitably also 
prompted some jealousies (4). To begin with, the 
directorate-general was fairly small (in the second half 
of the 1970s the total staff, taking all grades together, 
numbered about 110, some of whom also dealt with 
education and culture) (5), but numbers steadily 
increased thereafter. The directorate-general had two 
directors-general during this period, both of them 
scientists originally: Günter Schuster (from 1971 to 
1981) and Paolo Fasella (from 1981 to 1995). Thanks 
to their qualities and longevity, they left a lasting mark 
on Community research policy.
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a positive dimension to the restructuring that was 
necessary ... I was very aware that a second pillar was 
needed. A second pillar — not that the old approach 
was not geared to the future, but in a different way 
— that would lead to the creation of new activities,’ 
explained Étienne Davignon (1). He listened closely 
to his staff (before coming to the Commission he 
had been Director-General of the Belgian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs) and his aides soon convinced 
him that progress was possible, especially in infor-
mation technology. 
And the Commission did indeed draw up a number 
of programmes in that area. Initially the amount of 
funding was very small, but gradually it increased. 
In 1977, the Council rejected an action plan for 
aeronautical research. The inclusion of research in 
(1) Interview with Étienne Davignon, 14 September 2010.
industrial strategy was reflected in the creation in 
1978 of the new Advisory Committee on Industri-
al Research and Development (CORDI), compris-
ing representatives from industry organisations. 
The Directorates-General for Internal Market and 
Industrial Affairs and for Research, Science and 
Education actively sought to boost their expertise 
through studies carried out by consultants and 
through a new Community programme, FAST 
(forecasting and assessment in the field of science 
and technology), launched in 1978. The ideas devel-
oped in the course of the FAST programme, headed 
for 15 years by Riccardo Petrella, contributed dir-
ectly to the new research initiatives in information 
technology and biotechnology.
From 1979, information technology became a pri-
ority for Davignon. A pilot phase of the European 
strategic programme for research and development 
in information technologies (Esprit) started  up  in 
Children working on a computer in 1984 under the Esprit programme.
285Chapter 13 — Research: towards a new common policy 
1983. The first Esprit programme, covering the 
years 1984–88, received Community funding total-
ling ECU 750 million, the other half of the budget 
being covered by the businesses and institutions 
taking part. It financed pre-competitive research 
projects involving partners from at least two Mem-
ber States. Esprit took Community research policy 
to a new level and would serve as a model for other 
programmes.
Like Spinelli, Davignon approached research from 
an industrial policy angle and wanted there to be a 
true common policy rather than just a coordination 
of national policies. He was able to rely on the prec-
edent of a few small research programmes in infor-
mation technology and on the experience gained by 
his departments. He also benefited from the reali-
sation among the Member States that national ac-
tion alone would not suffice. Despite considerable 
efforts since the 1960s, their national champions 
were still rather weak compared with their interna-
tional rivals. In his speeches, Davignon repeatedly 
highlighted the threat of industrial domination 
not only by the Americans but also by the Japanese. 
But more than anything else, Davignon used the 
tried and tested approach he had used for the steel 
industry: to obtain the Council’s approval for new 
Community initiatives, he involved enterprises 
and administrations from the Member States and 
national authorities in formulating his proposals. 
These round-table discussions with IT industrial-
ists and captains of industry offered an opportunity 
to consult and negotiate, but above all to convince. 
Once these key players had been won over to a Com-
munity scheme, they became valuable allies in the 
battle for approval from their governments. At last 
there was a favourable climate for the adoption of a 
major Community programme. France abandoned 
its 1981–82 national expansionary policies and the 
United Kingdom’s budget demands were met at 
the Fontaine bleau Summit in 1984, so removing 
two major obstacles to the launch of new common 
policies. In the wake of the economic crisis of the 
1970s, the need for public intervention to stimulate 
positive adjustment of the economy was largely ac-
cepted. At the time, the Organisation for Econom-
ic Cooperation and Development (OECD) referred 
to any industrial policy geared towards market- 
driven developments as positive (1). This was typi-
cally the case with support for research and inno-
vation.
In his second term of office as commissioner from 
1981, Davignon was given responsibility for en-
ergy and research as well as industrial affairs. He 
instructed the Directorate-General for Science, 
Research and Development to gear its research 
programmes to the needs of industrial and en-
ergy  policy  (2). The Directorate-General for In-
ternal Market and Industrial Affairs retained 
responsibility for research actions of immediate 
relevance for industry, such as Esprit, because 
‘it is essential for them to remain fully integrat-
ed with the coherent whole of an industrial pro-
gramme’  (3). In a communication to the Council 
on the future of European research policy in the 
1980s, this close link with other policies was put 
forward as an argument in favour of Community 
action: ‘By setting out research actions in the con-
text of an overall strategy, the Community can 
ensure their continuity from the economic point 
of view (the market), the industrial point of view 
(innovation) or the regulatory point of view (fi-
nancial incentives, standards, competition). This 
is how the best can be made of R & D [research 
and development] action at the earliest stage’  (4). 
Along the same lines as for Esprit, Davignon and 
his departments drew up programmes in the fields 
of telecommunications (RACE), the application of 
(1) OECD, ‘The case for positive adjustment policies: a compendium of OECD 
documents, 1978/79’, Paris, 1979.
(2) HAEC, BAC  47/1986/92, Memo from Fernand Braun to Étienne Davi-
gnon and Karl-Heinz Narjes, 11 February 1981.
(3) HAEC, BAC 10/1985/280, Schuster, G., ‘Rapport sur les améliorations à 
apporter en matière de coordination des activités de recherche financées par 
la Commission’, Bonn, October 1981.
(4) EC Commission, ‘Scientific and technical research and the European Com-
munity — Proposals for the 1980s’, HAEC, COM(81) 574 final, 12 Octo-
ber 1981.
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new technologies in traditional sectors (BRITE) 
and new materials (EURAM), plus a small bio-
technology programme. These all started up in 
1985–86. ‘Our approach was always the same,’ re-
calls a senior official at the time, ‘to meet people, 
to listen, to take note, to analyse and to come back 
with proposals that would then be acceptable’ (1). 
It is interesting to note that standardisation was 
a major element in all these programmes and was 
one of the justifications for Community action. In 
1983, in parallel with the initiatives in support of 
industrial research, the Commission also launched 
the ‘Stimulus’ programme, aimed at boosting basic 
research, networking between researchers and mo-
bility among researchers, which was the forerun-
ner of the current Marie Curie actions.
Consultation between the commissioners and the 
Commission departments responsible for research, 
industry and innovation was usually ad hoc and in-
formal, but Davignon also set up formal groups at 
various levels. In September 1982, detailed prepar-
ation of Esprit was assigned to a small task force of 
officials from the three Directorates-General for 
Internal Market and Industrial Affairs, for Science, 
Research and Development and for Information 
Market and Innovation. The task force grew rap-
idly, eventually becoming a separate Directorate- 
General for Telecommunications, Information 
Technology and Innovation in 1986. There would 
always be a certain latent rivalry between it and the 
DG for Science, Research and Development.
The programmes, budgets and staff of the DG for 
Science, Research and Development also grew rap-
idly during these years and a large proportion of its 
officials were mainly engaged in managing joint 
programmes rather than devising new ones. New 
recruits were often highly specialised, with cut-
ting-edge scientific or technical skills, experience in 
(1) Interview with Michel Carpentier, 22 October 2010. 
industry or a wide range of contacts in one sector or 
another.
But while the number of Community schemes in 
the field of research was growing, there was still 
no overarching approach. Since 1980, the Com-
mission had been suggesting the idea of a multi-
an nual  framework programme covering all the re-
search measures based on the three treaties (EEC, 
Eur atom and ECSC). This kind of strategic pro-
gramming would enable the Community to focus 
its research actions on the priority sectors, to ensure 
they were consistent with other Community policies 
and to plan them over the medium term. Essential-
ly, Council approval of the framework programme 
was supposed to make decisions on individual pro-
grammes easier and to get round the restrictions 
of annual budget programming. The Commission 
hoped that this would avoid the usual interminable 
discussions on each individual programme, with ob-
jections of principle becoming mixed up with tech-
nical considerations. As Étienne Davignon said, ‘the 
spirit of the framework programme — though this 
got distorted later — was that negotiations with the 
Member States should deal with the overall fund-
ing envelope rather than how it was allocated. The 
Member States clawed this back in the management 
committees after I left. In a way, the idea of the 
framework programme was that discussions with 
the Member States would cover the total amount 
and the topics. Once the total amount and the vari-
ous topics were settled, management was to be del-
egated to the Commission’  (2). Together with the 
new framework programme, the Commission pro-
posed to rationalise the structures for drawing up, 
examining and implementing Community research 
programmes. As different types of measures had 
developed, with a variety of legal bases, a verit able 
labyrinth of committees had grown. Ultimately, 
the Commission saw the framework programme as 
confirmation of the Member States’ will to develop 
(2) Interview with Étienne Davignon, 14 September 2010.
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Community research policy, necessarily implying 
a substantial increase in the amount of funding al-
located. In fact, it hoped for nothing less than the 
doubling of funding.
It took several years for the Commission to pre-
pare the first framework programme and, above all, 
to secure its adoption. It was not until July 1983 
that the Council approved it. The Commission in-
volved every existing advisory body in drawing up 
its proposals. It sought to gain the support of sci-
entific experts (in the European Research and De-
velopment Committee (CERD)), replaced at the 
end of 1982 by the Committee for the European 
Development of Science and Technology (Codest), 
representatives of industrial organisations (in the 
context of CORDI, which was succeeded in 1984 
by the Industrial Research and Development Ad-
visory Committee (IRDAC) and, most important 
of all, the senior national officials who were mem-
bers of CREST. As for its initiatives in the steel 
and IT sectors, Davignon sought to ‘Europeanise’ 
the vision of those in charge in the national ad-
ministrations. The support of scientists and leading 
specialists in research policy would help legitimise 
the Commission’s proposals. A major conference 
held in Strasbourg in the autumn of 1982, entitled 
‘1980–90: a new development on European scien-
tific policy’, broadened the range of interlocutors 
and at the same time boosted the visibility of the 
Commission’s plans. At ministerial level, the Com-
mission obtained more regular meetings of the Re-
search Council, with meetings being held twice a 
year from the end of 1981.
The Commission’s considerable efforts to dissem-
inate its ideas so as to forge a coalition in support 
of a framework programme of Community scien-
tific and technological activities eventually bore 
fruit. In May 1983, the Commission presented its 
final proposal for the first 4-year framework pro-
gramme to the Council (4). It called for a budget of 
The birth of innovation policy
In parallel with the development of research policy, 
the Commission also established a new policy in a 
closely related area: innovation. It defined 
innovation as ‘the introduction of new products, 
services, production methods or marketing and 
management techniques throughout the 
economy’ (1). In 1978, this area was assigned to 
Commissioner Brunner and DG XIII, which was 
already responsible for the dissemination of 
technical information — originally one of Euratom’s 
tasks. According to the director-general at the time, 
Raymond Appleyard, launching a policy for 
innovation was a welcome challenge for the 
directorate-general: ‘[Scientific and technical 
information and information management] was a 
true support activity: patents and publications and 
all the consequences of Commission research. It’s 
pretty practical and wasn’t, in my view, a raison 
d’être for a directorate-general. For a directorate or 
a division, maybe. So there was this directorate-
general, on its own, in Luxembourg. Some 100 or 
150 officials with very little to do and no reason, at 
Commission level, to exist at all. It had no policy 
area of its own, and I tried to create one for those 
people as best I could’ (2). DG XIII set out to draw up 
a new innovation policy in close collaboration with 
the other departments, in particular through an 
interdepartmental working party. In 1981, Karl-
Heinz Narjes took over responsibility for innovation. 
The Commission launched various horizontal 
measures to foster innovation. Several of those 
initiatives sought to promote the dissemination of 
information. Others involved funding for innovation 
(for example Community support for the creation of 
the European Venture Capital Association, set up in 
1983) and a number of studies and colloquia. There 
were also proposals for tax measures in favour of 
investment and a projected European innovation 
loan scheme. Unlike the Esprit programme, which 
focused initially on large companies, most of these 
‘horizontal’ projects were targeted at small and 
medium-sized businesses. Raymond Appleyard 
himself said that this innovation policy never 
became a ‘really solid policy’, but it did make it 
possible ‘to set up clubs’: ‘Perhaps there was only 
enough money for meetings and small-scale 
activities, but the end result was that the people 
responsible or active in the various countries got to 
know each other well and came to treat one 
another more or less as friends’ (3). 
(1) EC Commission, ‘A policy for industrial innovation — strategic lines of a 
Community approach’, HAEC, COM(81) 620 final, 20 October 1981.
(2) Interview with Raymond Appleyard, 17 October 2011.
(3) Ibid.
(4) EC Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council decision on the framework 
programme for Community scientific and technical activities 1984–87’, 
HAEC, COM(83) 260 final, 17 May 1983.
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ECU 3 750 million over 4 years — a 60 % increase 
in annual funding compared with 1982. In parallel 
with the framework programme, the Commission 
proposed a fundamental reform of the structures 
and procedures underlying common policy in the 
field of science and technology (1).
(1) EC Commission, ‘Communication on structures and procedures for 
the common policy in the field of science and technology’, HAEC, 
COM(83) 143 final, 16 March 1983.
The principle of the framework programme did not 
meet with any opposition in the Council, but Com-
munity policy at the time was dominated by the 
budget dispute. Consequently, the Federal Republic 
of Germany and the United Kingdom were very re-
luctant to increase funding for Commu nity research. 
On 25  July, the Council approved the principle of 
framework programmes and the scientific and tech-
nical objectives of the first framework programme 
(1984–87), but put off a decision on the financial 
side of the programme pending the outcome of the 
The key to Commissioner Davignon’s success was to meet and to convince all the parties concerned. 
Here he is (fourth from the left) at a seminar in Brussels on the relationships between technology, employment and work. 
Although the Commission’s studies showed that technical innovation created long-term employment, it could not deny 
that technological progress would cause some jobs to be lost in the short term and would change the nature of work.
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wider discussions on the Community’s resources. 
On 19 December, the Council finally reached agree-
ment on a budget of ECU  1  225  million for the 
framework programme, including ECU 750 million 
for Esprit. The structures of the common research 
policy were amended: two new management and 
coordination advisory committees were set up under 
the aegis of the Commission, replacing the special-
ised CREST committees and most of the advisory 
committees on programme management. But the 
Council rejected the fundamental reform proposed 
by the Commission, as it would have meant losing 
some of its powers.
Even though Community research was now embed-
ded in the structure of the framework programme, 
the EEC still had no explicit competence in this 
area. After the adoption of the framework pro-
gramme, every Community scheme still required 
the unanimous approval of the Council under Art-
icle 235 of the EEC Treaty or under the Euratom or 
ECSC treaties. 
In quest of foundations 
for the future, 1985–86
The adoption of the first framework programme 
in 1984 gave a new impetus to research activities. 
But only a few months later, in the spring of 1985, 
France proposed a new framework for European 
cooperation in this area: the European Research 
Coordination Agency, better known by the name 
Eureka. Conceived in response to the United 
States’ strategic defence initiative, Eureka offered 
an intergovernmental alternative to cooperation 
under the auspices of the Community. There was 
a clash between two visions of common research 
policy: France viewed the Community as one form 
of cooperation among many, whereas the Commis-
sion’s ambition was for a Community that would 
encompass, more or less directly, all public meas-
ures on research in Europe.
At the Commission, Eureka was seen as a ‘blow be-
neath the belt’, an ‘anti-Commission explosion’ (1). 
While the single market was making great strides 
forward, Community research seemed to be strug-
gling against a strong headwind. The JRC faced 
a new crisis owing to management problems that 
had led to a delicate financial situation, and also 
because the United Kingdom, in particular, was 
no longer willing to fund this ultra-federalist in-
stitution. This crisis was resolved by agreeing on a 
(1) Interview with Jean-Pierre Contzen, 11 July 2011.
Poster for Comett, a cooperation programme between 
universities and enterprises in training relating to technology. 
During the period 1986–90, grants totalling ECU 52.5 million 
were paid out under Comett. The projects financed led to the 
establishment of 125 joint university–business consortia, more 
than 4 000 student work experience placements in companies 
in other Member States and 232 exchanges of staff between 
universities and businesses.
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certain amount of contract work for external third 
parties, and setting up a board of governors made 
up of representatives of the Member States. Offi-
cially, Jacques Delors welcomed the idea of Eure-
ka, but he also insisted that it be incorporated in 
the framework programme. In June, the Commis-
sion proposed setting up a European technological 
community that would embrace the framework 
programme, Eureka and other forms of European 
cooperation on technology. The idea turned out to 
be a ‘1-day wonder that came to nothing’ (1). So the 
Community did not become the supreme coordi-
(1) Interview with Herbert Allgeier, 4 November 2010.
nator of all European action in the field of research, 
but remained one alongside several others. 
Nevertheless, Community competence in the area 
of research, although not exclusive, was still ac-
knowledged by all the Member States. In February 
1986, the EEC Treaty was amended by the Single 
European Act, with a new Title VI (Article 130f to 
q) officially establishing Community research pol-
icy. This formally sanctioned the existing practices 
and confirmed the powers gradually acquired over 
the previous 20 years. Title VI set the Community 
the objective to ‘strengthen the scientific and tech-
nological basis of European industry and encourage 
it to become more competitive at international level’ 
(Article 130f(1)). Research policy was, then, explic-
itly aimed at industrial research rather than at basic 
research. It was also an element of the single market 
project, since it was intended to support cooperation 
between undertakings, ‘aiming, notably, at enabling 
[them] to exploit the Community’s internal market 
potential to the full’ (Art icle 130f(2)). Title VI also 
clearly spelled out the limits of Community com-
petence. Under Article 130g, Community activities 
were to ‘[complement] the activities carried out in 
the Member States’, while Article 130h stated that 
the Member States would coordinate their national 
research policies ‘in liaison with the Commission’. 
The framework programme still had to be adopted 
unanimously; adoption by qualified majority was 
not introduced until the Treaty of Amsterdam (2). 
Nevertheless, in 15 years the Commission had won 
recognition for a new common policy and laid down 
a solid foundation for its future.
Arthe Van Laer
(2) Elizalde, J., ‘Legal aspects of Community policy on research and techno-
logical development (RTD)’, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 29, No 2, 
1992, pp. 311–314.
At a time when the Commission was proposing to set up a 
European technological community, François Mitterrand and 
Helmut Kohl launched an intergovernmental alternative: Eureka 
(with an allusion to environmental research, liable to interest 
the German chancellor, whose country was suffering the effects 
of acid rain), here in a cartoon by Plantu from April 1985 
(Le douanier se fait la malle. 20 ans de dessins sur l’Europe, 
Le Monde Éditions, Paris, 1992, p. 87).
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Chapter 14  
Competition at the service 
of the market
Competition policy plays a fundamental role in the 
process of European integration because it must 
ensure that neither companies nor countries erect 
new barriers to trade once customs barriers in the 
common market have been removed  (1). The EEC 
Treaty conferred on the Commission the task of 
monitoring the behaviour of companies so that they 
did not share markets using a cartel or an agreement 
(Article  85) and so that a firm did not abuse its 
dominant position in a given market (Article  86). 
The treaty also granted the Commission the power 
to monitor and prohibit certain measures by Mem-
ber States, such as state aid (Articles 92 to 94) and 
certain measures in favour of public-sector under-
takings (Article 90).
(1) See Warlouzet, L., ‘The Rise of European competition policy, 1950–91: A 
cross-disciplinary survey of a contested policy sphere’, EUI Working Papers 
RSCAS 80, European University Institute, Florence, 2010, p. 39.
However, the Commission found it difficult to 
apply these ambitious provisions. Admittedly, 
competition policy was a new field in western 
Europe. It was developed in the United States as 
antitrust policy with the Sherman Act of 1890 
and did not cross the Atlantic until after the Sec-
ond World War. As early as the Hallstein period, 
the Commission developed an ambitious policy in 
the form of Regulation No 17 of 1962 that granted 
it many powers for overseeing agreements. How-
ever, the department responsible for implementing 
competition policy, DG  IV (Competition), had 
not succeeded in applying the policy effectively in 
the 1960s. Furthermore, the Community’s com-
petition policy had to be coordinated with other 
Community policies with complementary or 
even  contradictory objectives, such as regional or 
industrial policy. Accordingly, between 1973 and 
1986, the main challenge facing the Commission 
was to gradually implement an effective competi-
tion policy.
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Slow affirmation
The difficult context of the crisis years
The difficult economic situation resulting from the 
oil crises in 1973 and 1979 made it trickier to de-
velop Community action. The worsening crisis in 
the sectors that were industrialised first (coal min-
ing, steelmaking, textiles, shipbuilding) resulted 
in a rush to state aid and to crisis cartel practices (a 
temporary agreement involving independent com-
panies in the same sector with a view to limiting 
competition and possibly obtaining or defending 
monopolistic positions). In the EEC of Six, this type 
of subsidy to firms already existed in all the Member 
States, but was particularly evident in certain coun-
tries such as France and Italy. The 1973 enlargement, 
especially combined with the oil crisis, did not re-
solve the problem, quite the reverse. Jean-Louis 
Cadieux, who worked in the state aid department 
in DG IV, noted: ‘When the British joined, I would 
say that they even outdid the French, because with 
the Labour government  [1] we had aid appearing 
everywhere and in all sectors’ — an opinion still 
shared by Willy Schlieder, the Director-General for 
Competition, in 1981 (2). The Commission strove to 
monitor aid to check that it was compatible with the 
common market under Articles 92 to 94 of the EEC 
Treaty by requiring Member States to notify their 
draft decisions before they were adopted. However, 
the economic crisis made the problem particularly 
acute because the Member States greatly increased 
support for companies in difficulty.
(1) Harold Wilson’s Labour government, which returned to power in 1974.
(2) Interview with Jean-Louis Cadieux, 19  November 2010; HAEC, 
BAC 131/1996/135, Memo from DG XVI.A.2.JVG, 20 March 1981.
The gradual solution to the problem of 
agreements
Given this delicate situation, for a long time DG IV 
focused a large part of its energies on agreements. 
Regulation No 17, which had been adopted as early 
as 1962, granted the Commission a dual monopoly: 
information (any company that wanted to be ex-
empt from the prohibition had to notify its agree-
ments to the Commission) and decision-making 
(the Commission alone decided whether or not an 
agreement was admissible), including the imposi-
tion of sanctions in the form of fines. The link with 
the Member States was maintained by an advisory 
committee that gave its opinion on the future de-
cision, while the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities retained its role of judicial review. 
The Commission was therefore granted broad deci-
sion-making powers of its own.
The problems implementing Regulation No 17 were 
linked to the gap between the substantial number 
of notifications — up to 36 000 in 1966 — and the 
processing capacity in DG IV, which was limited by 
both the low staffing level and the fact that this field 
was still very new in Europe. The strategy chosen 
by DG IV was therefore to focus on block exemp-
tions; instead of taking a decision on all these cases, 
the Commission contented itself with several land-
mark decisions to establish case-law, and then pro-
posed an exemption regulation that set out the types 
of agreement that were authorised (i.e.  exempted 
from the prohibition in Article  85(1)). The Com-
mission obtained this power gradually from 1965, 
and increased the number of block exemptions, in 
particular under Frans Andriessen (commissioner 
for competition from 1981 to 1985). During this 
period, the regulations on specialisation agreements 
and on exclusive distribution and purchase agree-
ments were renewed (1982–83), while new regula-
tions were adopted for licences (1984), research and 
development agreements (1985) and motor-vehicle 
distribution (1985). The issue of franchise agree-
ments was dealt with in a regulation that had been 
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envisaged since 1985 and was finalised in 1988 (1). 
Its architect in DG IV, Jean Dubois, explained the 
process that led to the regulation being drafted, 
starting with complaints by firms, moving on to a 
consultation of all interested parties to define an 
acceptable model, and culminating in its final adop-
tion (2). The process of regulation by the Commis-
sion was therefore based on the working out of rules 
in complex markets by a constant interplay between 
the needs of the various economic operators — who 
were regularly consulted and whose interests  were 
often contradictory  — and the definition of the 
European interest. Gradually, the many pending 
cases were dealt with by these block exemptions or 
by case-law, without the Commission having to take 
a position on every individual case.
Inter-DG cooperation
In laying down and applying competition policy, 
DG  IV had to cooperate with other Commission 
departments such as the Legal Service, DG  III 
(Internal  Market and Industrial  Affairs) and 
DG XVI (Regional Policy). Thus, in the case of the 
regulations exempting research and development 
agreements and licensing agreements, the DG for 
Industrial Affairs, headed by Commissioner Éti-
enne Davignon, intervened frequently when it came 
to establishing the Commission’s position  (3). In 
order to deal with the crisis in the steel industry, a 
task force comprising DG III, DG IV and the DG 
managing the ECSC funds was successfully set up 
between 1981 and 1984. Its purpose was to coord-
(1) Regulations EEC (No) 3604/82 (specialisation) (OJ L  376, 31.12.1982, 
p.  33), EEC (No) 1983/83 and EEC (No) 1984/83 (exclusive distribu-
tion) (OJ L  173, 30.6.1983, pp.  1 and 5), EEC (No) 2349/84 (licences) 
(OJ L 219, 16.8.1984, p. 15), EEC (No) 123/85 (motor vehicle distribution) 
(OJ L 15, 18.1.1985, p. 16), EEC (No) 418/85 (research and development) 
(OJ L 53, 22.2.1985, p. 5) and EEC (No) 4087/88 (franchising) (OJ L 359, 
28.12.1988, p. 46).
(2) Interview with Jean Dubois, 16 February 2011.
(3) Van Laer, A., ‘Vers une politique industrielle commune. Les actions de la 
Commission européenne dans les secteurs de l’informatique et des télécom-
munications (1965–84)’, PhD thesis, UCL, Louvain-la-Neuve, 2010; 
HAEC, BAC 91/1994/57, Memo from Fernand Braun (DG III) to Hugo 
Paemen, Head of Cabinet to Étienne Davignon, 15 November 1983.
inate the monitoring of aid and the reduction of 
capacity (see Chapter  12, ‘Devising a strategy: the 
internal market and industrial policy’, and the 
‘Eurofer’ box, page 269). 
There was also close cooperation with DG  III in 
the field of state aid. The situation was particular-
ly problematic in the shipbuilding sector. Faced 
with increasing structural difficulties (oil crises, 
competition from Asia), the sector was receiving 
massive amounts of aid in all European countries. 
The Community’s action, which was rooted in the 
EEC  Treaty itself (Article  92(3)(c)), sought to co-
ordinate the national aid schemes in order to pre-
vent major distortions, facilitate rationalisation by 
reducing capacity and ensure flanking social meas-
ures. Many directives were adopted (the third in 
1975, the fourth in 1978, the fifth in 1981). Coordi-
nation was shared between DG IV and DG III; in 
1983–85 the latter wanted to launch a more global 
sectoral industrial policy, similar to that put into 
practice for the steel industry (4).
The dialogue with DG  XVI concerned the assess-
ment criteria for regional aid, which differed be-
tween the two DGs (5). DG XVI felt that DG IV’s 
approach did not take sufficient account of the 
wealth of the countries concerned in relation to the 
Community average. However, regional policy re-
mained modest throughout the 1970s, as did state 
aid control in general. DG  IV remained focused 
on resolving the difficult issue of agreements, even 
though the seeds of change had begun to germinate.
(4) HAEC, BAC  323/1993/209, Memo from Paul Waterschoot (DG III/
F3) to Rolf Möhler, 26  October 1983; BAC  323/1993/210, Memo from 
Daniele Verdiani (DG III/C), 11 January 1984; Memo from A. Van Rhijn 
(DG III) to Manfred Caspari (DG IV), 1 August 1985.
(5) Interview with George Rencki, 31 May 2011; HAEC, BAC 131/1996/134, 
Memo from DG XVI (Georges Rencki) to Riccardo Perissich, head of cab-
inet to Antonio Giolitti, 28 May 1984, and memo from Pierre Mathijsen 
(DG XVI) to Manfred Caspari (DG IV), 28 April 1983.
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Towards new developments
DG IV and the German experience
German competition policy, which came into 
being in 1957 and had been applied since 1 January 
1958, was not the first such policy in Europe, but 
it had quickly become the most active. To a great 
extent it inspired Regulation No  17, all the more 
so since the agreements sector in DG IV was dom-
inated by officials from Germany, in particular the 
influential Hans von der Groeben, the first Euro-
pean commissioner for competition (1958–67). The 
continuity with the 1960s remained strong in the 
period 1973–86 in relation to agreements, first be-
cause of the nationality of the two directors-general, 
who were German, but also because of their experi-
ence in DG IV during that decade. Willy Schlieder 
(director-general until 1981) had participated in 
the process that resulted in Regulation No 17. His 
successor, Manfred Caspari, had worked in the pri-
vate office of Commissioner Hans von der Groeben 
prior to occupying the post of director-general until 
1990. However, the German influence was neither 
exclusive nor unique. National competition policies 
had been applied for many years by other Mem-
ber  States, such as the United Kingdom (1948), 
France (1953) and the Netherlands (1956). Further-
more, it is striking that in DG IV German was only 
one working language among others; some direct or-
generals had the habit of holding their meetings in 
French, according to Jean Dubois (1). 
The operation of the DG changed gradually in the 
1980s thanks to the arrival of a new commission-
er, Frans Andriessen, and a new director-general, 
Manfred Caspari, who was a trained economist. 
They reorganised the internal structure, which be-
came sector-based rather than task-based. As part of 
this process, three directorates disappeared: Direct-
(1) Interview with Jean Dubois, 16 February 2011.
orate A, the inspections directorate, Directorate B, 
which was responsible for Articles 85 and 86 of the 
EEC Treaty (agreements and abuses of dominant 
positions), and Directorate  C, which handled the 
other types of cases (concentrations, ECSC rules, 
industrial property rights, energy, transport). To re-
place them, two directorates were set up that shared 
the different sectors of activity by amalgamating the 
former inspection units and the units responsible 
for decisions (B and C). To avoid divergences in ap-
plication between these sectoral units, a directorate 
for coordinating decisions was established that re-
tained segmentation by type of activity. A further 
development was the creation of a post of deputy 
director-general in 1984. The post was filled by 
Jean-Louis Cadieux, who had previously headed an 
inter-DG task force charged with the sensitive issue 
of the crisis in the steel industry (2).
The merging of influences
In addition to this German substratum, the increas-
ing influence of British and American practice was 
changing DG IV. First, the accession of the United 
Kingdom in 1973 brought in a country where busi-
ness law was much more developed. The style of 
pleading before the Court of Justice changed. Es-
sentially, procedures paid more heed to the rights 
of the defence with the creation by Andriessen (3) 
of the ‘hearing officer’. A further reason for creating 
this post was the removal of the division between 
inspection and assessment tasks during the 1984 re-
organisation. 
Next, the American antitrust experience rapidly 
became much more widely known, in particular 
through the evolution in Commission officials’ 
previous training, as stressed by John Temple Lang, 
himself an alumnus of the University  of Chicago: 
‘There  was certainly a general influence on Com-
(2) Interview with Jean-Louis Cadieux, 19 November 2010.
(3) Interview with Frans Andriessen, 14 October 2010.
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mission officials due to the fact that so many of 
them had studied in the United States and had 
studied American antitrust law. That became much 
more common in the 1980s and the 1990s  than 
it had been in the 1970s’  (1). To that extent, the 
change in DG  IV paralleled that taking place in 
DG II. Finally, the commissioners’ style was chang-
ing. The Dutchman Frans Andriessen asserted his 
dynamism in relation to his predecessor Raymond 
Vouel, who was more unassuming (2). The Irishman 
Peter  Sutherland succeeded him. He combined 
sound legal training, experience as a lawyer, in par-
ticular in the United States, and a political career 
during which he had served as a very young attor-
ney general (1981–85). As a former rugby player, 
Sutherland was notable for his fighting spirit dur-
ing his stint at the Commission (3). He symbolised 
the association of DG  IV’s long-established very 
solid legal expertise and a new willingness to meet 
head-on economic operators suspected of breaking 
the rules. This dynamic led the Commission to take 
multiple initiatives.
Multiple initiatives in the 
1980s
In the 1980s, the economic and intellectual con-
text and the single market programme acted as 
levers for the development of common rules for 
competition. The Commission took advantage of 
the more favourable context by launching a num-
ber of initiatives on competition, in both old and 
new areas.
(1) Interview with John Temple Lang, 15 February 2011.
(2) Interviews with Jean-Louis Cadieux, 19 November 2010, and Gianfranco 
Rocca, 8 October 2010.
(3) Ibid.
Progress on old issues
Ever since the 1960s, the Commission had not 
limited itself to actions under Article 85 against 
agreements. At a very early stage it also started work 
on curbing abuses of dominant positions using Art-
icle 86. The first prohibition decision, addressed to 
GEMA, a German company managing author’s 
rights, was thus taken in 1971. During the 1970s it 
was followed by a series of important decisions by 
which the Commission imposed heavy fines in par-
ticular on powerful American and Swiss groups that 
had abused their dominant positions in various mar-
kets in the European Community  (4). These deci-
sions were then upheld by the Court of Justice. It was 
using this legal basis that proceedings were started 
against the computer giant IBM (sometimes known 
as ‘big blue’), with the support of the commission-
er for industrial, technological and scientific affairs, 
(4) Commercial Solvents–ICI decision, OJ L 299, 31.12.1972, p. 51 — Joined 
Cases 6/73 and 7/73 [1974] ECR 223; Chiquita bananas decision, OJ L 95, 
9.4.1976, p. 1 — Case 27/76 [1978] ECR 207; Hoffmann-La Roche decision 
(vitamins), OJ L 223, 16.8.1976, p. 27 — Case 85/76 [1979] ECR 461.
IBM was a highly dominant player on the computer market in the 
1970s. The Commission’s competition case against it lasted for a 
decade before finally being settled out of court on 1 August 1984.
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Altiero Spinelli (see box, page 297). The then com-
missioner for competition, Albert Borschette, had 
wanted to go even further by attempting to use Art-
icle 86 (as interpreted by the Court of Justice in Con-
tinental Can) to obtain a power of control over con-
centrations. An initial draft regulation was tabled in 
1973 but the discussions were held up in the Coun-
cil and Coreper in 1974–75, before the Commis-
sion put forward new proposals under Andriessen 
in 1981 and then in 1984 (1). The impetus from the 
Single European Act gave new wings to this matter 
since it stimulated an increase in the number of com-
pany mergers. The work done by the Commission 
during the 1980s did not bear fruit until some years 
later, specifically with the merger regulation adopted 
by the Council in 1989. The Philip Morris judgment 
in 1987 helped break the deadlock in the negoti-
ations (2). The case concerned a partial concentration 
agreement between two tobacco multinationals. It 
had been the subject of many coordination meetings 
between DG IV and the Legal Service between 1982 
and 1984 because the powers that the treaty grant-
ed to the Commission in the field of concentrations 
were not clear (3). The negotiation process was then 
accelerated by determined action by Commissioner 
Peter Sutherland, who threatened to act without the 
regulation  (4), and was completed by his successor, 
Leon Brittan. The Council regulation of 21 Decem-
ber 1989 granted the Commission exclusive power 
of control over concentrations with a Community 
dimension.
(1) HAEC, BAC 104/1993/152, Memo from John Temple Lang to Paul 
Schmitt, 24 September 1981; Memo to Frans Andriessen, 6 March 1984; 
Memo from Manfred Caspari to Frans Andriessen, 30 November 1983. 
(2) Joined Cases 142/84 and 156/84 BAT and Reynolds v Commission [1987] 
ECR 4487.
(3) HAEC, BAC 176/1995/808, Memos from John Temple Lang (Legal Ser-
vice) to DG IV, 13 May 1982, and from Claus-Dieter Ehlermann to B. van 
der Esch, 21 February 1983; Memo from Manfred Caspari (DG IV), 22 De-
cember 1983.
(4) Interview with Peter Sutherland, 8 September 2011.
Work on state aid began very early on because of 
its prerogatives that the Treaty of Rome granted to 
the Commission in this area, but tangible results 
took a long time to emerge (5). The first urgent task 
was to provide a framework for the substantial in-
crease in aid to sectors in difficulty. The Commis-
sion took particularly strong action in two sectors 
where it had specific powers under the treaties: the 
steel industry under the ECSC Treaty (6) and ship-
building under the EEC Treaty (third directive in 
1975, fourth directive in 1978, fifth directive in 
1981). The task was to reconcile the demands of 
intra-Community competition and international 
competitiveness, and social and regional consider-
ations. Outside these very specific areas, the Com-
mission took other initiatives to affirm these pre-
rogatives, in particular by prohibiting Dutch aid 
to the American firm Philip Morris in 1979. This 
prohibition decision was confirmed by the Court 
of Justice in 1980, in a judgment that underlined 
the discretionary power available to the Commis-
sion when examining the compatibility of state aid 
with the common market  (7). At the same time, 
the Commission adopted Commission Directive 
80/723/EEC of 25 June 1980 on the transparency 
of financial relations between Member States and 
public undertakings. France, Italy and the Unit-
ed Kingdom unsuccessfully challenged the direct-
ive before the Court of Justice (8). 
(5) Interviews with Catherine Day, 9  September 2011, Étienne Davignon, 
14 September 2010, and Petrus (Pierre) Mathijsen, 14 June 2010.
(6) See Chapter 12, ‘Devising a strategy: the internal market and industrial pol-
icy’, and the box ‘Eurofer’ in Chapter 12, p. 269.
(7) Case 730/79 Philip Morris v Commission [1980] ECR 2671.
(8) Joined Cases 188/80 to 190/80 France, Italy and United Kingdom v Com-
mission [1982] ECR 2545.
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The Commission takes on IBM
Although the Commission only had relatively limited 
authority in the area of competition policy during the 
1970s, it decided to take on the computer giant IBM. At 
that time, the American multinational dominated the 
computer market (1). IBM’s competitors had taken many 
cases against it to the American antitrust authorities, 
criticising its dominant position. But IBM won all seven 
cases brought against it in the United States in the 
1970s (2). Even the American government abandoned 
its prosecution in January 1982.
The Commission, on the other hand, persisted in its 
investigation launched in 1973–74 on the basis of 
Article 86, with the support of the commissioner for 
industrial, technological and scientific affairs, 
Altiero Spinelli. Jean Dubois, who was handling this 
case at the time in DG IV, recalls the disarray in the 
Commission’s teams because of their lack of 
knowledge of a sector that was then very new. An 
in-house training seminar was therefore organised to 
remedy the lack of technical expertise among 
Commission officials (3). DG IV took IBM to task for not 
authorising the connection of peripherals from other 
companies. For its part, IBM did not hesitate to exert 
pressure on the European institution and even 
threatened to close its plant in Montpellier (4). Finally, 
the Commission notified a 1 000-page statement of 
objections to IBM in December 1980, to which the 
American firm responded with an 8 000-page file and 
a request for an oral hearing. The hearing was held in 
February 1982 and lasted no less than 8 days. Once 
again, Jean Dubois describes the gap between the 
power of the American multinational and the 
Commission’s resources. While the European team was 
struggling to take notes with just one secretary, IBM 
offered to help: ‘Then IBM said: “It’s not complicated, 
we will help you. We have a secretariat, can they come 
(1) The historical work of reference on this case  is: Van Laer, A., ‘Vers 
une politique industrielle commune. Les actions de la Commission 
européenne dans les secteurs de l’informatique et des télécommunica-
tions (1965–84)’, PhD thesis, UCL, Louvain-la-Neuve, 2010.
(2) Sobel, R., IBM — Colossus in Transition, Sidgwick & Jackson, Lon-
don, 1984, pp. 274–275.
(3) Interview with Jean Dubois, 16 February 2011.
(4) Ibid.
to take notes to prepare the verbatim record?” The plan 
was to prepare a verbatim record of every session. We 
said yes. The sessions lasted until 5 or 6 o’clock every 
evening and, the next morning, the verbatim record of 
the previous day was there, printed by IBM. They had 
resources that we certainly did not possess. They 
brought with them experts who explained some very 
interesting points, with video screenings’ (5). The 
American multinational even provided character 
witnesses such as the former American Secretary of 
State, Cyrus Vance, and the former European 
Commissioner, Robert Marjolin. IBM enjoyed 
considerable support from the American administration. 
In January 1982, the Department of Justice, after 
dropping its charges against IBM, advised Europeans to 
do the same. The American delegation to the European 
Commission even made official overtures. In the words 
of Frans Andriessen, ‘it really was David [against] 
Goliath’ (6). In the end, the Commission agreed to 
negotiate with IBM, even though Andriessen was still 
threatening to continue the official proceeding and 
conclude with a formal prohibition decision. Agreement 
was eventually reached on 1 August 1984. The 
Commission was tasked with checking that IBM was 
effectively implementing its commitments to open up 
to other brands’ peripherals (7).
This case illustrates the Commission’s ambition — it did 
not hesitate to take on a very powerful organisation 
outside Europe, which was supported by its major 
American ally — but also its independence. It also 
heralded other spectacular Commission decisions 
concerning non-European companies, such as the 
prohibition of the GE/Honeywell merger in 2001 or the 
2004 finding against Microsoft for abuse of its 
dominant position in a decision that cited the IBM 
case (8).
(5) Ibid.
(6) Interview with Frans Andriessen, 14 October 2010. 
(7) Fourteenth Report on Competition Policy, Office for Official Publi-
cations of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1985, para-
graphs 94–95.
(8) Commission decision of 24 May 2004 (Case COMP/C-3/37.792 — 
Microsoft), paragraph 22, OJ L 32, 6.2.2007, p. 23.
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This gradual affirmation, combined with the ex-
perience acquired in examining regional and sec-
toral aid, facilitated the work of Commissioner 
Peter Sutherland when he took over this question, 
which at the time was highlighted in the short 
section on competition policy in the 1985 White 
Paper  (1). In a single market, the removal of tariff 
and non-tariff barriers to trade must not be coun-
terbalanced by a large increase in public support for 
certain firms. A stock-taking of all state aids was 
therefore launched, which resulted in the publica-
tion of the ‘First survey on state aids in the Euro-
pean  Community’ (SEC(88) 1981 final of 13  De-
cember 1988) in 1988  (2). Crucial decisions were 
then prepared during this period, such as the Bous-
sac decision concerning the leading French textile 
firm. The size of this company and the scale of the 
aid it had received rapidly transformed this case into 
a prime example of the Commission’s determina-
tion to apply the rules on state aid more strictly (3). 
The case eventually led to an initial Commission 
decision at the end of 1986, and to the final decision 
in 1987 requiring the repayment of more than 
300 million French francs in unlawful aid (4).
New dossiers: sectoral liberalisation
The air transport sector had traditionally been or-
ganised around duopolies. Competition on a given 
international route was limited because, in general, 
only two airlines, often  flag  carriers, could carry 
passengers. Furthermore, fares were the subject of 
binding agreements. This situation evolved with the 
impetus provided by the international regulatory 
(1) ‘Completing the internal market’, White Paper from the Commission to 
the European Council (Milan, 28 and 29 June 1985), HAEC, COM(85) 
310 final, 14 June 1985, p. 39.
(2) Cini, M. and McGowan, L., Competition Policy in the European Union, 
Palgrave, Basingstoke, 1998, p. 145.
(3) HAEC, BAC 327/1994/159, Memo from G. Thies (DG IV) to Robert 
Sunnen, 11  October  1985; Letter from Frans Andriessen to Bob Cryer, 
28 November 1984.
(4) Commission Decision 87/585/EEC of 15 July 1987, OJ L 352, 15.12.1987, 
p. 42.
context — in particular the  deregulation under-
taken in the United States by the Carter administra-
tion in 1978 — and technological progress, with the 
reduction in the cost per passenger carried. New op-
erators entered the market. At the end of the 1970s, 
the Danish airline Sterling lodged a complaint with 
the Commission against the Danish government 
and the Scandinavian airline SAS about the latter’s 
dominant position, in particular on the Copen-
hagen–London route. The Commission did not 
agree with Sterling, but used this case to promote its 
plans to introduce more  flexibility  into the sector. 
The case was picked up by Lord Bethell, a Conserva-
tive member of the House of Lords and of the Euro-
pean  Parliament. In 1980, he set up the ‘Freedom 
of the skies’ campaign (5). In 1981, he even threat-
ened to lodge a complaint against the Commission 
with the Court of Justice if it did not intervene to 
enforce competition in the setting of air fares. The 
action against the Commission for failure to act was 
eventually dismissed by the Court in 1982 (6), but 
it left its mark. The Commission then continued its 
action, which paved the way for the first liberalisa-
tion directive in 1987.
In the field of telecommunications, the same phe-
nomenon of a radical change in the rules (liber-
alisation of monopolies and oligopolies in the 
United Kingdom and the United States) and tech-
nologies (convergence of communications and elec-
tronics by digitisation) affected Europe. Here again, 
the Commission’s action starting in the 1980s con-
sisted in gradually challenging the existing monop-
olies. This action paved the way for the 1987 Green 
Paper and the 1988 directive under Peter Suther-
land. The directive required liberalisation not only 
of public procurement (to break the exclusive rela-
tionship between national producers of telephone 
equipment and the public operating monopoly), but 
also of telephone services.
(5) HAEC, BAC 104/1993/61, Memo from Ian S. Forrester to Jean-Louis 
Cadieux, 13 May 1981.
(6) Case 246/81 Lord Bethell v Commission [1982] ECR 2277.
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Conclusion
During a large part of the period from 1973 to 
1986, the Commission’s action on competition 
remained limited by extremely powerful struc-
tural  and economic factors such as the successive 
economic crises and the very limited developments 
in national competition policies. However, at the 
end of the period, DG IV emerged as a particularly 
active Commission department by drawing upon a 
blend of the German tradition inherited from the 
Hallstein Commission and new dynamics. A field 
of multiple justifications and ramifications, compe-
tition policy underwent many developments. The 
Commission took advantage of a more favourable 
ideological context, the single market programme 
and the support of the Court of Justice on certain 
important cases. Initiatives blossomed in many areas 
with the arrival of Commissioner Frans Andriessen 
and would result in substantial delegation of powers 
under Commissioners Peter Sutherland (1985–89) 
and Leon Brittan (1989–93). 
Laurent Warlouzet
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Chapter 15  
Economic and monetary affairs: 
new challenges and ambitions
New conditions, 
new challenges
Until the early 1970s, the European economy was 
still being swept along by the dynamics of the 1960s, 
marked by Keynesian policies and growth. This cli-
mate made it easier to set up the common market 
and, with the 1971 Werner plan (1), to make a first 
attempt at economic and monetary union.
However, the situation deteriorated sharply in the 
1970s, with the collapse of the Bretton Woods in-
ternational monetary system and the oil crises of 
1973 and 1979. The new climate of stagflation — 
low growth accompanied by inflation — also saw a 
resurgence of national protectionism against a back-
(1) Bussière, É., ‘Moves towards an economic and monetary policy’, in Dumou-
lin, M. (ed.), The European Commission, 1958–72 — History and Memories, 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxem-
bourg, 2007, pp. 391–410.
ground of major differences in the economic prior-
ities of Member States, compounded by large infla-
tion differentials and serious monetary instability. 
These problems culminated, for the Euro peans, in 
the realisation at the start of the 1980s that there 
was a contrast between their performance — with 
low growth and high unemployment — and that of 
the United States. On the one hand ‘Eurosclerosis’, 
on the other a renewed dynamism, which many 
obser vers attributed to the virtues of the supply-side 
economics of Reagan’s America. 
This new situation, so different from that of the 
1960s, posed a major challenge for the Commis-
sion. The crisis was leading the Member States to 
renationalise policymaking and was posing a threat 
to economic union. A new economic strategy was 
therefore needed to restore dynamism and cohe-
sion within the Community. With this in view, the 
Commission had to intervene more forcibly in the 
debate, improving the expertise at its disposal; it 
had to suggest new strategies and regain the initi-
15
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ative, especially in the area of economic and mone-
tary union (EMU).
Actors and economic 
strategies
The task of identifying the major policy options 
fell in the main to the member of the Commission 
with responsibility for economic and financial 
affairs and the directorate-general of which the 
member was in charge (DG  II). Because of the 
importance attached to such matters, the mem-
bers of the Commission responsible were usually 
vice-presidents of the Commission, like Wilhelm 
Haferkamp from 1973 to 1976, and François-
Xavier Ortoli from 1977 to 1984, although Alois 
Pfeiffer, who was responsible for economic and 
financial affairs in the early years of the Delors 
Commission from 1985, was not. These were such 
important matters, however, that the presidents 
themselves often devoted a great deal of attention 
to them. Thus, when Roy Jenkins took office in 
1977, he took a number of initiatives in this field 
in spite of reservations on the part of François-
Xavier Ortoli. In 1985, Jacques Delors took charge 
of monetary affairs rather than leaving them in the 
hands of the commissioner with responsibility for 
DG II.
The change in the economic climate meant that the 
period from 1970 to 1980 was marked in Europe 
by intensive discussions on how to tackle the crisis, 
and the Commission — itself divided — did not es-
cape these discussions. As Robert Verrue explained, 
‘there was a very clear split among my colleagues be-
tween those who had studied in the United States 
or the United Kingdom — particularly the London 
School of Economics — and those who had fol-
lowed a more French approach, shall we say, typified 
by the Commissariat au Plan (planning commis-
sion), which was really very influential in Europe 
both politically and economically’  (1). The French 
tradition, passed down from Robert Marjolin and 
Raymond Barre, was carried on by François-Xavier 
Ortoli, who believed in targeted interventionism 
and who had become increasingly preoccupied with 
the convergence of economic and monetary policies 
by the end of the 1970s. The German view, domin-
ated by the social market economy, was represented 
at that time by two commissioners from the world 
of socialism and trade unionism, Haferkamp and 
Pfeiffer, who wanted to encourage growth with-
out conflict by promoting dialogue between the 
social partners so as to improve the consensus on 
the macroeconomic stability framework. In that 
respect, their ideas were close to those of a certain 
Jacques Delors, but also to those of François-Xavier 
Ortoli, who had tried to introduce elements of the 
German model in France in the 1960s (2).
Robert Verrue describes the synthesis which gradu-
ally emerged within the Commission through ‘the 
need to construct a “concept”, in the German sense 
of the word, an economic policy concept that would 
solve the European problem … which followed up 
new approaches in economics’  (3). Everyone, how-
ever, was influenced in the 1970s by Anglo-Saxon 
economic thinking, first by Keynesianism and then 
(1) Interview with Robert Verrue, 24 January 2011.
(2) Particularly during his time as commissioner for the plan from 1966 to 
1967, with Delors in charge of social affairs.
(3) Interview with Robert Verrue, 24 January 2011.
The consequences of the devaluation of the dollar, February 1973. 
Cartoon by Plantu.
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by monetarism and supply-side economics, which 
grew in influence during the 1980s. 
Organisational and management changes within 
DG II reflected these trends. An Italian former dip-
lomat, Ugo Mosca, had been at the reins of DG II 
since 1973. In 1979, he was succeeded by Tommaso 
Padoa-Schioppa, from the Banca d’Italia. An ex-
cellent administrator, he was also one of the most 
brilliant economists of his generation, and a former 
student of Franco Modigliani at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology. One of his colleagues at the 
time described him as ‘absolutely and implacably 
demanding in the service … of a long-term vision of 
the role of the directorate-general’  (1). Others said 
that he combined German discipline with Italian 
flair. As soon as he arrived, said Robert Verrue, 
‘the work of his departments changed. Because we 
knew what the boss wanted, the mechanism for 
giving him what he wanted was put in place, and 
throughout the whole of that time not even the 
slightest opinion could be offered … — in success 
as in failure — without an eye to the influence of 
Padoa-Schioppa’ (2). In March 1980, he reorganised 
the DG, primarily in order to improve its analytical 
capability by creating a new directorate for macro-
economic analyses and policies, headed by Michael 
Emerson, an economist from the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
and a former member of Roy Jenkins’s cabinet  (3). 
One of the main objectives of this reform was to 
bring about a change of scale by considering the 
Euro pean economy as a whole rather than the na-
tional economies separately. The introduction of 
new teams at the start of the 1980s also saw the de-
parture of Frédéric Boyer de La Giroday, who had 
for a long time been director of monetary affairs and 
who was the main mouthpiece within the Commis-
sion of the economist Robert Triffin; he was re-
placed by Jean-Paul Mingasson, who was soon to be 
(1) Interview with Hervé Carré, 3 July 2011.
(2) Interview with Robert Verrue, 24 January 2012.
(3) Interview with Michael Emerson, 26 July 2010.
a close collaborator of Jacques Delors on monetary 
questions. In 1983, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa was 
replaced by Massimo Russo, another Italian, who 
had spent most of his career at the International 
Monetary Fund. 
A new approach
As the Council decision of 22  March 1971 illus-
trates, at the start of the 1970s the Commission’s 
macroeconomic policy choices were still domin-
ated  by Keynesianism. At that time, fiscal policy 
was considered less a policy in its own right than the 
main instrument of short-term economic policy (4). 
As the aim was essentially to stabilise the economic 
cycle, a balance had to be found between acceptable 
levels of employment and inflation.
The arrival of the former German trade unionist 
Wilhelm Haferkamp in economic and financial af-
fairs in 1973 did not fundamentally alter this view. 
However, he did stress the need to introduce social 
dialogue into a Community-wide economic policy, 
basing his ideas on the German model with which 
he was familiar. In June 1976, the tripartite con-
ference on employment and stability in the Com-
munity, organised on the Commission’s initiative, 
established a link between the Commission and 
governments, as well as union and employer repre-
sentatives  (5). Haferkamp’s aim was to restore full 
employment and price stability linked to an elevat-
ed annual growth rate of approximately 5 %, i.e. a 
return to the growth rate of the 1960s, by linking 
salary increases to greater productivity. Gradually, 
though, a new paradigm emerged for monetary pol-
icy. This new paradigm was a consequence of the end 
of fixed exchange rates, which freed monetary pol-
icy from the objective of keeping the exchange rate 
(4) Maes, I., Economic Thought and the Making of European Monetary Union, 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2002, pp. 90–94.
(5) EC Commission, Annual Report on the Economic Situation 1976–77, 
OJ L 358, 29.12.1976, p. 13; see also Chapter 18, ‘Free movement of work-
ers, social rights and social affairs’.
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steady. In line with the new approach in the Bun-
desbank, which embarked on this course in 1975, 
managing the money supply became the foundation 
of a policy centred on controlling inflation. How-
ever, the Commission’s approach was more gradual. 
As late as 1977, it noted disappointing growth in 
the Community, which it attributed to unduly re-
strictive policies on the part of countries with strong 
currencies, especially Germany where public-sector 
deficits had been scaled down too quickly  (1). The 
(1) EC Commission, Annual Report on the Economic Situation 1977–78, 
OJ L 323, 19.12.1977, p. 3.
Commission accordingly promoted a growth scen-
ario that followed a Keynesian logic designed to 
boost demand by 1 point of GDP (2).
The annual economic report for 1980 marked a 
change of course characterised by the abandoning 
of active demand management policies and a move 
towards a medium-term supply policy with more 
structural ambitions. This new trend was clearly set 
out in the introduction to the 1980 report: ‘While, 
(2) Ibid., p. 5.
Young people demonstrate in support of a European currency in front of the Berlaymont, 5 December 1977.
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in the past, economic policy was often perceived as 
a problem of demand management in a world based 
on the assumption of unlimited supply of energy 
and raw materials, the importance and critical value 
of supply constraints and structural adjustment 
problems are now evident’  (1). The break with the 
policies of the past was thus very clearly expressed: 
‘The concerted response to the present general eco-
nomic situation should be based on the right strat-
egic mix of demand and supply policies and notably 
the right balance in their application to short- and 
medium-term problems. Short-term adjustments 
should be more moderate than at times in the last 
decade, and a heavier weight has to be given to re-
ducing medium-term inflationary expectations and 
improving supply conditions in the economy’  (2). 
This major change in direction followed the failure 
of the experiments in demand-driven recovery, par-
ticularly that launched on a Community scale at the 
Bonn European Council in 1978, which had been 
followed by major discussions on the effectiveness 
of this type of policy. Since the effectiveness of these 
detailed and short-term demand management pol-
icies had been called into question, attention turned 
towards medium-term economic policies aimed 
largely at improving the operation of the markets 
within the more general framework of supply-side 
policies.
The Commission therefore turned its efforts to-
wards the structural dimensions of the crisis: ‘The 
accumulated back-log of adjustments and ... our 
growing incapacity to respond quickly to the re-
cent changes in the economic environment. The 
increased structural rigidities in our economies and 
social behaviour have changed profoundly the long-
term dynamics of the business cycle’ (3). It stressed 
the structural nature of unemployment, which was 
partly connected with the cost of labour and the 
(1) EC Commission, ‘Annual economic report 1980–81’, European Economy, 
No 7, November 1980, p. 9.
(2) Ibid., p. 13.
(3) EC Commission, ‘Annual economic report 1982–83’, European Economy, 
No 14, November 1982, p. 11.
burden and structure of taxation. This was in addi-
tion to the growing rigidity of the labour market as 
a result of social legislation introduced in the 1960s. 
The Commission therefore based its employment 
policy on the creation of a stable macroeconomic 
environment, increased competitiveness of the en-
terprise sector by a deepening of the single market, 
wage restraint and a systematic reappraisal of labour 
market regulations (4).
The new Delors Commission, with Alois Pfeiffer as 
member of the Commission with responsibility for 
DG II, while not wishing to question the substance 
of the policy outlined since the beginning of the 
1980s, nevertheless wanted in 1985 to place greater 
emphasis on the ties between growth and employ-
ment through its cooperative strategy for growth 
and employment. This initiative, which was de-
signed to create closer links between the actions of 
the Community, governments and the two sides of 
industry in order to create growth that would gen-
erate more jobs, combined moderate growth in real 
wages and greater profitability for businesses and 
demand: ‘Only if wage moderation is accompanied 
by a sufficient level of aggregate demand can one 
have confidence that the process of improving prof-
itability and restructuring demand (relatively more 
investment and relatively less consumption) will be 
rapid enough and not involve drastic deflation that 
would place social consensus under considerable 
strain. Only in this way can wage moderation fulfil 
its employment function’ (5). This draft, which tied 
in with the relaunch of the single market and Ob-
jective 1992, was produced under the authority of 
Alois Pfeiffer and Ludwig Schubert, his economic 
affairs adviser, and therefore also emphasised dia-
logue between the social partners. As Schubert ob-
served, ‘Achieving the internal market was one of 
the major themes of that time. Our role was to show 
(4) EC Commission, ‘Annual economic report 1984–85’, European Economy, 
No 22, November 1984, pp. 33–34.
(5) EC Commission, ‘Annual economic report 1985–86’, European Economy, 
No 26, 1985, p. 10.
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that the growth potential created by the internal 
market had to be used effectively to enable actual 
growth — over and above productivity gains — to 
also create the jobs we so badly needed. This was an 
essential plank in what Delors used to call the “so-
cial dimension” of the internal market’ (1). 
All in all, the DG  II of the mid-1980s should be 
seen as a kind of melting pot of economic cultures 
in constant search of a combination that would be 
right for a European Community trying to find 
a new impetus. An official at the time lists the 
leading figures in this ongoing debate:  ‘There was 
Mingasson, the Frenchman, for him it was all about 
the European monetary system, monetary relations, 
monetary policy is the key element. Then there was 
Michael Emerson — Operation 1992, the internal 
markets, structural policies. Lastly there was the 
Rhenish contingent in the purest sense, Ludwig 
Schubert, who was an advocate of wage restraint 
in line with productivity to ensure that unit labour 
costs did not get out of hand … All the discussions 
centred on variants of these three approaches, which 
merged together’ (2).
The creation of the European 
Monetary System:  
the Commission in retreat
The first weeks in office in Brussels of François-
Xavier Ortoli coincided with the death throes of 
the Bretton Woods monetary system: the fixed 
pegs which were thought to have been preserved 
at the Washington conference in December 1971 
finally gave way to a general floating of currencies 
from March 1973. The Commission, which had 
worked non-stop on the introduction of the first 
attempt at economic and monetary union, tried 
to maintain stability at Community level by a 
(1) Interview with Ludwig Schubert, 8 October 2010.
(2) Interview with Fabio Colasanti, 25 January 2011.
joint flotation of the European currencies against 
the dollar (known as the ‘snake in the tunnel’). 
To this end, it wanted to ensure that the newly 
created European Monetary Cooperation Fund 
(EMCF) would have plenty of funds to intervene 
on the exchange markets to combat speculation (3). 
However, the Commission was ignored and the 
growing tensions on the market led to the break-
up of the snake, which by 1974 was reduced de 
facto to a sort of ‘mark area’ that the French franc 
tried, in vain, to join in 1975. Despite the prior-
ity given to reviving the economic and monetary 
union (EMU) project by Ortoli during his time as 
presi dent, the Commission continued in fact to be 
sidelined when the most important monetary de-
cisions were taken, the governments keeping this 
right for themselves, whether in a European forum 
such as Ecofin (Economic and Financial Affairs 
Council) or in the G5, to which the Commission 
tried to gain admittance in 1975 (4). This situation 
was typified by the way in which the Commission 
president was invited to meetings of the governors 
of the central banks of the Community countries 
in Basel, even at the beginning of the 1980s: ‘The 
welcome extended to the Commission was not very 
encouraging — the president had been put in a tiny 
office … ’ (5). 
The Marjolin report of March 1975 described this 
situation as a failure: ‘Europe is no nearer to EMU 
than in 1969. In fact if there has been any movement 
it has been backwards. The Europe of the 1960s 
represented a relatively harmonious economic and 
monetary entity which was undone in the course of 
recent years; national economic and monetary pol-
(3) HAEC, COM (73), Minutes No 244, second part, meeting of 11 March 
1973; François-Xavier Ortoli, ‘L’Europe au carrefour’, lecture in connec-
tion with the Paul-Henri Spaak Chair at the Institute for European Studies 
at the Free University of Brussels (ULB), 28 October 1976, pp. 14–15.
(4) HAEC, COM (75), Minutes No 362, second part, meeting of 3 December 
1975.
(5) Interview with Jean-Paul Mingasson, 11 October 2010.
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icies have never in 25 years been more discordant, 
more divergent, than they are today’ (1).
The Commission’s departments nevertheless devel-
oped a number of initiatives, some of which would 
have a lasting influence on the process of monetary 
unification. First, there was the study on the imple-
mentation of a parallel currency, which was consid-
ered at a very early stage in a study by Robert Mun-
dell, the future winner of the 1992 Nobel Prize in 
Economic Sciences, produced for the Commission 
in 1969 and published in 1973 (2). The parallel cur-
rency solution was also central to the 1975 All Saints 
manifesto, drawn up by a group of economists from 
(1) HAEC, BAC 241/1991/161, EC Commission, ‘Report of the study group 
“Economic and monetary union 1980”’, Marjolin report, Brussels, March 
1975, p. 1.
(2) Mundell, R., ‘Why Europa?’, European Economic Integration and Monetary 
Unification, Study Group on EMU, Brussels, 1973, pp. 110–122.
Community countries. The basic idea was to create 
a European currency, the ‘Europa’, which would 
compete with national currencies. The Optica re-
ports, produced at the request of the Commission, 
also returned to this notion of a parallel currency. 
Neither ministers nor central bank governors were 
won over by these initiatives, however. The develop-
ment of the private European currency unit (ecu) 
in the early 1980s would nonetheless be based on a 
fairly similar model. 
The Commission also took a close interest in the 
economic side of the EMU project, asking a group 
of experts, chaired by Donald MacDougall (with 
Michael Emerson as rapporteur), to study the 
budgetary implications of EMU. The MacDougall 
report thus provided a series of analyses and hypoth-
eses on the role of public finance at Community 
level. It established a link between deepening EMU 
Commission President Roy Jenkins (on the left) arriving at the European University Institute in Florence on 27 October 1977, the day when 
he delivered his famous speech advocating European monetary union.
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— completing the single market, introducing com-
mon policies, etc. — and the redistributive and sta-
bilising effects of a Community budget that was 
larger in terms of domestic product. Some of the 
conclusions of this report would be used by Roy Jen-
kins in his speech in Florence in 1977 (1). 
For Roy Jenkins, the European economy had to be 
put back on its feet and the Commission had to 
take back the initiative in this area, at the risk of 
upsetting the Member States and the central banks. 
The speech he gave at the European University 
Institute in Florence on 27  October 1977 was in-
tended to cause surprise, to create shock waves (2). 
On the monetary front, he wanted to relaunch the 
unification process; the loose cooperation offered by 
the snake was not enough. On the economic front, 
the Commission needed to stimulate the recovery 
by mobilising more resources, as recommended by 
the conclusions of the MacDougall report  (3). The 
Jenkins initiative was drawn up by his cabinet — in 
which Emerson played an essential role — and dis-
cussed in detail with Triffin, but Ortoli had doubts 
about the merits of the approach (4). Although there 
was no direct follow-up to the October 1977 initia-
tive, it came at just the right time and triggered the 
process that culminated in the European Monetary 
System (EMS).
The negotiations that led to the creation of the EMS 
in December 1978 began outside the Commission, 
however, and for a while the latter’s role became 
more of a technical one. Although President Valéry 
Giscard d’Estaing and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt 
discreetly kept Commission President Roy Jenkins 
informed, the Commission as such was not involved 
(1) EC Commission, Annual Report on the Economic Situation 1977–78, 
OJ L 323, 19.12.1977, p. 2.
(2) HAEC, Archive of speeches, ‘Current challenges and future opportuni-
ties for Europe’, speech given in Florence by Roy Jenkins at the first Jean 
Monnet conference, 27 October 1977.
(3) Ludlow, P., The Making of the European Monetary System: A Case-Study 
of the Politics of the European Community, Butterworth, London, 1982, 
pp. 39–40 and pp. 48–49. 
(4) Interview with Michael Emerson, 26 July 2010.
in the negotiations until the essentials had been 
agreed on. The competent Community bodies — 
the Monetary Committee, the Committee of Gov-
ernors and the finance ministers — only became in-
volved after the Bremen European Council in July 
1978. 
Like the snake, the EMS included an exchange-rate 
and intervention mechanism based on fluctuation 
margins of 2.25  % either side of bilateral central 
rates and on a number of lending and support mech-
anisms. The main innovation was the creation of a 
new instrument, the ecu — a basket of currencies 
designed to act as an intervention indicator and a 
means of settlement for central banks within the 
system. The December 1978 agreements provid-
ed for the creation, after 2 years of operation, of 
a European Monetary Fund which was to mark 
the  start of the second, institutional, stage of the 
system (5).
The Commission steps up its 
role
Once the EMS was actually launched on 13 March 
1979 — the delay caused by discussions on compen-
satory amounts for the common agricultural pol-
icy (6) — the Commission tried its best to consol-
idate it, so that it did not turn into a second snake, 
plagued by repeated realignments and member 
countries withdrawing from the system. However, 
most economic and monetary decisions fell to the 
Member States and not to the Community: ‘we had 
no idea what was going on’ (7). One of the priorities 
was therefore to strengthen the Commission’s role 
(5) One of the themes that was absent from the negotiations on the EMS 
was the movement of capital; see Bakker, A., The Liberalisation of Capital 
Movements in Europe — the Monetary Committee and Financial Integration 
1958–94, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1996.
(6) See Chapter 16, ‘Contested fields: the common agricultural policy and the 
common fisheries policy’.
(7) Interview with Hervé Carré, 3 July 2011.
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in the management of an EMS which was large-
ly in the hands of the central banks. With this in 
mind, DG  II’s Directorate for Monetary Affairs 
was boosted by the addition of an office in charge 
of the EMS, and a manual was produced laying 
down realignment procedures. The procedures for 
realignments gradually became more collegial. The 
first realignment was determined primarily by Ger-
many and the second and third — devaluations of 
the Danish krone and the Italian lira — were uni-
lateral decisions. As the Commission had not even 
been involved in the consultations between the cen-
tral banks regarding the Danish krone, Ortoli called 
for a reform of the procedures at a meeting of the 
Committee of Governors: ‘As regards the procedure 
applied in the case of the devaluation of the krone, 
while it is fortunate that consultations took place 
between the central banks, it is regrettable that the 
Commission was consulted only at a late stage, since 
the Commission is responsible for administering 
the agro-monetary system and realignments are not 
without consequences for this system (and in par-
ticular compensatory amounts). The procedures for 
realignments should therefore be re-examined’  (1). 
His argument was accepted. Tommaso Padoa- 
Schioppa, director-general of DG II from 1979 to 
1983, summarises the resulting changes thus: ‘The 
so-called hegemonic system was therefore aban-
doned following the first realignment and the uni-
lateral method characteristic of Bretton Woods 
was abandoned after the third’  (2). From then on, 
re alignments became more a Community decision.
In autumn 1979, the Commission drew up new 
proposals for improving the coordination of pol-
icies. Ortoli explained in Basel to the Committee 
of Governors that ‘monetary policy decisions, espe-
cially in the case of a large country, are not without 
their effects on developments within the EMS and 
(1) BNB archives, Minutes of the 140th meeting of the Committee of Gover-
nors, 11 December 1979.
(2) ‘Lessons from the European Monetary System’, in Padoa-Schioppa, T., The 
Road to Monetary Union in Europe, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1985, p. 73.
as a result such decisions should be subject to prior 
high-level consultation’  (3). His remarks met with 
little enthusiasm, however. The Commission’s pro-
posals, examined over the next few months by the 
central banks, had almost no effect. 
However, the tensions facing the EMS in the early 
1980s made a greater convergence of national pol-
icies essential, and realignments played a crucial 
part in a process that had become more commu-
nautaire. The example of France is indicative of this 
trend. When François Mitterrand became president 
of the republic in May 1981, it was not long before 
the question arose of the franc’s continued member-
ship of the EMS. French Finance Minister Jacques 
Delors, former Chairman of the European Parlia-
ment’s Economic and Monetary Affairs Commit-
tee, was at that time working closely with Tommaso 
Padoa-Schioppa and François-Xavier Ortoli. Their 
actions played a role in the change in economic 
policy direction adopted in Paris. The Commis-
sion was thus able to increase its role in supporting 
adjustment policies, as it itself explained in 1982: 
‘The June [1982] realignment is also indicative of 
a concern to establish greater convergence. In the 
countries whose currencies were devalued, stabil-
isation policies are now being applied. The French 
government has introduced measures intended rap-
idly to reduce the rate of inflation and to encourage 
the recovery of investment. The measures include 
a 4-month prices and incomes freeze, at the end 
of which the rate of inflation should have declined 
considerably, the control of public finances, with 
a budget deficit kept down to 3  % of GDP, and a 
return to a balanced budget for the social security 
funds. The countries whose currencies were re valued 
have recognised that the readjustment could make it 
easier for them to apply policies which would pro-
mote economic recovery. The Commission has, for 
its part, actively encouraged the process of conver-
gence. It has not confined itself simply to following 
(3) BNB archives, Minutes of the 140th meeting of the Committee of Gover-
nors, 11 December 1979.
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through as effectively as possible the coordination 
procedures for economic policies provided for in 
Community texts. It has tried to spell out what 
convergence should mean in practice’ (1) in terms of 
overall balance (budget, balance of payments, etc.) 
or inflation. In some cases, the recommendations 
of the Commission and the Monetary Committee 
came hand in hand with Community loans which 
made them easier to implement. The realignment 
of March 1983 and the austerity turn that followed 
were thus helped along by a Community loan, dis-
creetly negotiated between the French government 
and François-Xavier Ortoli, the member of the 
Commission responsible for economic affairs. The 
principle of convergence was now accepted by Mem-
ber States’ governments. The implementation of the 
EMS therefore also played an important role in the 
stabilisation and convergence policies of the 1980s.
The Commission also tried to implement the insti-
tutional phase of the EMS. Following on from its 
proposals of previous years, it submitted a dossier 
on ‘European Monetary Fund: preparatory works’ 
to the Monetary Committee with a number of 
memos on acceptance and convertibility/negotiabil-
ity of the ecu, liquidity of the fund, procedures for 
increasing EMS reserves, consolidation of Commu-
nity  appropriations in the European Monetary 
Fund, external role of the ecu and the European 
Monetary Fund: institutional aspects  (2). These 
attempts came to nothing, however, and the Com-
mission’s plans were shelved in December 1980. 
Padoa-Schioppa reacted sharply to this failure: 
‘There were all sorts of reasons for this: the second 
oil shock, the new inflationary upsurge that fol-
lowed, the rise in value of the dollar, centrifugal 
pressure as a result of these developments. But the 
main reason was, generally speaking, the distrust of 
the fund displayed, sometimes openly, by the mon-
(1) EC Commission, ‘Dossier on the European Monetary System’, European 
Economy, No 12, July 1982, p. 36.
(2) ‘Fonds monétaire européen, travaux préparatoires’, 5 November 1981, 
II/480/81.
etary authorities of the country with the strongest 
currency. A public opinion that was already less 
than favourable to the system was encouraged in its 
anti-EMS sentiments by the very authority respon-
sible for running it’ (3). 
The Commission then looked for other ways of 
strengthening the EMS. These efforts culminated 
in the proposals of March 1982 in favour of the 
non-institutional development of the EMS. These 
proposals were aimed first of all at increasing the 
role of the ecu in the exchange mechanism. The 
Commission also tried to promote the use of the 
ecu by the monetary authorities of countries outside 
the zone and to encourage its use on the financial 
markets by increasing the Community institutions’ 
issues in ecus and making private use easier. The 
Commission also put forward proposals that were 
more political in scope. Thus it attached great im-
portance to all the Community currencies’ joining 
the system, explaining that ‘the European Mon-
etary System will not assume its full significance and 
will not achieve its full potential until it organises, 
on an equal footing, the exchange rate relationships 
of all the Community currencies: sterling’s, and lat-
er the drachma’s, participation in the exchange rate 
mechanism (and the narrowing to 2.25  % of the 
Italian lira’s present margins) would bring the sys-
tem to full fruition and would act as a signal to the 
markets and to public opinion of the determination 
to pursue in common the attempt — accepted and 
recognised by all — to establish a zone of monetary 
stability in Europe’  (4). The Commission likewise 
suggested issuing an ecu coin to capture the public 
imagination, and pressed for the creation of an ecu 
clearing system, a brainchild of Robert Triffin. The 
development of a market in the ecu as a parallel cur-
rency, under the guidance of Padoa-Schioppa, was 
(3) Archives of Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa; Padoa-Schioppa, T., La direction 
générale des affaires économiques et financières de 1979 à 1983, EC 
Com mission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, 
Dir ector-General, 25 February 1983, p. 30. 
(4) EC Commission, ‘Dossier on the European Monetary System’, European 
Economy, No 12, July 1982, p. 52.
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therefore one of the cornerstones of the Commis-
sion’s action at that time (1). 
Under the Delors Commission, the process of 
European integration took off once more with the 
project for an internal market, designed to set in 
motion a chain of events leading from the single 
market to a single currency. In his address to the 
European Parliament in January 1985, Jacques De-
lors underlined the merits of the EMS, describing 
it as ‘an area of relative calm in a sea agitated by the 
wide and sudden fluctuations of currencies’ (2). He 
stressed that ‘a real Community currency’ was not 
yet on the agenda: ‘I am too well aware of the funda-
mental problems, notably for the central banks, and 
the technical complexities of monetary questions to 
make any hasty promises.’ His statement was very 
much in line with the Commission’s traditional 
recommendations on this matter, namely stepping 
up monetary cooperation and extending the role of 
the ecu: ‘No hasty promises. However, I do believe 
that a substantial strengthening of monetary co-
operation and a controlled extension of the roles of 
the official and the private ecu are both possible.’ 
The Single European Act of 1986 marked an essen-
tial stage in the consolidation and the construction 
of European economic and monetary union. As 
Jacques Delors noted in his memoirs, ‘Lastly, there 
was the Community’s monetary capacity. The ul-
timate battle in a sense. How could we conceive of 
total freedom of movement of capital, which was 
one of the main goals of Objective 1992, without 
giving thought to the necessary strengthening of 
monetary cooperation — in the EMS in the first 
(1) Interview with Massimo Russo, 30 June 2011.
(2) Delors, J., ‘Statement on the thrust of Commission policy’, Strasbourg, 
14 January 1985; Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement, No 1, 
1985, p. 12. 
instance, then within the economic and mon-
etary union? How could we not learn from this 
experience of cooperation, while at the same time 
maintaining the status of the European Monetary 
System which was outside the treaty? I wanted the 
treaty to acknowledge that the Community could 
provide itself with a monetary capability’  (3). De-
lors also recounts how he had to fight: ‘I coun-
ter-attacked by tabling a chapter for inclusion in 
the Single European Act. A classic example of a 
compromise that breaks the deadlock. Chapter  I 
was entitled “Cooperation in economic and mon-
etary policy”, with the sub-heading “Economic and 
monetary union”. The first article read: “In order to 
ensure the convergence of economic and monetary 
policies, Member States shall cooperate in accord-
ance with the objectives of Article 104. In so doing, 
they shall take account of the experience acquired 
in the European Monetary System (EMS) and in 
developing the ecu”’ (4). 
The single market and the creation of a Commu-
nity-wide capital market based on an end to ex-
change control would not be possible without the 
prospect of a future monetary union. The Single 
European Act provided the Communities with 
monetary capability and established the EMS and 
the development of the ecu as part of a dynamic 
which its supporters were not going to allow to lose 
momentum. The teams in charge of economic and 
monetary affairs in the mid-1980s and the 1990s 
would have the satisfaction of guiding the process 
to its conclusion.
Éric Bussière and Ivo Maes
(3) Delors, J. and Arnaud, J.-L., Mémoires, Plon, Paris, 2004, pp. 223–224.
(4) Ibid., p. 224.
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Chapter 16  
Contested fields: the common 
agricultural policy and the 
common fisheries policy
16.1. Adjusting a flagship 
policy: the common 
agricultural policy in 
the 1970s and 1980s
During the 1970s and the early 1980s, the com-
mon agricultural policy (CAP) remained one of 
the Community’s flagship policies, but its strengths 
and weaknesses were coming to the fore. The CAP 
was one of the first common policies that had been 
fleshed out in the course of the 1960s. Articles 38 
to 47 of the EEC Treaty decreed that the common 
market to be created should include agricultural 
products. The Community agricultural policy was 
to increase the productivity of the agricultural sec-
tor whilst taking account of the specific character 
of agricultural production, the social fabric of the 
agricultural population and the structural and nat-
ural disparities of production conditions. Ensuring 
the supply of agricultural goods to consumers at 
reasonable prices was also one of the policy’s aims, 
as was maintaining a fair standard of living for the 
agricultural community. Of the several options for 
the organisation of a common agricultural policy 
that the treaty provided, the Community opted for 
a fully integrated common agricultural market with 
shared price and market mechanisms, guided and 
managed by the Commission. Since the early 1960s, 
the core principles of the CAP were market unity, 
Community preference and financial solidarity. 
The CAP became fully operational in July 1968; 
its completion was generally seen as a major suc-
cess for European integration. The Member States’ 
agricultural policy was now managed at Commu-
nity level. This brought with it great challenges and 
16
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responsibilities for the Commission. It is important 
to remember that the CAP was founded in a period 
when agriculture, forestry and fisheries represented 
over 20 % of the workforce and contributed around 
11 % of GDP. In the post-war period, agriculture was 
an economic sector in transition and suffering from 
a number of structural problems, such as the exodus 
of rural labour, low incomes and low productivity. 
The Community agricultural policy thus had to ad-
dress these problems through market measures and 
structural policy. At the same time (and this was the 
Commission’s main concern), the agricultural mar-
kets had to be kept in balance, avoiding shortages 
and surpluses of foodstuffs, and meeting the needs 
of both farmers and consumers.
The milk lakes and butter mountains which made 
the headlines in the 1970s and the early 1980s 
illus trate how difficult it was to achieve a balanced 
agricultural market, not least because these surplus-
es were caused by a whole range of factors, the most 
important being technical progress in the agricul-
tural sector. This chapter discusses the challenges 
the Commission faced in agricultural policy by 
addressing internal developments in market and 
structural policy. The external dimension — en-
largements and international negotiations — to-
gether with monetary turbulences formed another 
set of challenges the Commission had to negotiate. 
Finally, the imbalance of supply and demand and 
the resulting increase in costs of the agricultural 
support mechanisms became untenable and led the 
Commission to propose adjustments to the CAP. 
DG VI: a well-oiled machine
In 1973, Sicco Mansholt, the ‘father’ of the CAP, 
left the Commission. Mansholt had dominated 
agricultural affairs in Europe since the 1950s and 
his was a difficult act for his successors to follow. His 
immediate successor, Pierre Lardinois  (1973–76), 
was seen as a good manager of the policy and, due to 
his experience as agricultural minister in the Neth-
erlands, he had excellent relations with the Council 
of Ministers. However, he was not perceived as being 
very imaginative. According to Michael Franklin, 
deputy director-general in DG VI in the early 1970s, 
‘the pendulum has swung too far from Mansholt’s 
grand design to Lardinois’s daily patchwork’  (1). 
Pierre Lardinois’s successor, the Dane Finn Olav 
Gundelach (1977–81), was the first commissioner 
for agriculture who had not previously been agricul-
ture minister in his home country. Gundelach took 
over the agriculture portfolio in a difficult period 
of mounting agricultural surpluses. His answer was 
to press for a more prudent price policy. Following 
Gundelach’s sudden death in January 1981, Dan-
ish Agriculture Minister Poul Dalsager (1981–84) 
took over. Under Dalsager, the Community faced 
its worst budgetary crisis. As a response, the Com-
mission successfully introduced measures to bring 
down the costs of agricultural support  (2). When 
Frans Andriessen (1985–89), formerly a minister of 
finance in the Netherlands, took over the agricul-
ture portfolio in 1985, he had already served a term 
as the commissioner for competition. Under An-
driessen, the Commission started to develop a new 
outlook on the role of agriculture in society.
The commissioners for agriculture changed fre-
quently, while DG VI had only three directors- 
general between 1958 and 1986, all of them French. 
The first, Louis Georges Rabot, who retired in 1978, 
had served DG VI for 20 years. In the Commission, 
Rabot was an outstanding figure who had made a 
major contribution to setting up the CAP. His suc-
cessor, Claude Villain, was perceived as a strong per-
sonality. Although this did not always make for an 
easy relationship with his staff, he was generally per-
ceived as an able director-general (3). When Villain 
left the Commission in 1985, Guy Legras took over 
(1) Interview with Michael Franklin, 5 August 2010, reading an entry from his 
diary of 1976.
(2) Interviews with Michel Jacquot, 9 September 2010, and Peter Pooley, 
10 August 2010.
(3) Interviews with Claude Villain, 19 September 2011, and Peter Pooley, 
10 August 2010.
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as director-general. A former French diplomat, he 
played an important role in defending the CAP in 
the GATT Uruguay Round, starting in 1986.
During the 1970s and the early 1980s, DG VI con-
tinued to be one of the largest DGs in the Commis-
sion. The belief that European integration was most 
tangible and concrete in the CAP was fully accept-
ed in the Commission and it was the credo in DG 
VI. As David Williamson, deputy director-general 
of DG VI, pointed out: ‘Because agriculture was 
a fully working European policy, you know, that 
gave it a special status. Some may occasionally have 
viewed it as a bad policy, but it was a fully working 
policy and was, as such, considered as the way we 
ought to work in Europe’ (1). 
(1) Interview with David Williamson, 28 July 2010; see also interview with 
Claude Villain, 19 September 2011.
Controlling the agricultural markets
‘Mr Lardinois, when commissioner, was asked to re-
port on agriculture to the ministers one year and he 
said: “Europe has been fed this year”. That’s what we 
were doing. Some people don’t quite understand it, 
but without this system the whole thing would have 
broken down’ (2).
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, market policy 
and price policy were the main instruments used to 
achieve a balance between supply and demand, bind-
ing most of the Community’s financial resources in 
the guarantee section of the European Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF). During 
the 1960s, the Community had devised market or-
ganisations for different agricultural products that 
were managed by the Commission. DG VI officials 
chaired management committees in which national 
officials came together at regular intervals, some-
times weekly, to decide on levies and intervention 
sales and other measures to keep the markets for 
the different products in balance. This manage-
ment side was very time consuming and DG VI of-
ficials had a great deal of responsibility (3). On top 
of that, the deputy director-general responsible for 
markets represented DG VI at the weekly meeting 
of the Special Agriculture Committee where senior 
agriculture officials either from national ministries 
or the permanent representations met to consider 
Commission proposals and to prepare decisions of 
the Council of Ministers.
For several agricultural products, mainly milk and 
dairy products, cereals, sugar and beef, the Coun-
cil had to decide annually, on a proposal from the 
Commission, on a range of prices that were to be 
set for the marketing year ahead and on other mar-
ket measures. These are key elements of a managed 
market as opposed to a free market where supply, 
demand and prices are self-regulatory. As farmers’ 
(2) Interview with David Williamson, 28 July 2010.
(3) Ibid.
Agricultural Europe — a Community action. A poster from 
1978 detailing the principles and achievements of the common 
agricultural policy. 
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incomes were perceived as being directly dependent 
on the price levels of the different products, in some 
areas, such as milk, the Community had ended up 
with high prices that had triggered a considerable 
increase in production and had left the Community 
with a structural surplus. Nonetheless, the pre-
occupation with income levels in farming remained 
an important guiding factor in CAP policymaking 
for the Commission as well as for the Council of 
Ministers and the European Parliament. The aim 
of raising farmers’ incomes was enshrined in Art-
icle  39(1)(b) of the EEC Treaty: ‘thus to ensure a 
fair standard of living for the agricultural commu-
nity, in particular by increasing the individual earn-
ings of persons engaged in agriculture’. This article 
followed on from Article 39(1)(a), which outlined 
the aim of increasing agricultural productivity as 
a ne cessary precondition for an increase in farm 
incomes. However, only raising food commodity 
prices, and not the rationalisation of production 
methods, came to be seen as the primary means 
of improving farmers’ standard of living. Conse-
quently, it was in the annual price negotiations in 
the Council of Ministers that agriculture ministers 
sought to improve the situation of their farmers. 
‘On the key budget side, at that time it was, I 
would say, an open purse. I mean by this that we 
didn’t actually feel the financial pressure,’ Frank-
lin acknowledges retrospectively  (1). In the early 
and mid-1970s the Commission’s price proposals 
consequently became generous. The Council usu-
ally increased prices far beyond the Commission’s 
proposals. High inflation rates hitting the Member 
States in the aftermath of the oil shock also part-
ly explain price increases in the mid-1970s. Later, 
under Commissioner Gundelach, the Commis-
sion pursued a prudent price policy, leading to less 
marked price increases. 
The Commission’s track record in achieving market 
balance was thus mixed. During the 1973–74 world 
food crisis, European prices remained lower than 
world market prices, thus ensuring supplies reached 
consumers at reasonable prices as required by Art-
icle 39(1)(e). On the other hand, technical improve-
ments in farming methods as well as incentives pro-
vided by the Community’s market and price policy 
led to surpluses for a number of agricultural prod-
ucts. As the costs for storage and market support in-
creased and, perhaps more importantly, as the image 
of the Community began to suffer, the Commission 
worked hard to find solutions to the problem. 
Structural policy
The Commission’s core idea since the late 1950s 
was that improving farm structures would increase 
the productivity of farmers, raise farm incomes and 
eventually allow for a lower level of agricultural 
prices, thus ensuring supplies reached consumers 
at low prices. Market and price policy should thus 
go hand in hand with structural policy measures, 
(1) Interview with Michael Franklin, 5 August 2010.
Farmers collared by agricultural policy. French cartoonist Plantu’s 
image of power relations in the common agricultural policy, 
September 1974. (Cartoon by Plantu, published in Le douanier 
se fait la malle. 20 ans de dessins sur l’Europe, Le Monde Éditions, 
Paris, 1992, p. 10.)
317Chapter 16 — Contested fields: the common agricultural policy and the common fisheries policy 
financed through the EAGGF ‘Guidance’ section. 
However, structural policy had been the last bas-
tion of control of national agriculture ministries 
and a Commu nity structural policy for agriculture 
was only born in 1972, with three directives on the 
modernisation of farms (72/159/EEC), the cessa-
tion of farming (72/160/EEC) and the improve-
ment of vocational training and guidance of persons 
engaged in agriculture (72/161/EEC). These direct-
ives launched a Community structural policy and 
were subsequently extended and updated. Under 
Gundelach, important new regulations came into 
being, one on improving processing and marketing 
structures in agriculture ((EEC) No  355/77) and 
the other ((EEC) No 1360/78) on setting up pro-
ducer groups in Belgium, Italy and some regions of 
France to improve the performance of producers in 
the market. 
Faced with the problem of population exodus from 
mountainous areas, the Commission drafted a dir-
ective on mountainous and deprived areas that the 
Council pledged to adopt in its resolution of May 
1973  (1). Georges Rencki, then in charge of the 
measure in DG VI,  relates the rationale of granting 
direct payments to farmers, as envisaged in the dir-
ective, to the interest the Community had in keep-
ing farmers in mountainous areas where the land-
scape prevented them from ever running efficient 
(1) Council resolution of 15 May 1973 on farming in certain less-favoured 
areas, COM(73) 202 final, OJ C 33, 23.5.1973, p. 1.
A bureaucrat’s dream or nightmare? The EAGGF files in the Commission in the 1980s.
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and profitable farms  (1). Under Directive  75/268/
EEC, which was adopted on 28 April 1975, Mem-
ber States were authorised to grant aid to farmers in 
regions corresponding to criteria fixed by the Com-
munity (e.g. steepness of slopes, duration of vegeta-
tion). These national measures were co-financed by 
the EAGGF. In fact, the directive for the first time 
provided for the possibility of granting direct aid to 
the agricultural sector. 
In 1984–85, a new policy on structures in the sec-
tor was in the making, starting with a reform of the 
1972 directives, due to expire in 1984. This over-
haul was increasingly geared towards a qualitative 
improvement of production and thus demonstrates 
the slow change in the perception of agricultural 
policy (2). Over time, the aims of structural policy 
changed. Initially conceived with the aim of help-
ing small and backward farms to become larger and 
more efficient, as shown by the three Mansholt dir-
ectives of 1972, structural policy focused increas-
ingly on the notion of improving rural space, en-
compassing a broader view of agriculture as part of 
the rural economy (3).
The CAP in a changing environment: 
enlargement and international affairs
Both the northern and southern enlargements had 
a strong impact on the CAP. The United Kingdom, 
for example, imported a lot of its foodstuffs from 
Commonwealth countries. This had to be accom-
modated into the CAP framework  (4). Import 
quotas, for example for New Zealand butter and 
sheepmeat, were fixed but were often seen as insuf-
ficient by the British government and the exporting 
(1) Interview with Georges Rencki, 31 May 2011.
(2) ‘A future for Community agriculture — Commission guidelines following 
the consultations in connection with the Green Paper’, COM(85) 750 final, 
18 December 1985, p. 16.
(3) Interview with Helmut von Verschuer, 11 and 12 October 2010.
(4) Franklin, M., Joining the CAP — The Agricultural Negotiations for British 
Accession to the European Economic Community, 1961–73, Peter Lang, Ox-
ford, 2010.
countries. In 1974–75, the new British Labour gov-
ernment demanded a renegotiation of the British 
terms of entry, one of the elements being the con-
cern to guarantee the continued access of non- 
European producers, particularly from the Com-
monwealth, to the British food market. 
Once renegotiation was completed, the British con-
tribution to the budget became the next problem. 
Due to its small and efficient agricultural sector, the 
United Kingdom received far less from the Com-
munity budget, in particular EAGGF guarantees, 
than large producer countries such as France. This 
problem occupied the Community from the late 
1970s, when the cap on the Irish and British con-
tributions agreed on upon accession was due to 
expire, to the Fontainebleau Summit in 1984. The 
rising cost of the CAP contributed to exacerbating 
the British budget problem, although an attempt 
by the British agriculture minister in 1980 to link 
the budget negotiations and the concurrent annual 
price fixing negotiations failed.
With the accession of Greece and the prospect of 
enlarging the Community to Spain and Portugal, 
the weight shifted from northern products, such as 
cereals and dairy, to southern products, such as wine, 
fruit and vegetables, olive oil and tobacco. Moreover, 
producers of southern products often felt that their 
markets were less protected than those of northern 
products. The Commission tried to counterbalance 
this, and expenditure in agricultural guarantees was 
redirected towards the support of Mediterranean 
products, which rose from 8.9 % of agricultural mar-
ket support in 1978 to 22 % in 1982 (5).
Another problem was that, from a structural and 
natural resources perspective, the agricultural sector 
of the southern Member States was lagging behind. 
(5) HAEC, Archive of speeches, ‘Mediterranean agriculture: problems and 
prospects’, Speech by Poul Dalsager to a group of Community journalists 
visiting Greece to study the problems of Mediterranean agriculture, Ath-
ens, 22 November 1982.
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Farm incomes in Greece, Italy and southern France 
were on average much lower and holdings were on 
average much smaller and less productive than in 
the rest of the Community. This gap between north 
and south would increase once Spain and Portugal 
joined the Community. 
The Commission had studied the Mediterranean 
problem since 1975 and produced a communica-
tion to the Council in 1977 which included special 
measures for southern agriculture. However, Gun-
delach understood that agriculture was only one of 
the problems of structurally weak regions and that 
the fundamental difficulty was the general under-
development of the periphery of the Commu-
nity  (1). With the second southern enlargement 
imminent, this was moving more into the centre of 
attention of the Commission (2). 
These ideas fed into the integrated Mediterranean 
programmes (IMPs), which put a strong emphasis 
on modernising agriculture but which were also 
geared towards the broader aim of improving re-
gional economies. The Council and the Commis-
sion worked on the IMPs during the early 1980s 
with the Fontainebleau European Council of 1984 
giving a firm commitment to carry them out  (3). 
The IMP pilot projects were carried out in 1984 
and 1985 and the Community financial contribu-
tion drew on all three existing Structural Funds (4). 
The IMPs were finally implemented in 1986 and 
the Community pledged to devote ECU 6.6 billion 
over 7 years to the modernisation of the economy 
of Greece and certain Mediterranean regions of 
France and Italy. 
(1) Interview with Jens Hauge Pedersen, 2 May 2011.
(2) ‘Mediterranean agricultural problems’, Communication from the Com-
mission to the Council, COM(77) 140 final, 1  April 1977; Ranieri di 
Carpegna archives, ‘Le problème Nord/Sud dans le secteur agricole’, 
SEC(87) 44, 13 January 1987.
(3) ‘Integrated Mediterranean programmes’, Commission communication, 
20  February 1985, Bulletin of the European Communities, No 2, 1985, 
pp. 9–11.
(4) See Chapter 17, ‘Regional policy: a tangible expression of European soli-
darity’.
The status the Community acquired in the 1970s 
as a major exporter of agricultural products led to 
difficulties with other exporting countries such as 
Australia, New Zealand  and the United States (5). 
It also affected up-and-coming exporting nations 
such as Argentina, Brazil and Thailand. Trade con-
cessions were, however, made in the Community’s 
relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific states 
(ACP); the Lomé agreements granted export quotas 
to ACP countries  (6). With the sugar protocol at-
tached to Lomé I, for example, the Community 
agreed to purchase and import from the sugar- 
producing ACP states a guaranteed quantity of 
sugar that would benefit from the same regime as 
Community-produced sugar. Lomé III was even 
more geared towards agricultural cooperation and 
provided for the free entry of 96 % of products ex-
ported by ACP countries. 
The international dimension of the CAP gave the 
Commission the opportunity to negotiate on be-
half of the Community. It represented the Com-
munity in, for example, the International Wheat 
Agreement and the International Sugar Agreement. 
Moreover, the Commission obtained the right to 
negotiate in the GATT on behalf of the Commu-
nity; the fact that the Commission, and not individ-
ual Member States, negotiated agricultural matters 
helped to keep the policy intact. On the other hand, 
the international dimension resulted in a great deal 
of pressure on the CAP. While in the GATT ne-
gotiations of the Kennedy Round (1964–67) the 
CAP remained unscathed, the climate at the Tokyo 
Round (1973–79) had become harsher with coun-
tries such as Australia and the United States openly 
attacking the CAP (7). Their aim was to treat agri-
culture not in a separate negotiating group, but as a 
sector of the economy like any other. 
(5) Interview with Michel Jacquot, 9 September 2010.
(6) See Chapter 22, ‘Development aid: historic priorities and new dynamics’.
(7) HAEC, BAC 48/1984/234, Memo from Leslie Fielding to David Hannay, 
‘Australia’s relations with the Community’, Policy statement by the Aus-
tralian foreign minister, 28 July 1976, pp. 16–18.
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The CAP got off lightly in the Tokyo Round; the 
final Commission communication to the Council 
of October 1979 reiterates the European Commu-
nity’s victory in separating the negotiations on in-
dustrial goods from those on agricultural goods: 
‘This recognition of the specific nature of agricul-
ture has made it possible not to call into question 
the common agricultural policy’ (1). 
In the subsequent GATT round, launched at Punta 
del Este in September 1986, this special status of the 
CAP came under much more serious threat. This 
time, a group of exporting countries, the so-called 
Cairns group, put even more pressure on the Euro-
peans to liberalise agricultural trade and to abolish 
export subsidies. The Commission was thus in the 
difficult position of having to face the maximalist 
claims by the Cairns group, as well as Canada and 
the United States, targeting export subsidies. Even-
tually, the Uruguay Round (1986–94) would con-
tribute to speeding up the CAP reform in the form 
of the MacSharry reforms of 1992.
The CAP and ‘green money’
The economic and monetary troubles of the 1970s 
affected the CAP considerably. The unity of the 
common agricultural market had been expressed 
in the uniformity of institutional prices, the 
agricultural unit of account (AUA) (‘green money’), 
initially corresponding in value to the US dollar 
and the ordinary unit of account. As a consequence 
of the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system 
in the late 1960s, this unity was under threat as 
Member State currencies started fluctuating. In 
(1) HAEC, BAC 48/1984/238, Memos on the negotiations, pp.  563–573; 
HAEC, ‘GATT multilateral trade negotiations’, Communication from the 
Commission to the Council, COM(79) 514 final, 8 October 1979. 
1969, the French franc was devalued and the Ger-
man mark was revalued, which affected the value of 
these countries’ agricultural products; in the case 
of France they became cheaper, and for Germany 
they became more expensive. To balance these dif-
ferences, the Community introduced export levies 
imposed at the French border and subsidies paid 
on imports to France; in the German case, import 
levies were raised and an export subsidy imposed 
on German agricultural products. These original 
monetary compensatory amounts (MCAs) were at 
first seen as a temporary measure but, as monetary 
turbulence persisted, they were introduced on a per-
manent basis in 1971 (2). While they protected the 
price intervention mechanism and thus upheld the 
market unity principle of the CAP, the MCAs had 
problematic side-effects on consumption, produc-
tion and trade. MCAs were only applied to products 
for which intervention buying existed, such as cere-
als, milk and sugar, whereas other product groups 
immediately felt changes in currency values. More-
over, the system distorted common pricing and led 
to the existence, in the late 1970s, of seven separate 
price zones and increased the financial burden of the 
EAGGF. Throughout the period, the Commission 
thus argued strongly in favour of dismantling the 
MCAs (3). However, due to the large gap between 
strong and weak currencies, this proved difficult. 
Member States with strong currencies, such as Ger-
many and the Netherlands, came to rely on them 
as additional income aids for their farmers. The in-
troduction of the European Monetary System was 
a missed opportunity for dismantling the MCAs, 
a step which was only agreed at the Fontainebleau 
Summit in June 1984 in return for additional aid 
for German farmers. 
(2) Fennell R., The Common Agricultural Policy — Continuity and Change, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997, p. 89 et seq.
(3) HAEC, ‘Economic effects of the agri-monetary system’, Communication 
from the Commission to the Council, COM(78) 20 final, 10  February 
1978.
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Adjusting the common agricultural 
policy
Expenditure on agricultural market-support ar-
rangements through the EAGGF ‘Guarantee’ sec-
tion (EAGGF guarantee) had grown considerably 
in real terms by the mid-1980s and amounted to 
around two thirds of Community spending. Three 
instruments were available to stabilise food pric-
es within the Community: a variable import levy, 
which raised the price of imported food from pro-
ducers outside the Community, intervention pur-
chases (and, to a lesser extent, sales), which aimed 
to maintain price levels within the Community 
market, and export subsidies to enable Community 
supplies to be sold on the lower-priced markets of 
the world. The amounts to be spent on the EAGGF 
guarantee were not fixed, only forecast — the actu-
al spending on agricultural support would depend 
both on the prices set for agricultural products and 
on a range of conditions — dollar exchange rates, 
world prices, weather conditions, etc. — that were 
beyond the control of the Community. Expenditure 
for the EAGGF guarantee was not adequately con-
strained by budgetary procedures and could exceed 
the amounts forecast in the budget. 
As the costs of the support system grew and surplus-
es began to damage the image of the CAP, the Com-
mission attempted to diversify the instruments of 
the policy but did not propose a serious overhaul of 
the CAP mechanisms and aims. And even if it had 
put forward such an overhaul, the barriers to chang-
ing the policy would have been extremely high. Be-
sides resistance from within DG VI, where reform 
was seen as a ‘dirty word’ (2), and from some com-
missioners, the Council of Ministers itself was not 
likely to endorse change easily as the struggle to in-
troduce even minor modifications shows. Therefore, 
between 1973 and 1986, the Commission’s strategy 
(2) Interview with Michael Franklin, 5 August 2010.
For The Economist, the Tacitus quote ‘he was capable of 
ruling, if only he hadn’t ruled’ expresses the inability of the 
EEC members to apply the Treaty of Rome. In this issue, on the 
occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, the CAP is 
depicted as an achievement adorning the tombstone of the EEC.
Christmas butter
‘For the butter, the only outlet was to outside 
the Community using export subsidies. The only 
market was Russia and, at that time, we were in 
the middle of the Cold War. Feeding Russians 
who could for 2.8 francs buy a kilo of butter 
which cost 28 francs in Europe was scandalous. 
The European Parliament … was violently 
opposed to this slashing of the price of 
European butter. They, the Germans in 
particular, called for a generalisation or increase 
of Christmas butter operations. At Christmas, 
the butter stocks were brought out and put back 
on the internal market with significant price 
reductions of around 20, 30 and 40 %. The 
Germans said that rather than selling to the 
Russians, we should step up Christmas butter 
operations. They did not take into account that if 
people bought the Christmas butter, they would 
no longer buy normal butter’ (1). 
(1) Interview with Claude Villain, 19 September 2011.
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was limited to curing the symptoms of agricultural 
surpluses rather than tackling the root of the prob-
lem. 
To achieve a balance in the different markets, DG 
VI devised different schemes, some of them bold 
and adventurous, others bordering on despair. 
Butter was sold off at very low prices to countries 
beyond the Iron Curtain, for example. The butter 
deals with the Soviet Union in 1973 and 1977 were 
a politically highly sensitive and contested affair. 
Other, more conventional, ways of getting rid of the 
surpluses, were food aid for developing countries 
(the programme for sending butter oil and skimmed 
milk powder to India was among the most impor-
tant (1)), incentives to increase consumption such as 
subsidised Christmas butter, free school milk and 
fruit, turning wine into cheap alcohol and butter 
into butter oil, and many more. These measures of-
fered no long-term solutions, but they were popular 
with the Member States as they did not cost farmers 
anything. 
Co-responsibility levy and milk quota
Since 1973, the Commission had toyed with the 
idea of producers sharing the costs of overproduc-
tion (2). In the dairy sector this was eventually put 
into practice with the co-responsibility levy and the 
milk quota. 
The co-responsibility levy can be considered as the 
first move away from the generous price policy and 
the Community’s guaranteed and unlimited pur-
chase of produce. In July 1976, the Commission de-
cided to propose to the Council a co-responsibility 
levy in the form of a 3-year action programme to 
(1) Interview with Helmut von Verschuer, 11 and 12 October 2010.
(2) HAEC, ‘Improvement of the common agricultural policy’, Communica-
tion from the Commission to the Council, COM(73) 1850, 31  October 
1973.
balance the milk market (3). The Council adopted 
this action programme on 17 May 1977 and the 
co-responsibility levy came into effect in September 
of that year (4). 
Put simply, the co-responsibility levy was a means 
to reduce prices indirectly, through a levy on the 
price of milk delivered to dairies. It had only limit-
ed success as initially the Council fixed the levy at 
the low level of 1.5 % and, if the limit was exceeded, 
prices would only be reduced in the following year. 
However, the co-responsibility levy was reinforced 
in 1980 when a supplementary levy was introduced 
which applied if deliveries to dairies exceeded those 
of 1979 by 2 %. Between 1979 and 1982, EAGGF 
guarantee expenditure grew much more slowly than 
in the period from 1974 to 1979, notably due to the 
co-responsibility levy (5). 
After 1982, EAGGF guarantee expenditure rock-
eted from ECU 12.4 billion in 1982, to ECU 15.9 
in 1983 and ECU 18.4 in 1984  (6). The quest of 
the European Council (notably at the Stuttgart 
Summit of 1983) and the Commission for further 
and more radical measures to curb production 
and thus costs has to be seen in conjunction with 
three interlinked issues: first, the budgetary rebate 
requested by the British government; second, the 
threat which the exploding costs of the CAP posed 
to the Community budget (in 1983 and again in 
1984 the Community’s spending commitments ex-
ceeded its own resources); and third, the Council’s 
decision to enlarge the Community to Spain and 
Portugal, two relatively poorer exporters of (south-
ern) agricultural products. This enlargement would 
(3) HAEC, COM(76) Minutes No 391, second part, sitting of 6  July 1976; 
BAC 177/1995/3070, ‘Document de travail complémentaire sur certaines 
questions relatives au secteur du lait et des produits laitiers’ (distributed on 
the authority of Pierre Lardinois), SEC(75) 3530/10, 25 November 1975, 
pp. 4–6.
(4) Council Regulation (EEC) No 1078/77 and Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 1079/77, OJ L 131, 26.5.1977, p. 1 and p. 6.
(5) ‘Guidelines for European Agriculture — Mandate of 30 May 1980’, 
COM(81) 608 final, 23 October 1981. 
(6) Petit, M., Agricultural Policy Formation in the European Community: The 
Birth of Milk Quotas and CAP Reform, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 1987, p. 27.
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thus necessitate further adaptations of the CAP and 
put a further strain on the budget. These three is-
sues combined meant that pressure on the CAP was 
higher than ever before. 
In its response to the Stuttgart Summit, the Com-
mission proposed the introduction of a quota sys-
tem for the milk market by means of a supplemen-
tary levy on milk produced in excess of the guarantee 
threshold (1). In the absence of a quota, the unattrac-
tive alternative was to slash the milk price by 12 % in 
1984–85 to offset the additional expenditure likely 
to arise from the guarantee threshold being exceed-
(1) HAEC, ‘Common agricultural policy — Commission proposals’, Com-
munication from the Commission to the Council, COM(83) 500, 28 July 
1983.
ed in 1983 (2). Given the farm income objective of 
the CAP, this would have been unacceptable. The 
Commission, and Director-General Claude Villain 
in particular, thus chose a practical measure that 
would not threaten the core principles of the CAP 
(common prices, Community preference, financial 
solidarity) but that was in itself a bold solution to 
the financial problems. 
In the Commission, the introduction of quotas had 
been discussed for a very long time but many were 
against the system. The argument against quotas 
was that they were an artificial mechanism that 
would freeze production patterns, not allowing pro-
duction to move to the most efficient farmers and 
(2) HAEC, BAC 49/1989/237, ‘Economic consequences of the Commission’s 
proposals for adaptation of the market organisation for milk and milk prod-
ucts’, Information note from François-Xavier Ortoli and Poul Dalsager, 
SEC(83) 1508, 23 September 1983.
At a demonstration in Brussels in April 1982, French farmers vent their anger against the proposed reform of the common agricultural 
policy with the slogans ‘Washington governs in Brussels’ and ‘Europeans enjoy the prices, the French foot the bill’.
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thus going against the principles of a free market (1). 
In the Member States and among farm interest 
groups, quotas were equally unpopular. Claude Vil-
lain recalled how he fought for a milk quota: ‘I de-
fended it against the agricultural leaders of France 
and in other countries as there was widespread op-
position’ (2). 
Not surprisingly, the endorsement and adoption 
of milk quotas by the Member States was an ardu-
ous process. By 16 September 1983, the Commis-
sion had agreed on a set of specific proposals. The 
quantities of production were set at the 1981 level 
(1) Interview with Sergio Ventura, 14 September 2010.
(2) Interview with Claude Villain, 19 September 2011. 
plus 1 %, and production beyond these quotas was 
subjected to a super levy of 7 % of the EEC target 
price. A special levy hit intensive producers (more 
than 15 000 kg of milk per forage hectare) at 4 % of 
the target price (3). The Member State governments 
appointed a high-level group of officials to prepare 
the summit meeting in Athens on 6 December 
1983. The Athens Summit was a failure and it took 
another 3 months of Council and high-level group 
meetings and mediation by the Commission to even 
out differences on the agriculture package. 
(3) Petit, M., Agricultural Policy Formation in the European Community: The 
Birth of Milk Quotas and CAP Reform, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 1987, p. 30.
In 1984, the Council of agricultural ministers adopted the milk quota. Observing the continuing problem of agricultural surpluses, 
the Dutch cartoonist Fritz Behrendt asks dryly: ‘Common market obstacles — no more?’ (Europe, summer 1984, p. 6.)
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On 13 March 1984, the Council agreed to impose 
a milk quota for 5 years. The levy could either be 
applied at the dairy or at the farm level. The base 
period was 1981 plus 1 %, as the Commission had 
suggested in its initial proposal  (1). The final deal, 
sealed in the Council on 31 March 1984, after the 
European Council of 19 and 20 March had en-
dorsed it, was very close to the initial Commission 
proposal. It was an endorsement of the principle of 
guarantee thresholds and their extension to other 
products; importantly, the Council also agreed on 
dismantling positive MCAs. 
Costs for EAGGF guarantee measures in the milk 
market fell from ECU 3 014 million in 1984 to 
ECU 2 815 million in 1985  (2). The milk quota 
regulation was an effective and sustainable measure 
that was here to stay. 
New directions and the Green Paper of 
1985
Following the introduction of the milk quota in 
1984, the Commission continued on the path of 
revising the CAP to control production and costs. 
With Commissioner Andriessen in charge, it be-
came more open to the idea of a CAP reform. Ac-
cording to his head of cabinet, Carlo Trojan, ‘At 
that time, genuine reforms of agricultural policy 
began with Andriessen’ (3). 
In January 1985, the Commission launched a ‘gen-
eral debate on the perspectives for the common agri-
(1) HAEC, BAC 40/2002/37, ‘The Council — main points of the agreement 
on the control of production in the milk sector’ (5802/84), 13 March 1984; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1371/84 of 16 May 1984 laying down 
detailed rules for the application of the additional levy referred to in Art-
icle 5c of Regulation (EEC) No 804/68 (OJ L 132, 18.5.1984); Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 857/84 of 31 March 1984 adopting general rules for 
the application of the levy referred to in Article 5c of Regulation (EEC) 
No 804/68 in the milk and milk products sector (OJ L 90, 1.4.1984); and 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 564/84 of 1 March 1984 on suspension of 
aids for investments in the field of milk production (OJ L 61, 2.3.1984).
(2) Archives Ranieri di Carpegna, Table No 12, undated.
(3) Interview with Carlo Trojan, 13 January 2011. 
cultural policy’ (4). The conclusions were published 
in a Green Paper in July 1985. The Green Paper did 
not suggest a revolutionary overhaul of the CAP. In-
stead, it was an options paper, presenting a range of 
potential measures such as a restrictive price po licy, 
direct income aid and the extension of the quota 
system to other product areas. The paper was much 
criticised in the Commission. For President Jacques 
Delors and a few others, the Green Paper went too 
far and they feared that some of its passages would 
poison the political discussion (5). 
(4) HAEC, COM(85) 333 final, 30 July 1985, p. 1; HAEC, BAC 237/2004/46, 
‘Note du secrétariat du Steering Group sur les Perspectives de la PAC. 
Résumé des principales décisions de la réunion préparatoire (14 mars)’, 
15 March 1985; Interview with Frans Andriessen, 14 October 2010.
(5) BAC 49/1989/257, Communication from Jürgen Schüler to Karl-Heinz 
Narjes, 9 July 1985. 
Following the European Council in Stuttgart in June 1983, the Commission 
tabled a proposal for quotas on milk production. The Commission’s 
internal magazine Courrier du personnel took this view on the measure. 
(No 443, 28 June 1983). 
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Diversifying the instruments of the common agricultural policy (1)
(1) ‘Perspectives for the common agricultural policy — The Green Paper of the Commission’,  
July 1985, pp. V–VI.
‘Up to now, the CAP has been characterised by 
an emphasis on the instrument of price support, 
an emphasis which is reflected in the share 
which the Guarantee Section takes of the 
Community’s Agricultural Guidance and 
Guarantee Fund. This imbalance between price 
support and other measures is not what the 
original designers of the CAP intended, and has 
resulted in the policy using one principal 
instrument for the achievement of diverse 
objectives. Since the limits of this approach 
have now been reached, the question is 
inevitably posed which complementary 
instruments should be developed. 
Important steps have recently been taken in this 
sense with the Council’s decisions on the new 
agricultural structures policy, and integrated 
Mediterranean programmes. Further reflection is 
necessary on the means by which the place of 
agriculture in society can be better assured, 
taking account particularly of the situation of 
family farms. This is all the more necessary 
because of:
•  the impact of a restrictive price policy on 
agricultural incomes;
•  the risk of a growing polarisation between the 
different agricultures in Europe, ranging from 
those with a good structure in favourable 
economic conditions, to those with natural 
handicaps in the context of a poorly developed 
regional economy;
• the challenge of enlargement. 
The Community must ensure that the social and 
economic conditions of those working in 
agriculture are not prejudiced by these 
developments, and that the social fabric of the 
rural regions is not destroyed by an accelerated 
departure of the agricultural workforce. In some 
regions, agricultural employment and activity, 
even if maintained by subsidies, is simply 
indispensable if depopulation of the countryside 
is to be avoided. The maintenance of a 
significant number of persons in agriculture is 
not, however, incompatible with the 
development — which should be encouraged 
— whereby a part of their income is derived 
from non-agricultural sources (part-time 
farming).
That is why, in this consultative document, the 
Commission sets out a number of options to be 
considered in the following fields:
•  the role of agriculture as a protector of the 
environment; in our industrialised society, this 
role is perceived to be increasingly important, 
and if agriculture were willing to accept new 
disciplines in this context, society should 
recognise it by providing financial resources;
•  the better integration of agriculture in regional 
development; since not all the problems of 
agriculture can be resolved by agricultural 
policy alone, it is imperative to consider what 
contribution other policies can make; in fact, 
agricultural policy has to be seen in the 
broader perspective of overall rural policy;
•  the question of direct income aids for 
agriculture; in the context of a restrictive price 
policy, it is necessary to envisage 
complementary measures in the form of 
income aids.’
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Conclusion
While the 1960s can almost be qualified as the gold-
en age of the CAP, in the 1970s and the 1980s the 
policy confronted the Commission with immense 
challenges, the most important being the battle 
against the proverbial butter mountains and milk 
lakes. However, during the period 1973–86, the 
CAP evolved and, to a certain extent, demonstrat-
ed its flexibility and versatility. The Community 
successfully negotiated a number of challenges 
such as monetary turbulence, the southern enlarge-
ments and the GATT rounds. While the CAP 
came under great pressure during the period, the 
Community was not prepared to embark on far- 
reaching reforms that would challenge the prin-
ciples of market unity, financial solidarity and 
Community preference. Hence, the Commission 
came up with innovative solutions such as the milk 
quota. Finally, the economic crisis of the 1970s and 
the subsequent adoption of neo-liberal economic 
policy principles meant that protectionist and re-
distributive policies such as the CAP became more 
difficult to justify than had been the case in the 
1960s. Greater changes awaited the CAP in the 
early 1990s and it can be argued that the events of 
the late 1970s and 1980s had opened up the path 
in the Commission towards adapting the CAP and 
discussing and initiating change. 
Katja Seidel
After the Commission had adopted the Green 
Paper, a consultation process was put in motion 
in which the opinions of interest groups, Member 
States and other Community institutions were 
collected. Not surprisingly, farmers’ lobbies were 
against price reductions counterbalanced by direct 
income aids. The opinions of the different Member 
States diverged. Most Member States were against a 
restrictive price policy; some were however inclined 
to accept direct income aids under some circum-
stances, whereas the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom were in favour of reform and a restrictive 
price policy (1). The stakes for a further CAP reform 
thus remained high and the Commission reacted 
accordingly. The result of the consultation process 
was published in December 1985  (2). It reflected 
Andriessen’s formula throughout his term in office: 
instrument diversification — as only a policy mix 
(restrictive price policy plus additional measures 
such as the co-responsibility levy) seemed accept-
able to ministers and the farming community. 
The Green Paper was innovative in that it launched 
a consultation procedure with Community institu-
tions and other interested parties. More important-
ly, it accelerated a thought process about the aims 
and instruments of the CAP and how they needed 
to be adapted in the future. In the Commission, 
there was an increasing tendency to see agriculture 
as part of the larger rural space, the economy and 
the society of rural areas (3). 
(1) HAEC, BAC 98/1997/1351, Memo from Michel Jacquot (president’s cab-
inet) on the informal meeting of the Agriculture Council on the future of 
the CAP, 25 September 1985.
(2) HAEC, COM(85) 750 final, 18 December 1985.
(3) Ibid.; Interview with Helmut von Verschuer, 11 and 12 October 2010.
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16.2. Creating a ‘blue 
Europe’: the common 
fisheries policy
The legal basis for a common fisheries policy (CFP) 
can be found in the EEC Treaty articles on agri-
culture: Article 38 states that the common market 
shall extend to agricultural products, including 
products of fisheries. The objectives of the CAP — 
market unity, financial solidarity and Community 
preference — were thus equally valid for the fish-
eries sector. To begin with, fisheries had not been 
a major economic sector in the Community of Six 
and the CFP got off to a slow start. It was only in 
1966 that the Commission published a first ‘Report 
on the situation in the fisheries sector of EEC Mem-
ber States and the basic principles for a common 
policy’  (1). Four years later, in June 1970, follow-
ing further work by the Commission, the Council 
adopted a resolution on fisheries and agreed on two 
regulations in October that year. These regulations 
((EEC) No 2141/70 and (EEC) No 2142/70) came 
into effect in early 1971 and created a common 
market for fisheries products together with a com-
mon price policy, provisions on trade with third 
countries and the possibility for national structural 
measures to be co-financed by the EAGGF ‘Guid-
ance’ section. Crucially, through these regulations, 
the principle of equal access of Community vessels 
to all Member States’ fishing grounds had become 
part of the acquis communautaire. 
These measures were clearly prompted by the 
wish to define the principles of the policy before a 
major event took place, namely the opening of the 
first enlargement negotiations with three of the 
world’s largest fishing nations (Denmark, Norway 
and the United Kingdom), whose waters, like those 
of Ireland, were important fishing grounds for the 
(1) COM(66) 250 final.
fleet of the Six. As the prospective Member States 
did not have a say in defining the principles of the 
CFP, so obviously of vital importance to them, they 
greatly resented the Community’s decision on fish-
eries  (2). While it was foreseeable that developing 
the CFP would not be easy, it is doubtful whether 
anybody guessed just how difficult it would be. 
Two periods can be distinguished in the emergence 
of the CFP; in the first period, from 1973 to 1977, 
groundbreaking work laying down the basis of the 
CFP was accomplished in a small ‘Fisheries Prod-
ucts’ division, in DG VI (Agriculture). The Coun-
cil formally adopted the result of this work in the 
The Hague resolution of November 1976. The 
second period began with the formal setting-up 
of a Directorate-General for Fisheries (DG  XIV) 
in 1977 and concluded with the launching of the 
CFP in early 1983. DG  XIV was created for pol-
itical rather than organisational reasons —  a dir-
ectorate-general needed to be assigned to an Irish 
national. Eamonn Gallagher was thus appointed 
director-general while the commissioner for agricul-
ture maintained responsibility for this policy area 
until 1981, when the Greek commissioner, Giorgios 
Contogeorgis, was given the fisheries portfolio in 
addition to that of transport. Some criticised the 
creation of an independent DG for fisheries as un-
necessary. Some Commission members certain-
ly feared the loss of staff and competences when 
both DG I and DG VI transferred a division to the 
new DG XIV (3). The new DG XIV consisted of a 
small and tight-knit group of fisheries experts. The 
dominant figures were Eamonn Gallagher, the dir-
ector-general, and Raymond Simonnet, a director 
who was known to his staff as ‘the admiral’. Both 
Gallagher and Simonnet played a key role in the 
establishment of the CFP. Their dominance of the 
DG sometimes created frustration and difficulties 
(2) Interviews with David Hannay, 14 July 2011, and Robert Jackson, 27 Sep-
tember 2011.
(3) HAEC, COM(77) Minutes No 416, second part, meeting of 2 February 
1977, p. 11.
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for other members of staff, who complained about a 
lack of transparency (1).
The first phase: international challenges 
and Community responses, 1973–77
In the light of the Danish, Irish and British dis-
like of the principle that all Community fishermen 
should enjoy equal access to one another’s territor-
ial waters, the act of accession of 1972 (Article 100) 
granted a  derogation from free access for an area 
of 6  nautical miles off Member States’ coastlines 
until  31  December 1982. In some regions that 
were particularly dependent on fisheries, this zone 
was extended to 12 miles (Article 101). The histor-
ic fishing rights of other Member States in these 
zones were, how ever, upheld. For the Commission, 
(1) Interview with Eugenio Pino, 10 October 2011.
two tasks derived from this act: within 6 years the 
Council was to determine the conditions for fishing 
with a view to ensuring the protection of the fishing 
grounds and conservation of the biological resourc-
es of the sea (Article 102) and, with the derogation 
due to expire in late 1982, a durable solution needed 
to be found. 
It was international developments that precipitated 
changes in the original CFP framework. In 1973, 
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law 
of  the Sea opened, with the most likely outcome 
being that certain states would claim up to 200 naut-
ical miles from their coastlines to form an exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ), including fishing rights. The 
Commission was acutely aware that this would have 
severe implications for the Community’s fisheries 
sector. The probable consequences of such a move 
were twofold. Firstly, Community vessels could 
lose access to their customary fishing grounds in 
third-country waters and could be forced to move 
A fisherman harvesting his ‘crops’: French cartoonist Plantu’s take on the birth of the common fisheries policy in January 1983. 
(Le douanier se fait la malle. 20 ans de dessins sur l’Europe, Le Monde  Éditions, Paris, 1992, pp. 68–69.)
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their activities into Community waters. Secondly, 
fishing vessels of third countries that were fishing 
in what were potentially Community waters would 
have to be regulated. The Commission thus had to 
provide solutions for several problems: firstly, mak-
ing sure that the new 200-mile zones of the Member 
States would become a Community zone, respect-
ing the equal access principle; secondly, regulating 
fishing activity in this zone, for example through 
conservation measures; thirdly, solving the problem 
of access for Community vessels to fishing grounds 
of third countries and of third-country vessels to 
Community waters; and, lastly, devising measures 
to assist with the conversion and adaptation of the 
Community fishing fleet to meet the new challenge. 
The Commission expected that the extension of 
Member States’ waters to 200 miles would exacer-
bate the diverging interests already existing between 
Member States. Many of the most popular fishing 
grounds would come under the jurisdiction of Den-
mark, Ireland and the United Kingdom (80  % of 
Community catches were in the north-east Atlan-
tic, 75 % in Community waters), whereas Belgian, 
German, French and Dutch vessels needed access to 
these waters (1). 
Louis Mordrel, a senior official in DG  XIV who 
participated in the Third United Nations Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea, explained the poten-
tially disastrous implications for the CFP: ‘It was a 
challenge to which there were two solutions. Either 
the Community should break up as regards fisher-
ies, with each Member State going its own way, but 
this would have been a disaster. Or, we had to try 
to find joint solutions and joint positions vis-à-vis 
third countries’ (2). A very small team in the fisheries 
division in DG VI then prepared the Commission’s 
response to the challenge and the first proposals for 
fleshing out the CFP. 
(1) Louis Mordrel archives, Louis Mordrel, Note for the attention of Van Li-
erde, 27 May 1974.
(2) Interview with Louis Mordrel, 16 June 2011.
In February 1976, the Commission submitted 
a communication to the Council proposing an 
overall solution to the management of a potential 
200-mile zone. Resource conservation was at the 
forefront of the Commission’s concerns and total 
allowable catches (TACs) were the suggested method 
by which fishing should be regulated. As to the ques-
tion of access, the Commission recommended that 
the derogations in the act of accession be extended. 
Hence, all waters extending between the 12-mile 
and 200-mile limits would be Community waters 
governed by the equal access principle (3). 
The communication acknowledged that future 
Commission proposals would have to cater for both 
the increasingly technological high-seas fishing fleet 
and small-scale inshore fishing. On the one hand, 
many fishing vessels were geared towards cod fishing 
in the extreme North Atlantic and, if banned from 
these fishing grounds, would have to be equipped 
to fish for other species or be taken out of produc-
tion to avoid overfishing. On the other hand, small-
scale coastal fishing was widespread, in particular 
in structurally weak regions. It accounted for one 
third of the production and three quarters of fish-
ermen. Hence, the Commission proposed special 
measures for these zones under Regulation (EEC) 
No  2141/70. As all Member States, except Italy, 
fished outside their 200-mile zone, agreements with 
third countries were vital. For example, the British 
fleet would suffer most from Iceland and Norway 
extending their zones, as demonstrated by the so-
called cod wars between Iceland and the United 
Kingdom in the early to mid-1970s. 
When it came to developing concrete policy pro-
posals from this communication, the main point 
of contention in the Commission was the question 
of equal access. In a dramatic all-night session on 
22 September 1976, against the fierce resistance of 
(3) HAEC, ‘Problems which the introduction of economic zones of 200 miles 
poses for the Community in the sea fishing sector’, Communication from 
the Commission to the Council, COM(76) 59 final, 18 February 1976.
331Chapter 16 — Contested fields: the common agricultural policy and the common fisheries policy 
the Irish (Patrick Hillery) and British (Christopher 
Soames and George Thomson) commissioners, the 
Commission decided that exemptions from the 
equal access principle were to be limited to a 12-mile 
zone. The Irish and British commissioners had 
fought for a better deal for their countries, knowing 
that this was a matter of major importance in both 
countries. The Commission also proposed to extend 
the regime of Articles 100 and 101 beyond 31 De-
cember 1982 (1). 
On 23 September 1976, the Commission submitted 
suggestions to the Council of Ministers  (2). These 
contained four essential points. The first was that 
Member States should, in a concerted move on 
1  January 1977, extend the fishing zone off their 
coasts to 200 miles. Second, the management of this 
new zone should be undertaken by the Commu-
nity and not by the Member States. The 6-mile zone 
referred to in Article 100 of the act of accession 
should be extended to 12 miles, and this arrange-
ment should be continued beyond 31 December 
1982. Historic fishing rights within the 12-mile 
zone had to be respected. Third, the Commission 
should, on behalf of the Community, negotiate 
agreements with third countries that would grant 
vessels of the Member States the right to fish inside 
their 200-mile zone and would permit some vessels 
from third countries to fish in Community waters. 
And fourth, the Community would contribute fi-
nancially to the restructuring and adaptation of the 
Community fishing fleet. 
On 8 October, a draft regulation containing these 
principles was submitted to the Council. However, 
the Irish and British governments had hoped for 
an exclusive zone of up to 50 miles, something that 
was not acceptable to the other Member States or 
to the Commission, as it violated the non-discrim-
(1) HAEC, COM(76) Minutes No  397, second part, meeting of 22 Sep-
tember 1976.
(2) HAEC, ‘Future external fisheries policy and internal fisheries system’, 
COM(76) 500 final, 23 September 1976.
ination principle in the treaty. Hence, the Council 
was divided on most issues and could not reach an 
agreement by the deadline of 1 January 1977. For-
eign ministers reached a compromise at a European 
political cooperation meeting in The Hague, which 
the Council formally adopted on 3 November 
1976 (the The Hague resolution). This contained 
an agreement to establish in concert, on 1 January 
1977, a 200-mile zone and to authorise the Com-
mission to negotiate agreements with third coun-
tries. However, it would take another 6 years and 
much hard work and skilful negotiation on the part 
of the Commission before the Council would come 
to an agreement on the CFP. 
Second phase: the battle over access 
and quotas, 1977–83
In a very difficult context of declining fishing 
resources, which made draconian conservation 
measures necessary, a fierce battle ensued, 
lasting nearly 7 years, between the founding 
Member States and new Member States. The 
former, led by France, wanted to apply the 
principle of free access and share the resources 
in line with traditional fishing activities, including 
in the waters of other Member States. The new 
Member States, basically Ireland and the United 
Kingdom, only agreed to allow the others to 
have any surplus which they did not fish 
themselves in accordance with the consensus 
which had emerged at the conference on the 
law of the sea (3). 
A deadlock in the Council had occurred over the 
questions of access to fishing grounds and the dis-
tribution of resources. The extreme positions were 
held by the United Kingdom, and to some extent 
Ireland, which wanted access to their coastal waters 
to be permanently limited in the largest possible 
area (ranging from 12 to 50 miles in some areas), 
and France, which insisted on historic fishing rights 
and equal access. 
(3) Comment by François Benda on the initial draft of this chapter.
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The positions became more and more intransigent 
and angry rhetoric both in the Council and among 
the population of the Member States aggravated 
the situation. With the Conservative Peter Walk-
er replacing British Fisheries Minister John Silkin 
in May 1979, the new Thatcher government sent 
more conciliatory signals. Although breakthrough 
was not yet reached, the Council was able to adopt 
the first annual total allowable catch regulation in 
1980. The Commission tabled several compromise 
formulas and the Council now centred its work on 
achieving a compromise on the basis of an exclusive 
12-mile zone. It looked as if the deadline of the end 
of 1980, set by the Council’s declaration of 30 May 
1980 (1), could be met as Member States were com-
ing together on a compromise formula. Progress on 
the British budgetary question in 1980 may also 
have improved matters in the fisheries sector (2).
Apart from the question of access, Member States’ 
shares of the available resources, that is quotas, were 
also highly contentious. Initially the United King-
dom demanded to be allocated 60  % of the quota 
of the main species; this was later scaled down to 
45 %, whereas the Commission’s proposal of 1978 
suggested 31  % for the United Kingdom. Finally, 
the Commission’s proposal of 3  December 1980 
on the allocation of quotas was deemed acceptable 
by most Member States, attributing 36.1 % to the 
United Kingdom, 24.1 % to Denmark and 13.6 % 
to France. However, in December 1980, a domes-
tic policy issue prevented an overall agreement from 
being reached — the upcoming French presidential 
elections and the coming to office of the new French 
president, François Mitterrand, who was hoping to 
negotiate better access and a better quota for French 
fishermen. Matters improved only in 1982 when the 
approaching enlargement to include Spain, a coun-
try where fishing is an important activity, and the 
(1) Council declaration of 30 May 1980 on the common fisheries policy, 
OJ C 158, 27.6.1980, p. 2.
(2) Leigh, M., European Integration and the Common Fisheries Policy, Croom 
Helm, London, 1983, p. 84. 
threat of the 10-year derogation expiring on 31 De-
cember 1982, accelerated decision-making. The 
Commission tabled its final compromise proposals 
in June 1982 (3). The last obstacle to an agreement 
was the Danish government seeking last-minute im-
provements in a few areas, in particular in its catch 
quota for mackerel. 
On 25 January 1983, the Council finally took a 
decision on access and quotas and put in place a 
Community regime for fisheries and aquaculture. 
The solution corresponded largely to the Commis-
sion’s initial proposals of 1976: the derogation (the 
12-mile regime) was extended for another 10 years, 
until 1992, renewable for another period of the 
same duration, and it was extended to cover the 
waters up to 12 miles off the coastlines of all Mem-
ber States. Exceptions were made for those holding 
historic fishing rights. The objectives of the Com-
munity fisheries regime were laid down in the basic 
Regulation (EEC) No  170/83: to ‘ensure the pro-
tection of fishing grounds, the conservation of the 
biolog ical resources of the sea and their balanced 
exploitation on a lasting basis and in appropriate 
economic and social conditions’. This included a 
system of TACs, to be divided into quotas for each 
Member State, a regulation setting TACs for 1982 
and the conditions under which they may be fished 
((EEC) No 172/83) and a regulation providing for 
the common management and conservation of re-
sources ((EEC) No 171/83). A scientific and tech-
nical committee was set up to ensure the TACs met 
scientific standards of stock conservation. 
The 1983 decisions included an important agree-
ment on structural policy, an area that had also suf-
fered from the 6-year deadlock. In 1977 and 1978, 
the Commission had put forward a proposal for a 
directive to facilitate the adaptation of production 
(3) HAEC, ‘Modified proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) establishing 
a Community system for the conservation and management of fishery re-
sources’, COM(82) 368 final, 11 June 1982; COM(82) 368 final/2, 22 June 
1982.
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and processing capacity to the new circumstances. 
While the Council did not adopt this proposal, 
some Member States applied measures from the 
directive in the form of state aid measures, which 
were mostly approved by the Commission under 
Article 92. In response to the May 1980 Council 
declaration, the Commission came up with a new 
revised proposal regarding structural policy which 
it submitted to the Council on 22 July 1980  (1). 
The Council pledged to adopt the necessary meas-
ures in a resolution of 25 January 1983. Finally, on 
4 October 1983, the Council agreed on what was 
later called the multiannual guidance programme 
(MAGP) (Regulations (EEC) No  2908/83 and 
(EEC) No 2909/83). These regulations were geared 
towards restructuring the fishing industry and re-
ducing and modernising the fishing fleet. The first 
MAGP (1983–86) was purely indicative but the 
following one, adopted in December 1986  (2), in-
troduced an obligation for Member States to reduce 
the capacity of their fleet by 2 % (engine power) and 
3 % (vessel tonnage) over a 5-year period. 
As was agreed in the The Hague resolution of 
1976, and in spite of the deadlock in the Council, 
the Commission negotiated numerous agreements 
with third countries. In cases of reciprocal interest 
in each other’s fishing grounds, the Commission 
aimed for framework agreements such as those 
signed in 1978 and subsequent years with Sweden, 
the Faeroe Islands, Canada, Finland and Norway 
for fishing within the 200-mile Community zone. 
Where a country had nothing to offer, its vessels 
were banned from Community waters; this was 
the case with the German Democratic Republic, 
Japan, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union. 
This freed up fishing capacities for Community 
vessels. As some Member States fished in African 
(1) HAEC, BAC 36/1980/450, ‘Proposals concerning the coordination and 
promotion of fisheries research’, Communication from the Commission to 
the Council, COM(80) 420 final, 18 July 1980.
(2) Council Regulation (EEC) No 4028/86 of 18 December 1986 on Commu-
nity measures to improve and adapt structures in the fisheries and aquacul-
ture sector, OJ L 376, 31.12.1986, p. 7.
waters in the central-east and south-east Atlantic, 
the Commission started exploratory talks and con-
cluded agreements with, among others, Guinea-
Bissau, Mauritania and Senegal. The European 
Community became a member of several regional 
fisheries management organisations such as the 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (1979) 
and the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission 
(1982) (3). 
Enlargement, stock conservation, 
control and enforcement
The breathing space obtained after the break-
through of January 1983 ended with the Spanish 
and Portuguese enlargement. A new phase began, 
bringing with it a new set of problems which threat-
ened to disturb the hard-fought balance of quo-
tas and access. Eugenio Pino, a former director in 
DG  XIV, remembers: ‘The accession of Spain and 
Portugal posed a new challenge. This accession 
resulted in the virtual doubling of problems, and 
capacity and people employed in the fisheries sec-
tor’  (4). The third enlargement would double the 
number of fishermen and see an increase of 65 % in 
the tonnage of the Community fisheries fleet and 
45 % in fishing (5). At the same time, Iberian waters 
contained no major fishing areas and hence would 
not increase the overall availability of resources. If 
Spain and Portugal were to be granted full access to 
Community waters, existing Member States would 
have to reduce their catch quotas considerably as 
stocks were already fully exploited. Even though the 
Spanish government, in its declaration of 21 July 
1980, underlined the importance of fisheries for its 
economy, it was out of the question to grant Spanish 
vessels equal access. Not surprisingly, the accession 
(3) Churchill, R. R. and Owen, D., The EC Common Fisheries Policy, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2010, p. 8.
(4) Interview with Eugenio Pino, 10 October 2011.
(5) Lequesne, C., ‘Quand l’Union européenne gouverne les poissons : pourquoi 
une politique commune de la pêche?’, Les Études du CERI, No 61, Decem-
ber 1999, p. 5.
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negotiations in this area were particularly testing 
and the final outcome was that in the 1986 acces-
sion treaty, access of the Spanish and Portuguese 
fleets to Irish and British waters was restricted for a 
transitional period lasting until 2002. 
Stock protection to secure a future for the fisheries 
sector was one of the main reasons why, in 1976, 
the Commission thought it vital to put into place 
an efficient conservation policy for the Commu-
nity 200-mile zone (1). The absence of an agreement 
in the Council meant that the Community’s stock 
conservation policy remained ineffective. Some 
Member States, such as the United Kingdom, were 
taking unilateral conservation measures, something 
the Commission could not tolerate. The case was 
brought to the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities, which ruled in favour of the Com-
mission  (2). When the new policy was delivered 
in 1976, fish stocks of some species, for example 
herring, were already diminishing dramatically. 
The lack of firm Community commitments to the 
Commission’s proposed TACs and quotas led to 
overfishing in the years 1980 and 1981. As no agree-
ment could be reached on the protection of marine 
resources, voluntary compliance with the Commis-
sion’s TAC proposals as well as interim conservation 
and resource management regulations and national 
measures, agreed by the Commission, provided a 
temporary but unsatisfactory solution. 
Given the dwindling fish stocks, the question of en-
forcing the rules of the new CFP was a crucial one. 
The Commission had limited powers in enforcing 
the CFP. In 1983, a team of inspectors was estab-
lished to ensure compliance with TACs and quotas, 
but the head of the inspection team reported con-
siderable difficulties in detecting fraud as the Com-
mission had to alert national authorities and an-
nounce the arrival of its inspectors in advance. He 
(1) Louis Mordrel archives; Louis Mordrel, ‘L’adaptation de la politique com-
mune de la pêche’, 2 August 1976.
(2) Interview with John Temple Lang, 15 February 2011.
also complained that all too often the Community 
inspectors were not able to assert themselves against 
local authorities, which were turning a blind eye to 
irregularities (3). 
Under a regulation adopted in 1982 establishing 
certain control measures for fishing activities by 
vessels of the Member States (4), the 
Commission issued and implemented a number 
of measures designed to ensure compliance 
with the fishing restrictions imposed by the 
Council.
(i)  An inspection force composed of agents 
appointed by the Commission was set up to 
assist in the control operations carried out 
by the national authorities at sea and in the 
ports.
(ii)  On several occasions, decisions were taken 
to cease the fishing of species for which the 
stocks, in the light of the catch figures 
reported by the Member States, had been 
found to be exhausted.
(iii)  A logbook to be kept by the masters of 
fishing vessels flying the flag of a Member 
State or registered in a Member State was 
introduced in a regulation adopted on 
22 September 1983 (5). This document, 
which came into force in 1984, was to show, 
for the species for which a TAC had been 
fixed, at least the quantities of each species 
caught and kept on board, the date and 
position of each catch and the type of gear 
used. A licensing system was also 
introduced to manage the activities of 
Community ships in a biologically sensitive 
area north of Scotland (6). 
(3) Interview with François Benda, 2 November 2010.
(4) Council Regulation (EEC) No 2057/82 of 29 June 1982 establishing cer-
tain control measures for fishing activities by vessels of Member States, as 
amended by Regulation (EEC) No 1729/83, OJ L 220, 29.7.1982, p. 1.
(5) Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2807/83 of 22 September 1983 laying 
down detailed rules for recording information on Member States’ catches of 
fish, OJ L 276, 10.10.1983, pp. 1–18.
(6) EC Commission, Seventeenth General Report on the Activities of the Euro-
pean Communities in 1983, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, Luxembourg, 1984, p. 195. 
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Conclusion
In the period from 1973 to 1986, the achievements 
of the CFP were considerable. In response to an 
international challenge, the Commission devised 
adequate solutions, provided the necessary pro-
posals and guided the Council through extremely 
difficult negotiations, which resulted in the estab-
lishment of a fully fledged Community conserva-
tion and management system for fisheries in 1983. 
Moreover, by negotiating bilateral agreements and 
participating in international negotiations such as 
those of the UN on the law of the sea, the Com-
mission took on an important external relations 
role for the Community. However, the fisheries 
policy was and remains a controversial issue, with 
Member State interests diverging widely. The new 
policy rules could not even out these differences. 
In spite of TACs and quotas, the problems of over-
fishing could not be controlled effectively either, as 
the inspection system remained a paper tiger. The 
Commission’s task with regard to the CFP was 
enormous: it had to reconcile the demands of fish-
eries ministers and discontented fishermen with 
the need to monitor and conserve fish stocks — 
often an almost impossible task. 
Katja Seidel
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Chapter 17  
Regional policy: a tangible 
expression of European 
solidarity
Since its inception, European regional policy has 
helped finance a host of development and conver-
sion programmes in Europe using instruments 
known as Structural Funds. It has come to play an 
increasingly central role in pursuing the objectives 
set by the European treaties. The situation today 
is the culmination of a long process dating back to 
1973. Before that ‘there was no regional policy, nor 
was there a directorate bearing that name … There 
was only a division in the Directorate-General for 
Economic Affairs which dealt with the regional 
dimension of national economic policies’  (1). The 
Treaty of Rome had very little to say on the subject 
and contained no provisions on regional policy. 
Nonetheless, one of the basic objectives of the EEC 
was to ‘strengthen the unity of [the Member States’] 
economies and to ensure their harmonious develop-
(1) Interview with Carmelo Messina, 23 November 2010.
ment by reducing the differences existing between 
the various regions and the backwardness of the less 
favoured regions’ (2). 
Some of the implementing arrangements for com-
petition rules set out in the EEC Treaty can, how-
ever, be regarded as paving the way for a European 
regional policy. In accordance with the provisions 
of Articles 92 to 94 of the treaty, state aid was con-
sidered incompatible with the common market in 
so far as it distorted trade between the Member 
States. But these same articles provided for an ex-
ception, namely for state aid granted to areas ‘where 
the standard of living is abnormally low or where 
there is serious underemployment’  (3). The Com-
mission’s objective in examining the various state 
aid systems was both to safeguard the conditions 
(2) Preamble to the EEC Treaty, fifth paragraph, and Article 2.
(3) Article 92(3)(a) and (c) of the EEC Treaty. 
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for effective competition and to promote orderly 
regional development in the Member States. Re-
gional aid was the subject of a communication from 
the Commission to the Council in 1971. The aim 
was to put an end to bidding contests in the area 
of regional aid and to properly coordinate these aid 
systems at Community level (1). The objective over 
time was to concentrate national aid on the most 
disadvantaged regions of the Community, which 
would be identified using criteria set at Commu-
nity level. Although some progress was made dur-
ing the period in question, no truly satisfactory 
outcome was achieved. 
Commission studies and reports from that time 
confirm the existence of regional disparities which, 
against the wider backdrop of an economic and 
oil crisis, failed to dissipate with the progressive 
establishment of the common market. This failure 
to achieve economic convergence in the six Mem-
ber States would help raise awareness of the need 
for the Community to take action to help its most 
disadvantaged regions. Accordingly, the heads of 
state or government reached agreement at their 
Paris conference of October 1972 on the principal 
means of addressing the structural and regional im-
balances which posed a threat to the achievement 
of the objective of economic and monetary union 
by 1980. Enlargement to Ireland and the United 
Kingdom added further major regional difficulties 
to those already encountered by the Six, in particu-
lar Italy.
A formative period, 1973–75
The first enlargement exacerbated the regional 
problems, completely redrawing the map of socio-
economic disparities between the Member States. 
Ireland’s gross domestic product stood at 60  % of 
the EEC average, while that of all of the United 
(1) OJ C 111, 4.11.1971, pp. 7–9.
Kingdom’s regions but one (the South East) was 
below 80  % of the average. This situation was 
to recur with the accession of Greece in 1981, 
which raised from 9 to 16 the number of regions 
whose GDP was less than 50 % of that of the 10- 
member EEC. Furthermore, the accession of Spain 
and Portugal in 1986 saw the average income of the 
12  Member States (expressed as GDP per capita) 
drop by 8 % compared with that of the Community 
of Six. Meanwhile, in the wake of the oil crisis, the 
economic and social disparities between the regions 
of the Community continued to widen rather than 
narrow in line with the treaty objectives. 
The Copenhagen Summit of December 1973 
sealed the commitment undertaken in October 
1972 on the principle of setting up a regional de-
velopment fund. The decision to launch the fund 
was taken in Paris in December 1974. In an effort 
to resolve coordination problems between national 
Cartoon from February 1973 on the delay in implementing 
a regional development fund. The decision to implement 
the fund was finally adopted in Paris in December 1975.
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and European structures active in the field of re-
gional policy, George Thomson, the British com-
missioner responsible for the newly launched pol-
icy, announced the five key tenets of a Community 
regional policy, inspired by a report on regional dis-
parities in the enlarged Community presented to 
the Parliament and the Council in May 1973. ‘One 
of the key tenets is not only to develop a policy in 
support of the poorest regions, but also to strive 
for a better overall territorial balance,’ underlined 
Renato Ruggiero, Director-General of DG XVI 
(Regional Policy) in February 1975  (1). Ruggiero 
went on to highlight the coordinating role of the 
policy and the need for complementarity. ‘Com-
munity regional policy cannot, and should not, re-
place the regional policies of the Member States. It 
should, on the other hand, coordinate and comple-
ment those policies by providing additional finan-
cial support. Community efforts in the field should 
not be limited to providing new forms of financial 
assistance, but should give a decisive impetus to all 
the other policies, including the sectoral ones such 
as agricultural policy.’ 
Regional policy advanced British interests in so far 
as the United Kingdom was dealing not only with 
industrial areas in decline, but also with poorly de-
veloped rural areas like its Irish neighbour, a bene-
ficiary country which was determined to stand its 
ground when it came to certain issues. ‘Ireland’s 
case was a difficult one … Because … its economic 
situation, which was very weak, its level of develop-
ment, its geographical location and, furthermore, its 
relatively complex — not to say fraught — relations 
with the United Kingdom and with Northern Ire-
land, called for a different approach from that taken 
towards the rest of Europe’  (2). The impact of the 
first enlargement on regional policy was to be repli-
cated further down the line. According to Georges 
(1) HAEU, ‘La politique régionale de la Communauté européenne’, Speech 
given by Renato Ruggiero, Director-General of DG  XVI, fifth European 
Management Symposium, Davos, 3 February 1975, p. 3. 
(2) Interview with Carmelo Messina, 23 November 2010.
Rencki, director in charge of the coordination of 
national policies, studies and analyses at the Direct-
orate-General for Regional Policy: ‘Each successive 
enlargement of the Community right up until the 
last one, and with only one exception (Austria, Fin-
land and Sweden), led to an increase in development 
disparities (per capita GDP) in the Community. 
Furthermore, if you look at the increases in the 
regional policy budget, you can see that they were 
linked on the one hand to the enlargements and on 
the other hand to the progress achieved on econom-
ic integration. Every step towards the dismantling 
of customs barriers made it increasingly difficult for 
the poorest countries to remain competitive, and 
the concerns they expressed could not be ignored. 
Measures taken in respect of monetary union also 
served to heighten fears, leading Jacques Delors to 
put forward the concept of “economic and social co-
hesion” which he would go on to have adopted as 
part of the Single European Act’ (3). 
Negotiations on the establishment of the Euro-
pean Regional Development Fund (ERDF) proved 
particularly difficult owing to budget pressures 
caused by the difficult economic situation and the 
geographical distribution of assistance from the 
fund. The Commission proposed the establish-
ment of a European Regional Development Fund 
(with co-financing to be provided by the benefi-
ciary Member States) to the tune of 2.25 billion 
units of account (UA — almost at par with the 
dollar) over the next 3 years, i.e. from 1974 to 1976. 
In January 1974, the Ortoli Commission managed 
to convince the Heath government to accept the 
German offer of a regional fund worth 1.25 billion 
UA in exchange for a guaranteed share of 25  %. 
However, the budget proposed fell far short of 
Irish and Italian expectations and the negotiations 
on Community policies and actions ground to a 
halt following changes of government in Germany, 
France and the United Kingdom. In October 
(3) Interview with Georges Rencki, 7 June 2012. 
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1974, the Commission proposed a compromise in 
respect of the size of the budget envelope and the 
eligibility conditions for the fund. This was largely 
to win round Ireland, Italy and the United King-
dom, and amounted to 1.4 billion UA over 3 years. 
The Paris Summit of 9 and 10 December 1974 gave 
the green light to the establishment of the ERDF 
for a 3-year period starting on 1 January 1975. The 
final budget allocation amounted to 1.3 billion 
UA — a far cry from the Commission’s original 
proposal. On Sicco Mansholt’s initiative, part of 
the total was financed by EAGGF reserves, to the 
tune of 150 million UA. 
The budget was divided into national quotas set 
during ad hoc negotiations. The Member States 
with the most severe regional imbalances received 
proportionally higher shares. The need to develop 
structural policies was recognised from the out-
set. The Marjolin report of 1975 on economic and 
monetary union called for the implementation of a 
structural regional policy funded by the ERDF and 
the European Investment Bank (EIB) (1). The Euro-
pean Social Fund, set up by Article 123 of the EEC 
Treaty, was overhauled in 1972 and underwent fur-
ther changes in 1977 to ensure a better balance be-
tween the regional measures to boost employment 
and those intended to help vulnerable people enter 
the labour market (2). In the 1980s, measures sup-
ported by the fund were increasingly targeted at the 
most vulnerable citizens. 
Antonio Giolitti took over from George Thomson 
as commissioner responsible for regional policy 
from 1977 to 1985, flanked initially by Renato Rug-
giero, the first director-general of DG XVI, who 
was succeeded by Pierre Mathijsen in March 1977. 
DG XVI was divided into two main directorates. 
The development of regional policies came under 
the remit of Directorate A, headed by Georges 
Rencki (who replaced Philippe de Castelbajac), a 
Frenchman of Polish origin and an ardent feder-
alist. A former member of the Mansholt cabinet, 
he would occupy the post until 1991. Directorate 
B (Development and Conversion Operations) had 
the task of managing the funds. It was headed from 
1968 by Rosario Solima, an Italian official who took 
forward the work begun at the end of the 1960s. 
The activities of this directorate were more focused 
on the management of the ERDF appropriations 
and the ECSC conversion loans. Before the ERDF 
was set up in 1975, extra staff were assigned to DG 
XVI to enable it to cope with the task of manag-
ing the fund. The DG was also responsible both for 
policy development (analyses of regional disparities, 
regional impact of Community policy, etc.) and for 
managing the ERDF. 
(1) HAEC, BAC 214/1991/161, EC Commission, ‘Report of the study group 
“Economic and monetary union 1980”’, Marjolin report, Brussels, March 
1975.
(2) EC Commission, ‘European Social Fund — official texts’, Brussels, 2nd 
edn, 1977, p. 3. 
Map showing aid to French regions in 1978. The ERDF 
subsequently developed a more ‘community’ approach.
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After a long battle, 
the ERDF came into being
The European Regional Development Fund was 
established by a Council regulation of 18 March 
1975  (1). Its purpose was to make a financial con-
tribution to measures approved by the Member 
States in the form of grants or soft loans to support 
investment in industrial, craft or service activities. 
The fund could also be used to help finance infra-
structure (up to a maximum of 30 % of the Member 
State contribution). The funding was intended pri-
marily for job creation measures, but could also be 
granted for investments to help maintain employ-
ment in connection with conversion plans or com-
pany restructuring. This clause was of particular 
interest to the United Kingdom, which was facing 
the large-scale conversion and modernisation of old 
industrial plants. In 1975, the first year of operation 
of the ERDF, requests for assistance were received 
from the Member States in respect of 1 521 projects, 
1 183 of which were accepted by the Commission. 
The ERDF was the main instrument for mobilising 
Community financial resources for the regions. 
It did not take long for the wheels of the ERDF ma-
chine to start turning and the programme was up 
and running by summer 1975. The fund commit-
tee helped DG XVI to develop and implement the 
rules and procedures governing the funds and was 
also consulted on the quality of the projects. It was 
composed of representatives of the Member States 
and chaired by the Commission. If its opinion was 
unfavourable, an appeal could be submitted to the 
Council. When the ERDF was launched, a region-
al policy committee was set up within the Council 
and the Commission to help coordinate the region-
al policies of the Member States. The establishment 
of this committee was one of the sticking points 
prior to the adoption of the 1975 regulation. There 
(1) Regulation (EEC) No 724/75, OJ L 73, 21.3.1975, p 1.
were two questions at issue. First, the French per-
manent representative did not share the Commis-
sion’s view that the committee should be set up 
within both the Council and the Commission, and 
called for it to be established solely at Council level, 
with the Commission closely cooperating. How-
ever, the eight other countries sided with the Com-
mission, whose viewpoint ultimately prevailed. 
Second, there was disagreement on whether the 
regional policy committee should grant a consul-
tative role to professional organisations. Opinions 
diverged on this matter among the various Member 
States. In the end, on the basis of a suggestion by 
Renato Ruggiero, Director-General of DG XVI, it 
was decided that the consultation procedure would 
be set out in the regional policy committee’s rules of 
procedure. 
The chair of the regional policy committee was 
elected by its members, while its secretariat was 
provided by DG XVI (Directorate A). The commit-
tee became operational in July 1975 with the aim 
of helping coordinate the regional policies of the 
Member States. It was also responsible for prepar-
ing a blueprint for a common regional development 
programme in the Member States. 
Since its inception, Community regional policy 
had to contend with the strong desire on the part 
of Member States to retain centralised control and 
not to delegate authority to the regions, and to re-
tain their monopoly over relations with the Com-
munity institutions, particularly the Commission 
and its departments. The Commission sought to 
loosen these ties by fostering direct relations, par-
ticularly at an informal level, with regional and local 
authorities. This caused a certain amount of friction 
with governments. These local contacts encouraged 
representative bodies — where they existed — to 
become involved in preparing regional development 
programmes (with the exception of the budgetary 
aspects thereof). The second-generation ERDF, 
post-1985, did not usher in any major changes to the 
set-up, which varied at any rate from one Member 
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State to another. The national administrations 
continued to dominate project selection and the 
implementation of the funds, while the Commis-
sion played a more active role, particularly in con-
nection with non-quota operations. It was actually 
easier to manage consultations under multiannual 
programmes than on the basis of a plethora of indi-
vidual projects. 
Active efforts were made to identify programmes 
which could be financed under the non-quota 
section. Regions such as the German Länder, the 
Belgian regions and the island regions, but also 
Brittany and Scotland, led the way when it came 
to the (still severely restricted, albeit increasing) in-
volvement of sub-national territories in preparing 
and managing ERDF programmes. Relations with 
these associations would be rendered official by the 
Commission decision to create a consultative com-
mittee of regional and local authorities — the fore-
runner of the Committee of the Regions, enshrined 
in the Maastricht Treaty as a Community consul-
tative body. 
A major political problem: which 
regions should receive assistance?
Although it was the Commission that conducted 
the analyses and highlighted the existing regional 
disparities, it was the Member States that deter-
mined the regions that should receive ERDF fund-
ing. The primary aim was to give priority to the 
regions facing the most serious problems and most 
in need in economic and social terms. But whose 
job should it be to determine regional priorities? 
This was a difficult question to answer. Although 
that was the Commission’s role, the British, for ex-
ample, felt that the Member States were best placed 
to set priorities for the allocation of Community 
funding in the social sphere at regional level and 
that, therefore, this task should be left to them. The 
definition of the nature of regional disparities and 
the selection of indicators to measure them enabled 
decisions to be taken on which regions should be 
eligible for Community assistance. The process was 
an extremely tricky one because of the considerable 
financial and political implications of the decisions 
made in respect of the distribution of resources. 
Before specific indicators could be established, a 
number of technical difficulties had to be resolved, 
linked primarily to the initial lack of comparabil-
ity of the statistical data provided by the different 
countries. It took several years to resolve these 
difficulties and, as a result, a number of regions in 
prosperous Member States which were eligible for 
regional aid at national level also benefited from 
ERDF assistance and appeared on the Commission 
maps although their wealth considerably exceeded 
the Community average. This situation, which nul-
lified positive discrimination efforts to ensure that 
Community assistance went to the poorest areas, 
would be changed in 1979 with the adoption of 
the first regional policy reform, which stipulated 
that account had to be taken of the principles of 
coordination of regional aid at Community level 
when deciding which national priority areas were 
to receive ERDF investment aid. This provided 
a first indication of the Commission’s powers in 
the area of competition, as it set limits on certain 
types of regional aid granted to prosperous coun-
tries. From 1980 onwards, the Commission would 
use a synthetic index composed of per capita GDP 
(considered as reflecting economic or business po-
tential) and the unemployment rate, measured 
against the Community average. This approach 
painted a picture of the socioeconomic situation 
of the regions, which differed in many key respects 
from the national averages used for the national re-
gional policies. This kick-started a lengthy process, 
culminating in a system from 1986 onwards which 
saw ERDF assistance concentrated in the least de-
veloped regions, which were defined using the per 
capita GDP indicator measured against the Com-
munity averages. In the end, purely national re-
gional aid was also granted using the same criteria, 
despite the initial reticence of a number of Member 
States, particularly Germany.
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From ECU 0 to
ECU 1.5 million
Greenland
From ECU 1.5 million to
ECU 5.8 million
From ECU 5.8 million to
ECU 21 million
More than ECU 21 million
French overseas
departments
Greece
Distribution of ERDF aid per region during its first 10 years, in millions of ECU. (‘The European Community and its regions: 
10 years of Community regional policy and of the European Regional Development Fund’, 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1985.)
European regional fund aid, 1975–84
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When the ERDF was launched in 1975, the regions 
eligible for assistance represented some 100 mil-
lion inhabitants, or 38 % of the Community’s total 
population. During this initial period, the Com-
mission defended the following two principles: 
first, the complementary nature of the assistance as 
a means of making an additional contribution to 
regional development and concentrating resources 
and, second, a rule that aid should be granted as a 
matter of priority to the regions most in need. On 
19 December 1975, Commissioner Thomson con-
tacted the ministers responsible for regional policy 
in the Member States to draw their attention to the 
Commission’s concerns about the ERDF  (1). He 
underlined the importance of the complementarity 
principle, whereby the additional resources provid-
ed through contributions from the fund enabled the 
Member States to spend more on regional develop-
ment than would otherwise have been the case. The 
commissioner stressed that the objectives set could 
not be attained if this principle was not applied 
correctly, underlining that ‘that should be equally 
clear to the Community partners and Community 
public opinion’ (2). The main aim was to prevent the 
ERDF from subsidising projects which had already 
been finalised. For the Commission, it was essential 
to raise public awareness of the fact that new rela-
tions were being established between the Commu-
nity and the Member States in the regional develop-
ment field. 
From its very first year of operation, the ERDF em-
phasised a number of features which were to prove 
important for the development of European region-
al policy, such as the ERDF contribution in terms of 
additional resources. Emphasis was also placed on 
the need for geographical concentration in priority 
areas and for precedence to be given to investments 
to boost employment. The importance of the proper 
(1) HAEC, BAC 48/1984/177, SEC (76) 685, 19 February 1976, including in 
Annex B the letter sent by Mr Thomson to the ministers responsible for 
regional policy in the Member States. 
(2) Ibid.
preparation and implementation of regional devel-
opment programmes governing future ERDF oper-
ations was also underlined.
A first reform of regional 
policy, 1979
In 1977, an exhaustive review of Community re-
gional policy was launched in line with the provi-
sions of the ERDF regulation. The time had come 
for the Community to establish a clear blueprint 
for Community regional policy for the years to 
come  (3). It was also important, as Commission-
er Antonio Giolitti underlined in March 1980, to 
provide the general public with tangible evidence 
that the Community had not been set up with 
the sole aim of running the common market, but 
also to tackle the problems affecting the everyday 
lives of its inhabitants  (4). New problems emerged 
in connection with the overall development needs 
of the traditionally more backward regions. These 
problems were compounded by difficulties in adapt-
ing and converting certain sectors in crisis such as 
textiles or steel, even in the richest regions. Com-
munity regional policy would also be called upon 
shortly to help resolve the problems connected with 
the latest accessions, in particular by contributing 
to the development of certain Mediterranean re-
gions. The aid system set up during the first phase 
of the ERDF was not spared criticism from some 
quarters, undoubtedly because of the fact that some 
Member States could not meet the co-financing 
obligation. These criticisms, which Commissioner 
Grigoris Varfis alluded to at the 10th anniversary 
of the ERDF, stemmed primarily from the fact that 
the richest regions sometimes received more fund-
(3) HAEC, BAC 48/1984/178, ‘Guidelines for Community regional policy’, 
Communication and proposals from the Commission to the Council, 
COM(77) 195 final, 1 June 1977.
(4) ‘The regional policy of the European Community’, Text of speech given by 
Antonio Giolitti at the VIIIth International Congress of Regional Eco-
nomies, Brussels, 3 May 1980, p. 3. 
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ing than the less-developed regions, whose limited 
resources meant that they received less from the na-
tional purse and from the Commission (owing to 
their inability to provide co-financing) (1). 
A major review of Community regional policy was 
necessary, all the while bearing in mind that unani-
mous agreement was required from the Council for 
initiatives in this field. Against this backdrop, the 
Commission adopted its guidelines for Commu-
nity regional policy on 1 June 1977 (2). In this docu-
ment, the Commission highlighted two key objec-
tives: to reduce existing regional imbalances and 
to curtail the risk of new imbalances occurring as 
a result of global economic developments or Com-
munity policy decisions. 
A number of new plans were put forward and ac-
cepted by the Council on 26 and 27 June 1978. 
They can be summarised as follows: regional policy 
instruments were to become more diverse and to in-
clude non-financial aspects to ensure that the pol-
icy’s outcomes in the various regions would dovetail 
with those of other Community policies and vice 
versa. Regional policy was considered an integral 
part of the economic policies of the Community 
and the Member States. Finally, the Commission 
was to prepare regular reports on the state of play 
and socioeconomic development of the Commu-
nity’s regions. 
Two key mechanisms were established
Alongside the national programmes of Community 
interest for which the Member States had the right 
of initiative and which helped further the develop-
ment of the regions, sometimes on a multiannual 
(1) HAEU, Emanuele Gazzo papers (EG-98), ‘Event to mark the 10th anniver-
sary of the ERDF’, Brussels, 28 November 1985, p. 5.
(2) HAEC, BAC 48/1984/178, ‘Guidelines for Community regional policy’, 
Communication and proposals from the Commission to the Council, 
COM(77) 195 final, 1 June 1977.
basis, the Commission helped establish two new 
mechanisms which would turn out to be pivotal. 
The first was the obligation on DG XVI to carry out 
regular analyses (positive or negative) of the impact 
of other Community policies on the regions. These 
were commonly referred to as regional impact ana-
lyses (RIAs). Accordingly, studies were carried out 
on the regional impact of the common agricultural 
policy, on trade policy and on fisheries. The RIAs 
were intended to do away with or bring in compen-
satory measures to attenuate the negative effects of 
Community policies or reinforce the positive ones. 
The end result, following a parliamentary debate, 
was to steer agricultural income support measures 
more towards products from southern European 
regions. 
The second mechanism was the establishment of 
a new section of the ERDF, which, while modest 
in financial terms, offered greater flexibility. A so-
called non-quota section set at 75  million UA for 
1978 and 1979, i.e. 5 % of the ERDF budget, was 
made available for the financing of specific Com-
munity actions. The non-quota section was ap-
proved by unanimous decision of the Council, on 
the basis of a proposal from the Commission and 
following the opinion of the European Parliament. 
It provided funding for specific development meas-
ures prompted by the regional impact of Commu-
nity policies. Thus, the non-quota section was in-
tended to increase the Community’s influence on 
national policies — hence the reticence on the part 
of the Member States (3). 
So-called specific Community development meas-
ures, eligible for assistance from the non-quota 
section of the regional fund, were adopted by the 
Council in October 1980. These measures, which 
were implemented in the form of special multi-
(3) According to French MEP François Musso in his a posteriori analysis of the 
situation, European Parliament, session document 1988/89, 21 October 
1988, series A, p. 18.
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annual programmes as opposed to individual pro-
jects, provided funding for investment aid, par-
ticularly for small and medium-sized enterprises. 
Their role in respect of job creation was not limited 
to physical investments (e.g. the construction of a 
factory and provision of the necessary equipment), 
but also extended to intangible investments (e.g. 
consultancy and management fees, tourist accom-
modation in rural areas, market study costs and the 
costs of restoring derelict sites) in areas which were 
not necessarily situated in ERDF regions  (1). The 
financing was determined on the basis of a project 
framework. One of the first specific measures con-
cerned the regeneration of the steel areas affected 
by the restrictive measures of the Davignon plan, 
followed by others concerning the areas affected by 
the crises in the shipbuilding and textile industries. 
A second series of Community programmes was 
adopted in 1984 to help in particular the regions of 
the south affected by the forthcoming accessions of 
Spain and Portugal.
On 6 February 1979, the ERDF regulation, amend-
ed by the Council, was adopted by the latter, pav-
ing the way for the development of a regional policy 
that was more Community-oriented and global in 
outlook. The financing allocated to the fund in-
creased to 945  million UA, up from 581  million 
UA in 1978; this 63 % rise owed much to the Euro-
pean Parliament’s tenacity in the face of a European 
Council which was reticent to say the least (2).
This reform of the ERDF reflected the Commis-
sion’s desire to improve coordination between the 
Member States on regional policy and to demon-
strate the effectiveness of the funds. Better coord-
ination was achieved by two key means, the first 
of these being strengthened regional development 
programmes (RDPs) which were to run for several 
years on the basis of a compulsory common frame-
work. The RDPs submitted by the Member States 
(1) Interview with Georges Rencki, 27 October 2011.
(2) OJ C 36, 9.2.1979, p. 12.
to the Commission would now comprise new in-
formation on the policy side (priorities, budgetary 
aspects, statistical overviews for each region, results 
obtained in terms of investment and employment). 
On receiving the information in question, the Com-
mission would examine it in order to ‘determine the 
priority areas for fund intervention’. Despite this, 
funding from the quota section of the ERDF was 
still allocated on a project-by-project basis, a situ-
ation which was to remain unchanged until 1984. 
The second means of achieving better coordination 
between the Member States was through improve-
ments to Community management of national re-
gional aid, taking due account of competition rules. 
A second reform in 1984
The new ERDF reform was implemented follow-
ing a report on improving the effectiveness of the 
Community’s Structural Funds, produced by the 
Commission at the request of the Stuttgart Euro-
pean  Council of June 1983. One of the Commis-
sion’s key proposals was to step up its dialogue with 
the Member States on the use of resources. 
The adoption of a new regulation on 19 June 1984 
following 3 years of negotiation further emphasised 
the Community character of regional policy in at 
least three areas (3). First, the non-financial instru-
ments formed an integral part of the regulation: 
Title 1 was devoted to the coordination of region-
al policies. Second, national quotas were replaced 
by a band system for 3 years and only a minimum 
was guaranteed for each Member State. Third, the 
non-quota measures continued and their share of 
the ERDF budget rose rapidly from 5 % to 9 %. A 
number of new Community actions were launched 
in areas hard hit by industrial decline, and measures 
were also taken to provide access to advanced tele-
communications services in the most disadvantaged 
(3) Council Regulation (EEC) No 1787/84, 19 June 1984, OJ L 169, 28.6.1984, 
p. 1. 
347Chapter 17 — Regional policy: a tangible expression of European solidarity 
regions and to encourage the exploitation of en-
dogenous energy potential. Non-quota programmes 
would now be adopted by qualified majority rather 
than unanimity. Clearly, the allocation of funding 
to multiannual programmes (as was the case with 
non-quota operations) rather than to individual 
projects gave the Commission a greater say in dis-
cussions with Member States on the future of their 
development policy than had been the case in the 
past, when piecemeal contributions were made in 
respect of individual investment projects. 
This financing approach was extended to all of the 
funds, albeit very gradually. The objective pursued 
at the outset was that at least 20 % of the assistance 
should be earmarked for the financing of pro-
grammes, while the remainder could be used to fi-
nance individual projects, as had been the case since 
the launch of the ERDF. The RDPs could also co- 
finance aid schemes for business investment. These 
programmes, which required the Commission’s ap-
proval for the very first time, and which provided for 
the possibility of appeals to be made to the Council, 
were to be more specific and had to include quanti-
fied objectives. The Member States were to report 
annually on the results of regional action in terms 
of investment and jobs. 
This period of reform was punctuated by intense in-
ternal discussions within the Commission on how 
to cope with the increasingly difficult task of car-
rying out effective examinations in Brussels of the 
growing number of individual projects. A number 
of officials felt that the system no longer enabled 
the Commission to have a coherent overview and to 
have a say on the policy side, i.e. regarding the choice 
of objectives and priorities for the development of 
the eligible regions to ensure that Community 
prior ities were taken into account. Nonetheless, fi-
nancing on a project-by-project basis had its propo-
nents because of the high profile it afforded ‘on the 
ground’ and so this approach was retained for large-
scale projects. The 1984 ERDF reform underscored 
the horizontal or global nature of regional policy 
and paved the way for more in-depth regional impact 
analyses. This development was also attributable to 
staff in the Directorate-General for Regional Policy, 
who were adamant that greater account should be 
taken of the considerable positive or negative im-
pact that other Community and national sectoral 
policies (e.g. agriculture, competition, transport 
and even research) could have on the development 
of the poorest regions of the Community.
The 1984 reform helped increase the Commission’s 
influence vis-à-vis the Member States, which still 
regarded this dossier as very political and difficult 
to manage. The Commission’s margin of discretion 
increased as a result both of the funds being concen-
trated in the poorest regions and of the shift from 
unanimous voting to qualified majority voting in 
the Council. Undeniably, the intention in 1986 was 
to bolster the Commission’s role in allocating and 
using the funds, and this was borne out by develop-
ments at the beginning of the following decade (1).
Furthermore, the European Parliament asked the 
Commission on a number of occasions to ensure 
compliance with the principle of additionality in re-
spect of Community action. The Commission’s job 
was to check that the Member States did not relax 
their efforts regarding the level of eligible ERDF 
expenditure, to ensure that the growth sparked by 
Community input would have a real impact on the 
regional economies. It was not until 1988, however, 
that the additionality principle would be adopted. 
(1) Interview with Eneko Landaburu, 20 January 2012; Barca, F., ‘An agenda 
for a reformed cohesion policy — A place-based approach to meeting 
European Union challenges and expectations’, Independent report pre-
pared at the request of Danuta Hübner, Commissioner for Regional Policy, 
April 2009. 
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were brought together for the calculation (quota and 
non-quota) (1).
A third programme was concerned with energy supply 
in the mountainous regions of the Mezzogiorno. 
Investment aid was granted for mini hydroelectric 
turbines (new technology) and for other alternative energy 
sources. These measures were implemented as special 
multiannual programmes and no longer as individual 
projects, such as those financed in the quota section of the 
ERDF. This measure was intended to respond to the risk of 
oil imports being disrupted. Italy depended on this raw 
material for its energy needs and its electrical power 
(1) Personal archives of Georges Rencki, and informal interview with him on 
7 June 2012.
La Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, set up in 1950, played a 
significant role in the development of southern Italy until 
it was abolished in 1986. Thanks to ERDF aid, it financed 
infrastructure like this aqueduct in Sicily, built in 1976.
Towards specific Community measures: 
non-quota operations
As a follow-up to the Council regulation of February 
1979, which created specific Community co-financed 
regional development actions under the non-quota 
section of the ERDF, from 1980 onwards, on the basis 
of a proposal from the Commission, the Council 
adopted a series of Community measures valid for 
5 years (a number of which were extended). These 
actions could also cover different areas from those 
covered by the non-quota section. In this context, the 
fund co-financed Commission-approved multiannual 
programmes as opposed to individual projects. Some of 
these programmes are mentioned here by way of 
example, in order to illustrate the two particularities of 
non-quota actions: first, their very raison d’être and, 
second, the nature of the aid granted. 
The aim of one of these programmes was to improve 
the economic and social situation of the border areas of 
Ireland and Northern Ireland by developing their 
considerable tourist potential. These areas were lagging 
severely behind in economic terms and were known at 
the time as areas of violent political confrontation. 
Another programme aimed to reinforce the economic 
structures of the regions of south-west France 
(Aquitaine, Midi-Pyrénées and Languedoc-Roussillon) 
and Italy (Mezzogiorno) whose agriculture was at risk 
owing to the forthcoming accession of Spain and 
Portugal. The programme provided for investment aid in 
SMEs and the craft industry as well as the promotion of 
rural tourism within the framework of agricultural 
development. It was clearly, therefore, a preventative 
action. It is important to highlight the reservations 
expressed by Commissioner Christopher Tugendhat 
(Commission Vice-President) when the action was being 
prepared. The British quota was to be reduced and, 
consequently, that of France increased. Commissioner 
Giolitti confirmed to his colleague that these figures 
were correct, but only if the two sections of the ERDF 
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reserves were particularly low compared with the other 
Member States. These factors all limited the 
development possibilities in the Mezzogiorno, 
especially in the mountain regions where the need for 
the creation of new sectors of activity was particularly 
keenly felt.
With the entry into force on 1 January 1985 of the new 
ERDF regulation, the first two Community programmes 
(STAR and Valoren) co-financed by the regional fund 
were launched. These concerned the least-developed 
regions of the Community, i.e. Greece, Ireland, the 
Mezzogiorno, Northern Ireland, Corsica and the French 
overseas departments, as well as Spanish and 
Portuguese regions which remained to be determined. 
As well as contributing to regional development, these 
two programmes therefore helped to achieve the 
objectives of other Community policies such as 
telecommunications and energy policy. The first 
programme, STAR, provided for better access to 
advanced telecommunications services while the 
second, Valoren, was concerned with exploiting 
endogenous energy potential.
The other particularity of specific Community measures 
concerns the different nature of the eligible operations 
compared with those usually entitled to receive ERDF 
funding. 
Examples here are the measures targeted at the areas 
affected by the restructuring of the steel industry as a 
result of production overcapacity. Adopted in 1980 and 
renewed in 1984 for a further 5-year period, these 
measures concerned regions in Belgium, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
Furthermore, in addition to traditional business 
investment aid, a series of measures were aimed at 
‘overcoming constraints hampering the development of 
new economic activities’. These aid measures covered 
the rehabilitation of derelict sites, targeting the 
modernisation of premises for SMEs, the creation of 
green spaces, work to improve the attractiveness of 
sites, the development of adjoining road infrastructure 
and contributions to whatever construction work was 
necessary to promote new activities, such as 
accommodation for workers. 
In August 1985, on the initiative of Commissioner 
Lorenzo Natali, who was responsible for the 
enlargement negotiations, the Commission launched an 
action similar to the ERDF non-quota programme which 
was targeted at south-west France and the Italian 
Mezzogiorno, but then extended to Greece and also to 
other Community funds, including the Social Fund and 
the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee 
Fund. 
These programmes heralded a new era in regional 
development, proposing an overall integrated approach, 
combining aid for investment in firms with agricultural 
support and measures to help address social and 
vocational training issues. They therefore touched upon 
a variety of new development areas and mobilised all 
sources of Community, national, regional and local 
financing for a particularly long period (7 years). This 
was the first attempt at a large-scale integrated 
Community operation. The national authorities were no 
longer alone in holding the reins since each IMP was the 
subject of a tripartite agreement between the 
Commission, the Member State and the regional 
authorities concerned. Unfortunately, the integrated 
programmes were not to become a key feature of the 
future Structural Funds landscape. One plausible 
explanation for this is the comparatively low financial 
contributions made by the Community in a given region 
compared with the financing granted by the various 
national ministries. Thus, some years later, the structure 
set up specifically to promote this type of integrated 
activity was wound up. The IMPs did, however, leave 
behind a legacy of improved fund coordination and, as 
such, they can be considered as having provided real 
added value.
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Inclusion in the treaty
In the decade following the establishment of the 
ERDF, the Commission managed to transform an 
instrument which had been set up with the primary 
aim of achieving a financial balance between Mem-
ber States at different stages of development into a 
real policy for Community solidarity which would 
benefit from a steady increase in resources (13 % of 
the total European Community budget in 1985). 
Furthermore, the policy was to become enshrined in 
the EEC Treaty thanks to the Single European Act 
and the efforts of Jacques Delors, who was president 
of the Commission at the time. The Commission 
could henceforth put greater emphasis on Commu-
nity priorities via the initiatives and programmes 
which it promoted and funded. From a simple com-
pensation instrument, Community regional policy 
progressively became a major financial instrument 
for redistributing wealth to the less developed coun-
tries, and subsequently to all of Europe’s peripheral 
regions. 
Despite this, considerable disparities continued 
to  exist between the various regions of the Com-
munity throughout this period. In 1985, the per 
capita income of the 10 richest regions of the 
European Community was more than triple that 
of the 10 least prosperous regions, a gap that was at 
least twice as wide as that observed in the United 
States. The gradual reduction of these disparities 
would be a long-term endeavour requiring a major, 
prolonged display of solidarity. It was a sign of the 
times that regional policy was to focus increasingly 
on en dogenous development to emphasise the fact 
that the regions themselves were the main drivers 
of their own development. In his Strasbourg speech 
in January 1984, Commissioner Giolitti could not 
have put it better when he said that ‘development is 
like a plant which needs to be adapted to local con-
ditions and to be fed and cultivated by local energy; 
otherwise it will produce only a scattering of flowers 
in the desert’ (1). 
In conclusion, the period from 1973 to 1986, which 
began with the birth of regional policy solely as a 
means of co-financing national policies, came to a 
close with the ERDF as an established Community 
policy whose rise in power could be seen, inter alia, 
from the almost twofold increase (from 4.8  % to 
7.3 % in 10 years) in the ERDF share of the budget 
alone — the ERDF being one of the major instru-
ments of regional policy — and from the tireless ef-
forts to achieve greater effectiveness in the field of 
regional development (2). Every individual involved 
had to face up to their responsibilities since ‘our role 
was to make a contribution to efforts that needed 
to be made by the countries and regions themselves; 
even though our funds increased dramatically and 
substantial sums of money were made available, 
particularly in the areas previously known as Objec-
tive 1 regions, i.e. those which were lagging behind, 
the Community contribution was, fortunately, not 
the main catalyst for development’ (3).
Pierre Tilly
(1) HAEC, Archive of speeches, ‘Le rôle des régions dans la construction d’une 
Europe démocratique’, Speech given by Antonio Giolitti at the Conference 
of the Regions of the European Community and the candidate countries, 
Spain and Portugal, Strasbourg, 27 January 1984, p. 11.
(2) ‘The regions of Europe: a means of strengthening EC cohesion’, Interview 
with Grigoris Varfis on ‘These regions which make up Europe’, June 1985, 
p. 49.
(3) Interview with Eneko Landaburu, 20 January 2012.
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Chapter 18  
Free movement 
of workers, social rights 
and social affairs
The creation of a social Europe is founded on a 
number of provisions of the Treaty of Rome, var-
ious legislative measures and the case-law of the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities (1). 
In this regard, the period from 1973 to 1986 saw 
little change in approach. It began with the adop-
tion of a social action programme and continued 
with a number of initiatives in areas as diverse as 
health and safety at work, equal opportunities, so-
cial security for migrant workers and industrial re-
lations (2). From the outset, governments, the Com-
mission and the other European institutions were 
guided by a desire for social harmonisation with the 
aim of improving the functioning of the common 
market and making progress towards attaining the 
(1) De Schutter, O., ‘L’équilibre entre l’économique et le social dans les traités 
européens’, Revue française des affaires sociales, No 1, 2006, p. 131.
(2) Council resolution of 21 January 1974 concerning a social action pro-
gramme, OJ C 13, 12.2.1974, p. 1.
social objectives of the Treaty of Rome. However, 
the economic crisis and deep changes to the indus-
trial fabric changed the assumptions inherited from 
three decades of post-war economic boom, giving 
rise to the implementation of measures which es-
sentially aimed to cushion the social impact of the 
crisis. A marked change to the Community’s polit-
ical and economic approach therefore occurred at 
the end of the 1970s/beginning of the 1980s, with 
increasing attention being paid to competitiveness 
and social support measures for workers affected by 
economic restructuring. Then, in 1986, the Single 
European Act launched a new stage characterised 
by a desire to create a European social area through 
Commu nity  legislation based on Commission ini-
tiatives, but also — and this is what was new — on 
agreements between the two sides of industry. The 
undertaking was driven forward by Jacques Delors, 
a former Christian trade unionist, who had been ap-
pointed president of the Commission in 1985.
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The early years, 1958–73
While the Treaty of Rome established some of the 
elements of social policy — the European Social 
Fund (ESF), the Economic and Social Committee 
(ESC) and a number of common principles in the 
area of professional training — the initial Com-
munity objectives were still focused on increasing 
production and opening up markets. Social policy 
was merely meant to support economic integration 
between the Member States of the Community (1). 
Although there was a Directorate-General for So-
cial Affairs in the Commission, it essentially dealt 
with the freedom of movement for workers and pro-
fessional training, two areas for which the Treaty of 
Rome provided a basis for action. 
The context changed in the late 1960s and the 
early  1970s. Well before the 1973 oil crisis, eco-
nomic overheating had led to a drop in growth, 
and structural unemployment was re-emerging in 
Europe (in 1971 unemployment in the EEC stood 
at 1.4 million; by 1972 it had risen to 1.6 million), 
accompanied by a new rise in inflation. This gave 
rise to new social imperatives: combating unem-
ployment, providing support measures for restruc-
turing, etc. Willy Brandt’s coming to power in Ger-
many, with the support of the powerful DGB trade 
union, relaunched the debate on a social Europe. 
A new dynamic was forming. Not only did Com-
munity provisions — including those applicable 
in the social domain — have to be extended to the 
new Member States, it was also necessary to absorb 
countries which, in their approach to social matters, 
did not always have the same vision as the original 
Six. Indeed, the fact that the newcomers’ social pro-
tection systems were based on different principles 
than those of the founding Member States put paid 
to the hopes of social harmonisation in Europe that 
(1) Varsori, A., ‘The emergence of a social Europe’, in Dumoulin, M. (ed.), 
The European Commission, 1958–72 — History and Memories, Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2007, 
pp. 427–441.
had been held since the beginning of the European 
Community. This schism ran through the Commu-
nity from 1973 onwards. 
The road towards a social 
Europe opens up, 1974–85
At the time of the 1973 enlargement, optimism 
was the order of the day, all the more so because the 
1972 Paris conference had given the Commission 
a mandate to draw up a social action programme 
before 1 January 1974. A major impulse seemed to 
have been given to the idea of a social Europe, and 
the Community was able to invest in major projects, 
such as the protection of migrant workers, the fight 
against poverty and insecurity, employment, the 
position of women at work and social dialogue. 
On 21 January 1974, the Council adopted a reso-
lution concerning a social action programme, based 
on work done by the Commission during 1973. It 
covered a 2-year period (1974–76), and the Com-
mission was to draw up another social action pro-
gramme by 31 December 1976. The text adopted by 
the Council stressed that social policy had a specif-
ic role to play vis-à-vis other fields of Community 
action and set three objectives: the attainment of 
full employment, the improvement of living and 
working conditions, and increased involvement 
of management and labour in Community deci-
sion-making  (2). Roland Tavitian, who worked in 
the Directorate-General for Social Affairs in Octo-
ber 1972, described the context as follows: ‘I arrived 
in a DG, led by Léo Crijns, which was geared up for 
the task of drafting [the social action programme]. 
And it was a great, almost euphoric period. The 
Community was growing. The British were arriving 
together with Denmark and Ireland. The first step-
by-step plan for EMU was emerging. And the So-
(2) Heynig, E., ‘Le programme d’action sociale de la Communauté eu-
ropéenne’, Revue du Marché Commun, No 173, 1974, pp. 111–120.
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The Economic and Social Committee
Relations between the Commission and the Economic 
and Social Committee, made up of representatives of 
economic and social life and civil society, developed 
slowly between the mid-1970s and the signing of the 
Single European Act. The influence which this 
consultative assembly had on Community political 
decisions grew in relative terms over this period, 
particularly following a number of reforms aimed at 
improving its relations with the Commission and 
strengthening its institutional role. 
At the Paris Summit in October 1972, the ESC was 
given the right to examine any issue relating to 
Community law without being asked by the Commission 
or Council, fulfilling the ESC’s wish for greater 
recognition. This decision was a first step towards 
increased ESC involvement in Community decision-
making. In the same year, the committee was also 
granted the right to publish its opinions in the Official 
Journal and to open its doors to the press, thus putting 
an end to the restriction on its deliberations being made 
public. 
During the 1970s, the ESC, which was still very much in 
the shadows, militated for better institutional 
cooperation and greater involvement in developing 
major action programmes. Its director-general, Roger 
Louet, stated in 1975 that the ESC wished to be 
involved at the stage of reflection and research so that 
it could contribute towards formulating Commission 
proposals, ensuring that greater account would be 
taken of the concerns of the circles it represented (2). 
Despite an increasingly dynamic approach, the 
effectiveness of the ESC’s involvement remained 
limited, with the Council and the Commission tending to 
ignore its opinions or to consult it at too late a stage (3). 
Nevertheless, the Commission did play a greater role in 
meetings of the various ESC bodies (sections, sub-
groups, study groups, plenary sessions), sending senior 
officials and sometimes even commissioners to 
represent it. For his part, the president of the 
Commission undertook to attend an ESC plenary session 
at least once a year to speak about the political 
situation of the Community. 
It was only in the mid-1980s that the ESC truly 
emerged from the shadows. When Jacques Delors 
became Commission president, the number of 
requests for opinions coming directly from the 
Commission increased considerably. The Single 
European Act confirmed this trend by significantly 
widening the areas in which consultation of the ESC 
was mandatory. In a context of economic crisis, this 
demonstrated the Commission’s desire for 
socioeconomic groups to be more involved in 
Community political decision-making. 
Élisabeth Palmero
cial Fund had just been reformed in order to make 
it more automatic, to link it better to Community 
priorities and to develop, in the words of Raymond 
Rifflet, an active employment policy’ (1). 
But the euphoria of 1972–73 did not last long. The 
optimism of enlargement on the economic front 
quickly crumbled as a result of international mon-
etary instability and the first oil crisis. Economic 
growth slackened. Social policy could no longer 
be conceived of as a policy merely geared towards 
redis tribution, as Roland Tavitian pointed out: ‘In 
(1) Interview with Roland Tavitian, 10 September 2010; see also box ‘The 
Commission and the agencies: a difficult start’, p. 354. 
around 1975–76, the Commission’s activities were 
focused on four or five main priorities: youth em-
ployment, equal opportunities for men and women, 
the Vredeling directives on worker participation, 
health and safety at work and, of course, the creation 
of the European Foundation for the Improvement 
of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound) 
and the European Centre for the Development of 
Vocational Training (Cedefop), tools designed to 
(2) ‘Activité et influence du CES’, Roger Louet, Director-General, Courrier du 
personnel, No 352, 7 February 1975, p. 18.
(3) Alphone Lappas, ESC President, in 30 Jours d’Europe, No 188, March 1974, 
p. 32.
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The Commission and the agencies: a difficult start
The European Centre for the Development of Vocational 
Training (Cedefop) and the European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 
(Eurofound), both set up in 1975 during a period of 
economic difficulties and rapid social change, are the 
oldest of the Community’s decentralised bodies. These 
two ‘satellite’ agencies assisted the Community 
institutions, and in particular the Commission, in 
achieving the objectives set by the first social action 
programme adopted in the wake of the 1974 Paris 
Summit. 
Initially located in West Berlin, Cedefop (1) aimed to 
promote social dialogue and to encourage the 
promotion and development of vocational and 
continuing training at Community level. The first few 
years of its existence were not an unmitigated success. 
For a long time, its precise role, structure and budget 
and the status of those who worked for it remained 
uncertain. It was only from the second half of the 
1980s and in the run-up to the Single European Act 
that Cedefop’s structure and links with the Commission 
were strengthened, as social policy and the 
development of vocational training came to play a 
prominent role in the Community debate (2).
The mission of Eurofound, established in Dublin in 
1976 (3), was to ensure that the technical and scientific 
information necessary for planning and achieving better 
living and working conditions was available, in particular 
to the Commission. Through its research and analysis 
activities, it helped facilitate discussions on subjects 
such as the impact of teleworking or of technological 
development on shift work. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, relations between the 
Commission and the two agencies were uncertain and 
limited and the negotiations between them delicate. As 
a result, DG V (Social Affairs) and the foundation tended 
to duplicate each other’s work rather than coordinate 
(1) Council Regulation (EEC) No 337/75 of 10 February 1975, OJ L 39, 
13.2.1975, p. 1. Cedefop would move to Thessaloniki in 1995.
(2) Varsori, A., ‘Vocational education and training in European social 
policy from its origins to Cedefop’, European Journal of Vocational 
Training, No 32, 2004.
(3) Council Regulation (EEC) No 1365/75 of 26 May 1975, OJ L 139, 
30.5.1975, p. 1 (Article 2(1)).
their research efforts. This was despite the fact that the 
Commission sent representatives to both boards of 
directors. Jean Degimbe, director of Cedefop for 3 years 
and of the foundation for 10, confirms this state of 
affairs, stressing that the Commission and its agencies 
belonged to ‘two different worlds, treating each other 
with distrust’ (4).
Élisabeth Palmero
(4) Interview with Jean Degimbe, 13 July 2010.
Cedefop publications.
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encourage an effective dialogue between manage-
ment and labour’ (1). 
To help it cope with the huge diversity of tasks 
facing it, the Directorate-General for Social Affairs 
was able to draw on the experience gained in the so-
cial field since the establishment of the ECSC and 
to rely on people who were familiar with the prac-
tices and realities of the world of employment and 
work. The period 1973–86 saw three successive dir-
ectors-general. The Belgian Raymond Rifflet held 
the post up to May 1973, and his successor, Michael 
Shanks, who came from industry (British Oxy-
gen), remained at the helm for 18 months, thereby 
demonstrating the importance of social affairs to 
the British, who were faced at the time with major 
industrial restructuring problems. In 1976, another 
Belgian, Jean Degimbe, took over. During his time 
as a member of the Ortoli cabinet, he had chaired 
the group of heads of cabinet whose task it was to 
examine the social action programme approved by 
the Council in January 1974. A former Christian 
trade unionist, he had worked in the cabinet of 
Vice-President Raymond Barre in the Rey Commis-
sion and in the cabinet of President François-Xavier 
Ortoli. Degimbe remained in charge of the DG 
until 1992, an exceptionally long tenure of office. 
Under him, the DG developed a grassroots ap-
proach. Here again, Roland Tavitian’s testimony is 
enlightening: ‘There was no question of applying 
any kind of “manual”. Perhaps more than elsewhere, 
social affairs can only work seriously by having reg-
ular contact with the grassroots and with experts. 
This presupposes a crucial element of trust on the 
part of the hierarchy — within reasonable limits, of 
course’ (2).
(1) Interview with Roland Tavitian, 10 September 2010. 
(2) Ibid.
A major step towards gender 
equality (3)
Female employment was a particular concern of 
the Commission at the time, and the Commission 
helped secure spectacular advances in the area of 
gender equality from the second half of the 1970s. 
This has to be seen as a reflection of its desire to pro-
tect social rights and so bolster the internal market, 
to avoid distortions of competition between Mem-
ber States and also as the outcome of a (gradual) 
shift in attitudes. 
The directive on equal pay for men and women 
adopted by the Council on 10 February 1975, fitt-
ingly in the United Nations’ International Women’s 
Year, was symbolic of this proactive approach. Al-
though the Council initially favoured addressing 
the issue by means of a recommendation, the Com-
mission’s efforts meant that it was possible to take 
the route of a directive. For Jacqueline Nonon, head 
of unit at the time, the context arising from the 1973 
enlargement made such progress easier: ‘The oppor-
tunity came with the arrival of the British, because 
they already had their equal opportunities legisla-
tion in place. They were proud to show just how far 
ahead they were, and I was lucky enough to have a 
commissioner, the Irishman [Patrick] Hillery, who 
fully backed me, and a director-general, Michael 
Shanks, who was supportive as well’ (4). 
A second directive, adopted in 1976, dealt with 
equal treatment in access to employment, vocation-
al training, promotion and working conditions. 
This Commission proposal, annexed to its 1975 
memorandum on the situation of workers, was a 
response to the growing influx of women to the la-
bour market. Investigation had shown that women 
remained confined to a limited number of jobs. 
(3) See Quintin, O., ‘L’égalité entre hommes et femmes: une réalisation spéci-
fique de la politique sociale communautaire’, Revue du Marché Commun, 
No 288, 1985, pp. 309–318.
(4) Interview with Jacqueline Nonon, 25 October 2010.
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This reinforced existing discrimination, a situation 
that had to be resolved, as the case of Gabrielle De-
frenne, an employee of the Belgian airline Sabena, 
showed. In the Defrenne judgments, the European 
court established the principle of direct effect (en-
abling individuals to invoke European rules directly 
before a national or European court) with regard to 
Article 141 of the EEC Treaty (1). The prohibition 
of all discrimination based on gender has, indeed, 
become a general legal principle. A third directive, 
adopted in 1978, supplemented the legislation by 
establishing equal treatment in the area of social 
security, though it did not come into effect until 
(1) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 8 April 1976 in Case 43/75 Defrenne v 
SABENA [1976] ECR 455.
1984. These initial steps owed much to the intensive 
efforts of Jacqueline Nonon, Marie Josée Jonczy and 
other officials within the Legal Service. The Com-
mission continued to develop its thinking in this 
area, and significant advances were achieved in the 
1980s. An action programme (1982–85) included 
specific measures to remedy the factors hampering 
women’s employment prospects (2). The aim was to 
help women create businesses or to encourage them 
to invest in areas traditionally considered to be the 
preserve of men. It also advocated further discus-
sion on part-time working so as to allow parental 
responsibilities to be better shared and to end dis-
crimination in this area (3).
Health and safety at work
The Commission was also active in the field of 
health and safety at work, an important issue ever 
since the beginning of the 1950s. In 1974, a tri-
partite committee set up by a Council decision of 
27 June was assigned the task of assisting the Com-
mission in preparing and implementing appropriate 
measures, for example with regard to medical pre-
vention or the protection of workers. It would en-
able cooperation to be stepped up between national 
authorities and organisations representing workers 
and employers. 
In 1978, and again in 1984, the first health and 
safety action programmes were launched  (4). The 
first framework directive on health and safety at 
work was adopted in 1980. It was concerned with 
protecting workers from the risks of exposure to 
chemical, physical and biological agents at work (5). 
(2) OJ C 186, 21.7.1982, p. 3.
(3) Proposal for a Council directive on parental leave and leave for family rea-
sons, 24 November 1983, OJ C 333, 9.12.1983, p. 6.
(4) A first directive on the approximation of the laws, regulations and admin-
istrative provisions of the Member States on the protection of the health 
of workers exposed to vinyl chloride monomer also entered into force on 
29 June 1978 (Council Directive 78/610/EEC, OJ L 197, 22.7.1978, p. 12).
(5) Council Directive 80/1107/EEC of 27  November  1980, OJ L 327, 
3.12.1980, p. 8.
Poster advertising the Community health and safety at work week 
from 2 to 8 May 1977. Working conditions were high on the list of 
workers’ demands in the 1970s.
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The directive on the protection of workers from the 
risks related to exposure to asbestos at work (1) was 
concerned with one chemical agent in particular. It 
gave rise to strong opposition from employers, but 
was nevertheless a first step towards solving a prob-
lem that would become increasingly important and 
give rise to much debate.
This series of directives was completed with the 
adoption on 12 May 1986 of the directive on the 
protection of workers from the risks related to ex-
(1) Council Directive 83/477/EEC, OJ L 263, 24.9.1983, p. 25.
posure to noise at work  (2). Owing to the absence 
of explicit legislative competence in the treaty up 
to the mid-1980s, this issue was, however, generally 
considered to be an add-on to market harmonisa-
tion and the Community’s economic policies. The 
Single European Act was a major step forward in 
that it introduced into the treaty a new provision for 
the enactment of social policy legislation aimed at 
promoting ‘improvements, especially in the work-
ing environment, as regards the health and safety 
of workers’  (3). This also formed part of a wider 
shift towards an approach focusing on prevention. 
The Occupational Safety and Health Convention 
(No 155), adopted by the International Labour Or-
ganisation (ILO) in 1981, was a key instrument in 
this context. 
Facilitating the free movement 
of people
Progress towards the free movement of workers 
started in the 1950s  (4). The Commission’s action 
programme of 18 December 1974 related mainly to 
the situation of migrant workers and their families. 
The first result was an amendment of Regulation 
(EEC) No 1408/71 on improving the application 
of social security schemes to migrant workers (5). It 
was in this context that mention would be made of 
the possible creation of a passport union between 
the Member States based on the gradual harmonisa-
tion of legislation relating to foreign nationals, lead-
(2) Council Directive 86/188/EEC, OJ L 137, 24.5.1986, p. 28.
(3) Two new articles inserted by the Single European Act opened up major 
prospects in this area. These were Article 118a, which authorised the Coun-
cil to adopt minimum requirements to encourage ‘improvements, especially 
in the working environment, as regards the health and safety of workers’, 
and Article 110a, which aimed to eliminate all trade barriers in the single 
market and allow goods to move freely across borders.
(4) This owed much to Regulation No  15 and to the directive of 16 August 
1961 (OJ  L 57, 26.8.1961, p.  1073) and, above all, to Regulation (EEC) 
No 1612/68 and to Council Directive 68/360/EEC of 15 October 1968, 
OJ L 257, 19.10.1968, p. 2 and p. 13.
(5) Degimbe, J., La politique sociale européenne: Du traité de Rome au traité 
d’Amsterdam, European Trade Union Institute, Brussels, 1999, p. 107.
Raising awareness of occupational health, European Trade Union 
Confederation poster, 1970.
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ing eventually to the abolition of passport checks 
within the Community (1). 
The freedom of movement for employed work-
ers would be the subject of a number of directives 
aimed at improving the coordination of rules on 
access to and the pursuit of professions. These in-
clude, for example, the directive of 16 June 1975 on 
the activities of doctors (2). This was the first time 
that directives coordinating national laws on a pro-
fession had been extended to an activity exercised in 
an employed capacity. It was also a step forward in 
terms of the mutual recognition of diplomas applic-
able to both employed and self-employed doctors. 
But coordination of social security schemes applic-
able to self-employed workers would continue to be 
problematic, and it was not until 1981 that Regu-
lations (EEC) No 1408/71 and (EEC) No 574/72 
were extended to the self-employed and to their 
family members (3).
Regulations (EEC) No 1407/71 and (EEC) No 
574/72, which also cover the payment of family 
benefits to migrant workers and their families, were 
the subject of a proposal from the Commission to 
the Council on 10 April 1975. The actual entry 
into force of these regulations was vital to achieving 
the freedom of establishment and freedom to pro-
vide services. The Commission wanted a uniform 
solution to be implemented in all Member States 
so as to make the principle of family benefits being 
granted by the host country a general one. This 
meant eliminating differences in treatment where 
the worker’s family resided in their country of ori-
gin. These Community-level arrangements required 
adjustments at the level of national administrations. 
However, some Member States were reluctant to 
adapt their laws and practices. One example was 
(1) Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement, No 7, 1975; Cited in 
Ribas, J.-J., Jonczy, M.-J. and Séché, J.-C., Traité de droit social européen, 
Presses universitaires de France, 1st edn, Paris, 1978, p. 194.
(2) OJ L 167, 30.6.1975, p. 1.
(3) By virtue of Council Regulation (EEC) No  1390/81, 15 May 1981, 
OJ L 143, 29.5.1981, p. 1.
France, which for a long time refused to pay family 
benefits to Community workers for family members 
who remained in their country of origin. The Com-
mission’s effort in terms of both drafting and imple-
menting legislation was thus crucial, giving rise to 
a substantial number of references for preliminary 
rulings before the Court of Justice, for which the 
Commission always prepared a written submission, 
as Head of Unit Annette Bosscher recalls: ‘When I 
left social security for migrant workers (in 1981), I 
think there were 150 Court judgments relating to 
preliminary rulings or infringements, and I some-
times went to the Court to help the Commission’s 
lawyer on the technical details’ (4).
(4) Interview with Annette Bosscher, 13 August 2010.
Cartoon by Plantu on the freedom of establishment for 
doctors in EEC countries  in March 1977. The harmonisation 
and mutual recognition of qualifications happened fastest 
in the health sector.
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The Court of Justice played a major role in interpret-
ing Community rules on the freedom of movement 
of workers and equal treatment in the area of social 
protection, but it was not until specific rulings in 
1986 and 1989 that France finally relented on the 
question of paying family benefits to Community 
workers. Following the Pinna judgments concern-
ing an Italian national working in the Savoy region 
of France whose family continued to reside in Italy, 
amendments had to be made to both Community 
and French legislation. In particular, the Court de-
clared the former Article 73(2) of Regulation (EEC) 
No 1408/71 invalid on the grounds that it preclud-
ed the award to employed persons subject to French 
legislation of French family benefits for members 
of their family residing in another Member State. 
It considered this to be a covert form of discrimi-
nation in that the conditions were more difficult 
to meet for a non-national that for a national. The 
Pinna case ultimately led to the adoption of Regula-
tion (EEC) No 3427/89 of 30 October 1989, which 
made it a general principle in all Member States 
that the law of the country of employment would 
apply. For the Commission, as Annette Bosscher ex-
plains, stressing the importance of the Pinna judg-
ment, ‘This was a great victory … because we had 
tried several times to make the system the same for 
everybody: France had always been very opposed, 
while Germany considered it to be a fairly good sys-
tem ... So after the preliminary ruling, I think we 
had to launch three infringement procedures. It 
took  15  years in all, I think, before France finally 
accepted it’ (1). 
Social dialogue: early promise gives 
way to disappointment
As far as the involvement of management and labour 
in the dialogue and management of the Commu-
nity  is concerned, the results were more mixed de-
(1) Interview with Annette Bosscher, 13 August 2010.
spite a promising start following the creation in 1970 
of the Standing Committee on Employment  (2). 
The Commission played an active role in establish-
ing dialogue with stakeholders, and Jean Degimbe 
contributed to this from the moment he took over 
as director-general: ‘As soon as I arrived in 1976, I 
wasted no time in bringing management and labour 
together; that was in my first week, and it was the 
first time in ages. We talked at length and promised 
to meet very regularly’ (3). This dialogue took shape 
in tripartite conferences prepared by the Commis-
sion. It was felt at the time that a tripartite meeting 
would above all allow an initial contact to take place 
with employer and trade union representatives, and 
President Ortoli was very keen on the idea. When 
Roy Jenkins took over as Commission president in 
January 1977, contacts with the European Trade 
Union Confederation (ETUC), the Union of In-
dustrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe 
(UNICE) and the European Centre of Employers 
and Enterprises providing Public Services (CEEP) 
intensified, at least in the initial phase of his Presi-
dency. They discussed the political priorities and 
work programme that the Commission had put 
forward. At the Commission’s initiative, advisory 
committees were set up on hygiene and health pro-
tection at work, social security for migrant workers 
and the free movement of workers. Prepared by the 
Commission, which also presented a report on the 
relevant subject at each conference, these tripartite 
meetings were an opportunity to compare differ-
ent points of view (business and trade associations 
would also make their views known on the subject 
under discussion). Statements would be issued at 
the end of these conferences, and it was up to the 
Commission and the Council to draw the necessary 
conclusions. 
(2) Paulus, D., La création du Comité permanent de l’emploi des Communautés 
européennes, Travaux de l’Institut d’études européennes, ULB, Brussels, 
1972.
(3) Interview with Jean Degimbe, 11 July 2010.
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The dialogue which the conferences were supposed 
to foster proved particularly difficult  (1). The June 
1976 conference set the tone for this. It must be 
pointed out that economic growth was very disap-
pointing at the time. Attempts to analyse the causes 
and propose remedies divided the various parties to 
such an extent that it proved impossible to adopt a 
joint statement. The only tangible decision was in 
favour of a study programme on employment issues. 
The growing differences between trade unions and 
employer organisations and between trade unions 
and the public authorities were again exposed. In 
reality, they had existed in the social dialogue since 
the beginning of the decade. Employer representa-
tives insisted on the need to control wage rises and 
for the public authorities to disengage from the 
economy, while the trade unions were unable to 
speak with a single voice. Those in favour of moder-
ate social dialogue (the German DGB trade union, 
for example) opposed those who wanted a different 
type of growth based on a reduction in working 
hours, controls on prices and capital movements 
and the maintenance of a strong public sector. At 
the very least, this was a long way from the objec-
tives set out by the Commission. 
Employers and trade unions became increasingly 
divided, for example on the question of the organ-
isation of working time from 1979. One of those 
involved remembers the ambiguities: ‘We opted for 
proposing a directive on the organisation of work-
ing time. A young German from the DG had done 
some extraordinary groundwork. Two years were 
spent working intensely with expert groups and 
employer and trade union organisations developing 
economic models to try to gauge the results and the 
alternatives. The whole exercise finally boiled down 
to a few texts on minimum working hours (plus a 
very vague agreement at the tripartite conference) 
that fell well short of the unions’ demands. It was 
(1) On tripartite conferences, see Laudat, G., ‘Une nouvelle instance com-
munautaire: les conférences tripartites’, Revue du Marché Commun, 
No 213,1978, pp. 30–39.
as if we were just throwing them a bone. And this 
illustrated the very ambiguity of European social 
policy. It is an area in which subsidiarity applies 
very strictly; but taking action (or appearing to do 
so) was essential for the sake of public opinion’ (2).
Despite these very mixed results in relation to Com-
munity social dialogue, the Commission never-
theless did important work in other areas linked 
to industrial relations. It drew up a text, which 
was adopted as a directive in 1975, on collective 
redundancies requiring the consultation of employ-
ee representatives. For the Commission, the 1975 
directive met the need to give workers and their 
elected representatives the means to influence the 
restructuring operations that were becoming ever 
more widespread. But the Commission did not stop 
there: issues such as a reduction in working time, 
the need for consultation and dialogue at the time 
of factory closures and greater emphasis on training 
also attracted its attention. Another issue, the Euro-
pean company statute and the need to inform and 
consult workers, would prove much tougher. 
The Vredeling proposal: a fierce debate
On 30 June 1970, the Commission presented an in-
itial proposal on a statute for a European company 
as a step towards the abolition of internal borders 
and the elimination of restrictions on the right of 
establishment. The proposed regulation established a 
legal framework to enable companies to be created on 
a European Community rather than a national basis. 
The aim was to facilitate the interpenetration  of 
European companies and to harmonise working con-
ditions between Member States. The idea was also to 
relaunch dialogue between management and labour 
and to provide more information to employees on 
the operating conditions of transnational compan-
ies. Indeed, Member States themselves, somewhat 
(2) Interview with Roland Tavitian, 10 September 2010.
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powerless in the face of entities, about which it was 
not always possible to know where decisions were 
taken or who they were made up of, wished to impose 
a degree of discipline on such companies.
Having failed at its first attempt, on 9 October 
1972 the Commission submitted a new proposal to 
the Council of Ministers. This set out to grant em-
ployees a right of scrutiny with regard to company 
matters, thereby extending the German dual system 
to the entire Community (1). It was planned to es-
(1) The dual system applicable at the time in Germany, the Netherlands, Italy 
and partly in France was based on the existence of two bodies with different 
missions. An executive board dealt with the management of the company, 
while a supervisory board monitored the activities of the executive board 
and took part in adopting important decisions relevant to the company.
tablish a European works council representing the 
interests of all employees in Europe and competent 
for all matters relating to several establishments. It 
would also have a right of veto on certain important 
decisions. However, this transposition of the Ger-
man co-decision model to Community level was far 
from unanimously supported by business and social 
stakeholders. At the end of 1974, the Commission 
had to abandon the project in the face of opposition 
from ETUC  (2). But most employer organisations 
were also against this project, with UNICE express-
(2) Signs of opposition which are found in the first action programme launched 
at the 1974 Copenhagen Congress (European Trade Union Confederation 
archives, International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam, file 736, 
Copenhagen Congress, 23–25 March 1974). 
Belgian metal workers demonstrate in front of the Berlaymont on 11 February 1982. Trade unions took widespread 
action to put pressure on the Commission during the crisis in the European steel industry.
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ing its strong opposition to legislation which, in its 
view, infringed the freedom to take management 
decisions. 
In 1978, after a further attempt to harmonise nation-
al company law legislation, the Commission failed to 
secure the support of the Member States. In 1980, it 
supported the proposal of Henk Vredeling, the com-
missioner responsible for employment and social af-
fairs, on procedures for informing and consulting the 
employees of undertakings with complex structures, 
in particular transnational undertakings  (1). This 
(1) Proposal for a Council directive on procedures for informing and consult-
ing the employees of undertakings with complex structures, in particular 
transnational undertakings, known as the Vredeling directive, OJ C 297, 
15.11.1980, p. 3.
proposal was welcomed by ETUC, which saw in the 
Vredeling directive the expression of some of its de-
mands and a necessary complement to the codes of 
good conduct adopted by international bodies such 
as the OECD and the ILO. It came as no surprise 
that employers opposed the project, although sev-
eral employer associations, including the German 
one, found it hard to come up with reasons for any 
fierce opposition. But UNICE and the employers’ 
side in general felt there was no need for Commu-
nity intervention. But European employers were 
not the most hostile opponents in this debate. In-
deed, it was hardly relevant to the majority who had 
become accustomed to informing and consulting 
their employees. In Germany and the Netherlands, 
for example, companies had for years had to come 
to terms with national legislation requiring them to 
A delegation of Belgian trade unions in the metal-working sector holds talks with the Commission on 11 February 1982 
in connection with the restructuring of the Cockerill group in Liège and Charleroi.
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do so. The draft directive did not therefore contain 
anything new or controversial. However, American 
multinationals lobbied hard to fight the directive, 
denouncing its aim, its hypothetical economic bene-
fits and its general impact on industrial relations. As 
far as American business circles were concerned, the 
by-pass, a system proposed in the directive, which 
implied extraterritorial power for the Community 
vis-à-vis multinationals with subsidiaries in Europe, 
was met with horror. The system would allow em-
ployee representatives to address a group’s parent 
company management directly if they did not re-
ceive adequate information. The Commission had 
to do a lot of explaining and make considerable 
sacrifices in order to persuade American interest 
groups that the system had relatively little impact 
on American multinationals. The commissioner re-
sponsible for social affairs, Ivor Richard, who had 
taken over from Henk Vredeling, defended the dir-
ective in the United States in March 1982 at a time 
when employers were waging a campaign against 
the project. It was no easy task, as the former com-
missioner explains: ‘I inherited something called 
the Vredeling directive. [Henk] Vredeling was the 
commissioner for social affairs immediately before 
me. And for some reason he got [Étienne] Davignon 
to put his name to the proposal as well, which was 
one that said workers would be consulted at any 
great change. This caused horror, of course, to Euro-
pean employers, and to American. I remember I had 
to go to America about three times in order to argue 
it in New York. But we pushed it pretty hard, and at 
the end we got a terribly diluted version of it, which 
got through the European Parliament. But now that 
took up quite a lot of time’ (1).
Appearing before the European Parliament, Ivor 
Richard, from the British Labour Party, declared 
his readiness to remove the most controversial as-
pects from the text of the directive in order to res-
cue the essential ones. Several attempts were made 
(1) Interview with Ivor Richard, 21 October 2010. 
to revive the idea, either by turning it into a recom-
mendation or by having its content incorporated 
into collective agreements. Another proposal was 
for the debate to continue at the level of dialogue 
between management and labour and to limit its 
content to technological issues. The whole scheme 
seems to have been buried in 1982, even though the 
Commission proposed a new version in July 1983. 
In May 1986, the European Council decided at the 
suggestion of the Dutch Presidency to put discus-
sions on the Vredeling project on hold until 1989, 
calling on management and labour to continue to 
negotiate during this period.
The Commission’s social action 
in the midst of the crisis of the first 
half of the 1980s
Changes in the international economic system 
profoundly altered the European context in the 
late 1970s and the early 1980s. The crisis triggered 
major shifts and raised the question of the role of 
public intervention and what means it could use. 
As a result of the second oil crisis in 1979, the issue 
of social dismantling reared its head in a new way: 
what should be done for those people affected by the 
economic impact of the increase in oil prices? There 
was also the prospect of enlargement to include the 
countries of the Mediterranean. The standard of 
living there called for a transfer of resources and an 
active regional policy, while an effort also had to 
be made to avoid social dumping to the detriment 
of the existing Member States. ‘The great expecta-
tions of the public related much more to the social 
consequences of economic Europe (unemployment, 
youth employment, restructuring) than to building 
a genuine social policy at European level covering 
the huge range of issues involved (social protection, 
health, retirement). Even the demands of national 
trade unions were mainly concerned with the over-
all issue of employment (which is essentially eco-
nomic in nature) and a few important, but limited, 
issues that had already been well identified, such as 
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the Vredeling directive, restructuring and worker 
consultation’ (1).
The Commission was dealing with issues such as 
restructuring and employment at a particularly 
difficult economic and social juncture, insists Jean 
Degimbe: ‘We had no legal instruments whatsoever 
regarding employment. There wasn’t even an em-
ployment chapter in the treaty. When I took over 
as director-general, the directorate-general was the 
Directorate for Social Affairs ... The word “employ-
ment” didn’t even feature in the title ... to give you 
some idea of attitudes at the time’ (2). With growing 
unemployment, the Community institutions were 
faced with critical problems, which led the Com-
mission to approach matters from two angles by 
promoting an active employment policy and seek-
ing to achieve social progress based on equal oppor-
tunities. In the words of Degimbe: ‘Via the Social 
Fund we were able to focus our efforts on retraining 
workers facing great difficulty who, without the So-
cial Fund, would have certainly been unemployed 
for longer and who in any case had the opportunity 
to retrain. I’m not saying that it solved all the prob-
lems. Far from it. But the Commission was never-
theless extremely useful in this area’ (3).
In April 1983, the Commission proposed a new 
job-creation strategy for young people (2.5 million 
jobs in 5 years). This was based on technological 
innovation and a reduction and reorganisation of 
working time, presupposing that, in addition to vo-
cational training, any jobs created as a result of the 
reorganisation of working time would be allocated 
as a priority to young people. It would then also be 
possible to reserve jobs for young people in the vol-
untary and public sectors. Finally, support would be 
available for young people who wanted to venture 
into setting up private or associative businesses. As 
far as the Commission was concerned, it was up to 
(1) Interview with Roland Tavitian, 10 September 2010.
(2) Interview with Jean Degimbe, 13 July 2010.
(3) Ibid.
the Member States to implement such measures. 
But it was also necessary to rely on employer organ-
isations, which believed that the cost of employing 
young people had to be reduced in order to make it 
more attractive. 
The Single European Act: 
an historic boost for social 
policy
The economic upturn in the second half of the 
1980s prompted a wave of optimism and put the 
creation of the single market back on track once and 
for all. The thinking of the Delors Commission was 
that the Single European Act had to be accompa-
nied by a forward-looking social policy, because if 
growth was to be fanned by the single market, the 
risk of social division between rich and poor re-
gions and skilled and unskilled workers could not 
be underestimated. Support for the labour market 
was envisaged by Article 118a, which provided for 
a gradual harmonisation of minimum require-
ments relating to working conditions. The need for 
social and economic cohesion was confirmed (Art-
icle  130), including further reform of the Struc-
tural Funds, with a substantial increase in funding 
thanks to the adoption of the ‘Delors package’. The 
Single European Act (Article 118b) also promoted 
dialogue between management and labour, whose 
role would be enhanced by the Maastricht Treaty.
The premises of a sui generis social 
dialogue
Social dialogue was one of the elements for reinforc-
ing social cohesion, which was at the heart of the 
concept of a European social dimension. Commis-
sioner Richard’s office felt that the Commission 
should go beyond protection and wealth redistribu-
tion systems. His view was that ‘good economic pol-
icy may be a condition for an efficient social policy, 
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but a good social policy may also be crucial for good 
economic policy’. To promote this approach, the 
Commission considered the possibility of conclud-
ing European collective agreements or, failing that, 
getting Member States to define binding minimum 
wages. They would then have to be induced to ac-
cept the same specific objectives and hence to adopt 
a common approach to social policy. The economic 
changes taking place at the beginning of the 1980s 
raised the question of how much leeway countries 
had, and social policy did not come through un-
scathed. The Commission was convinced that social 
policy issues could no longer be resolved by national 
action alone. It was therefore necessary to ‘Euro-
peanise’ the dialogue between management and 
labour and not keep it exclusively at national level. 
These concerns tallied with those of the new presi-
dent, Jacques Delors, whose vision was moulded 
by his involvement in the Christian trade union 
movement. The White Paper on the single market 
was accompanied by initiatives aimed at providing 
structure to the dialogue between management and 
labour. Indeed, UNICE and ETUC were asked by 
Delors from the beginning of 1985 to contribute 
to his project. Throughout that year, various com-
missioners, including the president himself, hosted 
meetings with the social partners. These began even 
before Delors officially took over at the head of the 
Commission. This was the start of a break with the 
past, with management and labour coming togeth-
er as part of an overall design. From January 1985, 
Delors spoke of the need for a European collective 
agreement, which he considered would strengthen 
democracy in Europe. This depended on ‘the vi-
tality of social relations and the involvement of as 
many people as possible’. For Delors, management 
and labour had to be involved in creating the Com-
munity. This policy of consensus on the part of 
Brussels could, it was felt, allow national laws to be 
harmonised and — in the context of the single mar-
ket project — give rise to a European labour market. 
By giving priority to agreement over legislation, the 
Commission was recognising the independence of 
the players, between whom it was organising a dia-
logue. 
Important groundwork
Delors hoped that the meeting of 31 January 1985 
would relaunch the social dialogue and place it on 
a fresh footing compared with 1984 (1). Alongside 
the president and Émile Noël, four commissioners 
attended the meeting: Peter Sutherland, Arthur 
Cockfield, Karl-Heinz Narjes and Alois Pfeiffer. 
They embarked not on a general discussion of social 
issues, but on a process of reflection about overall 
Community developments. The meeting would, it 
was hoped, launch dialogue between the two sides 
of industry. A series of meetings took place during 
1985 for which the Commission provided memos 
and analyses. Jean Degimbe, assisted by Carlo Sa-
voini, chaired the meetings at the request of Com-
missioner Marín. As Degimbe recalls: ‘I reported 
back, of course. Indeed, Marín said in the Com-
mission that we still had our own opinion  ... And 
we gradually saw the atmosphere becoming more 
relaxed during meetings. People began to say to 
themselves that the text was a good one, and grad-
ually trust was established. It took 5 to 6  months 
for this to happen. I am not saying that they always 
agreed. Far from it. But relations then were a lot eas-
ier. For example, they agreed that I myself should 
draw up a summary report [of the discussions] after 
meetings which would serve as a basis for the next 
meeting’ (2). The aim was to reach joint conclusions 
between the partners and to identify possible areas 
of agreement. Sectoral and inter-professional issues 
were discussed, and technological developments 
were examined. Working groups were set up to con-
tinue the dialogue, and in the autumn of 1985 a first 
debate on growth and employment was chaired by 
Commissioner Pfeiffer. This was followed by a sec-
(1) Didry, C. and Mias, A., Le moment Delors, les syndicats au cœur de l’Europe 
sociale, PIE-Peter Lang, Brussels, 2005.
(2) Interview with Jean Degimbe, 11 July 2010.
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ond one on the introduction of new technologies, 
under Commissioner Sutherland. The process was 
under way, as Jean Degimbe recalls. ‘The change we 
saw along the way among those who took part in 
discussions on the preparation of opinions [sic]. At 
the outset, we sensed some resistance and a degree 
of hostility between the parties. One side was trying 
to read between the lines of what the others were 
saying and work out what they actually meant’ (1). 
Despite disagreements, the Delors Commission 
nevertheless laid the foundations for major chang-
es in the run-up to the signing of the Single Euro-
pean Act. The first change was that the dialogue 
indicated that the agreement between the two sides 
could be transformed into a European agreement. 
This consensual approach, rooted in the notion of 
joint management, also sowed the seeds for another 
development: the emergence of a European society, 
an issue that the two sides — like the Commission 
— cared about and something they both helped 
to define. The qualitative leap forward was poten-
tially significant. To achieve it, the market would 
have to be accompanied by a social dimension and 
would have to meet certain concerns of unions and 
employers alike. But did the means exist to trans-
form the discussions into directives, decisions and 
recommendations? After all, national governments 
retained important prerogatives in this area, and 
employers and trade unions might be tempted to 
rely more on them, unless the dialogue between 
them could offer a way for the Commission to cre-
ate the conditions for a European social policy by 
giving rise to objectives which could be transformed 
into texts and which the Member States would find 
it difficult to object to. This was a huge challenge 
in 1986. The dialogue between management and 
labour would gain renewed momentum in 1989 be-
fore being institutionalised by the 1992 Maastricht 
Treaty.
(1) Interview with Jean Degimbe, 11 July 2010.
Conclusion
Faced with the crisis of the 1970s and the widespread 
protests across Europe at the end of the decade, the 
Commission adopted the approach of seeking to 
remedy economic failings by means of social meas-
ures. It shrewdly exploited the few levers which — 
alongside freedom of movement for workers, which 
was already largely a reality — enabled it to support 
Member States’ action in specific areas, primarily via 
the Social Fund: vocational training and the transi-
tion to working life, and working conditions linked 
to the internal market (equal treatment, health and 
safety at work). Nor did it forget to cement Euro-
pean ties through its proposals. Nevertheless, it 
found it hard to get management and labour fully 
involved, and the Member States retained primary 
responsibility in this area. It became clear that there 
were limits to the idea of social harmonisation, as to 
the establishment of minimum standards.
The lines were redrawn as circumstances changed 
at the start of the 1980s. It became clear that social 
policy could be a factor in the economic health of 
Europe. Consequently, the Commission launched 
and fostered a discussion of the qualitative aspects. 
It had to face up to the loss of momentum experi-
enced in Europe in the early 1980s. After the Stutt-
gart Summit, and even more so after Fontainebleau, 
it adopted a slightly different approach. Without in 
any way changing its previous course, it sought to 
establish a dialogue between management and la-
bour that would involve the two sides in the Com-
munity venture. Encouraging the participation of 
the trade unions was vital for the success of this 
process, not only at central level (the tripartite con-
ferences and the standing committee were already 
up and running), but also through the development 
of sector-based dialogue. Here the political dimen-
sion was at least as important as the social aspects. 
By allowing management and labour to take part in 
defining and writing European rules, the Commis-
sion was taking the ob jectives of the Treaty of Rome 
to their logical conclusion. It had reason to hope 
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that it might enjoy greater leeway despite the Mem-
ber States’ prerogatives, which were still substantial 
in this area. But they — and certainly Spain and 
Portugal, which joined the EEC in 1986 — were 
counting above all on receiving Community fund-
ing — partly from the more limited ESF, but mainly 
from the ERDF — in order to deal with social im-
balances. Since the early 1970s, regional policy had 
become one of the EEC’s major successes as well as 
an important tool of social policy.
Sylvain Schirmann and Pierre Tilly
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Chapter 19  
Transport policy in transition
Until 1972, transport policy was the ‘bastion of 
nationalisms’ that prevented the establishment of a 
common policy as envisaged in Title IV of the EEC 
Treaty  (1), an obstacle largely due to the historical 
context facing the Commission. In 1973, trans-
port in the Community was the result of decades 
of national policy shaped by a range of geographical 
circumstances and traditions of state intervention, 
depending on combinations specific to each coun-
try. In the early 1970s, transport in Europe was an 
assortment of systems, all with their own internal 
coherence, far removed from the kind of European 
system which the establishment of a common mar-
(1) Dumoulin, M., ‘Transport: “bastion of nationalisms”’, in Dumoulin, M. 
(ed.), The European Commission 1958–72 — History and Memories, Of-
fice for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 
2007, pp. 443–455; Ebert, V. and Harter, P.-A., Europa ohne Fahrplan? An-
fänge und Entwicklung der gemeinsamen Verkehrspolitik in der Europäischen 
Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (1957–85), Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2010; 
Patel, K. K. and Schot, J., ‘Twisted paths to European integration: compar-
ing agriculture and transport policies in a transnational perspective’, Con-
temporary European History, Vol. 20, No 4, 2011, pp. 383–403.
ket increasingly demanded. Within the Commu-
nity, relations between national systems, particu-
larly in the road sector, were more often than not 
the subject of bilateral quota agreements designed 
to protect internal land transport markets. Air 
transport was subject to the same type of regulation 
at European and international levels, whilst in the 
case of maritime transport, cabotage was restricted 
to national fleets. 
Until then, the DG for Transport (DG VII), head-
ed by Commissioner Lambert Schaus between 
1958 and 1967, had tried to adopt a policy of global 
liberalisation for all sectors, the aim being to end 
the competition restrictions caused by this situ-
ation. This approach was subsequently deemed 
too  theoretical, opening the door to an endless 
debate on liberalisation versus harmonisation, re-
sulting in near stalemate despite partial progress in 
terms of harmonising competition conditions and 
national aid.
19
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The people behind transport 
policy
During the 1960s, DG  VII came under the re-
sponsibility of Luxembourgish Commissioners 
Lambert Schaus and Victor Bodson, and then 
Albert Coppé of Belgium (1970–73), who was 
succeeded by the Italian Christian Democrat 
Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza (1973–77). He was 
followed by Richard Burke (1978–81), an Irish 
politician from the same political family, Giorgios 
Contogeorgis (1982–85), a Greek conservative sen-
ior official, and then the British socialist Stanley 
Clinton Davis (1985–88). 
In contrast to the succession of commissioners of 
different nationalities, there was much greater con-
tinuity in the post of director-general. As soon as the 
Commission opened its doors to British officials, 
they laid claim to the position of dir ector-general, 
reflecting British interest in this sector, given 
the United Kingdom’s leading position in  Euro-
pean maritime and air transport. Raymond Le Goy 
(1973–80) was succeeded by another Briton, John 
Roderic Steele  (1981–86), who had spent his ca-
reer in his national civil service in transport-related 
positions, with particular experience in the aviation 
sector. His replacement by the Spaniard Eduardo 
Peña Abizanda (1986–90) came at a time when the 
transport portfolio had just been assigned to Stan-
ley Clinton Davis, a British commissioner from the 
Labour Party, assisted by a very proactive British 
head of cabinet, Graham Meadows (1). 
A policy renewed
The work programme submitted by the Commis-
sion in October 1973 on the development of the 
common transport policy  (2) marked a change of 
direction compared to previous policies. On the 
one hand, it set out the objective of a market with 
undistorted competition, based on, amongst other 
things, the free provision of services. But it also in-
volved a more nuanced approach to state interven-
tion which, where required, would be harmonised 
rather than prohibited (3). This policy became more 
global and less segmented than previously, its aim 
being to bring about a Community system, pro-
moting in particular combinations of modes of 
transport, whose overall coherence would replace 
that of previous national systems. Another object-
ive was  to bring transport into line with other 
Community policies (regional policy, industrial 
(1) Peña Abizanda, E., ‘Un Español en la Comisión Delors’, Información Com-
ercial Española, No 831, 2006, pp. 185–197; Interview with Eduardo Peña 
Abizanda, 22 June 2011. 
(2) ‘Common transport policy: objectives and programmes’, Communication 
of the Commission to the Council, Bulletin of the European Communities 
Supplement, No 16, 1973.
(3) Erdmenger, J., Vers une politique des transports pour l’Europe, Éditions 
Labor, Brussels, 1984, p. 37.
The major transport networks connecting Europeans. 
(Euroforum, 23 November 1979.)
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policy, social policy) and to take account of the in-
terests of users, of those working in the sector and 
of companies. 
The result was a pragmatic approach to both infra-
structure and the organisation of the market. The 
infrastructure policy started in 1976 aimed to grad-
ually end the divisions between national systems 
by entrusting the coordination of investment pro-
jects to an infrastructure coordination committee. 
This convergence of priorities, planned on a gradual 
basis, would be based on a programme of support 
for projects of Community interest, designed to 
remove the many bottlenecks within the Com-
munity area, and to encourage the emergence of a 
European transport network. A consultation on the 
Channel Tunnel was launched by the Commission 
in February 1974 (1). In 1982, an initial investment 
programme (1983–87) was proposed, while the 
Commission, with the help of the European Parlia-
ment, managed to ensure the creation of an initial 
— albeit modest — budget line for certain projects. 
The aim behind the organisation of the road and 
rail transport market was to promote the most ra-
tional combination of modes of transport. The 
principle adopted was to pass the cost of network 
main tenance on to users. Harmonising tariffs and 
national tax systems, which the Commission was 
working towards throughout this entire period, 
(1) HAEC, BAC 5/1981/65, Memo from J. Doucet to the Director-General of 
the DG for Regional Policy on the results of the consultation with Member 
States on the Channel Tunnel project, 25 February 1974.
Lorries transporting car bodies (23 September 1980).
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therefore played a critical role. The Commission was 
also committed to approximating rules on compa-
nies’ access to the international and national mar-
kets, and on access to professions, safety, including 
employment issues, the environment and technical 
aspects of transport (1). Nevertheless, measures could 
only be taken across the board and had to avoid any 
strictly sectoral approach: otherwise, how could an 
individual Member State with a large rail network 
be persuaded to liberalise road transport servic-
es if this liberalisation could increase the deficit of 
the national railway company? The liberalisation of 
road transport at Community level would therefore 
have to be achieved through, amongst other things, 
(1) Erdmenger, J., Vers une politique des transports pour l’Europe, Éditions 
Labor, Brussels, 1984, pp. 26–27.
a coordinated policy of financial stabilisation of the 
railways (2). The Commission embarked on this task 
in 1973 and encouraged rail companies to be man-
agerially independent, but was unable to limit the 
increase in national subsidies for companies in the 
difficult economic climate of the 1970s. In 1983, the 
Commission proposed separating the management 
and financing of network infrastructures (which 
would be transferred to the states) from the trans-
port activities of the railway companies (3). In road 
transport, the approach adopted was a gradual one 
and was intended to promote the transition from a 
regulatory system organised around bilateral quotas 
to a multilateral system based on Community quo-
(2) Ibid., p. 96.
(3) Ibid., p. 99.
A car disembarking onto the dockside in Athens. 
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tas. One of the objectives behind the harmonisation 
policy was also to standardise maximum loads per 
axle for lorries, an issue which would have an impact 
on maintenance costs for road networks and cost 
prices charged by carriers, but also major industrial 
implications for manufacturers of HGVs. In De-
cember 1984, the Commission came to a solution 
following a series of lengthy negotiations (1).
Meanwhile, in maritime transport, Europe watched 
with mounting concern as Eastern bloc and African 
countries restricted import and export transport 
to their own fleets, thus denying European carriers 
access to this market. It was therefore decided to 
take steps with international institutions to make 
all European Community Member States party 
to the United Nations Convention on a Code of 
Conduct for Liner Conferences. Regulation (EEC) 
No 854/79 established a link between the Commu-
nity’s policy and the international standards adopt-
ed by the UN  (2). However, the Commission also 
took action on safety-related issues, learning lessons 
from the sinking of the Amoco Cadiz off the coast of 
Brittany in March 1978. Starting in 1978, the steps 
taken by the Commission in this area resulted in 
a series of directives and proposals for rules on the 
monitoring of oil tankers. In its 1985 memorandum, 
the Commission also provided a detailed analysis 
of Community interests as regards global maritime 
navigation and submitted a package of four pro-
posals on this subject, which was adopted by the 
Council in December 1986 (3).
Regarding air transport, the existence of national 
companies belonging to Member States made the 
possibility of agreements at Community level very 
difficult. All Member States wanted to ensure their 
(1) Ramírez-Pérez, S., ‘Automobile standardisation in Europe: between tech-
nological choices and neo-protectionism’, in Bouneau, C., Burigana, D. and 
Varsori, A. (eds), Trends in Technological Innovation and the European Con-
struction, PIE-Peter Lang, Brussels, 2010, pp. 187–205.
(2) Erdmenger, J., Vers une politique des transports pour l’Europe, Éditions 
Labor, Brussels, 1984. 
(3) Regulations (EEC) No 4055/86 to (EEC) No 4058/86 of 22 December 
1986, OJ L 378, 31.12.1986, p. 1 et seq.
own independence by reserving the right to negotiate 
access to their airspace on a bilateral basis. This was 
also true outside the Community as regards relations 
with third countries. A system of this type led to high 
prices for users and, following the example of increas-
ing deregulation in the United States, the Commis-
sion took the lead in 1979 with a memorandum on 
the development of air transport services. The Com-
mission wanted to be able to move to a multilateral 
system controlled by European agencies. It proceed-
ed with caution by first making bilateral agreements 
more flexible (4). Its second memorandum in March 
1984 and the proposals added to it resulted in a first 
package of Community measures on this subject 
adopted by the Council in 1987 (5). But, as with mari-
time transport, the Commission also intervened in 
the area of safety and the environment, for instance 
as regards noise emissions, putting pressure on air-
lines to renew their aircraft fleets in order to comply 
with noise pollution levels, whilst also allowing the 
reduction of CO2 emissions and improving safety.
Relaunch and continuity
In 1973, the Commission was well aware that 
the implementation of its programme would be a 
lengthy process. It therefore made plans for a 10-year 
programme of cautious changes aimed not so much 
at pitting Community and national interests against 
each other as at securing convergence between them, 
as Commissioner Contogeorgis was still suggesting 
in 1984 when he spoke of ‘meeting, in a balanced 
way, Member States’ mutual interests᾽  (6). However, 
in order to do so, substantial negotiating skill was 
required on the part of the Commission in order to 
reach compromises. This was partly due to Member 
(4) ‘Air transport: a Community approach’, Memorandum of the Commission, 
Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement, No 5, 1979; HAEC, 
Civil aviation: Memorandum No 2, COM(84) 72, 15 March 1984. 
(5) Regulations (EEC) No 3975/87 and (EEC) No 3976/87 and Directives 
87/601/EEC and 87/602/EEC of 14 December 1987, OJ L 374, 31.12.1987, 
p. 1 et seq.
(6) Erdmenger, J., Vers une politique des transports pour l’Europe, Éditions 
Labor, Brussels, 1984, p. 7.
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States hardening their positions owing to the eco-
nomic difficulties of the 1970s but also, for example, 
to structural differences between national systems. 
The action programme for 1974–77 covered all areas 
of transport policy and also included a swathe of 
new initiatives. In November 1977, the Commis-
sion proposed a new programme, which was to last 
until 1980, but noted that many of the proposals had 
already been put to the Council. In October 1980, 
encouraged by the first directly elected European 
Parliament, the Commission proposed a new work 
programme for 1981–83 and, once again at Parlia-
ment’s request, issued a communication entitled ‘To-
wards a common transport policy’ in 1983.
The picture in the early 1980s was therefore mixed. 
The Commission had defined a series of objectives 
and the economic and legal bases of a common pol-
icy. There had been a sharp rise in the number of 
decisions taken since the mid-1970s and the founda-
tions for Community transport law had in part been 
laid. However, progress was frequently blocked by the 
Council: in late 1981, some 40 proposals were still 
pending (1), and there was pressure from Parliament 
and the business community to relaunch the process.
There was a boost to land transport policy on 22 May 
1985 when the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities ruled against the Council for failing 
to meet its obligations under the Treaty of Rome as 
regards the freedom to provide transport ser vices (2). 
These proceedings were brought before the Court by 
the European Parliament. A leading figure behind 
the European Parliament’s case was Horst Seefeld, 
Chairman of its Transport Committee between 
1979 and 1989. However, the battle was really fought 
thanks to a close partnership between Parliament’s 
Transport Committee and the DG for Transport at 
the Commission. As explained by Jürgen Erdmenger, 
a director in the DG for Transport between 1973 and 
(1) Interview with John Roderic Steele, 4 August 2010. 
(2) Judgment of 22 May 1985, Case 13/83, Parliament v Council [1985] ECR 
1513, Common transport policy — obligations of the Council. 
1998, ‘it was primarily the staff and departments of 
my directorate who helped Parliament’s Transport 
Committee to draft its complaint … We worked to-
gether very closely. We drafted the submissions for 
this complaint with Mr Seefeld  … At official level, 
the Commission joined forces with the Parliament 
in the complaint against the Council. We followed 
the case very closely with the Legal Service. There 
was a genuine team effort: the Transport Commit-
tee, the DG  for Transport, Parliament’s Legal Ser-
vice, the Commission’s Legal Service … It was a net-
work, an alliance … I remember, I was there with Mr 
Ehlermann  before the Court when the Commission 
was pleading alongside the Parliament’s legal team. 
Mr  Ehlermann himself, as director-general of the 
legal service, spoke after Parliament’s representative 
and I was behind Mr Ehlermann, whispering extra 
arguments in his ear’ (3).
The consequences of the Court of Justice ruling 
were not long in coming, since the judgment clear-
ly stated that the freedom to provide services in the 
inland transport sector was an obligation under the 
treaty to be met before the transitional period. The 
Transport Council took account of this judgment 
in its political decision of November 1985, finally 
defining an action programme which the Commis-
sion had called for so many times (4). However, the 
Court’s judgment also formed part of the dynamism 
created by the Commission White Paper on the in-
ternal market, approved by the European Council 
in Milan in June 1985. The relaunching of transport 
policy was therefore part of a dual framework: it was 
seen as an objective in itself, whilst also affecting the 
implementation of the more global objective of com-
pleting the internal market. 
By invoking both the judgment of 22 May and the 
Council’s decisions in Milan, the Commission was 
able to give new impetus to its activities from 1985 
onwards. There was no sharp break with previous 
(3) Interview with Jürgen Erdmenger, 30 September 2010.
(4) Council press release 10358/85 (Press 169).
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It is also worth mentioning the Commission’s ef-
forts in developing relations with third countries 
concerning land transport. For road haulage, this 
involved contacts and negotiations with Austria 
and Yugoslavia to facilitate transit across the Alps 
and towards Greece. Given the importance of the 
Rhine as the main axis for European inland naviga-
tion, the Commission continued to work very close-
ly with the Central Commission for Navigation on 
the Rhine in Strasbourg.
Lastly, the prospect of a single market made the 
promotion of wider European networks even more 
necessary. The fact that these networks had been 
found to be inadequate and inconsistent has formed 
the basis for the Commission’s activities in this area 
since the 1970s. This shortcoming was also cited by 
initiatives; they were most often reoriented and ac-
celerated. It was therefore a case of removing quotas 
for international road transport and facilitating ac-
cess of non-resident carriers to national transport by 
road or inland waterway. The method adopted was 
still a progressive one, although its implementation 
was accelerated in the run-up to 1992. In the rail sec-
tor, the Commission tried to accelerate the process 
of companies’ financial recovery while establishing 
rules for the relationship between companies and 
the state. It also sought to simplify border inspection 
procedures and initiate a series of initiatives for taxa-
tion or working conditions (1). 
(1) EC Commission, Nineteenth General Report on the Activities of the Euro-
pean Communities in 1985, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, Luxembourg, 1986.
Controls at the French/Belgian border (29 September 1980).
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represented a fundamental continuity in terms of 
objectives: the creation of an intermodal system, 
open and competitive at European level, integrating 
transport policy with the other common policies, 
without neglecting certain types of intervention 
aimed at promoting investment in networks and 
facilitating the regular provision of services. Trans-
port policy therefore experienced developments 
similar to those seen in industrial policy over the 
same period.
Éric Bussière 
and Sigfrido Ramírez-Pérez
businesses at the European Round Table of Indus-
trialists and, when Commissioner Stanley Clinton 
Davis and President Jacques Delors described in-
frastructure development strategies as ‘an integral 
part of economic and industrial strategy’, they were 
building on ideas that had become firmly estab-
lished since the 1970s. Both 1986 memoranda, one 
with a medium-term programme for the develop-
ment of transport infrastructure and the other on 
ways of financing this, provided the foundations of 
the trans-European networks initiative which was 
later included in the Maastricht Treaty (1).
The policy pursued after 1985 did not therefore dif-
fer greatly from its predecessor from the 1970s. It 
(1) HAEC, COM(86) 340 final, 27 June 1986; COM(86) 722 final, 15 De-
cember 1986.
A lorry with trailer at the Greek border (25 September 1980).
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Chapter 20  
At the centre of a web 
of interdependence: energy
The 1970s brought energy issues to the forefront of 
the Commission’s concerns and policies. The initial 
challenge was how to fashion what was termed an 
overall energy strategy by Christopher Audland, 
the director-general for energy between 1981 and 
1986, out of a diverse range of elements few of which 
amounted to concrete measures.  But this alone was 
enough to put energy at the centre of a new and 
highly interlinked economic and political agenda 
— also including the environment, economic and 
monetary issues, networks and Mediterranean pol-
icy  — where  the Commission needed to adjust its 
approach and bring together a series of disparate 
ideas and elements more effectively than it had done 
in the past. This was no easy task, since in the en-
ergy sector, the Commission’s capacity to act varied 
significantly: thus the ECSC and Euratom treaties 
gave the Commission quite extensive powers in the 
coal and nuclear sectors, whereas the EEC Treaty 
afforded the Commission some influence over hy-
drocarbons and electricity through its commercial 
and competition policies and the rules of the inter-
nal market. The combined use of these powers would 
favour a comprehensive and coherent approach to 
energy problems, but would not remove the legal 
inconsistencies. At the time of the 1973 oil crisis, 
DG XVII (Energy) was responsible for energy as a 
whole (as well as the Euratom safeguards inherited 
from the Euratom Treaty, with half of the relevant 
workforce in Luxembourg). The necessary overview 
required by the specific nature of this sector and the 
circumstances strongly influenced the distribution 
of tasks between directorates — energy savings, coal, 
oil, nuclear and electricity — which in 1973 were all 
placed under the coordination of Robert De Bauw, 
who was responsible for energy policy under the 
authority of the director-general, Fernand Spaak.
The staff of this DG — 200 people at the beginning 
of the 1980s — held talks with a series of very dif-
ferent stakeholders. The Member States themselves 
still defined, to a large extent, their extremely het-
erogeneous national energy frameworks, within 
which there were, according to the type of energy, 
20
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highly liberalised systems and monopolies, private 
companies and public ones, with or without a mon-
opoly in their domestic market, and sometimes in-
tegrated into international groups, operating glob-
ally. But there were also international institutional 
structures such as the International Atomic Ener-
gy Agency (IAEA) and the International En ergy 
Agency (IEA) created in 1974 after the first oil crisis 
within the framework of the OECD. 
That first crisis on the back of the Arab–Israeli war 
of October 1973 did not catch the Commission en-
tirely unprepared. As early as 1968, it had outlined 
the contours for a comprehensive policy combining 
the compilation of statistics, security of supply, re-
search and investment and storage obligations on 
oil companies. In July 1973, a directive was adopted 
by the Council requiring governments to adopt the 
regulatory instruments necessary to take emergen-
cy measures in the event of an oil supply crisis. But 
there was more disunity than unity during the 1973 
oil crisis, an outcome that owes as much to differ-
ences in market structures and supply policy as it 
does to more political factors like the lack of a com-
mon response and the absence of solidarity in the 
face of the first shock (1). This was why, at the end 
of 1974, the Council allowed the Commission to 
(1) ‘Compte-rendu succinct de la 244ème session du Conseil consacré aux 
problèmes énergétiques des 22–23 mai 1973’, SEC(73) 1911/12, 30 May 1973.
Europe in the throes of the energy crisis. Cartoon by Fritz Behrendt, 1974.
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set up an Energy Committee bringing together rep-
resentatives of the Member States under its chair-
manship with a mandate to ensure the coordinated 
implementation by the Member States of the meas-
ures taken by the Community in the field of energy 
policy, to facilitate an exchange of information on 
energy supply conditions and prospects and, finally, 
to assist the Commission in drawing up the propos-
als it intended to make  (1). So the events of 1973, 
by highlighting serious weaknesses caused by the di-
verse nature of the Community energy market, also 
pushed the Commission into taking action.
From 1974, the Commission did the groundwork 
for a long-term energy policy. This built upon the 
(1) For different reasons, this committee gradually lost credibility and was no 
longer effective. From the middle of the 1980s, it stopped meeting. Memo 
by Robert De Bauw, September 2010.
guidelines in place since 1968, designed to reduce 
the Community’s vulnerability by means of a more 
effective sharing of energy sources, a diversification 
of supply and energy savings. The stated objective 
in December 1974 was to reduce the level of exter-
nal dependence from 63 % to 40 % of consumption 
within 10 years. The general approach was to re-
duce the proportion of oil by shifting consumption 
to solid fuels, gas and nuclear energy. But the ob-
jectives for 1985 could be met only by taking into 
account the diversity of the structures and instru-
ments of national policy as shown by the recurring 
debates in the Energy Council from May 1973 (2). 
This fact became fully clear when the Commission 
attempted to foster cooperation at Community 
(2) HAEC, ‘Community energy policy — objectives for 1985’, Communica-
tion from the Commission to the Council, COM(74) 1960 final, 27 No-
vember 1974; ‘Council resolution of 17 December 1974 concerning Com-
munity energy policy objectives for 1985’,  OJ C 153, 9.7.1975, p. 2.
Car-free Sunday in Brussels (1973).
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level in order to provide the EEC with the uranium 
enrichment capabilities essential to the production 
of nuclear power (1). Although the principal Mem-
ber States approved of that objective, they were un-
able to reach agreement on a joint project for the in-
dustry and split into two alliances, Urenco around 
Germany and Eurodif around France, which then 
implemented their projects separately. This meant 
that, although the efforts of each Member State 
contributed to the overall objective, they worked 
along different lines, some countries, such as the 
United Kingdom, benefiting from new North Sea 
oil and gas production, while others, like Belgium 
or France, pressed ahead with their production of 
nuclear electricity. The second oil crisis in 1979–80 
underlined the need to renew an effort that had 
thus far yielded insufficient results. Yet the objec-
(1) Energy Council, 22 and 23 May 1973.
tives for 1990 prepared by the Commission in 1978 
and endorsed by the Council in 1980 hardly dif-
fered from those previously set out, with the level 
of dependence not to exceed 50 % by the end of the 
decade. In order to achieve this, the Commission 
concentrated on energy savings, the development 
of new energies and a partial return to coal, but 
the development of nuclear power remained ‘one 
of the key elements in the Community’s energy 
strategy’ (2).
Overall, the objectives set at the beginning of the 
1980s were reached by the middle of the decade. 
This result was due to efforts made in the areas of 
savings, redeployment and investment, but was also 
the result of the economic downturn caused by the 
second crisis. The Commission did not want those 
efforts to slacken, as appeared to be in danger of 
happening following the fall in petrol prices from 
1984 onwards, and then the nuclear accident at 
Chernobyl in Ukraine. In September 1986, new 
objectives for 1995 set the target level of reliance 
at 40 % (3).
The two oil crises served to highlight the hetero-
geneity and lack of transparency prevailing in the 
Community energy market, with all the attendant 
negative consequences in terms of efficiency and 
solidarity. From 1974, the Commission therefore 
focused on obtaining the information necessary in 
terms of national energy balances, flows and pric-
es. It was thus able to obtain more reliable statistics 
on supply flows and encourage the creation of re-
serve stocks, which increased from 102 days of oil 
consumption in February 1979 to 113 days a year 
(2) HAEC, BAC 144/1987/276, Preparatory document to ‘Energy objectives 
for 1990 and programmes of the Member States’, Communication from 
the Commission to the Council, COM(78) 613, presented at the Energy 
Council of December 1978; EC Commission, Sixteenth General Report on 
the Activities of the European Communities in 1982, Office for Official Pub-
lications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1983, p. 201.
(3) EC Commission, Twentieth General Report on the Activities of the Euro­
pean Communities in 1986, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, Luxembourg, 1987, pp. 274 et seq.
In search of new forms of energy. (30 jours d’Europe.)
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later  (1). This improved information also made it 
possible to develop scenarios for crisis management 
based on the interoperability of stocks between 
Member States and contributed in addition to de-
termining the overall targets for oil consumption 
during the second crisis. The Commission also 
sought more transparency from oil companies in 
the pricing of imported oil and tried to curb the 
upward pressure on prices caused by a speculative 
‘spot’ market which was not representative of actual 
transactions and was a destabilising factor because 
of its excessive rates  (2). Overall, the experience 
gained during the second crisis only confirmed the 
need for a reduction in national differences and 
a true Community market  (3). The Commission 
therefore managed to secure Council acknowledge-
ment of the need for ‘a common approach by Mem-
ber States on prices setting’, but also the fact that 
‘governmental policies must aim to progressively 
reduce the artificial obstacles that prevent the mar-
ket from receiving reliable information’.
The objective of a more unified market was not only 
a matter of more active policy intervention. It was 
what the oil industry wanted in order to deal with 
the refining crisis. At its root was the nationalisa-
tion of deposits by crude-oil-producing countries 
during the 1970s and the willingness of those coun-
tries to develop their crude-oil-processing industry 
and sales of refined products in Europe. The Com-
munity refining sector therefore faced new foreign 
competition and the need to significantly reduce 
capacity at the same time as having to adapt to a 
new demand structure, centred around lightweight 
products. This situation gave rise to a regular dia-
(1) HAEC, BAC 156/1990/4335, EC Commission, document XVII/103/80, 
19 February 1980, ‘Situation des stocks pétroliers’, prepared for the meeting 
of 20 March 1980 of the High-Level Group on Oil Supply.
(2) HAEC, BAC 156/1990/4334, EC Commission, document XVII/515/79-
FR, 20 December 1979, ‘Note des services, discussions avec les compagnies 
pétrolières’, prepared for the meeting of 11 January 1980 of the High-Level 
Group on Oil Supply.
(3) HAEC, BAC 156/1990/4336, EC Commission, document XVII/254/80, 
11 June 1980, ‘Mesures à prendre pour atténuer les effets d’une sous- 
crise des approvisionnements pétroliers’, prepared for the meeting of 
16 July 1980 of the High-Level Group on Oil Supply.
logue between the oil companies and the Commis-
sion for several years from 1976, these groups gen-
erally expressing their desire to see this reduction 
organised and backed up by a more interventionist 
Community policy. What actually happened, how-
ever, was a reduction and restructuring of refining 
techniques implemented at company level without 
any Community intervention  (4).  There was, by 
contrast, a rather greater degree of intervention in 
the coal sector. The ECSC Treaty authorised target-
ed state aid, but also allowed for Community fund-
ing in the form of subsidised loans or grants that 
were deployed after the first oil shock. It was there-
fore hoped to stabilise coal production through re-
(4) HAEC, BAC 156/1990/2272, EC Commission, COM/ENER 32/76, 
15 September 1976, ‘Résumé général des discussions tenues de mai à juillet 
avec les compagnies pétrolières’.
Faced with the crisis, the Community tries to develop 
alternative energies. Will solar energy help power cars? (Euroforum).
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structuring, exploration and the encouragement of 
consumption by the steel industry and electricity 
generation.  But the Commission struggled to win 
Council support for its initiatives, and had little ef-
fect on European coal production, which decreased 
steadily during the period.  Also developed during 
these years were a series of increasingly large sub-
sidies directed towards research and development, 
the promotion of new technologies for the explo-
ration and production of oil and uranium, and the 
development of potential new sources of energy 
(coal gasification and liquification and geothermal 
and solar energy).
More so than in the past, the energy crisis further 
reminded stakeholders of the degree to which the 
Community was involved in a series of networks 
of interdependence, both political and economic. 
This dual aspect did not escape the Commission’s 
attention, and some of its action in favour of greater 
unity in the Community market and the oil pol-
icies of the Member States was to promote dialogue 
with its international partners. The existing dia-
logue with the United States was essential in this 
regard. This was difficult at times, such as at the 
Washington conference of January 1974, at which 
France set itself apart from its partners by refusing 
to take part in the creation of the International 
Energy Agency, or in the early 1980s, when the 
European partners made arrangements to increase 
imports of Soviet gas, alarming the Americans and 
provoking draconian US counter-measures during 
the Euro–Siberian gas pipeline affair. In both cases, 
the Commission acted with a view to preserving 
Europe in search of petroleum during the second oil crisis. Cartoon by Fritz Behrendt. (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 1979.)
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Community unity and a dialogue with the Ameri-
cans, reassuring Washington that any freeze in So-
viet gas deliveries could be circumvented by a series 
of internal Community measures. The Commis-
sion also increasingly made its presence felt in the 
IEA, which represented western interests. It man-
aged to persuade the Members States of the need 
to support its efforts in monitoring and restricting 
imports during the second oil crisis through action 
in the IEA, which was endorsed by the decisions 
of the G7 in Tokyo in June 1979 (1). Subsequent-
ly, there was a danger that the growing influx on 
the world market of products refined in the Middle 
Eastern producer countries would exacerbate still 
further the position of European refiners — it was 
feared that other oil-importing countries, such as 
Japan, would close their markets, thereby shifting 
all the burden of that influx onto those countries 
which had kept their markets open. Working close-
ly with the Americans, the Commission was suc-
cessful in promoting an agreement in the OECD 
which ensured a fair distribution of the burden be-
tween all of the partners.
(1) HAEC, BAC 36/1984/127, Preliminary draft conclusions of the Council 
in Strasbourg, 21 and 22 June 1979; BAC 36/1984/127, ‘Note on the rela-
tionship between discussions on energy at Strasbourg and Tokyo’, undated 
(preparatory document for the Council in Strasbourg of 21 and 22 June 
1979).
On the initiative of Roy Jenkins and Étienne Dav-
ignon, Director-General Audland finally developed 
the necessary dialogue with producer countries 
during the second oil crisis, both within the Or-
ganisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OAPEC) and the Gulf Cooperation Council  (2). 
This dual dialogue made it possible to manage the 
second crisis in a more coordinated way and to mit-
igate in part its negative consequences for the Com-
munity economy.
The energy crisis years thus highlighted the vulner-
ability that stemmed from the lack of a Community 
energy market. On a political level, such heterogene-
ity hindered the solidarity measures needed in the 
event of an oil supply crisis.  On an economic level, it 
artificially amplified the effects of scarcity on prices. 
Over the years the Commission had therefore been 
able to demonstrate the need for profound change 
and lay the groundwork for the creation of a large 
energy market from the late 1980s onwards.
Éric Bussière
(2) Interview with Christopher Audland, 8 September 2010.
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Chapter 21  
Environmental and consumer 
protection
The environment was one of the new European 
policies of the 1973–86 period.  Prior to the 1970s, 
the only environmental measures enshrined in the 
European treaties related to the health risks run by 
mine workers and those employed in the iron, steel 
and nuclear industries rather than to the protection 
of the natural environment.  It was on the basis of 
the new impetus given by the The Hague confer-
ence in late 1969 that the Community was able to 
involve itself in areas related to the environment.
The environment included 
among the Community’s 
competences
The concept of environmental policy was defined 
only at the beginning of the 1970s and encom-
passed all issues concerning man’s relationship with 
nature, the preservation of resources and energy, the 
treatment of waste, urban development, the protec-
tion of nature, the pollution of air and water, noise 
pollution and soil conservation. 
There were several reasons why Europe became in-
volved with environmental matters. Looking be-
yond the Community institutions, the 1960s were 
the period in which the impact began to be felt of 
both a series of alarming scientific reports on the 
degradation of the environment (notably Silent 
Spring (1) and The Population Bomb (2)) and envir-
onmental catastrophes, such as the wreck of the 
Torrey Canyon off the English coast in March 1967. 
The environment also began to attract the atten-
tion of international institutions (for example the 
Council of Europe, and the United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (Unes-
co) at its 1968 biosphere conference), and even the 
European Parliament showed that it was becoming 
ever more concerned with environmental issues. 
(1) Carson, R., Silent Spring, Houghton Miflin, Boston, 1962.
(2) Ehrlich, P. R., The Population Bomb, Ballantine, New York, 1968.
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Meanwhile, the Member States — alert to the risk 
that competition might be distorted by the new 
environmental regulations that some of them were 
having to introduce — began to come round to the 
idea of the Commission acting as a referee on envir-
onmental matters.
It was hence via the approximation of laws that the 
Commission first engaged with the environmental 
challenge. It would go on to have a much more dir-
ect influence in this area thanks to the actions of the 
Italian Commissioner for industrial affairs, Altiero 
Spinelli, who seized the opportunity to explore a 
new area with the potential to deepen European in-
tegration. He asked one of the unit heads in DG III, 
Michel Carpentier, to draw up the first environ-
mental policy measures. At the beginning of Janu-
ary 1971, Carpentier prepared a communication to 
the Commission, and Spinelli presented this to his 
fellow commissioners  on 17  February. Having ex-
plained why there was a need for action at Commu-
nity level, he asked for a working party on the en-
vironment to be set up and for a dedicated unit to be 
established within his directorate-general (1).
Michel Carpentier headed the new Environmen-
tal Problems Unit within DG  III and set to work 
immediately, recruiting a small team of officials — 
Claude Pleinevaux, Peter Stief-Tauch and Vladimiro 
Mandl — who were to liaise with a member of Al-
tiero Spinelli’s cabinet, Claus Stuffmann. ‘That was 
the starting point, when we began to give some hard 
thought to the question of what we needed to do to 
provide a properly structured framework for a fu-
ture environment policy’  (2). The group members 
got together and began drawing up an initial com-
munication, which was finally presented by Spinelli 
on 22 July 1971. 
In February  1972, Agriculture Commissioner 
Sicco Mansholt, impressed by the conclusions of 
the Meadows report commissioned by the Club of 
Rome and entitled ‘Limits to growth’, proposed 
that serious thought be given to current econom-
ic policy and the dangers it posed for humanity’s 
future well-being and quality of life. A bold start, 
then; but the immediate outcome in the Commis-
sion was less than spectacular. Altiero Spinelli had 
little time for this radical position, and it was quick-
ly contested by his colleague, Raymond Barre. Not 
that this prevented Sicco Mansholt, who had since 
become Commission president, from pleading the 
cause at the United Nations Conference on the 
Environment, held in Stockholm in June 1972. Fi-
nally, on 21 October 1972 and following energetic 
lobbying by Spinelli, the Paris Summit mandated the 
Commission to formulate a number of proposals on 
the environment. ‘The heads of state or government 
stressed the value of a Community environment 
policy. They are therefore requesting the Commu-
nity institutions to draw up an action programme 
with a precise schedule before 31 July 1973.’
(1) HAEC, BAC 244/1991/1, ‘Proposition pour une action communautaire 
en matière d’environnement’, COM(71) 591, 12 February 1971.
(2) Interview with Peter Stief-Tauch, 6 June 2011.
Waste was a major concern in the first years following 
the introduction of the policy on the environment. This 
Courrier du personnel cartoon highlights the carefree attitude 
of inhabitants of the Community to waste disposal.
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This mandate was confirmed by the interministeri-
al conference of environment ministers in Bonn on 
31 October, during which eight principles on which 
future policy ought to be based were defined. En-
couraged though they were by this progress, Altiero 
Spinelli and Michel  Carpentier had to make sure 
that they protected the Commission’s right of in-
itiative in environmental matters which was being 
contested by certain Member States (1). 
Spinelli undeniably played an essential role, then, 
in the birth of an environment policy. The ‘father 
of environment policy’  (2) he may well have been, 
but he did not feel forever bound to his brainchild. 
With the approach of Community enlargement 
and the 1973 Commission changeover, he realised 
it was impossible to hang on to all of his portfolios 
and declared himself ready to abandon the environ-
ment brief in order to retain those areas of respon-
sibility he thought had higher status (3). There was 
no rush to take over the vacant portfolio, and in the 
end it was a former commissioner for agriculture, 
the Italian Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza, who inher-
ited it, together with the transport and information 
portfolios. 
Implementation
On 1 January 1973, the Community could boast of 
a newly formed Environment and Consumer Pro-
tection Service (ECPS). Led by Michel Carpentier, 
it would survive in that form until January  1981, 
when it would be given a new incarnation as Direct-
orate-General XI (Environment, Consumer Protec-
tion and Nuclear Safety), headed by a new arrival, 
(1) Spinelli, A., Diario europeo, II: 1970–76, edited by Edmondo Paolini, il 
Mulino, Bologna, 1991, p. 343; HAEC, BAC 244/1991/5, Meeting in 
Bonn of the environment ministers, 31  October 1972, SEC(72) 4042, 
Memorandum distributed on the instructions of Altiero Spinelli, Brussels, 
13 November 1972.
(2) Interview with Claude Pleinevaux, 8 October 2010.
(3) Spinelli, A., Diario europeo, II: 1970–76, edited by Edmondo Paolini, il 
Mulino, Bologna, 1991, pp. 353 and 358.
Athanase Andreopoulos, the Commission’s first 
director-general of Greek nationality.
On 17 April 1973, less than 4 months after the ser-
vice had been created, the Commission proposed 
a first action programme to the Council, which 
adopted it on 22  November of the same year. In 
reality,  this programme could be traced directly 
back to the communication of July 1971 and the 
decisions taken at the Paris Summit and the Bonn 
conference. It proposed a blend of short- and long-
term measures. Among the principles proposed, 
three in particular stand out: the ‘polluter pays’ 
principle and the principles of prevention and of 
subsidiarity (whereby action is taken at the most 
appropriate level). Three main categories of action 
were provided for, aimed at combating pollution 
and nuisances, at improving the environment and 
the quality of life and at involving international 
Though covering the fields of education, information and 
financial protection, the primary aim of the consumer 
policy launched by the European Commission was the 
physical protection of consumers, in particular from the toxic 
substances present in food.
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organisations. Implementation of this programme 
gave a boost to protection of the environment, with 
as many as 44 documents being transmitted to the 
Council the following year. 
Implementation did not, however, always proceed 
smoothly, as is made clear by a witness who, having 
failed to define what the ECPS meant by ‘waste’ and 
being faced by the Council with a request for an ex-
planation, had to reply: ‘Waste is anything anyone 
wants to get rid of ’ (1). In other cases, success came 
quickly, for example when, at the end of the 1970s, 
pioneering research conducted in conjunction with 
(1) Johnson, S., Stanley, I Presume?, Fourth Estate, London, 2009, p. 267.
DG  XII (Research, Science and Education) drew 
attention to the dangers of lead in petrol.
In 1973, consumer protection too was brought into 
the environmental fold. Why were these two policy 
areas merged? It is hard to give a precise answer to 
that question. In Michel Carpentier’s view, it hap-
pened ‘more or less by accident’ and ‘without any 
strategic design on the part of the Commission’ (2). 
In the opinion of some, environmental issues might 
just as well have found a home at DG V (Employ-
ment and Social Affairs). What appears finally to 
have clinched it was the health protection dimen-
(2) Interview with Michel Carpentier, 22 October 2010.
The consumer policy was slow to develop despite pressure from some quarters. These farmers, for example, demonstrating in Brussels 
in 1980, were calling for support from consumers for their protests.
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sion of environmental issues. A number of people 
did put forward the notion of a horizontal service 
that would get involved in each area dealt with by the 
Communities. Given the other DGs’ reservations 
about this idea, what eventually emerged, however, 
was a small, traditionally structured  direct orate-
general (1).
Little by little, the small team put together by 
Michel Carpentier grew in size. The ECPS then 
consisted of three divisions: two for the environ-
ment and one for consumer protection. The British, 
who had just joined the Communities, made their 
presence felt, with two of these divisions allocated 
to them. At the beginning of the 1970s, however, 
most of the staff came from the Ispra site. Because 
the Joint Research Centre was having difficulties at 
the time, a number of engineers from Ispra saw their 
scientific skills put to good use by the ECPS. They 
were joined by ‘one or two lawyers’ (2). Recruitment 
was therefore essentially on the basis of scientific 
and legal skills, even if flexibility was sometimes 
needed, as in the case of the new British head of 
the division for the prevention of pollution, Stanley 
Johnson, whose background was in classics (3).
Presided over by the universally respected and ad-
mired Carpentier, the service expanded its activities 
in a very positive atmosphere. Those who were there 
at the time emphasise how much freedom they had 
during the first few years when the environment 
team, being still small, was relatively free from the 
administrative constraints that would dominate 
later (4). The workload was heavy, but everyone was 
highly motivated. The 1974 screening group, which 
assessed the various services of the Commission, 
thus considered that the analyses carried out at the 
ECPS ‘testified to the considerable mobilisation of 
energy and thought in an area with very far-reaching 
(1) Interview with Ludwig Krämer, 7 October 2011.
(2) Interview with Michel Carpentier, 22 October 2010.
(3) Johnson, S., Stanley, I Presume?, Fourth Estate, London, 2009.
(4) Ibid., pp. 265 and 266.
objectives’ (5). The same report also noted ‘that only 
a very small percentage of A-grade officials (13  %) 
wanted to be transferred to another administrative 
unit’.  This made the ECPS the department with 
the lowest proportion of officials wanting to change 
jobs, a distinction it shared with the service respon-
sible for the administration of the customs union (6).
Despite the manifest loyalty of the staff, com-
missioners came and went. After Altiero Spinelli 
and Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza, another Italian, 
Lorenzo Natali, took over. He was followed by a 
German, Karl-Heinz Narjes, and then by Stanley 
Clinton Davis, from the United Kingdom. ‘Envir-
onment was the poor relation at that time. Let’s be 
clear. Even within the Commission, it was a port-
folio handed out as a consolation prize’ (7).
This lack of interest in the environment would di-
minish over time. Without it ever becoming a very 
prominent portfolio, the environment did become 
an issue to which several commissioners became at-
tached.  In 1985, for instance, Narjes fought hard to 
retain his environmental duties and insisted upon 
taking part in the first meetings of the Environmen-
tal Council.
Towards a traditional policy
Until the end of the 1970s, Commission depart-
ments concentrated on how best to respond to the 
most urgent environmental problems, on research 
planning and raising awareness of the issue amongst 
Member States. The initial programme was aimed 
at combating the most dangerous forms of pollu-
tion, starting with water pollution and its related 
problems, particularly in view of the pollution in 
European rivers and the Mediterranean. This en-
(5) HAEC, BAC  43/1978/173, ‘Report on the organisation and opera-
tion of Commission departments’, presented by the Screening Group, 
30 June 1974.
(6) Ibid.
(7) Interview with Giancarlo Chevallard, 25 November 2010.
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abled the Commission not only to propose major 
legislation (in particular for setting water quality 
objectives), but also to participate in international 
conventions (such as those agreed in Paris in 1974 
on land-based pollution and in Bonn in 1976 on 
protecting the Rhine).
The first action programme was followed rapidly by 
a second in 1977, adopting most of the principles 
discussed previously. When it came to reducing pol-
lution, priority had always been given to water pol-
lution. This time, however, the emphasis was also on 
preventive action  (1). The second programme also 
enabled the launch of longer-term actions on the 
protection and rational management of the natural 
environment, and the protection of flora and fauna.
A third programme was prepared in 1981 and 
adopted in 1983, emphasising continuity, the need 
to get to grips with economic and social problems 
(in particular waste), the impact of Community 
enlargement and, above all, how best to integrate 
environmental considerations into the full range of 
Community policies. This last measure was particu-
larly important as, at the beginning, cooperation 
with the other directorates-general was not always 
straightforward. ‘We stepped on a lot of toes’  (2), 
commented a former member of the ECPS. By their 
very nature, environmental concerns overlapped 
with those of a lot of other directorates-general. 
Thus, the environment interservice group was estab-
lished in the mid-1970s, bringing together members 
of the various directorates-general with which the 
ECPS had to work — most obviously those respon-
sible for agriculture, industry, research, transport, 
energy and regional policy. Beginnings are rarely 
straightforward, noted one observer in 1975: ‘Even 
within the Commission, the environment service 
still has only sporadic influence in areas of activity 
that touch upon its remit but for which it does not 
(1) HAEC, BAC 53/1987/269, ENV/396/78-FR, Report by Günter Schneider, 
Brussels, undated.
(2) Interview with Peter Stief-Tauch, 6 June 2011.
have direct responsibility ... The service is involved 
in discussions, but its role is consultative, and dis-
putes are sometimes bitter. It is on such occasions 
that anyone wishing to put a spoke in the wheels of 
the ECPS’s policy can make the service feel that, in 
terms of providing a legal basis for action, a mere 
summit declaration is no substitute for a treaty art-
icle. Not being a directorate-general and having 
one’s own commissioner is a handicap’ (3).
It was not surprising, therefore, occasionally to hear 
officials protest that they had no desire to radically 
change other Community policies: ‘In this respect, 
we have to make it very clear that our most dan-
gerous friends are those who think that conserva-
tion of the environment has to take place through 
a profound change in the whole structure of our 
economy or society … It therefore seems necessary 
to underline that there is no conflict between the 
environment and job creation, nor is our approach 
based on hippyism’ (4).
Some things became easier as environment policy 
developed, even if that very development sometimes 
produced a certain amount of jealousy given the 
large increase in the number of staff assigned to this 
area. Other difficulties persisted, as in the case of 
the directive devoted to nitrogen oxide and sulphur 
dioxide emissions from large industrial plants where 
the DG for Energy felt it was being presented with 
a fait accompli. In 1982, under pressure from Ger-
many, Karl-Heinz Narjes tried to get the directive 
passed by the Council. Insufficiently prepared, the 
proposal faced opposition from the southern Euro-
pean countries and the United Kingdom. It would 
not finally be adopted until 1988.
Political will on the part of the Member States did 
not always follow, as was the case initially with the 
(3) Bywater, M., ‘La politique de l’environnement de la Communauté’, Revue 
du Marché Commun, No 191, 1975, p. 546.
(4) HAEC, BAC 53/1987/269, Statement by Claus Stuffman, 22 April 1977, 
London.
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policy on combating atmospheric pollution. A rad-
ical change of attitude, passionately supported by 
those responsible at the Commission, did not come 
about until the 1980s, as Germany confronted the 
destruction of its forests by acid rain. 
As the years went by, the ECPS and then DG  XI 
attracted a considerably larger number of staff. 
From 39 people in 1973, the number rose to 90 
when, in 1981, the ECPS was converted into a dir-
ectorate-general, reaching 103 in 1984 — in other 
words, an increase of 165  % at a time when staff 
numbers at the Commission as a whole increased by 
‘only’ 65 %. This increase in the number of staff re-
flected the way in which the structure of the service 
was becoming more complex. In 1986, DG  XI fi-
nally consisted of two directorates comprising eight 
divisions, supplemented by four other divisions an-
swering directly to the director-general. In financial 
terms, the growth was still greater, with budgets 
increasing from ECU  510  000 in 1973 to almost 
ECU  10  million 10 years later  (1). The problems 
in terms of working conditions remained familiar, 
however: shortages of staff, slow translation and dif-
ficulties in obtaining meeting rooms were all part 
and parcel of the job for environment officials (2).
(1) EC Commission, ‘Ten years of Community environment policy’, unspeci-
fied location, March 1984, p. 75. 
(2) HAEC, BAC  53/1987/270, Annex to the memorandum from Michel 
Carpentier for the attention of ECPS managers of 28 September 1978 con-
cerning the 1979 keynote speech.
The appearance and development of the environ-
ment policy in this period, characterised by suc-
cesses and a few failures, makes it a particularly 
representative example of a ‘creeping competence’. 
Together with the ‘people’s Europe’, education or 
consumer protection, environmental policy was 
one of the relatively few new policies developed dur-
ing the 1973 to 1986 period and was undoubtedly 
that which enjoyed the greatest success.  It was one 
of what were known at the time as ‘grey areas’: pol-
icy domains that were not mentioned in the treaties 
and which were not primarily economic in nature. 
First recognised by the Paris Summit declaration, 
environmental policy developed rapidly without 
becoming the equal of other policy areas until its 
inclusion in the Single European Act.  There can be 
no doubt that being included in this last conveyed 
a sense of the inherent importance of environmen-
tal policy. Together with the designation of 1987 
as the European Year of the Environment, it also 
made it easier for environmental policy to be de-
veloped in the Community and to ensure that the 
policies of the Member States worked towards the 
same ends.
Christian Van de Velde
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Chapter 22  
Development aid: 
historic priorities  
and new dynamics
A turning point for DG VIII
In the 1970s, the EEC’s development cooperation 
policy underwent a major change. Known as associ-
ation policy, its inclusion in the Treaty of Rome had 
been the subject of difficult negotiations between 
the Six. France had made its participation in the 
EEC conditional on the association of its colonies. A 
5-year association convention, annexed to the EEC 
Treaty, set out the details of this association regime, 
which consisted of two parts. The first was commer-
cial and aimed ultimately to create a free trade area 
between Europe and Africa (1). Customs duties and 
(1) HAEU, Archives of the French Foreign Ministry (MAEF), De-Ce, 620, 
‘Discussion of the United Kingdom’s memorandum on the interests of 
the British territories’, 3 October 1957; HAEC, CEAB 1/394, Memo to 
members of the High Authority of the ECSC, 6 September 1961; HAEU, 
MAEF archives, De-Ce, 1518, (EEC document) ‘Draft report to the Coun-
cil prepared by the working group on OCTs’, 4 November 1961.
barriers between the Six and the associated countries 
would gradually be eliminated, and the associated 
countries would apply a system equivalent to that 
enjoyed by the colonial power to their trading rela-
tions with the Six. The second part of the association 
policy was based on an investment fund, which was 
originally known as the European Overseas Devel-
opment Fund (FEDOM), but became the European 
Development Fund (EDF) after the African states 
gained their independence. The aim of the EDF was 
to promote the economic and social development of 
the associated countries. The administration of the 
EDF and the other elements of association policy 
were entrusted to a Commission directorate-general 
— DG VIII (Development and Cooperation).
After gaining their independence (1960), the as-
sociated African states confirmed their desire to 
maintain the association convention, which was re-
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newed first in 1963 and then again in 1969. It was 
signed in Yaoundé, Cameroon, the conventions 
being referred to thereafter as Yaoundé I and II. 
Despite the transition from a convention ‘granted’ 
to the associated countries to one negotiated with 
them in the 1960s, the broad outlines of associ-
ation policy remained the same as in 1957, namely 
a policy based on the principle of reciprocal trade 
preferences, on the one hand, and the EDF for case-
by-case funding of projects in the associated coun-
tries, on the other (1).
The situation gradually began to change in the early 
1970s, partly because of the Community context 
(1) Interview with Emiliano Fossati, 17 March 2011.
(enlargement, and German and Dutch unease about 
a policy that concentrated on French-speaking Af-
rica), and partly because of international develop-
ments (the growing assertiveness of the Third World 
and the G77 within the United Nations). The start 
of accession negotiations with the United Kingdom 
raised the longer-term issue of the Commonwealth. 
At the end of the negotiations it was decided that the 
Community would offer Commonwealth countries 
that were similar in terms of economic and social 
characteristics to the countries already associated 
with the EEC (i.e. the African, Caribbean and Pacif-
ic countries) a choice of three options:
• ‘participation in the [new] convention of asso-
ciation which, upon the expiry of the [Yaoundé 
II] Convention ... will govern relations between 
Construction of a blood transfusion centre in Senegal, financed by the EDF (1974).
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the Community and the Associated African and 
Malagasy States (AASM) ... ’;
• ‘the conclusion of one or more special conven-
tions of association on the basis of Article 238 
of the EEC Treaty comprising reciprocal rights 
and obligations, particularly in the field of trade’;
• ‘the conclusion of trade agreements ... ’ (1).
At the same time, other developing countries in 
the Commonwealth would be offered ad hoc agree-
ments. These proposals, which were grouped in 
Protocol 22 annexed to the United Kingdom Ac-
cession Treaty, had the effect of greatly enlarging 
the scope of the Community’s development coop-
eration policy. Henceforth, the Commission’s rep-
resentatives would be dealing with almost all of Af-
rica (2), as well as with countries in the Caribbean 
and Pacific. 
The change was not just a matter of geography; it 
also affected the content of association policy. In 
the early 1970s, the Commission and the Member 
States realised that development cooperation need-
ed to include new instruments. The debates with 
Third World countries in the United Nations, and 
particularly in the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (Unctad), prompted the 
European countries to discuss issues such as com-
modity price stability and the industrialisation of 
developing countries. 
In a move that pre-dated these developments, the 
Commission took the initiative of publishing a 
memorandum on a Community policy on devel-
opment cooperation in July 1971. In it, the Com-
mission recognised the need to reform development 
cooperation policy to take account of the inter-
(1) Protocol 22 to the United Kingdom Treaty of Accession to the EEC.
(2) Moreover, countries that had not belonged to colonial empires (such as 
Ethiopia and Liberia) and states that had broken with their former colonial 
power (such as Guinea and Sudan) were also invited to take part in the ne-
gotiations.
national context and the new role of the enlarged 
European Community. It recommended retaining 
and strengthening the association policy, but also 
offering other developing countries specific means 
of cooperation, particularly in the fields of trade 
policy and commodities (3). A year later, at the Paris 
Summit of 1972, the Nine formally acknowledged 
the need to reform development cooperation policy. 
The communiqué issued at the end of the summit 
was the result of a careful compromise between old 
and new priorities and between regionalists and 
globalists. It reaffirmed the specific responsibili-
ties towards African and Mediterranean countries 
(with which negotiations were also under way as 
part of the overall Mediterranean policy) (4), while 
at the same time recognising the need gradually to 
implement a comprehensive development coopera-
tion policy on a global scale. Such a policy would be 
based in particular on commodity agreements and 
improving the generalised system of preferences (5).
Preparation of the Lomé 
Convention
Although it would be many years before a glo-
bal development cooperation policy for the Third 
World took off, questions relating to commodities 
and trade preferences were at the heart of the dis-
cussions on the new association agreement. These 
negotiations, which officially began in July 1973, 
would end a year and a half later with the signature 
of the new convention in Lomé, Togo, on 28 Feb-
ruary 1975. The talks proved particularly difficult 
and differed from previous negotiations, not only in 
the topics covered, but also in the parties involved. 
The original 19 French-speaking African countries 
of the association convention had now expanded 
(3) Frisch, D., ‘La politique de développement de l’Union européenne. Un re-
gard personnel sur 50 ans de coopération internationale’, ECDPM Report 
15, Maastricht, March 2008, p. 17.
(4) On Mediterranean policy, see Chapter 24, ‘The Mediterranean challenge’.
(5) Bulletin of the European Communities, No 10, 1972.
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to 46 African, Caribbean and Pacific states that 
would join together to form the Group of ACP 
States, formalised by the Georgetown (Guyana) 
agreement of June 1975 after the conclusion of the 
negotiations. The union of ACP countries, and par-
ticularly the African states, was the culmination of 
a long and difficult process. A number of African 
organisations, such as the Organisation of African 
Unity (OAU) and particularly the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), helped 
to foster the dialogue between the French-speaking 
and English-speaking countries. The secretary- 
general of the ECA, Robert Gardiner, in particular, 
saw in these negotiations an opportunity to bridge 
the division between associated and non-associated 
countries in Africa and worked hard, with the sup-
port of the United Kingdom and the cooperation of 
the Commission, to foster dialogue between the Af-
rican countries and disseminate more accurate in-
formation about the association arrangement. His 
efforts were particularly helpful in winning over the 
Commonwealth countries, which had been very 
wary of an agreement with the EEC. 
On the European side, the original six Member 
States had now become nine. The proponents of a 
cooperation policy that was less Africa-centric (the 
Germans and the Dutch) drew strong support from 
the Danish and above all the British, who feared 
that the products of Commonwealth countries 
which were excluded from the association would 
be discriminated against. The recruitment of of-
ficials from the new Member States to DG VIII 
also brought significant changes: English gradually 
joined French as a working language, and DG VIII 
began to adopt new working practices and methods 
of evaluation, which inevitably caused some friction.
The Commission, for its part, found itself called 
upon to play a bigger role, being responsible for the 
first time for representing the Nine in negotiations 
with the developing countries. During the Yaoundé 
Convention negotiations, the president of the 
Council of Ministers had always acted as spokes-
man. Now, for reasons connected with the need to 
simplify negotiations that had become highly com-
plicated because of the number of parties, but also 
because of the credibility which the Commission 
had gained in this type of exercise, and above all be-
cause of a shift in the French position, the Commis-
sion was given the task of representing the Commu-
nity. The preparatory work for the talks was done 
by DG VIII under its Commissioner Jean-François 
Deniau and, from April 1973, his successor Claude 
Cheysson.
Under Deniau’s authority, DG VIII produced a 
memorandum which was crucial in shaping the 
content of the new convention. The Commission 
memorandum on the future relations between the 
Community, the present AASM states (Associat-
ed African States and Madagascar) and the coun-
tries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Indian and 
Pacific Oceans, presented to the Council in April 
1973, envisaged a number of measures that would 
profoundly change the Community’s development 
cooperation policy, particularly as regards the sta-
bilisation of commodity markets. Moreover, by not 
making it a precondition for countries to choose be-
tween the three options set out in Protocol 22, the 
Commission opened the way for talks in which all 
issues were negotiable, thereby facilitating the par-
ticipation of the English-speaking countries. 
In spite of the importance of Jean-François Deniau 
and his memorandum, the role played by Claude 
Cheysson cannot be underestimated. Cheysson, 
‘who was something of a technocrat, but had an 
impressive operational intelligence, who had a very 
rapid grasp of the facts and was an extraordinary 
man of action’ (1), took up the post of commission-
er with the firm intention of reforming the admin-
istrative structure of DG VIII and raising the visi-
bility and credibility of the Community in external 
affairs. Cheysson’s hand was strengthened by inter-
(1) Interview with Hans Carle, 10 February 2011.
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national economic developments such as the 1973 
oil crisis, the debate on the new international eco-
nomic order and the adoption by the UN General 
Assembly of the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States, all of which put North–South 
issues firmly on the European agenda. Through-
out his period as commissioner he was to be one 
of the principal protagonists in the North–South 
dialogue.
The Lomé Convention
The international context influenced the negotia-
tions on and content of the new Lomé Convention. 
This took into account some of the demands made 
by the G77 in the Unctad, for example with the cre-
ation of Stabex (the system for the stabilisation of 
export earnings), which applied to the main agricul-
tural products exported by the ACP countries, and 
the abolition of any reciprocal trade requirements: 
from now on, ACP exports would enjoy free ac-
cess to the common market, whereas the reverse no 
longer applied. The abandonment of the principle 
of the free trade zone marked a real break with the 
Yaoundé Convention. Another important develop-
ment was the sugar protocol annexed to the conven-
tion which, for the first time, allowed sugar from 
the ACP countries to benefit from price and market 
guarantees traditionally reserved for Community 
products covered by the CAP  (1). The convention 
also included a new chapter on industrial coopera-
tion. This was not hugely successful, but it is impor-
tant to recognise that this was another step towards 
(1) On the international dimension of agricultural issues see Chapter 16, 
‘Contested fields: the common agricultural policy and the common fish-
eries policy’.
A group of Togolese catch up with the news on the signing in Lomé of the first ACP–EEC convention (27 February 1975).
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ACP countries questioning the international divi-
sion of labour, developing their industries in new 
sectors and benefiting from easier and cheap access 
to western technology. This marked the dawn of a 
new policy, based on a truly global approach which 
took account of various different aspects and was 
no longer confined to development aid (through 
the EDF) and trade policy. It even sought to help 
‘to establish a new model for relations between de-
veloped and developing states, compatible with the 
aspirations of the international community towards 
a more just and more balanced economic order’ (1).
It would be a mistake to single out only the new 
aspects of the Lomé Convention, as there were sig-
nificant elements of continuity too. Firstly, the EDF 
was retained and indeed very significantly increased, 
from ECU 1 000 million to ECU 3 150 million. But 
above all, the EEC’s development cooperation poli-
cy continued to be based on a regional approach fo-
cusing on Africa and the Mediterranean. As part of 
the overall Mediterranean policy, agreements were 
concluded in the course of the 1970s with almost 
all the countries around the Mediterranean Sea (2). 
Unlike Lomé, which was a multilateral convention 
for a term of 5 years, these agreements were bilateral 
and of unlimited duration. However, the measures 
enacted, which were based on trade policy and de-
velopment aid, reflected the cooperation model laid 
down by Lomé.
(1) Preamble to the Lomé I Convention.
(2) Cyprus (1972 and 1977), Spain (1973), Israel (1975 and 1977), Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia (1976) and Malta, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria 
(1977). These agreements were negotiated in a coordinated way by DG I 
and DG VIII. DG VIII then retained responsibility for relations with the 
southern and eastern Mediterranean countries. This division of labour was 
to remain in force until 1985. On Mediterranean policy, see Chapter 23, 
‘Trade policy and external relations: new dynamics’, and Chapter 24, ‘The 
Mediterranean challenge’.
DG VIII under Claude 
Cheysson
The arrival of Claude Cheysson led to a major re-
organisation of DG VIII and a complete overhaul of 
its organisation chart, which inevitably ruffled a few 
feathers. The launch of the Lomé Convention and 
the expansion of European cooperation to a large 
number of new countries had a significant impact 
on DG VIII’s working practices. Until then, the DG 
had been organised in four directorates, two devot-
ed to the administration of the EDF (one staffed by 
technical experts, the other by economists) and two 
focused on analysis and research into development 
and international issues respectively. One deputy 
director-general, Jacques Ferrandi, was responsible 
for coordinating EDF operations, the other, Maur-
ice Foley, for negotiations with the ACP countries. 
The administrative reform introduced by Cheysson 
in 1975 saw the arrival in DG VIII of desk officers 
responsible for organising and monitoring the pro-
gramming of aid for one or more developing coun-
tries. In order to be able to reply to any question from 
Cheysson or elsewhere, the desk officers had to over-
see all cooperation relations between the Commu-
nity and the countries for which they were respon-
sible and be familiar with the political, economic 
and social trends in these countries. The desk officers 
had a programming role, whereas the technical units 
prepared the financing proposals. The technical ex-
perts could not increase the grant to a project with-
out the authorisation of the desk officer: ‘from that 
point on, the desk officers gradually became the key 
players … And the desk officers answered to Foley … 
It was clear that this was a deputy director-general 
who supported his desk officers and would not let 
himself be pushed around’  (3). At the same time, 
when the new EDF was launched, the programming 
function acquired a new importance. Before Lomé, 
(3) Interview with Hans Carle, 10 February 2011.
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programming was still in its infancy and decisions 
were taken case by case, on the basis of criteria that 
were not specified but usually relied on intuition and 
experience gained in the field. In fact the style tend-
ed towards the paternalistic (1). From 1975 onwards, 
however, DG VIII was required to present an indic-
ative programme for each country, setting out the 
development objectives and priorities. A list of pro-
jects could be appended to the report, for example at 
the suggestion of the Community delegation in the 
country in question. The indicative programme was 
then negotiated and signed by the Commission and 
the beneficiary country (2). 
It was a notable change from what came before: 
‘We were no longer deciding on projects, but on the 
(1) ‘We didn’t have to worry about macroeconomics, that came later ... Ferran-
di didn’t think much of it,’ interview with Hans Carle, 10 February 2011.
(2) Interview with Wim Blonk, 8 March 2011.
country’s policy. And the country had an overall fig-
ure’  (3). The aim was also to make the beneficiary 
government more responsible in the way in which 
it managed the aid. This organisational model ob-
viously took away much of Jacques Ferrandi’s room 
for manoeuvre, and the former head of the EDF was 
to leave at the beginning of 1976. The transition 
period ended a year later with the retirement of the 
director-general, Hans Broder Krohn (who had also 
led the negotiations on the first Lomé Convention), 
who was replaced by Klaus Meyer.
The Lomé Convention led to a significant change 
in the status of EDF delegate controllers, who be-
came full Commission delegates, a change that was 
more than just a matter of job title. Firstly, the role 
of the EDF delegate controller was not mentioned 
(3) Interview with Hans Carle, 10 February 2011.
ACP house in Brussels: its construction was financed by the EDF in order to provide representatives of the ACP countries with 
a meeting place, especially during the Lomé negotiations.
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in the Yaoundé II Convention. Their powers were 
governed by intra-Community texts on the imple-
mentation of the Yaoundé II Convention, which 
stipulated that the teams managed by EDF delegate 
controllers could assume responsibilities for check-
ing and monitoring projects funded with Com-
munity aid. Most of the staff had a technical back-
ground and were mainly involved in development 
cooperation. They were employed under contracts 
administered by the European Association for Co-
operation (EAC)  (1) and did not have diplomatic 
status (2).
(1) The EAC was a private, non-profit organisation, set up by DG VIII and fund-
ed from Commission resources. Its task was to recruit and manage the experts 
sent to the EDF beneficiary countries on renewable contracts. See European 
Commission, ‘Taking Europe to the world: 50 years of the European Com-
mission’s external service’, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, Luxembourg, 2004, p. 15. See also Dimier, V., ‘The birth of a 
European diplomatic service: from Controleurs-Techniques to the delegates 
of the Commission in ACP countries’, in Deighton, A. and Bossuat, G., Les 
Communautés européennes, acteurs de la sécurité mondiale. Bilan de cinquante 
ans de relations extérieures, Paris, Soleb, 2007, pp. 114–129.
(2) European Commission, ‘Taking Europe to the world: 50 years of the Euro-
pean Commission’s external service’, Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities, Luxembourg, 2004, p. 16.
By contrast, the status of Commission delegates was 
defined in Protocol 2 to the Lomé Convention on 
the application of financial and technical coopera-
tion. They are linked to the administration of the 
EDF. However, delegates are said ‘to act as repre-
sentatives of the Commission in dealings with ACP 
states “for the purposes of applying the convention”, 
a flexible formula which in practice conferred a very 
general mandate on delegates to deal with all aspects 
of cooperation in future’ (3). Finally, the Commis-
sion delegates had to be approved by the ACP state. 
This did not entail granting them diplomatic status 
(which the Member States would not have agreed 
to), but was the next best thing.
The Lomé Convention thus had two important 
consequences for the delegates’ role: it extended 
their powers (delegates could now deal with issues 
that did not strictly fall under the heading of man-
agement of the EDF) and led to a significant in-
crease in their numbers. In 1973, there were 21 of-
fices employing 320 people: 120 Europeans (mainly 
civil engineers and agronomists) and 200  local 
staff (mainly providing logistical and administra-
tive support). By 1978, there were 41 missions in 
the ACP with a total staff of 900, of which 250 
were Europeans (4) recruited from the nine Mem-
ber States. Candidates to work in the delegations 
were selected by interviews with a committee con-
taining representatives of the EAC and DG VIII, 
which on 1 July 1975 was rechristened the Direct-
orate-General for Development. Members of the 
delegations remained EAC employees, answerable 
to the EAC. They were not Commission officials, 
although they wasted no time in seeking this sta-
tus, which they obtained in 1988 (5). The heads of 
delegation in ACP countries enjoyed considerable 
(3) Hans Carle papers, Carle, H., ‘Du contrôle technique du FED au Service 
extérieur unifié’, unpublished text, 2004, p. 7. 
(4) European Commission, ‘Taking Europe to the world: 50 years of the Euro-
pean Commission’s external service’, Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities, Luxembourg, 2004, pp. 16 and 21.
(5) On the organisation of the EAC, see interview with Eduard Weimar, 
21 July 2010.
Meeting of the ACP–EEC Council of Ministers, one of the 
institutions set up by the Lomé Convention, in Fiji, in April 1977.
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autonomy. Their relations with the ambassadors of 
the EEC countries varied according to the coun-
tries and individuals concerned. Depending on the 
personalities involved, some delegations were more 
successful than others in organising meetings for 
information and even mutual coordination (1).
The Lomé Convention also led to a significant 
expansion in the EIB’s field of action. It provided 
loans from its own capital to fund the development 
of ACP countries and managed the EDF resources 
earmarked for risk capital operations. As part of a 
redistribution of responsibilities between the Com-
mission and the Bank, productive investments in the 
manufacturing, mining and tourism sectors were 
submitted to the Bank for examination and then 
given priority funding from the Bank’s financial re-
sources. In addition, the Bank joined the Commis-
sion on programming missions to ACP countries to 
prepare indicative financial aid programmes, which 
were then agreed by representatives of the Commu-
nity and the ACP states (2).
Towards Lomé II
The end of the 1970s brought a degree of change 
to the EEC’s development cooperation policy. The 
Lomé Convention was renewed in 1979, but the at-
mosphere during the negotiations was one of mutu-
al incomprehension. One of the main negotiators of 
the day described the general context: ‘On the Euro-
pean side in general, among the Member States and 
also the Commission, broadly speaking, there was a 
feeling that the work had all been done for Lomé I; 
there were a few marginal improvements to be made 
here and there, but there was no need for anything 
new for Lomé II. So it was essentially no more than 
a formality’ (3). 
(1) Interview with Robert Cox, 26 October 2010.
(2) European Investment Bank, ‘Interventions de la BEI dans le cadre de la 
Convention de Lomé’, Luxembourg, undated, p. 6.
(3) Interview with Bernard Ryelandt, 26 October 2010.
The ACP countries, on the other hand, were disap-
pointed by the results of the first convention and 
hoped for a thorough reform. The issue of human 
rights was another source of tension. The British, 
strongly supported by the Dutch, pressed for the 
inclusion in the convention of a clause making aid 
conditional on respect for human rights. In prac-
tice, the Commission had already taken steps in 
this direction when it suspended aid to Uganda 
under Idi Amin Dada, even though no legal basis 
existed for such a decision. The issue now went 
much further and was a source of considerable con-
fusion, even among the nine Member States. In 
view of the ACP countries’ deep hostility, respect 
for human rights was not included in the text of 
the Lomé II Convention. However, the debate had 
begun and the ACP countries would finally be 
compelled to accept a reference to human rights in 
the preamble to the Lomé III Convention (1984) 
This poster, which lauds the example set by relations between the EEC 
and  developing countries, cites the main components of Community 
development aid to Lomé signatory countries and ‘non-associated’ 
developing countries.
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and a clause in the operational part of the Lomé IV 
Convention (1989).
Despite the ACP countries’ ambition to revolution-
ise the content of the new convention, there was 
con siderable continuity between Lomés I and  II. 
Nevertheless, the latter did contain a few new fea-
tures, such as a chapter on cultural cooperation. 
Another important inovation was Sysmin, an invest-
ment facility for the mining sector in ACP countries. 
Sysmin was the result of the intersection of two differ-
ent interests: on the one hand, European countries, 
and particularly Germany, were becoming seriously 
concerned about the operation of the mining sector 
in the ACP countries, their main source of  many 
strategic commodities; on the other, the ACP states 
with huge mining potential hoped to benefit from 
a system comparable to Stabex. However, Sysmin 
operated in a very different way from Stabex: Stabex 
funding formed part of the budget of the beneficiary 
state, which was free to spend it as it pleased, subject 
only to the requirement that it submit a final report 
(and even this did not always happen). In the case of 
Sysmin, however, the funding was intended to create 
a profitable, viable mining sector and went straight 
to the sector concerned. The state could not allocate 
it as it pleased. Two conclusions follow from this: the 
EEC was now beginning to intervene more closely 
in the aid allocation process, and Sysmin functioned 
differently because the European countries had a 
vital interest in the viable exploitation of Africa’s 
mining resources and in securing their supplies. This 
was hardly surprising, given that 1979 was also the 
year of the second oil crisis.
Lomé: preparing the room for the signing ceremony of the second Lomé Convention (31 October 1979).
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Edgard Pisani, a visionary 
in the field of development
In 1981, Edgard Pisani replaced Claude Cheysson, 
who had been appointed French foreign minister. 
Although he spent only a short time at the Com-
mission (1981–84), Pisani received a warm welcome 
in DG VIII, which was soon to see the arrival of 
a new director-general, too: in 1982, Klaus Meyer 
was replaced by Dieter Frisch, who was to remain 
in the job until March 1993. While Cheysson was 
often described as a man of action, Pisani was more 
of a thinker, ‘a visionary, but slightly unrealistic, and 
surrounded by people no more realistic than him-
self ’  (1). In this sense, the commissioner and dir-
(1) Interview with Hans Carle, 10 February 2011.
ector-general were a well-matched couple: Frisch’s 
pragmatism and years of experience in the Commis-
sion and DG VIII were a foil to Pisani’s visionary 
spirit and political instincts.
Pisani’s arrival and his leadership as from 1984 in 
DG VIII were followed within a year by a reorgan-
isation of this DG. This reform, which was also the 
subject of one of the first blue papers on the subject, 
reorganised the directorate-general around two 
‘poles’: the geographical units containing the desk 
officers and the sectoral policy/thematic units. The 
aim was to combine the country- (or region-)based 
approach with an approach driven by sectoral or 
thematic issues, which were central to Pisani’s con-
cerns. As a result of this reorganisation, the techni-
cians, who had occupied a central position in the 
projects section, were now regrouped into multidis-
ciplinary technical groups within the geographical 
The people of Togo at a rally to celebrate the signing of the second Lomé Convention (31 October 1979).
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directorates. The desk officers would in future play 
a pre-eminent role because they were expected to 
master all aspects of cooperation, whereas the tech-
nicians were in danger of being relegated to an unre-
warding role of providing technical back-up in their 
respective specialities (1). In addition, in response to 
the commissioner’s interest in the human element 
as a vital factor in development, a new Human Re-
sources Unit was created (2). 
Pisani’s years in charge of development policy 
marked a period of intense activity: first, the direct-
orate-general was called upon to help draft a mem-
orandum on relations between the EEC and the 
Third World. Then came the negotiations on renew-
ing the Lomé II Convention. The memorandum on 
the Community’s development policy was both a 
review of the EEC’s operations and an attempt to 
adjust its aid and operations to the new internation-
al context of the 1980s, marked by a resurgence of 
Cold War tensions. 
The Pisani memorandum was adopted by the Com-
mission in the summer of 1982 and sent to the 
Council that September. In it, the Commission ac-
knowledged that, despite its volume and the number 
of instruments involved, the EEC’s development aid 
(1) Interview with Hans Carle, 10 February 2011.
(2) Interview with Charles Van der Vaeren, 27 September 2010.
was not up to meeting the new challenges. Signif-
icant parts of the globe were still underdeveloped, 
particularly in Africa, where the EEC had concen-
trated its aid. The North–South dialogue had failed, 
despite a few isolated successes and agreements. 
These agreements were either symbolic (the UN 
Common Fund) or a form of exhortation (the de-
velopment strategy adopted by the UN General As-
sembly). Responsibility for this failure was shared by 
the developing countries, which had been unable to 
adopt a pragmatic position, instead remaining fixat-
ed on essentially political demands, the Communist 
countries, which had never wanted to participate in 
the construction of a system of multilateral cooper-
ation and had thus reduced the North–South dia-
logue to a West–South dialogue, and the developed 
western countries. Here, the position of the United 
States was particularly important, and in the first 
version of the text Pisani observed that the United 
States ‘appeared today to be fascinated by the East–
West dimension of international problems to the 
extent that it saw the Third World merely as the 
locus of a latent East–West conflict’  (3). The Cold 
War thus threatened to displace North–South is-
sues, undermining the role the EEC and the devel-
oping countries could play, given that in the event 
of war these two parties would ‘in all probability be 
cast as victims or provide the battlefields’ (4). 
Pisani’s proposals aimed at giving the Commu-
nity’s  development aid the coherence and consist-
ency of a genuine policy sought to reorganise aid 
along geographical lines, identifying priority areas 
for intervention (in particular Africa and the Med-
iterranean). He proposed launching a policy dia-
logue between the Community and the beneficiary 
countries so that the aims of Community aid would 
be defined jointly and the EEC would be able to 
mobilise rapidly if the aid objectives were in danger 
(3) Archives of the French Foreign Ministry, De-Ce 1981–83, 1932, ‘Mémo-
randum sur la politique communautaire de développement’, August 1982, 
p. 10.
(4) Memorandum on the Community’s development policy, Bulletin of the 
European Communities Supplement, No 5, 1982, p. 12.
Visit to Brussels of Abdou Diouf, President of Senegal (May 
1982). He met with Edgard Pisani, the new development 
commissioner replacing Claude Cheysson, appointed by 
François Mitterrand as France’s foreign minister.
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of not being met. Pisani suggested concentrating on 
agricultural development, self-sufficiency in food, 
preserving the ecological balance and upgrading 
and reinforcing technical training. 
Negotiations on the renewal 
of Lomé II
The Pisani memorandum made a significant con-
tribution to establishing the framework for re-
newing the Lomé Convention. Agriculture, self- 
sufficiency in food, sectoral policies and the policy 
dialogue were key elements in the discussions with 
the ACP countries. The Commission’s chief ne-
gotiator, Dieter Frisch, spent hours trying to allay 
the ACP countries’ suspicion of the concept of 
policy dialogue, which they saw as an attempt to 
introduce an element of conditionality into the 
allocation of aid, whereas the Commission regard-
ed it as a way of reaching agreement on reciprocal 
commitments. Pisani’s arrival marked a significant 
change in the management of the EDF. Whereas 
with Cheysson the watchword had been ‘the EDF 
is your money’ (1), Pisani’s aim was to launch a joint 
debate on how this money was spent and the EDF’s 
priorities. Pisani’s philosophy was that, before a pro-
ject was approved, it was necessary to check that it 
was coherent with the overall context. He therefore 
placed the emphasis on sectoral policies and the 
need to establish priorities within them. 
The negotiations on the renewal of Lomé II, which 
took place from 1983 to 1984, were particularly dif-
ficult. At a time of global economic recession, the 
European countries were not inclined to be gener-
ous (2). At the same time, the ACP countries were 
suffering as a result of the debt crisis, falling agri-
cultural prices, desertification and food crises. The 
Stabex and Sysmin funds had been exhausted by the 
(1) ‘Under the Lomé framework, the money did not belong to the Commission 
but to the [beneficiary] country ... De facto it was the Commission that ad-
ministered it, but legally it was their money which was jointly managed’, 
Interview with Emiliano Fossati, 17 March 2011.
(2) The EDF nevertheless increased from ECU 4.6 billion to 7.5 billion, al-
though the agreement was reached only in the final months of the negotia-
tions and by including future contributions from Spain and Portugal.
Heads of state or government of ACP countries were frequent visitors to Brussels for meetings with Commission representatives, 
particularly from DG VIII. Here, Roy Jenkins and Claude Cheysson meet with Zaire’s President Joseph-Désiré Mobutu (21 January 1977). 
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mid-term and their renewal was in doubt. Efficiency 
was becoming an increasingly important con-
sideration. The structural adjustment policies advo-
cated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank entered the debate on Third 
World development and could not be ignored by 
DG VIII (1). This period also saw an intensification 
of relations with the World Bank, even if there was 
still some competition for the funding of ‘useful’ 
projects  (2). Against this background, it is hardly 
surprising that Lomé III, despite elements of con-
tinuity, brought changes which would profoundly 
alter the nature of relations between the Commu-
nity and the ACP countries. Insisting on greater 
aid efficiency, the EEC introduced what could be 
seen as an element of conditionality, although the 
Commission always rejected this term and referred 
instead to reciprocal commitments. In financial and 
technical cooperation, for example, there was a clear 
shift towards the idea that the EDF should in future 
fund programmes, not just projects. The influence 
of the structural adjustment policies adopted by the 
World Bank and the IMF was clearly apparent in 
the idea that countries could develop only if they 
changed their policies. It was no longer a matter of 
financing ad hoc projects and investments, but of 
targeting the entire political strategy — hence the 
importance attached to supporting the ACP coun-
tries’ sectoral strategies too (what Pisani called ‘pol-
icy support’), developed with the help of the Com-
mission, particularly in the food sector. 
Lomé III also had the effect of strengthening the 
programming phase. Programming, which was the 
main result of the policy dialogue, aimed essentially 
at concentrating European aid on a few priority sec-
tors which were agreed with the ACP countries, in 
order to avoid spreading Community support too 
(1) Acting on a proposal by DG VIII, the Council, for example, approved a 
docu ment stating: ‘We are in favour of support for this structural adjust-
ment policy, but structural adjustment must not only be economically and 
financially viable, it must also be politically and socially acceptable’, inter-
view with Dieter Frisch, 28 June 2011.
(2) Interview with Klaus Roeh, 23 May 2011.
thinly and to achieve greater efficiency. On the same 
grounds, transfers under Stabex and Sysmin, which 
were renewed, were subject to strict monitoring.
Food security and the quest for self-sufficiency in 
food became the convention’s key objectives. In this 
sense it marked the end of an era in which indus-
trialisation was seen as the motor of development, 
even if it meant neglecting agriculture. Due to the 
famine and droughts that had devastated certain 
ACP countries, agriculture and food security once 
again became the priority objectives for develop-
ment. The environment and development dimen-
sion was now part of the EDF’s normal intervention 
approach, particularly in its integrated rural devel-
opment projects.
The convention also broached new areas. The in-
clusion of a chapter specifically on promoting and 
protecting private investment in ACP countries 
had a strong symbolic significance as these coun-
tries had always refused such a concession for fear 
that it would undermine their national sovereignty. 
Now they explicitly acknowledged the importance 
of creating a good environment for private inward 
investment. In a move that foreshadowed the devel-
opment of Community cooperation in the 1990s, 
Lomé III also included in its preamble a reference to 
the principles of the UN Charter and a reaffirma-
tion of the signatories’ faith in fundamental human 
rights.
Lorenzo Natali: the first  
non-French commissioner 
for development
The new convention was signed in December 1984 
and came into effect the following year. It was there-
fore administered by the new Commission under 
the presidency of Jacques Delors, which took office 
at the beginning of 1985. In the new Commission, 
the development portfolio was split between two 
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commissioners: the Italian Lorenzo Natali retained 
responsibility for relations with the ACP coun-
tries, while Claude Cheysson ‘vehemently reject-
ed’ (1) Jacques Delors’ offer of a portfolio based on 
intra-Community affairs (industry and research) 
and opted instead for external relations. He was put 
in charge of agreements with Mediterranean coun-
tries and with Central and Latin America, Asia and 
Oceania. The slightly paradoxical result was that a 
Directorate for North–South Relations (in DG I, 
subsequently DG IB) coexisted with the DG for 
Development (DG VIII).
This division of responsibilities was not well re-
ceived  by DG VIII, and particularly its director- 
general, who considered it a serious mistake: ‘Of 
course everyone asked us what the difference was 
between North–South and development. Frank-
ly, this structure sometimes made us look slightly 
ridiculous. But once a mistake like that has been 
made, the consequences can last for 25 years’ (2).
The arrival of the first non-French commissioner 
at DG VIII did not create much of a stir. Lorenzo 
Natali ‘was a very courteous man, level-headed, im-
bued with a degree of political realism; he was not 
out to change the world, but to secure progress on 
dossiers while taking into account the interests at 
stake — what was feasible won out over what was 
ideally desirable’ (3). A long-standing member of the 
Commission and a vice-president for the last two 
terms, Natali knew exactly how to establish himself 
in the administration of his new directorate (4) and 
quickly developed very close relations with the lead-
ers of the ACP countries. His staff was astonished at 
the ease with which he engaged with the Africans. 
His priority was to start implementing the conven-
(1) Delors, J. and Arnaud, J.-L., Mémoires, Plon, Paris, 2004, p. 240; see also 
interview with Emiliano Fossati, 17 March 2011.
(2) Interview with Dieter Frisch, 28 June 2011.
(3) Interview with Hans Carle, 10 February 2011.
(4) ‘In retrospect, I think Lorenzo Natali was the commissioner who most ap-
preciated the work of DG VIII and who, in return, was most respected by 
officials. You knew where you were with him’, interview with Hans Carle, 
10 February 2011.
tion as quickly as possible. To achieve this, he de-
cided to retain DG VIII’s organisational structure 
and to appoint two officials from the DG to posts 
in his cabinet. Relations between the new commis-
sioner and the director-general were good and based 
on mutual trust. The working meetings instituted 
by Pisani continued: Natali and his head of cab-
inet would meet with Frisch and his assistant, ‘the 
director-general would brief the vice-president and 
present proposals; Lorenzo Natali would listen, ask 
some questions and then take a decision’ (5).
DG VIII continued the practice inaugurated by 
Pisani of organising informal coordination meet-
ings with the directors-general of the various na-
tional development cooperation departments. 
These meetings, led by Dieter Frisch, enabled the 
Commission to take initiatives, press ahead with 
particular issues and pre-empt problems before offi-
cially presenting its proposals to the Council.
Under Natali, DG VIII was still very much seen as 
the odd man out in the Commission for a number 
of reasons: DG VIII was geographically isolated 
from the other DGs and had long enjoyed a degree 
of autonomy. Because the EDF was not part of the 
Community budget, its funds were subject to moni-
toring by the Financial Control Service, rather than 
by the DG for Budget, even though DG VIII had 
its own internal financial control department. It 
also had little need to consult other DGs because it 
had its own economists and lawyers. Dieter Frisch 
described how this esprit de corps developed: ‘The 
DG for Development — DG VIII as it was then — 
was always something of a world apart, a club ... — 
a club in the positive sense of the word ... At some 
point somebody commented that DG VIII was “a 
bit of an ivory tower” because we had less contact 
with other DGs than everyone else ... We were more 
or less self-sufficient; self-sufficient and independ-
ent. We had our own engineers, agronomists and 
(5) Interview with Hans Carle, 10 February 2011.
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economists who were all, ultimately, specialised 
in this area. And we didn’t need to call on anyone 
else very much. So this cut two ways. On the one 
hand we were a bit isolated, but on the other this 
helped to develop an esprit de corps’ (1). Towards the 
end of the 1980s, DG VIII even started publishing 
an internal newsletter, called Tam­tam 8 and later 
News 8. This sense of being different from the rest 
of the Commission was also partly due to the idea 
that DG VIII, unlike other DGs, was not so much 
defending the interests of the Community and its 
Member States as those of the developing countries. 
The fact that staff mobility was still not yet univer-
sally applied and a significant number of officials 
stayed in DG VIII for many years, or even their 
whole career, reinforced this tendency. 
Conclusions
Between 1973 and 1986, European development 
cooperation policy went through several important 
stages. This evolution, due largely to initiatives by 
(1) Interview with Dieter Frisch, 28 June 2011. 
the Commission itself, was all the more remarkable 
because ‘this policy lacked a specific legal base until 
the Treaty of Maastricht (1993)’ (2). 
With the Lomé Convention, the Community em-
barked on a cooperation policy that was no longer 
limited to the states of French-speaking Africa 
but extended to virtually all of the African conti-
nent and to countries in the Caribbean and Pacif-
ic. The instruments of cooperation policy changed 
too. It concerned itself with the stabilisation of the 
commodity markets and the need to promote in-
dustrialisation in the ACP countries, it provided 
special guarantees for sugar from ACP countries 
and abolished inverse preferences. Under pressure 
from the British, strongly backed by the Germans 
and the Dutch, a number of measures were intro-
duced for countries that remained outside the Lomé 
Convention: in 1976, an initial budget allocation 
of ECU  20 million was made available for non- 
associated countries  (3). Bilateral agreements were 
signed with countries in the eastern and southern 
Mediterranean as part of the overall Mediterranean 
policy. This was a policy with pro-Third World over-
tones, which gave the Community and its develop-
ment commissioner an essential role in the North–
South dialogue.
At the same time, DG VIII also underwent a change. 
Following the first enlargement, Danish, Irish and 
British officials joined the DG and English grad-
ually became a working language alongside French. 
Claude Cheysson radically reshaped the DG’s organ-
isational structure in order to implement the Lomé 
Convention. Geographical desk officer posts were 
created with responsibility for drafting and imple-
menting development programmes. The program-
ming of Community aid acquired a completely new 
importance. The early 1980s saw the dawn of a new 
(2) Frisch, D., La politique de développement de l’Union européenne. Un regard 
personnel sur 50 ans de coopération internationale, ECDPM Report 15, 
Maastricht, March 2008, p. viii.
(3) For aid to the non-associated countries, see the interview with Emiliano 
Fossati, 17 March 2011.
Maurice Foley, Deputy Director-General of the DG for Development, 
meets with Edward Seaga, Prime Minister of Jamaica, 
and members of his delegation.
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The possibility of appointing him as commissioner 
for development in Brussels had already been 
mooted at the end of 1980, when President Valéry 
Giscard d’Estaing was reluctant to retain Claude 
Cheysson in his post. Pisani was appointed 
commissioner in 1981 when Cheysson became 
minister for foreign affairs after Mitterrand’s victory 
in the French presidential election.
He remained at the Commission for a relatively 
short, but intense, time (1981–84), which saw the 
adoption of the memorandum on development 
cooperation policy (October 1982) and the 
negotiations on the third Lomé Convention 
(1983–84). On his arrival in Brussels, Pisani 
wanted to mobilise DG VIII in a collective effort to 
rethink cooperation policy in the decade to come. 
The memorandum on development cooperation 
policy was drafted after consulting DG VIII officials: 
their replies to the questionnaire they had been 
sent provided material for the discussion within the 
Pisani cabinet. 
The purpose of the Pisani memorandum was to 
redefine the EEC’s role and the objectives of 
development cooperation policy in the new 
international context of resurgent Cold War 
tension. Pisani saw several reasons for revising 
European aid: the difficulties experienced by the 
developing countries, particularly in Africa, caused 
people to question the strategies adopted until 
then; at the same time, the international economic 
crisis and high unemployment affecting many 
European countries raised doubts about the 
Community’s ability and willingness to contribute 
to Third World development. Two other factors also 
played a role: the accession of Spain and Portugal 
to the EEC, which called for a redefinition of the 
objectives of the enlarged Community, and the 
crisis in North–South negotiations, which involved 
issues of great importance for many European 
countries.
Finally, the opening of the negotiations on the 
renewal of the Lomé Convention, scheduled for 
1983, set a deadline by which the Community had 
to agree on its objectives.
As Pisani saw it, the EEC had undoubtedly made 
remarkable efforts in the field of development aid, 
but the various legal, financial and trade 
Edgard Pisani and the memorandum 
on development cooperation policy
Born in Tunis in 1918 of Maltese parents, Edgard 
Pisani was educated in Paris at the lycée Louis le 
Grand. He joined the Resistance in the Second 
World War and participated in the liberation of 
Paris. He served as head of the office of the Paris 
police commissioner in 1944 and 2 years later 
became the youngest préfet in France. It was in 
this post that he began to take an interest in 
regional development and agriculture, a subject 
that remained close to his heart throughout his 
career.
In 1954, Pisani was elected to the Senate as a 
member of the Democratic Left and sat on the 
national defence committee. In 1961, he was 
appointed minister for agriculture in Michel Debré’s 
government, which was facing a serious crisis in 
agriculture. Among Pisani’s priorities was to 
re-establish dialogue with the farmers, who were 
calling for new concessions and demanding a voice 
in the preparation and introduction of the common 
agricultural policy. 
Pisani remained minister for agriculture in Georges 
Pompidou’s government, but had an uncomfortable 
relationship with Pompidou himself. His position in 
the government became increasingly isolated and 
marginal. In 1966, he became minister for housing, 
appointed by Charles de Gaulle to look into the 
problem of housing, urban development and 
regional infrastructure. In this role he drafted 
legislation on town planning, which was adopted in 
1967. However, after the parliamentary elections of 
March 1967 (when he became member for Angers, 
representing the Regroupement pour la Cinquième 
République (the grouping for the fifth republic)) he 
resigned from the government in protest against 
the adoption of special powers. In May 1968, he 
considered the government to be incapable of 
dealing with the situation and supported the vote 
of no confidence. He therefore left the majority and 
joined the socialists, working with Michel Rocard 
and developing closer contacts with François 
Mitterrand. In the late 1970s, he was appointed a 
member of the Brandt Commission set up to 
produce a report on North–South relations. He was 
a member of the European Parliament from 1978 
to 1981. 
▶
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instruments it had adopted lacked the consistency 
and coherence of an effective policy. He therefore 
proposed incorporating the various measures 
adopted by the EEC into a comprehensive approach 
(and debate). However, recognising that ‘the 
Community cannot claim to cover every corner of 
the globe where development action is 
desirable’ (1), he identified geographical priorities, 
which remained Africa, the southern Mediterranean 
and the poorest of the developing countries. 
Pisani’s most important proposals included the 
adoption of sectoral strategies, particularly in 
agriculture, and the introduction of a policy 
dialogue. The adoption of sectoral strategies 
meant placing the emphasis on programmes 
rather than projects, as had been the practice in 
the past. The decision to concentrate on rural 
rather than industrial development also marked a 
break with the past. Finally, in Pisani’s eyes the 
policy dialogue represented a collective 
undertaking by the Community and the beneficiary 
countries so that the aims of Community aid would 
be defined jointly and the EEC would be able to 
mobilise rapidly if the aid objectives were in 
danger of not being met. Although Pisani had no 
intention of introducing conditionality into the 
policy dialogue, it was nevertheless the case that 
the introduction of the dialogue signalled a move 
on the Community’s part to regain some control 
over the management and use of aid. This was 
also what the EEC Member States had in mind 
(1) Memorandum on the Community’s development policy, Bulletin of the 
European Communities Supplement, No 5, 1982, p. 18.
when they supported the idea of the policy 
dialogue, whereas the representatives of the ACP 
states were very suspicious of this innovation.
As regards Lomé, Pisani proposed the adoption of 
a convention of unlimited duration, accompanied 
by regional protocols that would be periodically 
renewed, as well as the budgetisation of all the 
resources allocated by the Community to 
development. Finally, as headline policies, he 
suggested adopting certain symbolically important 
measures such as a commitment to dedicate 
0.1 % of European gross national product (GNP) to 
official development aid by the end of the 
decade (2).
The Pisani memorandum was adopted by the 
Commission in October 1982 and transmitted to 
the Council of Ministers, which debated it at 
length. It received a mixed response: the EEC 
Member States reacted cautiously to the 
memorandum’s proposals, and only the policy 
dialogue commanded something like consensus. 
At a time when it was deadlocked over the British 
contribution to the Community budget, the EEC 
believed it would be difficult to implement Pisani’s 
ideas. Having said that, although the 
memorandum failed in its objective of securing 
the adoption by the EEC of a comprehensive 
approach to European aid, it did significantly help 
to shape the negotiations on the third Lomé 
Convention.
(2) ‘The Commission proposes that the Community set itself the figure of 
0.1 % of the Community’s GNP as its development aid target and that it 
attain that target in stages over the next 10 years’, Memorandum on the 
Community’s development policy, Bulletin of the European Communities 
Supplement, No 5, 1982, p. 24.
▶
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phase. The low level  of development of many ACP 
countries and the ineffectiveness of aid prompted a 
debate and led to a serious questioning of Commu-
nity policy and the EDF. The reforms to European 
aid during this period foreshadowed the changes that 
would affect European aid policy after 1989. During 
the negotiations on the renewal of the Lomé II Con-
vention, Pisani and Frisch, the new director-general, 
insisted on the notion of policy dialogue. This was to 
be the instrument whereby the ACP countries and 
the Community jointly identified priority areas of 
intervention. Responding to the failure of develop-
ment policies in many countries, particularly in Af-
rica where European aid had been concentrated, but 
also to the renewed tensions connected with the Cold 
War, Pisani suggested to the ACP countries that they 
coordinate more closely in order to select priority sec-
tors for intervention. Although the Community dis-
tanced itself to some extent from the conditionality 
practised by the IMF and the World Bank, the influ-
ence of these two institutions started to be felt. This 
was also apparent from the fact that the EDF grad-
ually began to focus not only on projects, but also on 
programmes. Finally, the question of human rights 
also emerged during this period in the relations with 
the ACP countries, although a provision protecting 
human rights would only be introduced with the 
fourth Lomé Convention in 1989.
Guia Migani
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Chapter 23  
Trade policy and external 
relations: new dynamics
Between 1973 and 1986, a series of new dynam-
ics affected the Commission’s actions in the ex-
ternal relations field.  Some of them emerged as 
a consequence of long-established trends: com-
mercial policy for instance was grounded in the 
completion of the customs union in 1968. But the 
range of economic issues handled by the Com-
mission constantly increased as the areas covered 
by international rules grew following the Tokyo 
Round (1973–79) and then the Uruguay Round 
(launched in 1986). New prospects also opened 
up following the first enlargement in 1973 and 
the implementation of political cooperation, in 
which the Commission was determined to play 
its part alongside the Member States. Despite the 
significance of these developments, the govern-
ing structures remained largely unchanged, apart 
from some necessary adjustments.
Staff and management 
structures
In 1973, when the Ortoli Commission took office, 
all the departments were combined into a single 
Directorate-General for External Relations  (DG  I) 
by merging the former DG I with the former DG XI 
(External Trade) and the delegation for the enlarge-
ment negotiations. At the same time as this merger, 
responsibility for the Mediterranean basin, the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment (Unctad) and commodities was transferred to 
DG VIII (Development and Cooperation). The for-
mer DG I’s responsibilities for bilateral relations in 
the scientific, technical and nuclear fields were placed 
under the authority of the commissioner respon-
sible for research and transferred to a new DG XII 
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(Research, Science and Education). The new DG I 
became what might be described as large trade policy 
department, with an approach that was both func-
tional (the design of external economic policy and 
its instruments; interaction with agricultural and in-
dustrial policy; trade defence) and geographical. 
The real aim of this new organisational approach 
was to bring the creation and management of trade 
policy instruments closer to the geographical de-
partments that would have to implement them, with 
the exception of trade defence and safeguard claus-
es. In this way, units with horizontal responsibilities 
could be closely involved with those in charge of 
applying them, the geographical units being bound 
to seek their agreement to carry through their activ-
ities. It would not have been possible to devise the 
sectoral policies that at the time were very impor-
tant — shipbuilding, aerospace, steel and textiles 
— without the participation of the geographical 
departments concerned  (1). The considerable clout 
that trade policy enjoyed was clear from the overall 
organisation of DG I (2).
The suitability of this structure was called into ques-
tion a few years later. The distribution of tasks was 
unsatisfactory, the work of some units was not up 
to scratch and weaknesses were appearing in middle 
management  (3). There was a succession of critical 
reports, and constant efforts to streamline and re-
quests for more staff (4). The changing nature of the 
challenges faced by DG I simply increased the pres-
sure on it: changes in multilateral trade regulation 
systems, which were being extended to cover new 
areas; a growing network of contractual and auton-
(1) HAEC, BAC 48/1984/9, Memo from Edmund Wellenstein to the DG for 
External Relations officials, 19 February 1973, and to the DG for Exter-
nal Relations heads of services, 11 April 1973; Interview with Eric Hayes, 
22  October 2010. According to Hayes, the aim was to prevent a possible 
break-up of the new DG I. 
(2) HAEU, EN (Émile Noël ) No 653, ‘Rapport sur la structure et le fonction-
nement de la direction générale des relations extérieures’, April 1976. 
(3) Interviews with Paul Luyten, 5 October 2010, and Raymond Phan Van Phi, 
6 October 2010.
(4) HAEC, BAC 48/1984/9.
omous measures affecting international trade; and 
the priority attached to promoting relations with 
certain countries. 
In 1979, the decision was taken to remedy several of 
these shortcomings and reinforce the key units. The 
bulk of the changes were made in the departments 
most involved with the GATT Tokyo Round. But 
this first stage of reorganisation was not enough. In 
a climate of worsening economic crisis, defending 
the Community’s interests took on increasing im-
portance. The Commission needed to be equipped 
to face up to a widespread resurgence of protection-
ist tendencies (5). The arrival of the Delors Commis-
sion in 1985 was the occasion for a comprehensive 
reorganisation, taking into account the growing 
overlap between trade issues specifically within the 
Community field and development aid, conflict 
reso lution and, more generally, external policy 
where responsibilities specifically held by the Mem-
ber States and those within the Community sphere 
of competence were becoming increasingly inter-
twined. External relations had become too complex 
and DG I had to reflect this reality and adapt ac-
cordingly. DG I’s departments were therefore re - 
organised around two main themes. The first in-
cluded everything that specifically concerned for-
eign trade (external relations and trade policy) and 
a whole sector of activity was grouped into a second, 
more political, area of responsibility (North–South 
relations and Mediterranean policy). With some 
minor adjustments, this organisation chart was main-
tained during the first two Delors Commissions.
These changes were the result of action by the com-
missioners responsible for external relations but also 
of the enlargements that led to a string of changes 
in management positions. The portfolios covered 
by DG I were held successively by British, German 
(5) And also to check systematically the application of Community legislation 
in areas where it was not sufficiently robust. Audland, C., Right Place — 
Right Time, The Memoir Club, Stanhope, 2004, p. 245. The United King-
dom, for its part, lobbied for trade defence instruments to be beefed up 
(interview with Eric Hayes, 22 October 2010).
415Chapter 23 — Trade policy and external relations: new dynamics 
and Dutch/French commissioners. In the Ortoli 
Commission, a key political figure — the former 
British ambassador to Paris, Christopher Soames 
— took charge of external relations in his capacity 
as vice-president of the Commission. With his head 
of cabinet, David Hannay, he ensured that British 
officials, hand-picked by Whitehall for their Euro-
pean commitment and command of French, joined 
the ranks of the Commission. The Community 
is indebted to Soames for breathing new life into 
relations with the United States, which backed 
European integration at the political level but was 
less inclined to make concessions to it in the eco-
nomic field. He succeeded in developing a high-level 
dialogue between the Commission and the Ameri-
can administration that paved the way for recipro-
cal visits, including visits by several presidents of the 
United States for one-to-one meetings with that of 
the Commission  (1). He also encouraged the pol-
icy of anchoring to Europe pursued by the Canad-
ian prime minister, Pierre Trudeau. Looking to the 
longer term, his personal commitment to opening 
up trade relations with China deserves mention (2).
The new DG I, placed under Christopher Soames’s 
political responsibility, was put in the hands of Ed-
mund Wellenstein, a senior official who had been 
in charge of the former DG for Trade and the dele-
gation for the first enlargement. The 1973 enlarge-
ment had a major impact and led to innovations in 
DG I’s working methods, innovations that some-
times clashed with the procedures already in place. 
These were not very conducive to mobility and paid 
insufficient attention to the calibre of officials or 
their career paths (3).
(1) Interview with Günter Burghardt, 3 October 2011.
(2) Interview with Edmund Wellenstein, 7 November 2011. Wellenstein de-
scribed the curious circumstances in which the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between China and the Community took place; HAEC, BAC 
83/1984/325, Note for the file from Horst Krenzler on the ‘Troika’–China 
ministerial meeting, Paris, 6 April 1984.
(3) Interviews with Leslie Fielding, 28 October 2010, and Eric Hayes, 22 Oc-
tober 2010; Fielding, L., Kindly Call Me God, Boermans Books, Reading, 
2009; Fielding, L., ‘Europe as a global partner — The external relations 
of the European Community’, University Association for Contemporary 
European Studies, Occasional Papers, No 7, London, 1991, pp. 259 et seq. 
In the Jenkins Commission (1977–80), Christopher 
Soames’s successor was Vice-President Wilhelm 
Haferkamp, with Franz Froschmaier as his head 
of cabinet  (4). Personal relations between Soames 
and his successor were very close. Haferkamp had 
four priorities: the conclusion of the Tokyo Round 
of multilateral trade negotiations, thanks to his 
friendship with the American trade representa-
tive, Robert Strauss; closer relations with the Euro-
pean Free Trade Association (EFTA); closer links 
with the Association of South-East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN); and better relations with Latin America. 
Wilhelm Haferkamp’s role was particularly signifi-
cant because he held the same port folio  — with 
Eberhard Rhein as his head of cabinet  (5) — in 
the Thorn Commission. 
The impact and the extension of the tasks handled 
by DG I explains why the portfolios were split in 
1985. Willy De Clercq (head of cabinet: Alexander 
Schaub) dealt with international trade and relations 
with industrialised countries, China and South 
Korea. Claude Cheysson (head of cabinet: Philippe 
Soubestre) took charge of North–South relations 
and consequently relations with non-ACP develop-
ing countries. While Willy De Clercq’s chief objec-
tive was to conduct the new multilateral trade nego-
tiations (the Uruguay Round), Claude Cheysson’s 
sights were chiefly set on Latin America, Asia and 
the Gulf at the same time as enhancing Mediter-
ranean policy. Mediterranean policy had been 
under the responsibility of Cheysson, in his cap-
acity as development commissioner, in the Ortoli 
Commission, then under Vice-President Natali in 
the Thorn Commission. 
(4) Interview with Franz Froschmaier, 4 October 2010.
(5) Interview with Eberhard Rhein, 22 September 2010.
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External economic relations: 
a wider range of activities
Until the beginning of the 1980s, the main focus 
was on trade policy. This reflected the central po-
sition that trade policy had assumed in the first 
two decades of the European project because of 
the exclusive powers vested in the Commission in 
this field and the growing importance of multilat-
eral negotiations. But it also arose because of the 
difficult economic climate of the 1970–80 peri-
od, which tended to make for strained relations 
with the United States, whose trade balance with 
the EEC became very negative at the beginning of 
the 1980s (deficit of ECU 20 billion in 1986), and 
with Japan for the opposite reasons (EEC deficit of 
ECU 20 billion in 1986). The rules governing trade, 
adjustments to import arrangements and sectoral is-
sues were therefore fundamental aspects of relations 
with non-member countries. But the geographical 
scope of the Commission’s activities was expanding 
because of the priority given to developing econom-
ic relations with several groups of countries. These 
changes gave DG I a much wider field of action. The 
global economic crisis at the end of the 1970s and 
beginning of the 1980s simply raised the commer-
cial stakes. With the 1973 enlargement, the EEC 
had consolidated its position as the world’s leading 
trading power. In 1983, its external trade accounted 
for over 30 % of world trade.
But its trade balance with the three large blocs, 
namely the United States, Asia (Japan and the 
newly industrialised countries) and the Organisa-
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 
The second ASEAN–EEC meeting in Kuala Lumpur. The EEC was represented by President Gaston Thorn 
and Commissioner Wilhelm Haferkamp (7 March 1980).
417Chapter 23 — Trade policy and external relations: new dynamics 
was very negative, respectively USD  20  billion, 
USD 12.1 billion and USD 37 billion in 1980. Al-
though the figures improved as of 1986 with OPEC 
(USD 3.1  billion deficit) and the United States 
(USD 18.5  billion surplus), they remained nega-
tive with Japan and Asia (deficit of USD 25.4 bil-
lion)  (1). Tensions therefore ran high between the 
main world trading powers and this was reflected in 
the GATT multilateral negotiations.
From this point of view, the agreements signed in 
1972 between the EFTA and the EEC countries 
and the gradual elimination of customs duties and 
quotas brought about a major opening-up of bor-
ders. This was so much so that between 1972 and 
1986 trade between the Community and the EFTA 
countries increased fivefold. Discussions between 
the Commission and the EFTA countries were a 
permanent fixture and addressed all the key areas 
(the economy, monetary affairs, transport, environ-
ment, development cooperation and so on). In the 
mid-1980s, in the run-up to the Mediterranean en-
largement, the need was felt for a more comprehen-
sive approach to EEC/EFTA relations. At the first 
ministerial meeting held between the two groups of 
countries in Luxembourg in April 1984, reference 
was made to setting up a European economic area, 
a project that would be taken over by the Delors 
Commission in 1989.
Multilateral negotiations therefore provided the 
main framework for DG  I’s activity. Launched in 
April 1973 by President Richard Nixon, the Tokyo 
Round represented a major challenge for the EEC as 
the United States, in the midst of an economic and 
financial depression, no longer had the means or 
the desire to offer concessions to its main partners 
without some sort of quid pro quo. The issues dealt 
with became increasingly technical with the grow-
ing importance of non-tariff barriers to trade but, as 
(1) Eurostat, cited by Debon-Jay, M.-A., Lemoine, F. and Merviel, P., Économie 
de l’ intégration européenne, Presses universitaires de France, Paris, 1992, 
p. 350.
Soames said to the European Parliament, ‘the tech-
nical trees of the negotiations must not be allowed 
to hide the political forest’. The Commission sought 
— and managed — to get these non-tariff barriers 
put on the negotiating table. One of the main ob-
jectives was to secure the adoption by the GATT 
of specialised codes that would limit the scope of 
instruments such as the American selling price or 
anti-dumping duties. On the tariff front, the Com-
mission could be satisfied because, while it had 
undertaken to cut its average industrial tariff from 
9.8  % to 7.5  %, the United States had gone down 
from 8.2 % to 5.7 %. The Commission had above all 
defended the status quo on the agricultural front, 
which was a priority for the United States and the 
developing countries (2).
(2) HAEC, Archive of speeches, ‘Summary of Vice-President Haferkamp’s ad-
dress to the Bank für Gemeinwirtschaft’, Frankfurt, 22 March 1979. 
Vice-President Étienne Davignon delivers a speech 
on EEC–United States relations (17 November 1982).
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But the pressure mounted at the end of November 
1982 at the first GATT ministerial meeting since 
the end of the Tokyo Round. It was a particular-
ly difficult meeting, mainly because of the clashes 
in Geneva with the United States and some major 
agricultural exporters  (1), but also because of the 
difficulty of reaching a common position within the 
Council. Here there were disagreements between 
countries like the United Kingdom, which was keen 
for a new round of global negotiations to be launched, 
incorporating services, in particular, and other 
(1) HAEC, Archive of speeches, ‘The Commission’s overall view on the forth-
coming multilateral trade negotiations’, Christopher Soames’s reply before 
the European Parliament in Luxembourg, 4 April 1973, contribution by 
Paul Luyten. 
countries like France, which wanted to adopt a more 
defensive position. One of the objectives was to avoid 
calling into question a whole swathe of Community 
agricultural and industrial subsidies and self-limita-
tion agreements on imports, and to avoid making 
too many concessions on barriers affecting services 
(tourism, IT services, financial services). Above all, 
the Commission considered it premature to launch 
a new round so soon after the Tokyo Round, even 
if it meant giving its partners the impression that it 
was a fortress  (2). As no agreement was reached in 
November 1982, the decision to launch a new round 
of multilateral negotiations was postponed. 
A fresh start was made thanks to the GATT sec-
retary-general, Arthur Dunkel, and the Leutwiler 
working party, which proposed a set of measures to 
ease tensions with a view to a new round of nego-
tiations. The Commission therefore endorsed the 
United States’ request of November 1984 to hold a 
meeting to explore this possibility. The request was 
also backed by the G7 in Bonn in November 1985. 
In September 1986, the 92 countries attending 
the Punta del Este conference decided to launch a 
new round of negotiations — the Uruguay Round 
— whose work would culminate a few years later 
in the setting-up of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO). Under the authority of Vice-President De 
Clercq, who had prepared the ground for the March 
1985 General Affairs Council meeting at which it 
was agreed to take an active part in the new round, 
the Commission played a major role in this process 
as the launch of new GATT negotiations in parallel 
with the single market programme opened the way 
for new initiatives — such as the inclusion of ser-
vices in the negotiations — and for commitments 
that would have been politically unthinkable before 
1985. 
(2) HAEC, BAC 133/1987/17, Memo from Eberhard Rhein, ‘GATT minis-
terial conference: an initial political assessment’, 1  December 1982, and 
background brief on the GATT ministerial meeting of 1 December 1982 
(see section 4.1, ‘Coordination and decision-making process in the Com-
mission’) for the European Council meeting of 3 and 4 December 1982.
The European challenge: in the early 1970s, 
the longstanding readiness of the United States to accept 
the economic consequences of European integration as a 
price worth paying for the potential political gains seemed to 
diminish, especially after the first enlargement. This new chapter 
of more problematic transatlantic relations would reach its 
climax in 1973 with the row following Henry Kissinger’s ‘Year of 
Europe’ speech.
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All these discussions helped to create a highly specif-
ic administrative culture (1), born out of the need to 
address issues raised by the industrialised partners. 
The British presence and the input of leading trade 
policy experts (Edmund Wellenstein, Theodorus 
Hijzen and Paul Luyten) ensured that the pitfalls of 
protectionism were avoided (2). The steel crisis and 
the United States’ measures nonetheless led to mul-
tiple trade defence measures. An initial common 
strategy towards Japan, access to whose market was 
very difficult, was only established in 1978. When a 
3-year action plan was drawn up in 1985, it focused 
mainly on tariff barriers, certification standards and 
procedures, public procurement, financial services 
and import promotion measures. 
(1) Borrell, J. R., La centralidad perdida de la política comercial, Información 
Comercial Española, No 831, 2006, pp. 67–80.
(2) Interviews with Leslie Fielding, 28 October 2010, Paul Luyten, 5 October 
2010, and Raymond Phan Van Phi, 6 October 2010.
Outside the context of the  multilateral negotia-
tions, there were major developments in relations 
with several groups of countries, notably the state- 
trading countries. This was not yet a growth sec-
tor, except in the case of China, with which a first 
trade agreement was signed in 1978  (3). However, 
trade with the Eastern bloc countries was expected 
to grow following the Helsinki agreements (1975) 
under the Conference on Security and Cooper-
ation in Europe (CSCE). Negotiations (4) on an 
agreement with Comecon (Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance) began in 1978, but without 
much success. However, Romania, which sought to 
develop some margin of manoeuvre in respect of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), signed 
(3) Denman, R., The Mandarin’s Tale, Politico’s Publishing, London, 2002, 
p. 226.
(4) An opening-up by Comecon that included a Soviet manoeuvre to invite the 
President of the European Commission to Moscow had to be circumvented. 
The USSR was against bilateral negotiations with the countries in its sphere 
of influence. Interview with Edmund Wellenstein, 7 November 2011.
The G7 (summit of the industrialised countries) meeting in Bonn on 16 July 1978. Commission President Roy Jenkins (first on the left) 
found it hard to be invited into the G7 club. 
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an agreement with the Community on industrial 
products in 1980. A joint committee was set up to 
ensure its application in the following years. Last-
ly, in 1982, it was decided to grant humanitarian 
aid to Poland via non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) in the wake of the events there. 
External activities diversified towards the south and 
to other continents. The Community developed a 
network of more complex relations with the new-
ly independent countries in Africa, the Caribbean 
and the Pacific. At the same time as strengthening 
its relations with the ACP states, the Community 
wanted to make advances towards the countries of 
the Mediterranean basin. 
In 1975, an agreement with Israel came into force; 
in 1976, cooperation agreements were signed with 
the Maghreb countries and in 1977 with Egypt, 
Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. The Community asked 
for fairly significant tariff dismantling for industrial 
products, but was not prepared to offer equivalent 
concessions in the agricultural sector. The under-
lying principle was that the main component would 
be the creation of a partial free trade area. This had 
to be defended before the GATT, where a successful 
case was made for the aspects of these agreements 
that promoted development, even though the gen-
eralised system of preferences (GSP) worked pretty 
well for the region, particularly for textiles (1). Little 
by little, the beginnings of financial and technical 
cooperation were added in, once the considerable 
difficulties of its budgeting had been overcome (2). 
The Euro–Arab dialogue got under way in 1974. It 
was a ground-breaking operation as it was handled 
both as a Community activity and in the context 
of political cooperation. Even though the economic 
interests (energy, volume of Community exports, 
(1) Informal communication from Roderick Abbott to Angel Viñas.
(2) Since 1971, the Commission had been working on the problems that 
enlargement would cause for the Mediterranean countries. HAEC, 
BAC 250/1980/101 and BAC 250/1980/20 contain extensive documenta-
tion. 
possibilities of increasing mutual investment and 
others) identified by the Commission with a view 
to a regional approach were considerable  (3), the 
concrete results did not live up to expectations. By 
contrast, the signing of the agreement with ASEAN 
in 1980 deserves mention: it was the first time that 
the Community had concluded an agreement with 
a group of countries outside the industrialised world 
and the ACP framework. In the other cases, aspects 
such as development aid, humanitarian aid and even 
aid to refugees predominated since non-preferential, 
so-called first generation, agreements (with Bangla-
desh, Brazil, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Uruguay, 
etc.) did not have a very wide scope. 
The Commission was also following very closely 
the negotiations on the new international economic 
order, the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties 
of States as well as the North–South dialogue. A 
first indication of this was its participation in the 
Conference on International Economic Cooper-
ation (CIEC), the so-called North–South confer-
ence, held in Paris between 1975 and 1977. The 
former director-general, Wellenstein, held one of 
the four co-Presidencies held by the north, the oth-
ers being filled by the United States, Japan and the 
rotating Presidency of the Council (4). In this dia-
logue, the generalised trade preferences policy exert-
ed a powerful leverage effect. 
Claude Cheysson, who was in charge of these mat-
ters in the Delors Commission, brought his own 
experience to bear on the conduct of development 
policy, which he wanted to be more ambitious. The 
challenge was to apply it to a larger geographical 
area, in particular in Asia, Latin America and the 
Gulf. To that end, the DG VIII officials who were 
in charge of non-ACP development projects were 
(3) HAEC, ‘The economic objectives of the Community in the context of 
the Euro–Arab dialogue’, Commission communication to the Council, 
COM(78) 506 final, 3 October 1978.
(4) Informal communication from Edmund Wellenstein to Angel Viñas.
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transferred to DG I  (1). The most burning issues 
concerned Latin America, owing to long-standing 
external factors and internal factors connected with 
Spain and Portugal’s accession. 
Commissioner Haferkamp had already felt this 
need and a communication to the College was 
drafted in 1980 (2). The need for Community action 
in Latin America was acknowledged but the means 
of implementing it were not very innovative and this 
attempt came to nothing. However, the conflict in 
Central America made it all the more urgent. The 
third enlargement finally created new conditions 
within the Community for launching an initia-
tive. The stepping-up of the Commission’s activities 
meant that relations with Asia also needed to be 
modernised, with the United Kingdom taking great 
care to ensure that the position of those countries 
not included in the Lomé system was maintained, 
in particular as regards financial and technical aid. 
This new sector continued to grow in importance 
under the Delors Commission. 
Finally, one new area of activity that became par-
ticularly significant was the support for democra-
tisation and the strengthening of civil society in 
Chile under General Augusto Pinochet. Up until 
this point, there had been little scope for this type 
of action, even as part of the Member States’ foreign 
policies. In the 1986 budget, the European Parlia-
ment set up budget heading 992, with an allocation 
of ECU 2 million, and the Commission, through 
its office in Santiago, offered valuable assistance to 
Chilean democratic forces. This was a new depar-
ture which foreshadowed further aid for democrat-
ic transition in Europe after the Berlin Wall came 
down in 1989. The subject was considered so impor-
(1) HAEC, BAC 48/1984/10. Their continued assignment to DG VIII had 
given rise in the past to lengthy discussions.
(2) HAEC, ‘Latin America: a Community strategy’, COM(80) 517, 4 Septem-
ber 1980; Denman, R., The Mandarin’s Tale, Politico’s Publishing, London, 
2002, p. 235. Its main author acknowledged that the communication sug-
gested ‘nothing sensational but [pulled] together the threads of what we 
were doing … and suggesting some modest further steps. [It] was quietly 
done down by the French.’
tant that Cheysson  himself reserved the right to 
take decisions on all operations carried out in this 
context (3). 
In this expanding area of activity, the Commis-
sion managed to make its presence and its role felt, 
both vis-à-vis the Member States and in the main 
discussion forums where international economic 
and trade issues were of vital significance. It took 
part in discussions on the trade aspects of the G7 
Summit in London in 1977 thanks to President 
Jenkins’s initiative and the support of the Benelux 
countries and Ireland  (4). Similarly, at the GATT, 
the OECD and trade ministers’ informal quadrilat-
eral meetings (with Canada, Japan and the United 
States), the Commission demonstrated its expertise 
and managed to steer a difficult course between the 
interests at stake. Nonetheless, it often had to fight 
to be present at all the meetings held in these differ-
ent contexts (5). It also sometimes found it difficult 
to gain acknowledgement of its role as the Commu-
nity’s exclusive spokesman vis-à-vis the Presidency 
during the GATT negotiations, despite its efforts to 
reach a political agreement with the countries that 
had the most reservations about this requirement, 
such as France and the United Kingdom (6).
DG I thus found that their activities changed con-
siderably as a result of the first enlargement and 
the expansion of the activities just described. The 
Tokyo Round multilateral trade negotiations re-
quired major efforts to implement the new rules on, 
for example, technical requirements and standards 
in relation to adjustments to public procurement 
le gislation. Similarly, the contractual and autono-
(3) Interview with Dieter Oldekop, 4 October 2011.
(4) Bossuat, G., Émile Noël, premier secrétaire général de la Commission eu­
ropéenne, Bruylant, Brussels, 2011, p. 240. Roy Jenkins would later on say to 
the Commission that separating trade from other issues was neither logical 
nor satisfactory; HAEC, COM(77), Special minutes No 429, second part, 
meeting of 11 May 1977.
(5) For instance, at the Versailles Summit; HAEC, COM(82), Special minutes 
No 644, second part, meeting of 6 April 1982.
(6) HAEC, BAC 83/1984/190, Memos for the acts of H. Étienne on the 
1023rd meeting of the Committee of Deputy Permanent Representatives: 
International Cocoa Agreement, 26 March 1981.
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mous measures developed in sectors such as textiles, 
steel or footwear represented a large volume of work 
for the Commission departments. Implementation 
of the Multifibre Arrangement called for 24 bilater-
al agreements with the low-price export countries, 
most of which were initialled in December 1977. 
In the case of steel, no fewer than 17 arrangements 
were concluded for the following year. Lastly, active 
management of economic policy and external trade 
instruments, including trade defence against dump-
ing or the granting of premiums or subsidies, was 
taking place alongside developments in the GATT 
context in Geneva  (1). From the beginning of the 
1980s, the Commission was also faced with a whole 
set of new tasks connected with the implementation 
and management of codes and agreements conclud-
ed in Geneva, either involving incorporating them 
in Community legislation or monitoring their ap-
plication by non-member countries (2). 
With a view to ensuring consistent external action, 
DG I also had to step up its coordination efforts, 
both for agricultural and industrial trade policy and 
for other areas of internal policy with external re-
percussions  (3). The lack of staff and technical ex-
pertise meant that other directorates-general had to 
be called in to tackle complex sectoral issues. More 
effective exchanges of information and closer coord-
ination were becoming vital. Difficulties emerged 
as regards the external action of DG VI (Agricul-
ture), which managed to set up a large department 
to tackle the repercussions on the common agricul-
tural policy of developments in international nego-
tiations. In Geneva, DG VI defended a line with 
a purely sectoral focus that did not necessarily re-
flect the more global objectives of the Commission, 
which had to face the challenge of developing the 
external relations of the Community as a whole. As 
a result, DG I realised that its image and its effec-
(1) Interview with Johannes Friedrich Beseler, 27 September 2010.
(2) HAEC, BAC 48/1984/9, Memo from Paul Luyten, 26 March 1980. 
(3) Interviews with Roderick Abbott, 2 February 2012, Leslie Fielding, 28 Oc-
tober 2010, Paul Luyten, 5 October 2010, and Eric Hayes, 22 October 2010. 
tiveness depended on its capacity to play to the full 
its role as interlocutor with the other departments 
and to ensure that the interests of external trade 
policy were also taken into account when devising 
measures internal to the Community market. As a 
result, external relations inevitably became one of 
the Commission’s main growth areas. 
The expansion of external 
representation
The representative offices — or representations — 
in non-member countries or attached to several 
international organisations came under DG I. They 
dealt  with the external repercussions of Commu-
nity policies. Obviously there were other forms of 
representation, but their task was either to imple-
ment development aid (responsibility of DG VIII 
through EDF delegate controllers) or informa-
tion activities (offices under the responsibility of 
DG X) (4). 
To begin with, the network was very small and its 
expansion met with many difficulties. Adminis-
trative structures in the central departments were 
limited and compounded by budgetary costs and 
a constant shortage of staff. Nor did the pace of 
development of Community policies other than 
trade policy always justify the necessary investment. 
There was another reason — partly hidden — that 
also acted as a brake: the lack of enthusiasm shown 
by several Member States at the Commission de-
veloping an active presence abroad  (5) outside the 
specific context of Geneva. Here, the Commission, 
thanks to the commitment of Paul Luyten and 
the support of the secretary-general of the GATT, 
(4) See Chapter 22, ‘Development aid: historic priorities and new dynamics’.
(5) Fielding, L., ‘Europe as a global partner — The external relations of 
the European Community’, University Association for Contemporary 
European Studies, Occasional Papers, No 7, London, 1991, p. 40; HAEC, 
BAC 300/1980/367, Report from the Working Party on Information to 
Coreper, 8 October 1963.
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Eric Wyndham White, had its way and became 
the Community’s spokesman after a long period of 
experimentation. A satisfactory balance was also 
reached at the OECD (1). The case of New York was 
the total opposite. 
As part of the international development strategy 
for the second United Nations development decade, 
several Member States wanted to have a Commis-
sion representative present in order to help them 
draw up positions on matters falling within the 
Community’s sphere of competence. In October 
1974, after the Federal Republic of Germany and 
the German Democratic Republic were admitted 
to the UN, the General Assembly decided to grant 
the EEC permanent observer status. The resolution 
allowed the EEC to participate in the sessions of the 
assembly and its committees without voting rights. 
In June 1974, the Economic and Social Council also 
invited the EEC to send an observer to the Coun-
cil’s work on matters within its remit.
From the point of view of representation in 
non-member countries, in 1973 the Commission 
was represented only in Washington  (2) and San-
tiago de Chile, the seat of the Latin American Iron 
and Steel Institute (important for the ECSC) and of 
the Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (ECLAC). Officials in representa-
tions had great difficulty making themselves heard 
in areas other than trade. Their basic role was to 
prepare for official visits by commissioners and the 
hierarchy and to serve as a channel for communi-
cation with the authorities. When the College dis-
cussed the question of external representation on 
30 May 1973, several commissioners called for closer 
coord ination between action by Commission offi-
cials and Member States’ representatives. Soames was 
in favour of extending cooperation in fields where the 
(1) Interviews with Jean-Pierre Leng, 11 July 2011, and Raymond Phan Van 
Phi, 6 October 2010.
(2) HAEC, BAC 328/1993/142. Diplomatic privileges and immunities had 
been granted by the United States at the end of 1972. 
Community was most experienced, while avoiding 
any overstepping into more political areas (3). 
Setting up in Washington would not all be plain 
sailing. The American capital housed one of the 
very first of the Commission’s external representa-
tions (together with the United Kingdom before 
the first enlargement). Jean Monnet had already 
set up an ECSC information office there. But the 
decision to embark on a high-level dialogue came 
up against difficulties in the Permanent Represent-
atives Committee (Coreper). Under Soames, how-
ever, it was felt that the Washington representation 
should be strengthened by an official ambassador. 
The Italian diplomat Aldo Mazio was appointed, 
but Secretary-General Émile Noël had to promise 
in writing that the request made by the Commis-
sion for Washington would not be repeated else-
where. Noël also had to agree that the accreditation 
of the Commission representative would not be to 
the president of the United States, but to the secre-
tary of state (4).
The move towards a bigger network of representa-
tions took a different course. Initially the Commis-
sion considered the possibility of setting up infor-
mation offices in Tokyo and Ottawa, but the host 
countries proved somewhat touchy and demanded 
that proper delegations be created. In February 
1973, the Japanese mission to Brussels announced 
this to the Soames cabinet. In November 1973, the 
vice-president replied to the Canadians that ‘the 
Commission, unlike a national government, can-
not take a decision autonomously on this issue’ (5). 
Prime Minister Trudeau’s visit to Brussels a year 
later and Canadian lobbying of the Member States 
broke the deadlock. The Member States’ ambassa-
dors on the spot also encouraged the setting-up of 
(3) HAEC, BAC 48/1984/9, Memo from David Hannay, 30 May 1973.
(4) Interview with Günter Burghardt, 3 October 2011. Burghardt played a 
significant operational role as assistant to Leslie Fielding and then to Roy 
Denman in DG I. 
(5) HAEC, BAC 416/1991/27, Press conference of Christopher Soames, 
Ottawa, 2 November 1973. 
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delegations. This was the case in Delhi (1). But the 
lack of posts and funds meant that many requests 
were put on hold. Towards the end of the Ortoli 
Commission, the possibilities of reinforcing the 
network were examined and it was acknowledged 
that political considerations increasingly tended to 
take precedence over other issues (2).
The process sped up for two reasons: the coup d’ état 
in Chile and the ambitions of the commissioner for 
development, the budget and Mediterranean policy. 
The arrival of General Pinochet’s regime in Septem-
ber 1973 had had a considerable impact in Europe. 
There were fierce debates in the European Parlia-
ment on the merits of maintaining a representa-
tion in Santiago. The Commission, which would 
have preferred to leave things as they were, finally 
gave way to Parliament after bitter internal discus-
sions. The delegation was accordingly transferred 
to Caracas, but a small office was left in Chile. In 
April 1975, David Hannay informed the cabinet of 
the president, who had visited Delhi, that the case 
of India could not be considered in isolation. The 
establishment of the ASEAN secretariat in Jakar-
ta created a new and even more pressing possibil ity. 
DG VIII also made efforts to set up representations 
in the Mediterranean area (which was the case 
3 years later under the Jenkins Commission in Al-
geria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Leb-
anon and Syria). Delegations were set up in Bang-
kok (advocated by Haferkamp for the ASEAN 
countries with subsequent accreditation in Burma, 
Afghanistan and Nepal), in Vienna (for the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the 
United Nations Industrial Development Organisa-
tion (UNIDO)), and in Canberra and Belgrade (3). 
Things slowed down under Thorn (accreditations in 
(1) HAEC, BAC 416/1991/27 for Canada; BAC 300/1980/368 for Japan; 
BAC 136/1987/166 for Delhi.
(2) HAEC, BAC 48/1984/20, Memo from E. Volpi to Leslie Fielding, 9 De-
cember 1976.
(3) HAEC, BAC 300/1980/367 for New York; BAC 39/1980/1157 for 
Bangkok,  Memo from Eberhard Rhein, 30 September 1977, and memo 
from R. Houliston to E. Volpi, dated 6 August 1979; BAC 39/1980/1158, 
Memo from Émile Noël to Vice-President Haferkamp, 21 May 1984. 
Bangladesh and India, 1983), but picked up again in 
the first 2 years of the Delors Commission (Brazil, 
Pakistan, Costa Rica and Indonesia). 
Thanks to the efforts of the director responsi-
ble, Leslie Fielding, the Commission managed to 
introduce various diplomatic practices that until 
then had been sadly lacking. These concerned the 
pro cedures to follow to obtain approval of the heads 
of delegation and the proper drawing-up of creden-
tials and letters of recall (4). The Commission took 
a long time to persuade the Member States and 
several host countries that the heads of delegation 
should be accredited at head of state or government 
level and have the rank and title of ambassador. 
This meant having to define the application to the 
Commission of the right to establish diplomatic 
relations with other states, which was a long, com-
plex process. Thus, for example, Commission repre-
sentatives in the ACP countries and, initially, in the 
Mediterranean area were not considered to be dip-
lomats and were therefore not entitled to diplomatic 
protection under international conventions. When 
security conditions deteriorated in certain coun-
tries (Lebanon, Chad, Uganda, etc.) they had to 
take ser ious personal risks. Progress on the external 
representation front was all the more necessary as 
the Commission sought to step up its participation 
in European political cooperation (EPC) mechan-
isms and needed to rely on its representatives in 
non-member countries. It was not possible to merge 
the delegations and information offices under the 
same authority. All the commissioners responsible 
for information were opposed to this (5).
(4) HAEC, BAC 39/1980/560, Memo from Roy Denman to Franz Froschmaier, 
14 December 1978.
(5) Interview with Franz Froschmaier, 4 October 2010. 
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The challenges of European 
political cooperation
According to the Luxembourg report of October 
1970, also known as the Davignon report (1), EPC 
had to maintain close contact with the Community 
institutions. The Commission would be invited to 
make known its views when EPC affected the ac-
tivities of the European Communities. This left the 
Member States with a wide margin of interpretation 
and consolidated the divide between EPC and the 
Community framework. The pragmatic principles 
that had governed the Commission’s inclusion were 
highlighted in the second report on EPC of July 
1973: ‘The Commission of the Communities has 
been invited to participate in ministerial discus-
sions and in sessions of the Political Committee and 
of groups of experts when the agenda of the meeting 
provides for the examination of questions affecting 
the activities of the Communities.’ 
The Commission was first represented in the EPC 
context (at political director level) by Edmund 
Wellenstein, at the invitation of the first Danish 
Presidency  (2). But after his departure in 1976 the 
practice was abandoned. At operational level, re-
sponsibility for ensuring the follow-up to and ar-
rangements for the Commission’s participation in 
EPC work lay with the secretary-general  (3), who 
acted as liaison with the various Community insti-
tutions, in particular the Parliament and the Coun-
cil. Little by little, officials from DG I and DG VIII 
(1) Gainar M., Aux origines de la diplomatie européenne, PIE-Peter Lang, 
Brussels … Vienna, 2012, pp. 48–62.
(2) Interview with Edmund Wellenstein, 7 November 2011.
(3) Émile Noël had from the outset sought to bring the Commission in via 
the economic part of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE). Bossuat, G., Émile Noël, premier secrétaire général de la 
Commission européenne, Bruylant, Brussels, 2011, pp. 224–225. In 1972, 
Commission officials were invited to participate in EPC for the first time. 
Da Fonseca-Wollheim, H., Dix ans de Coopération Politique Européenne, 
Brussels, p. 14 (mimeographed manuscript dated March 1981 kindly pro-
vided by the author);  the Commission gained wide experience in trade and 
economic negotiations with state-trading countries and Louis Kawan be-
came a key go-between. Interviews with Louis Kawan, 15 December 2011 
and 5 March 2012.
(for the ACP and Mediterranean countries) took 
part in the work, but at lower levels than that of the 
political directors. However, the president and the 
commissioners responsible for external relations 
paid close attention to EPC and the practices devel-
oping there. From 1974 they attended all ministeri-
al meetings. 
The Commission had to endeavour to make its voice 
heard at operational levels. But the diplomats — 
particularly the French — had been given instruc-
tions to prevent the possibility of its being involved 
in discussions on matters outside its sphere of com-
petence. Sometimes its representatives were not al-
lowed into the room where the meetings were held. 
The Commission’s path was therefore long and hard 
and punctuated by arguments over competence.
At first, very modest resources were made avai l-
able to EPC. It did not have a proper framework of 
common action or its own economic mechanisms 
(financial aid, trade, granting of preferences). Its 
sole instruments were the Member States’ joint ne-
gotiating power, their votes in international forums, 
the alignment of diplomatic procedures (démarches 
towards other states) and declarations sometimes 
thrashed out on the basis of the lowest common 
denominator. The separation between the political/
diplomatic and economic/trade spheres established 
strict limits between these fields, even though they 
had to be brought together at a higher level by the 
European Council and the conferences of foreign 
ministers. Even so, the Commission considered that 
attempts to integrate should focus on areas where 
Community competence and that of the Member 
States were closely interlinked. It was particular-
ly in favour of using procedures to ensure that the 
Community and the Member States spoke with 
one voice through joint representations of the Presi-
dency and the Commission (4). 
(4) HAEC, Special minutes, EC Commission, 28 January 1976.
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For many years, Community officials were therefore 
confined, in substantive terms, to the status of ob-
server, to whom requests for information were made 
from time to time. However, their participation in 
EPC activities gradually stepped up. The agendas 
of meetings and any invitations depended on the 
Presidency in office. The vital question of knowing 
whether Community matters would be addressed 
therefore depended on its representatives, even 
though the presence or otherwise of the Commis-
sion was subject to the Presidency’s interpretation 
(and the other delegations that had a sort of right 
of veto). Hence a degree of instability and a series of 
difficulties arose. The Commission could not ensure 
that it was present at all the working parties, even 
in cases where economic or development-related is-
sues were discussed. Lastly, there were Presidencies 
on which the Commission had to exert pressure to 
ensure that reports with a mainly economic content 
were also made available to Coreper and not just to 
the Political Committee.
The first objective was to convince the Member 
States that Commission officials should, as a general 
rule, take part in all the working parties. If the 
Presidency found that their presence was not desir-
able, it had to get in touch with the Commission. If, 
during a meeting, a delegation considered their par-
ticipation to be unjustified, it had to refer the mat-
ter to the Presidency or, if necessary, the Political 
Committee. Some of the difficulties encountered in 
this regard were, however, overcome in the spring of 
1977 (1). 
But participation in several working parties contin-
ued to be problematic. In addition, there was the 
question of the presence of Commission represent-
atives in those meetings which were not primarily 
the responsibility of the ministers of foreign affairs. 
From this point of view, the possibility of establish-
(1) HAEC, BAC 39/1986/784, Memo from Klaus Meyer to Roy Jenkins, 
25  January 1977; Note for the file from H. da Fonseca-Wollheim, dated 
1 April 1977.
ing a precedent arose in October 1978 when the 
German Presidency wanted to invite the Commis-
sion to a meeting of justice ministers to discuss the 
European judicial area. Member States’ opinions 
were divided. The German Presidency insisted and 
the Commission ended up attending the meet-
ing  (2). Similarly, the political activities or state-
ments of certain commissioners, for example during 
meetings with foreign political figures, sometime 
caused tensions that had to be managed. 
The topics most frequently addressed by EPC dur-
ing its first years of operation were the Middle East, 
south-west Africa, Cyprus and the CSCE. The 
participation of Commission representatives in 
the CSCE was settled, in principle, from Septem-
ber 1973 as far as economic issues were concerned. 
Their names had to appear on the list of the delega-
tion of the country holding the Council Presidency, 
but they had to be entered separately and state their 
position and job title. They expressed Community 
points of view both in plenary sessions and in work-
ing groups to the extent required by their respon-
sibilities and procedures. Although the approach 
was clear, further problems arose after the signing 
of the Helsinki final act. The question of the Com-
mission’s participation in the implementation of the 
conclusions caused new difficulties as the Commis-
sion considered that, for problems falling within its 
remit, its spokesman would speak on behalf of the 
Member States (3). For its part, the Council Presi-
dency insisted on its role in disseminating docu-
ments in international forums in order to make 
known the Community’s position  (4). In practice, 
by 1979 the only outstanding major difficulties for 
(2) HAEC, BAC 39/1986/791. Most of the work concerned extradition issues 
and certain criminal law problems. Da Fonseca-Wollheim, H., Dix ans de 
coopération politique européenne, Brussels, p. 10 (mimeographed manuscript 
dated March 1981 kindly provided by the author). 
(3) HAEC, BAC 250/1980/679, Memo from Theodorus Hijzen to Émile Noël, 
14 January 1977.
(4) HAEC, COM (77) 435, Minutes, second part, meeting of 22 June 1977. 
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the Commission were discussions on the Middle 
East and eastern Europe (1). 
Given these difficulties, it was therefore not sur-
prising that the Commission’s views about the 
effectiveness of EPC were somewhat mixed. In 
1979, President Jenkins confided to the Irish 
minister who was going to take over the rotating 
Presi dency of the Council that the performance of 
EPC was far from satisfactory. It was hesitant and 
slow to define its position. The strict division be-
tween the economic and political areas proved to 
be artificial (2). A memo dated May 1979 drafted 
by Christopher Audland underlined the need for 
the Member States to show more determination 
and to extend EPC activities. The Commission 
was well aware of the primarily reactive nature of 
EPC to crises and conflicts all over the world.  The 
improvement of the system needed to go beyond 
expanding its geo graphical reach. There was also 
room for much more consultation in terms of con-
tent. In the Commission’s view, any collaboration 
between Member States was a good thing, even 
if it took place outside the Community frame-
work. Experience showed that many of the topics 
addressed in EPC tended, once they had become 
tangible and technical, gradually to move on to 
Community forums. 
The organic development of EPC therefore es-
sentially consisted of problems of interface. The 
dividing line varied depending on the subject and 
in a number of areas the separation between the 
(1) HAEC, BAC 39/1986/791, Memo from Christopher Audland to Eberhard 
Rhein, 26 July 1979. In his memoirs, Audland was fairly circumspect on the 
limitations of EPC. Several Member States had even tried to ‘protect’ the 
bilateral nature of their relations with the Eastern bloc countries against 
the ‘interference’ of EPC; da Fonseca-Wollheim, H., Dix ans de coopéra­
tion politique européenne, Brussels, p. 7 (mimeographed manuscript dated 
March 1981 kindly provided by the author).
(2) The case of Portugal after the revolution, the UN conference on refugees 
from Indochina and the supply of agricultural products to Poland on fa-
vourable terms in 1981 had shown the need to use Community instruments 
for foreign policy purposes. Da Fonseca-Wollheim, H., Dix ans de coopéra­
tion politique européenne, Brussels, pp. 23–25 (mimeographed manuscript 
dated March 1981 kindly provided by the author); Interview with Edmund 
Wellenstein, 7 November 2011.
Community sphere and Member States’ responsi-
bility was simply artificial. Consequently, there was 
yet another call for the Commission to participate 
systematically in all EPC working parties and for-
ums  (3). This was the approach advocated by the 
London report of October 1981 and developments 
on the international scene in the following months 
showed to what extent the narrowing of the inter-
face was desirable, even necessary. The Falklands 
War marked a stage in this realisation. 
Following Argentina’s occupation of the Falkland 
Islands on 2 April 1982, Margaret Thatcher called 
on her partners to show their solidarity in order to 
bring political and economic pressure to bear on Ar-
gentina, on the basis of Article 224 of the treaty. At 
the operational level, the Commission reacted imme-
diately through the director-general, Roy Denman, 
raising the possibility of also resorting to Ar ticle 113 
and excluding Argentina from the benefits of the 
GSP or suspending all imports originating from that 
country for a period of 1 month — the time needed 
to reach a diplomatic solution. The question arose 
of the extent to which seeking a political consensus 
on the principle of combined action by the Member 
States and the Community was necessary in order to 
act. The reason for this discussion was the diverging 
views on the scope of Article 113. Certain Member 
States took the line that only measures that pursued 
a purely commercial objective came under trade pol-
icy. Recourse to Article 113 for sanctions was there-
fore fundamentally at odds with this approach  (4). 
The Member States finally decided that the precon-
dition for any economic sanctions was an EPC deci-
sion. On 9 April, the Political Committee managed 
to draw up conclusions on this basis. 
The subsequent handling of the war confirmed that 
EPC mechanisms and Community procedures 
(3) HAEC, BAC 39/1986/791, Note for the file from Christopher Audland 
with annexes, 23 May 1979.
(4) HAEC, BAC 252/1992/35, Memo from Claus-Dieter Ehlermann on 
the measures to be taken, 20 April 1982; Interview with Claus-Dieter 
Ehlermann, 8 October 2010.
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were moving closer together. Discussions continued 
in parallel in the two forums and trade sanctions 
were approved by the Council on a proposal from 
the Commission (Regulation (EEC) No 877/82 of 
16 April 1982). These sanctions were extended twice 
(Regulations (EEC) No 1176/82 of 18 May 1982 
and (EEC) No 1254/82 of 24 May 1982) despite 
the final defection of Ireland and Italy, which opted 
for national measures under Article 224 rather than 
applying the second extension. 
The Falklands War showed, in terms of both sub-
stance and procedure, the increasing closeness be-
tween the Community and the EPC context (1). Ac-
cordingly, following the London report of October 
1981 and the Falklands War, the Community’s par-
ticipation in EPC work developed on stronger bases 
even though certain operational problems concern-
ing the interface still persisted. Many of these were 
settled in 1986 when the Single European Act came 
into force, since it placed the EPC on a more solid 
legal footing, and confirmed the involvement of the 
Commission in all of its activities.
Conclusion
The period between 1973 and 1986 began with the 
first enlargement and ended with the third. The 
(1) HAEC, BAC 252/1992/35.
completion of the customs union provided a solid 
backdrop against which the Community’s exter-
nal relations, conducted through the intermediary 
of the Commission, changed radically. The Com-
munity’s influence grew considerably. Its external 
relations expanded. Community/EFTA relations 
were consolidated. Despite occasional tensions, 
relations with the United States and Japan were 
marked more by cooperation than confrontation, 
even though confrontation in the commercial field 
was sharp at times. New partners began to emerge. 
The external context also helped. There  were 
negative factors: the complexity of trade rules in 
certain sectors, the external repercussions of the 
CAP and reluctance on the part of the Member 
States to see the role of the Commission grow in 
the field of external relations. The Commission 
nevertheless managed to create new approaches 
and synergies to ensure that it became more in-
volved on the international scene. The Commu-
nity’s distinctive personality gained increasing 
international recognition, which allowed it to 
participate in international agreements. The Com-
mission did not hesitate to press ahead, en abling it 
to expand its representation in non-member coun-
tries and its role in EPC. 
Angel Viñas, Sigfrido Ramírez-Pérez 
and Éric Bussière
429
Chapter 24  
The Mediterranean challenge
When membership negotiations with Denmark, 
Ireland, Norway and the United Kingdom were 
concluded in January 1972, the European Com-
munity had every reason to expect that it would not 
have to deal again with the issue of enlargement for 
some time. With Greece, Spain and Portugal still 
under authoritarian rule, and the Austrians, Finns, 
Swedes and Swiss debarred from EC membership 
because of their status as Cold War neutrals, no 
western-leaning, democratic European countries 
remained outside the EEC — except of course for 
Norway, whose population voted to reject member-
ship in 1972, and Iceland, which showed no sign of 
contemplating membership. The Commission thus 
seemed justified in disbanding the high-calibre task 
force it had put together to handle the enlargement 
talks and allowing most of its members to rejoin 
the extensively reorganised DG I. A new round of 
enlargement negotiations did not seem to be on the 
cards.
Relations with the countries of southern Europe 
which remained outside the EEC remained im-
portant, of course. Indeed, 1972 to 1974 was a 
period  during which a sustained effort was made 
by the Community to bring together within a new 
global Mediterranean policy the rather untidy 
patchwork of commercial agreements with Medi-
terranean countries that it had inherited from the 
previous decade. Prompted in part by the free trade 
arrangements which Portugal had with the EEC as 
an EFTA member, France and several other Mem-
ber States pressed for similar trade arrangements 
to be extended more widely across the Mediterra-
nean region  (1). Their campaign was rewarded at 
the Paris Summit of October 1972 at which the six 
Member States and the three countries due to join 
in January  1973 jointly accepted the importance 
of the Mediterranean region to the Community; 
they said that agreements with the Mediterranean 
countries required ‘a comprehensive and balanced 
approach’ (2). Over the years that followed a num-
ber of further deals were struck with countries on 
both the northern and southern shores of the Medi-
terranean.
(1) Bicchi, F., European Foreign Policymaking toward the Mediterranean, 
Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007, pp. 63–101.
(2) Bulletin of the European Communities, No 10, 1972, p. 22.
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The prospects of actual membership for any coun-
tries in the region seemed, however, to be dwin-
dling rather than increasing. In the 1960s, Greece 
had been on course to join the Community, since 
the 1961 Treaty of Athens, the Community’s first 
ever association agreement, had explicitly provid-
ed for full membership as the final outcome of 
the process, albeit without specifying any precise 
timetable. The Colonels’ coup in 1967, however, 
interrupted  this  slow advance towards the EEC. 
The implementation of the association agree-
ment was partially frozen, financial transfers 
were stopped and dialogue between Athens and 
the Community was reduced to a minimum. The 
EEC’s tough stance on Greece also reinforced the 
growing consensus amongst the Nine that neither 
Spain nor Portugal could be considered for mem-
bership either, given their lack of democratic gov-
ernment. In 1973, therefore, no Mediterranean 
country looked likely to be in a position to seek 
entry into the Community in the near future. 
Trade agreements would have to suffice.
In the course of the next 2 years, this seemingly 
clear situation was to be transformed by a succession 
of events in southern Europe  (1). The first change 
occurred in Portugal, with the outbreak of the Car-
nation Revolution in April 1974. In the short term, 
admittedly, the confused state of politics in Lisbon, 
with different factions and parties competing for 
power, did more to highlight the potential instabil-
ity of transition in southern Europe than to suggest 
that EEC membership was imminent (2). But with 
the end of the Estado Novo regime it was already 
clear that a new phase of EEC–Portugal relations 
was being ushered in. By March 1977, the govern-
ment of Mario Soares was in a position to write to 
(1) Del Pero, M., Gavin, V. and Varsori, A., Democrazie: l’Europa meridionale e 
la fine delle dittature, Le Monnier, Florence, 2010.
(2) Interview with David Hannay, 14 July 2011.
the president of the Council applying for Commu-
nity membership (3).
The Commission and the years of 
dictatorship in Greece
Democracy was restored in Greece in 1974. In 
1975, the Commission received Greece’s 
application for membership. It may be worth 
mentioning the approach adopted by the 
Commission during the dictatorship. The 
Commission took a courageous stance, despite the 
difficult position it found itself in after the 
institutional crisis and the Luxembourg 
compromise.
When the Colonels seized power in April 1967, the 
association agreement with Greece was frozen at 
the Commission’s request, against opposition from 
some Member States. Thereafter, the Commission 
resisted any attempt to revive the agreement as 
long as the colonels remained in power.
That was the institution’s official position: some 
leading figures in the Commission — 
commissioners or officials — discreetly offered 
personal and private support to the Greek 
resistance to the dictatorship. This took the form, 
for example, of material aid for Greeks in exile and 
direct links with democrats still in Greece.
Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi
The collapse of the Colonels’ regime in Greece in 
July 1974 was followed by the triumphant return 
to power of Konstantinos Karamanlis, the man 
who had signed the 1961 Athens Treaty and a 
longstanding advocate of Greece’s European vo-
cation. Greece therefore moved swiftly to tighten 
its links with the Community, applying for full 
membership on 12 June 1975, less than a year after 
Karamanlis’s return from exile  (4). In Spain, also, 
(3) Historical archives of the Council of the European Union, Brussels. Acces-
sion of Portugal. Application for accession to the EEC lodged by Portugal 
on 28 March 1977 under Article 237 of the EEC Treaty, CM5/ADH3/82.
(4) For a new, archive-based account, see Karamouzi, E., Greece, the EEC 
and the Cold War, 1974–79, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2014 (forth-
coming).
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the prospects for change grew as General Franco’s 
health de teriorated. Western Europe’s last dictator 
died on 20  November 1975. As in neighbouring 
Portugal, the transition process was a complex one, 
and did not immediately result in a clear turn to 
Europe. But in July 1977 Spain, too, submitted a 
formal application to join the EEC (1). In the space 
of 4 years, therefore, a further round of enlarge-
ment had gone from being a remote prospect to a 
very immediate challenge.
The tenor of the Community’s response was shaped 
by two inescapable realities. The first was the polit-
ical imperative of doing everything possible to help 
consolidate democracy in southern Europe and the 
region’s alignment with the west, an objective that 
became all the more vital at a time when western 
governments fretted about the Cold War vulner-
(1) MacLennan, J. C., Spain and the Process of European Integration, 1957–85, 
Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2000.
ability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s 
(NATO’s) ‘southern flank’. The new governments 
in Greece, Spain and Portugal remained fragile, and 
the prospect of Community membership might 
well prove invaluable by giving them an objective 
and an incentive not to abandon economic reform 
and democratisation; indeed, many European pol-
iticians and political parties sought to encourage 
those working for reform in all three southern 
countries by promising them Community mem-
bership as a reward for success  (2). Now the EEC 
had to deliver. Roy Jenkins set out the issue clearly 
to the Luxembourg Council in October 1977: ‘The 
Commission believes that any reply which we might 
give to the candidate countries which rejected their 
applications, even implicitly or indirectly, would 
not be acceptable. A straight refusal would be a se-
vere blow to the fragile democratic regimes which 
have emerged with the open encouragement of the 
Community and which are already to some extent 
dependent on us’ (3).
The second, countervailing reality was that south-
ern enlargement could prove economically and in-
stitutionally difficult for the Community, especial-
ly at a time of ongoing economic and institutional 
difficulties within the EEC. All three applicants 
were much poorer than the Member States. Per 
capita GDP in Greece stood at 44 % of the Com-
munity average  (4), that of Portugal at 55  % and 
that of Spain at 77 % (5). Spain also had a serious 
problem of unemployment, with a rate running 
(2) See, for example, Ortuno Anaya, P., European Socialists and Spain: The 
Transition to Democracy, 1959–77, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2002.
(3) HAEC, Archive of speeches, Statement by President Jenkins to the Council 
in Luxembourg, 18 October 1977.
(4) Georges Rencki papers, EC Commission, ‘The Community of Ten’, First 
periodic report on the economic and social situation of the regions of the 
Community, 1981, p. 114.
(5) Georges Rencki papers, EC Commission, ‘General characteristics of the 
enlarged Community’, Graph  2.1, ‘Gross domestic product per head of 
population’, Third periodic report on the social and economic situation and 
development of the regions of the Community, 1987, p. 9.
Portugal, Greece and Spain broke free from authoritarian rule 
in the course of the 1970s.  Their success demanded a response 
from the European Community.
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at twice the Community average in 1986  (1). All 
three would pose challenges in terms of the ability 
of their administrative systems to fully adapt to the 
acquis  communautaire. The difficulties the Com-
mission was to experience during the membership 
talks in obtaining accurate statistics on the eco-
nomic situation in Greece did not augur well for the 
administrative challenge ahead  (2). An additional 
three Member States would also put great strain on 
a Community institutional system that seemed to 
be struggling to absorb the new countries that had 
entered in 1973. Furthermore, Spain in particular 
was a major agricultural producer and had a large 
fishing fleet, which was likely to pose problems for 
two key Community policies, the common agri-
cultural policy and the common fisheries policy, 
both of which were already under pressure in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. The similarity between 
Greek, Spanish and Portuguese agricultural pro-
duce and that of southern France and Italy meant 
that the costs of southern expansion would fall dis-
proportionately on agricultural regions that already 
felt disadvantaged within the existing CAP. Hon-
ouring the political imperative to enlarge would 
be no easy task. The row between the Commission 
and the Council over the Commission’s opinion on 
Greek membership, described below, was just a fore-
taste of how difficult it was to be to reconcile these 
twin realities.
A final difficulty arose over the question of whether 
or not all three applications should be considered 
as a package, or whether Greece’s 2-year head-start 
should be respected. The temptation to take an 
overall approach was obvious: all three countries 
posed similar challenges, and a rational response 
would be easier to devise were the Greek, Spanish 
(1) Georges Rencki papers, EC Commission, ‘General characteristics of the 
enlarged Community’, Table 2.2.1-B.1, ‘Comparable unemployment rates’, 
Third periodic report on the social and economic situation and develop-
ment of the regions of the Community, 1987.
(2) Karamouzi, E., Greece, the EEC and the Cold War, 1974–79, Palgrave 
Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2014 (forthcoming).
and Portuguese cases considered together (3). There 
would also be  substantial administrative and pol-
itical advantages to dealing with the three  appli-
cations at once. In the end, however, the Greeks’ 
determination to avoid having their application de-
layed in order to allow the Spanish and Portuguese 
to catch up prevailed. The Community’s southern 
enlargement thus became a two-stage affair, with 
Greece reaching the finishing line in 1981 and the 
Iberian countries not until 1986.
Greece’s accession: 
a political and a technical 
challenge
The dilemmas underlying the process of southern 
enlargement were apparent from the very start of 
the Greek membership bid. The Council asked the 
Commission for its opinion on 24 June 1975 (4). On 
27 January 1976, President François-Xavier Ortoli 
met Greece’s permanent representative, Stefanos 
Stathatos, who referred to reports in the Greek 
press and the International Herald Tribune that 
there were doubts as to whether the Commission 
would reply favourably. After two heated meetings, 
the Commission issued its opinion on 29  January 
1976 (5). Of the various proposals on the table, only 
that of Christopher Soames, vice-president responsi-
ble for external relations, met with majority approv-
al. The four French and Italian commissioners, in-
cluding François-Xavier Ortoli and Altiero Spinelli, 
voted against. The opinion adopted suggested that 
negotiations be opened after a pre-accession period, 
which must ‘in any case be limited’, in order to en-
courage economic reforms. A pre-accession phase 
(3) HAEC, COM(78) 120 final, 24 April 1978. The Commission did attempt 
an overall assessment of the three enlargement bids in its 1978 ‘Fresco’.
(4) The Commission organised itself internally to draw up its opinion by set-
ting up an interdepartmental working party. Its first meeting was on 8 Oc-
tober 1975. The interim report of DG I (in charge of the interdepartmental 
working party) on Greece’s membership application was issued on 6  No-
vember 1975.
(5) HAEC, COM(76) 30 final, 29 January 1976.
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would also have the merit of giving more time for 
arrangements to be found with Turkey that might 
prevent Community  membership from becoming 
a further source of discord between the two  east-
ern Mediterranean rivals. Soames stressed that the 
Commission’s  opinion was firmly in favour of the 
principle of Greece’s membership (1). The Commis-
sion’s position was, however, publicly condemned by 
one of its members, Spinelli, who voiced his views in 
the international press (2).
On 9 February 1976, the Council accepted Greece’s 
application without adopting the Commission’s 
proposal to impose a pre-accession probationary 
period. Both Germany and France backed its can-
didacy for mainly political reasons. Despite the 
ambiguity of the Commission’s opinion, they per-
suaded their European partners to come out clear-
ly in favour of opening negotiations. The constant 
pressure exerted by the Greek  government also 
played its part in this decision (3). The negotiations 
officially started on 27 July 1976. The basic uncer-
tainties about the feasibility of a rapid enlargement 
highlighted in the Commission opinion had not 
gone away, however, despite this political decision 
to press ahead.
The Commission’s misgivings also surfaced in the 
debate — internal and external — about whether 
to view the Greek application in isolation, or as 
part of a wider process of southern enlargement. 
In the end, the overall approach adopted for the 
1973 enlargement was discarded in favour of nego-
tiations with Greece that were kept separate from 
those with Spain and Portugal (4) so as to deal with 
(1) For a full view of the debates and proposals discussed within the Com-
mission, see HAEC, COM(76) Minutes No 369, second part, meeting of 
28 and 29 January 1976, sitting of 28 January, pp. 18–30.
(2) Interview with David Hannay, 14 July 2011.
(3) Karamouzi, E., Greece, the EEC and the Cold War, 1974–79, Palgrave 
Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2014 (forthcoming).
(4) HAEC, COM(77) Minutes No 442, second part, meeting of 13 and of 
16–18 September 1977, sitting of 17 September, pp. 16–17, Minutes of the 
discussions at the informal Commission meeting at La Roche-en-Ardenne 
on the economic problems arising from enlargement.
the specific nature of Greece’s social, economic 
and political structures (5) and to assess its candi-
dacy per se. This was not an easy decision to reach, 
and the situation remained strained for a year and 
a half after the official opening of negotiations 
with Greece. The Commission was aware that the 
three candidates had problems in common and it 
carried out a number of informal studies on com-
mon aspects of industrial policy, the setting-up of 
(5) HAEC, BAC 66/1985/192, Memo from David Goodchild (Task Force on 
Greece) to President Jenkins, 22 July 1977, p. 2.
Cover page of Euroforum on Greece’s accession to the 
European Communities. 
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new financial instruments and institutional mat-
ters (1). These overall studies show how aware the 
Commission was that, as well as the candidate 
countries adapting to EEC membership, the Com-
munity was going to have to adapt to enlargement. 
One of the more detailed Commission studies of 
the implications of enlargement, the ‘Fresco’ of 
April 1978, highlighted, for instance, the need for 
the Nine to rethink their approach to Mediterra-
nean agriculture as part of the enlargement process 
and to make a serious effort to address ‘the tenden-
cy of the decision-making process to become more 
cumbersome as a result of the involvement of a 
larger number of Member States’ (2).
Faced with the risk of an overall approach and the 
possibility that its membership bid would be put 
in the mix with those of the other applicants  (3), 
Greece exerted pressure to get a fast-track, indi-
vidual process.  On 27 January 1978, Konstan-
tinos  Karamanlis, the Greek prime minister, ar-
gued the case for Greece’s  unique position and 
insisted on speeding up the timetable. Panayiotis 
Papaligouras, the Greek minister for economic 
coordination, used the association agreement to 
support the case for Greece’s unique position. On 
19 December 1977, he submitted a tight timetable, 
proposing that all of the remaining substantive is-
sues be tied up by July 1978. This pressure began 
to have an effect. The Commission and the Mem-
ber States were aware that any delay might work in 
favour of anti-democratic and anti-European forces 
in the country. The November 1977 elections, for 
instance, while won comfortably by Kara manlis, 
had shown a strong surge in support for parties hos-
tile to Greece’s EEC bid. As a result, the Commis-
sion became more and more aware of the political 
(1) HAEC, BAC 66/1985/192, Memo from the Task Force on Greece to 
President Jenkins, 31 March 1977.
(2) HAEC, ‘General considerations on the problem of enlargement’, Commis-
sion communication to the Council, COM(78) 120 final, 24 April 1978.
(3) Greece reacted negatively to this approach, which favoured policy coordi-
nation before accession. After accession, its different economic structure 
became its key argument for adoption of the memorandum.
imperative to press ahead, despite the difficulties 
that this might involve. President Jenkins empha-
sised that they had to distinguish between opinions 
and the negotiations themselves, as the main rea-
son for the applications was political. Any accession 
procedure that was politically unacceptable to these 
countries could undermine the whole process.
The Commission organised itself internally for the 
negotiations (see table ‘The Commission’s internal 
organisation responsible for preparing Greece’s 
accession’, page 435). Concerning the order of the 
negotiating chapters, the Commission wanted to 
start with the customs union, followed by external 
relations. Agriculture and state aid were also prior-
ity chapters. Greece presented a memorandum on 
agriculture early in the negotiations. The speed at 
which the Community formulated its negotiating 
positions in this sector was, however, slower than 
Greece would have liked.
For Greece, the Commission inaugurated a ‘flex-
ible’ transition model (4). Compared with the first 
enlargement, the transitional period was longer 
and was staggered. It varied by sector and involved 
sweeping exemptions. This contrasted with the 
first  enlargement, during which exemptions were 
limited to the transitional period. But when Greece 
asked for significant and permanent exemptions, 
the Commission referred to the 1973 precedent. 
While the Commission thought that the transi-
tional period should be between 5 and 10 years, 
Greece wanted at most 5 years (customs union and 
external relations), with shorter periods in certain 
cases where the acquis would apply immediately. 
On agricultural policy (especially fruit exports), 
state aid and the free movement of labour, there 
were political disagreements between the Com-
(4) HAEU, EN (Émile Noël papers), file 49, ‘Avant-projet de rapport du groupe 
de travail sur les questions institutionnelles liées à l’élargissement sur “La 
période de transition”’, 30 November 1977, interdepartmental group on 
enlargement of the Communities — institutional aspects (the Kergorlay 
group), December 1977.
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Greece’s accession also offered the Commission 
an opportunity to put forward some innovative 
ideas on institutional matters inspired by the 1975 
Tindemans report (1). In response to the suggestion 
by some Member States that the blocking minor-
ity be frozen, despite the increase in the total num-
ber of votes with enlargement, the Commission 
came up with a compromise proposal that involved 
(1) See the introduction to Part Three.
mission, the Council and Greece. From the very 
start of the negotiations, Panayiotis Papaligouras 
demanded that provision be made in the accession 
act for a declaration recognising the importance of 
state aid. The Commission thought there was no 
need for transitional periods in this area. Neverthe-
less, it agreed to the Greek demand. After accession 
it would have the job of examining existing forms 
of aid and setting time limits and transitional ar-
rangements under Articles 92 et seq. of the treaty 
of accession.
The Commission’s internal organisation responsible for preparing Greece’s accession
Year Theme DG
1977 Working party on the general institutional 
implications of enlargement
Secretariat-General
Chaired by the Secretary-General, Émile 
Noël
Task force on new accessions DG for External Relations
Delegation for negotiations with Greece DG for External Relations
Roland de Kergorlay was responsible for 
general coordination
Task Force on Greece DG for External Relations
Interdepartmental working party on 
enlargement issues
Secretariat-General
Chaired by Vice-President Lorenzo Natali
Working party on enlargement-related 
institutional issues
Secretariat-General
1978 Subgroup on the administrative aspects of 
enlargement
Secretariat-General
Chaired by Christopher Audland
Delegation for negotiations on enlargement DG for External Relations
Roland de Kergorlay was responsible for 
general coordination
Three thematic interdepartmental working 
parties (economy, agriculture and industry/
state aid)
Chaired by the DGs for Economic and 
Financial Affairs, for Agriculture and for 
Internal Market and Industrial Affairs
The enlargement delegation acted as 
secretariat
Committee of deputies to improve the 
negotiation structures
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aligning the votes awarded to Greece closely on the 
current percentages. In addition, it set a new quali-
fied majority which, in turn, changed the blocking 
minority (45 of 63 votes for the new majority)  (1). 
Another idea canvassed in the light of the conclu-
sions of the Spierenburg report (2) was to reduce the 
number of commissioners when Greece joined, and 
various formulas were proposed (one commissioner 
per Member State, junior Commission members, 
etc.). In the end, despite the addition of a new mem-
ber, the proposal to maintain the relative strength of 
the Member States carried the day.
This institutional conservatism reflected a more 
general characteristic of the Greek  membership 
bid, namely that the Nine and the Commission ul-
timately decided for political reasons to push ahead 
with the bid, despite the fact that a number of fun-
damental issues had not been wholly resolved. This 
is why neither the breakthrough in the membership 
talks under the German Council Presidency in the 
second half of 1978 nor the final mopping up of the 
remaining issues in the first months of 1979 led to 
any radical rethink of the approach to Mediterra-
nean agriculture or of institutional rebalancing, as 
advocated in earlier Commission documents such 
as the ‘Fresco’.
Discussions on both issues were already under way, 
but no immediate agreement was in sight. The Greek 
membership application hence ended much as it had 
begun, with the desire to think through the broader 
implications of enlargement expressed in the initial 
Commission opinion swept aside once more by the 
political imperatives of enlargement. This certainly 
helped the task of Karamanlis. Indeed, the Greek 
leader’s skilful personal diplomacy with his fellow 
European leaders, Helmut Schmidt and Valéry Gis-
card d’Estaing in particular, but also Roy Jenkins, 
(1) It was the Danish, French and British delegations that wanted to keep the 
number of blocking minority votes as it was, on the lines of the Community 
of Nine. See COM(78) 356 final, proposal from the Commission, commu-
nication of 20 July 1978. 
(2) See Chapter 6, ‘An administrative culture in transition’.
was almost certainly one of the key reasons why the 
pressure to enlarge quickly overcame the need fully 
to equip both the applicants and the Community 
for the challenges ahead. But as will be seen below, 
this decision to put off a thorough consideration of 
how an enlarged Europe would function was a step 
that was to have serious implications for the other 
two southern European applicants.
On 28 May 1979, the treaty of accession bringing 
Greece into the EEC was signed, amid much pomp 
and splendour, at a ceremony in Athens. Eighteen 
months later, on 1  January 1981, Greece took its 
place amongst the Community Member States. As 
had earlier been the case with the United Kingdom, 
however, formal entry did not bring a definitive end 
to uncertainty over Greece’s place within the EEC. 
Within months of accession, the Panhellenic Social-
ist Movement (PASOK), which had campaigned in 
favour of Greece’s withdrawal from NATO and 
the EEC, won a general election. On 22 March 
1982, the new Greek government sent a memoran-
dum pointing out the weakness of the Greek eco-
nomy and asking for more concessions and financial 
support. On 29 March 1982, the Commission pro-
posed to the Council an approach that took some 
account of these demands. The Greek government 
reacted favourably and the Council supported the 
proposal. The Commission tasked Richard Burke, 
a member of the Commission, with coordinating 
the operation, which involved preparing a number 
of proposals and maintaining relations with the 
Greek  authorities to ensure that the Community 
acquis was being implemented. The Commission 
strove to get agreement with the Greek authorities 
on a tight timetable for getting Greece to comply 
with Community rules (1). Some years later, under 
the first Delors Commission, it became clear that 
very little progress had been made, particularly as 
regards transposing Community directives as en-
tailed by the act  of accession. Arthur Cockfield, 
vice-president responsible for the internal market, 
visited Greece with a view to a thorough inquiry. 
Regular contacts continued over the years.
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The arrival of Greek officials in Brussels
Unlike the Iberian applicants, whose case is discussed 
below, Greek officials arrived in Brussels and joined their 
new institutions in the course of the period to be 
covered by this volume. It is therefore important briefly 
to review the process by which they were chosen and 
their overall numbers.
The Commission calculated that Greeks should make up 
6 % of all staff (A and B categories) in order to 
establish a new geographical balance. To avoid 
significant deficits in some grades, as happened in 
1973, the Commission decided to recruit gradually over 
2 years, from 1980 to 1982. Only 15 officials in grades 
A1–A3 were due to retire by 1981; at least half of the 
posts would have to be found by creating new ones. 
The Commission suggested changes to the pension 
scheme (2). Filling lower grades did not pose any 
particular problem. Greece’s quotas for the higher 
grades entitled it to one A1, five A2s and 13 A3s. 
Candidates for the political A1 and A2 posts were put 
forward by the Greek government by means of a list 
offering alternative candidates for each post, sent via 
the Greek commissioner. Greece wanted to use the 
same method for A3s, a grade for which the 
Commission normally reserved the right to look for 
candidates from elsewhere. Eleven months before 
accession, the Greek government submitted to the 
Commission a (partisan-based) list of 45 candidates (3) 
for 15 posts. In May 1980, the Commission 
acknowledged that Greece constituted a special 
case (4). The newly elected socialist government of 
Greece put forward a new list of candidates in February 
1982. It also planned to transmit other names (which 
would also be valid for A2 and A3 posts). The tactic of 
bundling appointments thus continued (5). Seeing that 
the A2 candidates did not satisfy the profile requested, 
the Commission let it be known that it wanted to 
replace one A2 post by a number of A3s (6). Grigoris 
Varfis and Wilhelm Haferkamp agreed to replace the A2 
post in DG I by two (well-placed) A3 posts in the same 
DG (7). 
The Greek authorities believed that the Commission had 
been more exacting for the recruitment of Greek staff 
than for staff in 1973 and that their lists had been 
disregarded. While striving not to give the impression 
that it was constantly ignoring the Greek government’s 
recommendations, the Commission steadily pushed 
ahead with appointments between the end of 1982 
and the end of 1983 (see table ‘High-grade posts 
awarded to Greek nationals at 2 December 1983’, 
page 438).
(1) Bulletin of the European Communities, No 3, 1982, pp. 96–100; No 4, 
1983, p. 69.
(2) In 1973, Regulation (Euratom, ECSC, EEC) No  2530/72 provided for 
exceptions to the staff regulations. The Commission incorporated the new 
officials in a single operation. In Greece’s case, the special arrangements 
consisted in encouraging retirement at 60 and early retirement between 50 
and 60, and imposing mandatory retirement at 65.
(3) The opposition Greek press referred to it as the ‘pinnacle of byzantinism’ 
and special treatment (Eleutherotypia, 23 June 1979). Karamanlis’s govern-
ing party was accused of excluding from the recruitment lists candidates 
close to the socialist and communist parties (Eleutherotypia, 27 June 1980).
(4) HAEC, BAC  39/1986/82, Memo by Henri Étienne, 12  May 1980, con-
cerning the meeting between Christopher Tugendhat and deputy perma-
nent representatives on 8  May 1980 to discuss the recruitment of Greek 
officials.
(5) Interview with Grigoris Varfis, 6 October 2010.
(6) Interview with Ioannis Yennimatas, 7 October 2010.
(7) HAEU, EN (Émile Noël papers), file 2916, Follow-up to enlargement 
(‘Fresco’) 1982, Greek recruitment 1981–83 (documents 1980 to 1986).
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Enlargement to include Spain 
and Portugal 
The accession of Spain and Portugal in 1986 com-
pleted the Community’s southwards extension. The 
background to these accessions was quite different 
and the situations of the countries were dissimilar.
The case of Spain
Spain was excluded from European organisations 
for many years. Its international position was weak 
because of the regime in power. After a long wait, 
the Community offered it an opening in the form 
of a two-phase preferential trade agreement, which 
also avoided obstacles within the GATT. The agree-
ment was signed in 1970. Wisely, the conditions for 
moving from one phase to another were not speci-
fied. The basic problem was the lack of democracy 
in Spain.
The first enlargement affected Spain’s trade with the 
three new Member States and so the existing agree-
ment needed amendment. Political developments, 
however, created an obstacle. In March  1975, sev-
eral members of the Commission (Claude Cheysson, 
Wilhelm Haferkamp, Henri Simonet, Altiero 
Spinelli and George Thomson), though speaking in 
a personal capacity, issued firmly worded protests 
about acts of repression against opposition leaders 
in Spain. In September, the Commission as an insti-
tution expressed concern about a number of death 
sentences. When the executions went ahead there 
was an outcry. By early October, the Community 
decided that there was no point in pursuing ne-
gotiations on the revision of the trade agreement. 
The possibility of Commission representation at 
Franco’s funeral in 1975 was regarded with serious 
misgivings. The Danish Commissioner, Finn Olav 
Gundelach, represented the Commission at the reli-
gious ceremony and at the swearing-in of King Juan 
Carlos I on November 27. The Commission decided 
that, if questioned by the media, it would focus on 
its openness to strengthening relations between the 
Community and a democratic Spain (2).
High-grade posts awarded to Greek nationals at 2 December 1983 (1) 
 
Category Number Post % of category
A1 1 DG XI 0.9 %
A2 3 Cabinet (1), DG V (1), SOEC (1) 6 %
A3 13 DG II (2), DG III (1), DG IV (1), DG VI (2),  
DG VII (1), DG VIII (1), DG IX (1), DG X (1), 
DG XVI (1), Legal Service (2)
11.4 %
A4–A7 97 Including two A5s and two A7s in the cabinet
(1) HAEU, EN (Émile Noël papers), file 2917, Follow-up to enlargement 
(‘Fresco’) 1982, Greek recruitment 1981–83 (documents 1980 to 1986).
(2) HAEC, COM(75) Minutes No 333, second part, 25 March 1975; 
COM(75) Minutes No 350, meeting of 10 September 1975; COM(75) 
Minutes No 352, second part, 24 September 1975; COM(75) Minutes 
No 353, meeting of 1 October 1975; COM(75) Minutes No 354, second 
part, 8  October 1975; COM(75) Minutes No 357, second part, 28 and 
29 October 1975; COM(75) Minutes No 360, meeting of 17, 19 and 20 No-
vember 1975; COM(75) Minutes No 361, second part, 26 November 1975.
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At last the negotiations resumed. The new Foreign 
Minister, José María de Areilza, Count of Motrico, 
visited Member State capitals and Brussels in Feb-
ruary 1976. He outlined the new government’s 
democratisation plans and its desire to limit nego-
tiations to a revamping of the 1970 agreement. He 
also spoke of the desire to join the Community. 
It was made plain to him that this was impossible 
until a truly democratic system was in place (1). 
The negotiations ran into considerable difficul-
ties (2). In March 1977, the Commission envisaged 
purely technical adjustments to the bilateral agree-
ment. But this proved an inadequate response in 
the light of the fast-moving political situation in 
Spain. In late March 1977, Étienne Davignon and 
Finn Olav Gundelach argued for a detailed analy-
(1) HAEC, COM(76) Minutes No 372, second part, 17 and 18 February 1975, 
p. 15.
(2) HAEC, BAC 250/1980/674 and 675 contain abundant documentation.
s i s 
o f 
the industrial and agricultural situation in the 
countries that were already unofficially considered 
to be applicants  (3). The expectation was fulfilled. 
Four months after Portugal, and after the first free 
elections since 1936, the Spanish government pre-
sented an official request to become a member.
The time taken to draw up the opinion on Spain 
was similar to that taken for Portugal. It was sent to 
the Council on 29 November 1978 (4). Politically, 
the Commission welcomed the prospect of a demo-
cratic Spain as a member of the Community. From 
an economic point of view, however, it foresaw that 
integration would not be easy. It would involve 
dealing with the problems of industrial restructur-
ing, strengthening agriculture and implementing 
regional and social recovery measures in Spain. All 
(3) HAEC, COM(77) Minutes No 420, second part, 2 and 3 March 1977; 
COM(77) Minutes No 424, second part, 30 March and 1 April 1977.
(4) Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement, No 9, 1978.
The anxieties of French farmers threatened to derail the Iberian enlargement.
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that would take time and money. Transition would 
take place over 10 years. The Council responded 
as promptly as it had for Portugal. Negotiations 
opened in February 1979.
The case of Portugal
Portugal was a founder member of NATO and of 
EFTA. It had more room for manoeuvre on the 
international scene than Spain, and was seen as 
more acceptable by European organisations. The 
Carnation Revolution of April 1974 created an un-
precedented situation. The fact that a communist 
party had achieved such influence in a NATO mem-
ber state provoked consternation. Germany provid-
ed financial, political and diplomatic support, and 
facilitated the development of the socialist party to 
act as a counterweight. From there it was only a step 
to advocate Community intervention.
Portugal regarded continued access to the British 
market as an absolute priority, but did not imme-
diately seek to change its institutional links with 
the Community. It preferred to improve trading ar-
rangements and establish industrial, technical and 
financial cooperation. However, as early as Novem-
ber 1974 it let it be known that it did not exclude 
the possibility of establishing new links. Concerns 
about the situation in Portugal led to a proliferation 
of high-level contacts. Several prominent figures 
visited Portugal, including Willy Brandt, James 
Callaghan, Max van der Stoel and Altiero Spinelli. 
In June 1974, President Ortoli and Vice-President 
Soames held talks with the prime minister and the 
foreign minister. In October, Portugal’s requests 
went beyond trade and focused on access to loans 
from the European Investment Bank.
The Commission sent Soames to Lisbon in Febru-
ary 1975  (1). A  month later, the Commission dis-
(1) Interview with David Hannay, 14 July 2010.
cussed Spinelli’s suggestion that it issue a statement 
expressing the hope that the democratic order be 
confirmed. The idea of offering Portugal an asso-
ciation agreement was dropped. However, work 
started on establishing a free trade area for goods in 
Chapters 25 to 99 of the Common Customs Tariff 
(CCT)  (2). The proposals submitted by the Com-
mission to the Council demonstrated its philo-
sophy: ‘For its part, the Community from the first 
moment welcomed the establishment of democracy 
in Portugal and the possibilities this opened up for 
closer relations between the Community and Por-
tugal. This attitude stems from the Community’s 
very nature, consecrated in the treaty, namely that 
of an open Community based on the principles of 
democracy and freedom. It has a natural interest 
therefore in supporting wholeheartedly Portugal’s 
effort to reinforce its democratic order and its eco-
nomic and social progress’ (3). 
Work in the Council on the provision of emergency 
aid took time. The political situation was far from 
settled and uncertainty was growing. Economic col-
lapse had to be prevented. Aid therefore had to be 
effective and fast (4). The Commission gave instruc-
tions for vigorous action to speed up work within 
the Council and its working parties as much as pos-
sible.
The Portuguese government was notified of an aid 
grant of 180 million units of account on 7 October 
1975. The EIB would provide loans on favourable 
terms (5). Several Member States wanted projects to 
be approved by a procedure that was managed and 
controlled by their representatives. The Commis-
(2) The above analysis is based on a wide variety of documents kept at the 
HAEC, BAC 250/1980/372 and 505, and BAC 147/1991/439, and on the 
minutes of Commission meetings, first and second parts.
(3) HAEC, Communication from the Commission to the Council on meas-
ures in favour of Portugal, COM(75) 287 final, 11 June 1975.
(4) The Council meeting on 16 and 17 July 1975 discussed the proposals and 
declared that the European  Community would support only a pluralist 
democracy. The ministerial meeting with the Portuguese was postponed 
because of political turmoil in Portugal.
(5) HAEC, BAC 250/1980/378, 381 and 382 contain abundant documenta-
tion.
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sion opposed this; under the general policy guide-
lines agreed with the Council, responsibility for the 
management of the aid was to rest with the Com-
mission (1). 
The Portuguese authorities were now favour-
ing the prospect of joining the Community. The 
Commission had been preparing for this since the 
end of 1976. On 14 January 1977, Lorenzo Nata-
li announced that a comprehensive study on the 
problems of further enlargement was needed. Two 
months later the Portuguese government officially 
applied for membership. The uncertainty was over.
The Commission’s opinion was sent to the Council 
on 19  May 1978, 14 months after the application 
for membership (2). An unambiguously favourable 
reply should be given, it said. Economically, mem-
bership would have only a small direct impact on 
the Community, given the relative size of the Por-
tuguese economy. The more serious problems were 
linked to the wide development gaps. They could 
hold up progress towards greater Community con-
vergence, but they were far from being considered 
insurmountable.
The Council reacted immediately and gave the 
green light on 6 June. Negotiations officially opened 
in October 1978.
The membership negotiations
The membership negotiations lasted 6 years and 
were a frustrating episode for candidates and the 
Community alike (3). To some extent this slowness 
reflected the genuine substantive problems thrown 
up by Spanish and Portuguese membership. As 
(1) One of these cases was brought to the attention of the whole Commission in 
October 1981.
(2) Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement, No 5, 1978.
(3) The most detailed account from the Spanish side is Bassols, R., España en 
Europa. Historia de la adhesión a la CE 1957–85, Política Exterior, Madrid, 
1995.
the Commission’s opinions had made clear, the 
two Iberian applicants, Spain in particular, posed 
some very real difficulties to the Community, es-
pecially given the pre-existing concerns within the 
EEC about two of the policies most likely to be 
affected by enlargement, namely the CAP and the 
CFP. It was also going to be difficult to cope with 
the budgetary implications of enlargement and the 
inclusion of two poorer countries, each of which 
would be in need of substantial injections of Com-
munity money, at a time when the whole issue of 
how the Community was financed was the subject 
of bitter controversy among the Member States and 
the Community institutions  (4). There was also a 
widespread awareness that the underlying ques-
tions raised by enlargement to the south that had 
not been answered in the course of the Greek mem-
bership negotiations could not be escaped this time 
around. But even more fundamentally, the slowness 
of the process reflected the collision of the two in-
escapable realities mentioned above: the Commu-
nity could not afford to reject membership requests 
from the two new Iberian democracies, but equally, 
at a time of economic and institutional crisis within 
the EEC, the Member States recoiled from accept-
ing the costs — economic and financial — which 
Spanish and Portuguese membership would bring. 
Delay and procrastination were the inevitable result.
The team assembled by the European Commis-
sion to handle the Iberian negotiations was a high- 
calibre one. At Commission level, responsibility lay 
with the experienced Italian Vice-President, Lo-
renzo Natali, who hence became a regular visitor to 
both of the applicant countries (5). A member of the 
Jenkins, Thorn and Delors Commissions, Natali 
provided an important element of continuity in the 
Commission’s approach to the Iberian membership 
negotiations. Reporting to Lorenzo Natali was a 
team led initially by Roland de Kergorlay and then 
(4) See Chapter 11, ‘The politics of the Community budget’.
(5) See Gramaglia, G. (ed.), Lorenzo Natali in Europa. Ricordi e testimonianze, 
Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, 2010, pp. 57–66 and 155–163.
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Fernand Spaak, before finally becoming the respon-
sibility of Inger Nielsen. In such complex negotia-
tions, the enlargement task force, and subsequently, 
from May 1979, the Commission delegation to the 
enlargement negotiations, while officially part of 
DG I, had to liaise constantly with multiple other 
parts of the Commission, notably DG  VI and 
DG XIV.
Neither the Commission’s high level of expertise 
nor its clear desire to see the negotiations advance 
relatively quickly were sufficient to overcome the 
hesitancies and misgivings of the Member States 
about enlargement. As in the 1960s, it was France 
that proved most open about its reservations con-
cerning a rapid extension of Community member-
ship. In June 1980, President Giscard d’Estaing gave 
a speech in which he outlined his serious doubts 
about rapid enlargement to Spain and Portugal and 
emphasised the need for the existing Member States 
to settle their internal differences, especially those 
resulting from the 1973 enlargement, before further 
countries were allowed to enter: the Community’s 
priority should be to complete the first enlargement 
before embarking on a second, he declared (1). This 
move was greeted with fury in Spain, where the 
press talked of a giscardazo, a ‘hammer blow from 
Giscard’  (2). The parallels drawn with General de 
Gaulle’s treatment of the United Kingdom two dec-
ades earlier seemed alarming.
The Commission sought to distance itself from 
Giscard d’Estaing’s stance. The official response of 
the Commission spokesman to the news was suf-
ficiently positive to earn praise and gratitude from 
Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, the Spanish minister in 
charge of the EEC membership negotiations, at 
(1) Quoted in Trouvé, M., L’Espagne et l’Europe. De la dictature de Franco à 
l’Union européenne, ‘Euroclio’ collection, Vol. 43, PIE-Peter Lang, Brussels, 
2008, p. 333.
(2) Alonso, A., España en el Mercado Común. Del acuerdo del 70 a la Comuni­
dad de Doce, Espasa-Calpe, Madrid, 1985, pp. 140–141; Bassols, R., España 
en Europa. Historia de la adhesión a la CE 1957–85, Política Exterior, Ma-
drid, 1995, pp. 237–248.
a meeting with President Jenkins  (3). At the same 
meeting, President Jenkins himself emphasised that 
the Commission remained committed to the simul-
taneous entry of both Iberian applicants, preferably 
by 1  January 1983  (4). The Commission president 
once again sought to be as positive as possible about 
the prospects of progress in the negotiations when 
he visited Madrid in October 1980  (5). The next 
Commission President, Gaston Thorn, likewise as-
sured Spanish and Portuguese representatives of the 
Commission’s goodwill. Commission  negotiators 
meanwhile sought to press ahead with their dis-
cussions and examination of the multiple technical 
problems raised by Spanish and Portuguese entry.
There was no escaping the fact, however, that rapid 
progress in the talks with Spain and Portugal had 
become dependent on the European Community 
resolving a number of serious internal disagree-
ments (6). The first of these was the vexed question 
of how the Community should be financed and the 
allocation of the EEC  budget, both between sec-
tors and between Member States. The issues raised 
by the row over the United Kingdom’s budgetary 
contribution were, in other words, also casting their 
shadow over enlargement. Second, progress on con-
taining CAP expenditure was equally vital; with 
the agricultural policy already struggling to cope, 
the entry of a big producer like Spain posed major 
difficulties. Third, the Community needed to move 
ahead with the completion of the common fisheries 
policy before being able to contemplate the incor-
poration of the Spanish and Portuguese fishing in-
dustries, which would increase the number of people 
(3) Crispin Tickell papers, All Souls College, Oxford, file 18, Note of a meeting 
between the President of the European Commission and the Spanish minis-
ter for relations with the Community, 16 July 1980.
(4) Ibid.
(5) Crispin Tickell papers, All Souls College, file 18, Record of conversation 
between the President of the European Commission and the President of 
the Government of Spain, Palacio de la Moncloa, Madrid, 2 October 1980, 
and record of a conversation between the President of the European Com-
mission and the Spanish minister for community relations at la Trinidad, 
Madrid, 2 October 1980.
(6) See ‘Problems of enlargement: taking stock and proposals’, Commission 
communication to the European Council, 3 and  4 December 1982, Bulle­
tin of the European Communities Supplement, No 8, 1982.
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involved in the EEC fisheries sector by 133 %, and 
the size of the total Community fleet by 86 % (1). 
Fourth, the wider issue of the Community’s whole 
approach to the Mediterranean region had to be 
reassessed  (2). And last but not least, the sclerotic 
performance of the Community’s decision-making 
procedure needed to be addressed before the addi-
tion of two further Member States could be envis-
aged. On this issue, the Commission had no doubt 
that a greater use of majority voting in the Council 
was an important part of the solution (3).
(1) Figures quoted by Trouvé, M., L’Espagne et l’Europe. De la dictature de 
Franco à l’Union européenne, ‘Euroclio’ collection, Vol. 43, PIE-Peter Lang, 
Brussels, 2008, p. 437.
(2) An issue that Lorenzo Natali in particular was keen to emphasise. See, for 
instance, HAEC, Archive of speeches, ‘L’Élargissement de la Communauté 
européenne vers le sud’, Speech by Lorenzo Natali at the Konrad Adenauer 
Foundation conference, Brussels, 2 and 3 December 1982.
(3) See ‘Problems of enlargement: taking stock and proposals’, Commission 
communication to the European Council, 3 and 4 December 1982, Bulletin 
of the European Communities Supplement, No 8, 1982, pp. 8–9. 
In such circumstances, rapid advance towards a 
Community of Twelve was impossible. The Com-
mission could do its best to sustain the morale of the 
applicants. It could also contribute usefully to find-
ing solutions for these multiple internal difficulties. 
But unless and until the Ten rediscovered the abil-
ity to advance collectively towards CAP and CFP 
reform, budgetary agreement, new ideas on policy 
towards the Mediterranean region and institutional 
change, the Iberian applicants were likely to remain 
frustrated in their desire to enter the EEC. Neither 
the failed coup of February 1981, which seemed to 
underline the fragility of Spanish  democracy, nor 
the victory of Felipe González’s PSOE party in the 
1982 Spanish  elections, which by contrast seemed 
to demonstrate its vitality, sufficed immediately to 
alter the situation. Instead, an impasse remained. The 
road to enlargement seemed very uncertain indeed.
The breakthrough, when it finally happened, 
seemed to have more to do with the general re vival 
of the integration process in 1984–85, than with 
The Spanish and Portuguese flags are raised outside the Berlaymont in December 1985 to mark the imminent arrival 
of the two new Member States.
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any specific change in the enlargement dossier. Cru-
cial in this respect was the renewed determination 
on the part of François Mitterrand’s government to 
move Europe forward: not only did the French gov-
ernment work hard on mending its highly strained 
relations with Madrid, but the French Presidency of 
the first half of 1984 also, and crucially, managed 
to end the budgetary gridlock at the Fontainebleau 
Summit. President Thorn’s speech in Lisbon in July 
1984 left little doubt as to the importance of this. 
‘My visit to your country, prime minister, comes, 
as you remarked yourself, at a crucial time for the 
Community and for the accession of Portugal. The 
recent European Council meeting at Fontainebleau 
has enabled the Community to overcome the 
budgetary difficulties that have occupied us for 
many years. We have thus dealt with a problem that 
has hindered somewhat the conclusion of the acces-
sion negotiations’ (1). 
Also important was the Council agreement of 
March 1984 to introduce milk quotas, a step that 
would help to rein in runaway CAP spending (2). 
(1) HAEC, Archive of speeches (unofficial translation), Speech by President 
Thorn on an official visit to Lisbon, 2 July 1984.
(2) See Chapter 16, ‘Contested fields: the common agricultural policy and the 
common fisheries policy’. 
The earlier 1983  settlement on the CFP further 
increased the feasibility of Iberian enlargement (3). 
Helpful too was the progress in Commission think-
ing on integrated Mediterranean programmes, a 
policy framework which would allow Spanish and 
Portuguese membership to occur within the con-
text of a more generalised attempt to redirect the 
attention and resources of the Community towards 
its southern Member States and their immediate 
neighbours. It nevertheless took two  successive 
marathon Council meetings in March 1985, mas-
terminded by the veteran Italian Foreign Minis-
ter, Giulio Andreotti, before full agreement was 
reached and the membership negotiations were 
brought to a successful conclusion. Spain and 
Portugal were thus able to take their place in the 
Community on 1 January 1986, over a decade after 
the internal political transformations that had put 
them on the long road to EEC membership.
Piers Ludlow, Filippa Chatzistavrou, 
Angel Viñas, Sigfrido Ramírez-Pérez 
and Jürgen Elvert
(3) Ibid.
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Chapter 25  
At the service of the European 
citizen: information policy, 
a people’s Europe, culture, 
education and training
Information policy
In 1973, the DG for Information (DG X) entered 
into a long period of turbulence. After the birth and 
infant years described in the earlier volume came 
the adolescence of what some consider to be the 
enfant terrible  (1) of the Commission. Although it 
would be the structure and staff of the Community 
information policy set-up that bore the brunt of this 
turbulence, fundamental question marks contin-
ued to surround its nature, objectives and purpose 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s.
(1) ‘Nachlese zur Direktwahl’, Courrier du personnel, No 457, October 1984, 
p. 3.
The end of an era
Structurally speaking, the Commission’s informa-
tion services had already known many shapes and 
forms since their modest origins 20 years earlier (2). 
But DG X’s transformation was of a different order, 
often described as an ‘upheaval’ or ‘rupture’ by those 
who went through it  (3). Although the word ‘up-
heaval’ reveals some of the intensity of the chang-
es — as as they were perceived at the time and still 
(2) Dumoulin, M., ‘What information policy?’, in Dumoulin, M. (ed.), The 
European Commission 1958–72 — History and Memories, Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2007, 
pp. 507–531.
(3) Interviews with Jacqueline Lastenouse, 24 March 2011, and Robert Pend-
ville, 24 March 2011.
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seem today — the word ‘rupture’ emphasises the 
end of an era, that of the founders and the spirit of 
commitment that they embodied. The most signifi-
cant of the departures was undoubtedly that of the 
director-general, Jacques-René Rabier. 
Rabier, the founder of the information services, 
was mentor to many officials who worked for him 
or who knew him. This ‘exceptional man’  (1) was 
among the associates of Jean Monnet and belongs, 
(1) Interview with Ivo Dubois and Guy Vanhaeverbecke, 7 April 2011.
according to Jacqueline Lastenouse, ‘to the genera-
tion of founders ... who have always been there to 
accompany and guide us’ (2). His departure marked 
the end of an era. However, he continued to work as 
consultant, creating, in 1973, the well-known Euro-
barometer.
Jacques-René Rabier’s successor was Seán Ronan, an 
Irish diplomat. Although he had little experience in 
the information field, he could rely on two newly ap-
pointed and competent directors: Frenchman Paul 
Collowald, deputy spokesman since 1959, and Roy 
Pryce, from the United Kingdom, founder-director 
of the Centre for Contemporary European Studies 
at the University of Sussex. Seán Ronan could also 
count on the experience and dedication of his Bel-
gian assistant, Robert Pendville. Pendville, who had 
been in the department since 1960, was able to ex-
ercise real influence over this multifaceted DG X in 
part by remaining there as assistant to the director 
general until 1988.
Decentralisation of the information 
service
Following the first enlargement, the patchwork of 
press and information offices (PIOs) was extended 
by the establishment of offices in Copenhagen and 
Dublin, while the delegation in London became a 
full PIO. In step with the report of MEP Wilhel-
mus Schuijt of 7 February 1972 (3), the Commission 
took the view at the time that it was ‘absolutely nec-
essary to decentralise its activity … by giving greater 
stimulus to its offices abroad’ or by giving priority 
‘in certain countries … to the immediate setting-up 
of “antennae” or “mobile teams” attached to exist-
ing information offices’ (4).
(2) Interview with Jacqueline Lastenouse, 24 March 2011.
(3) European Parliament, document 246/71.
(4) EC Commission, Seventh General Report on the Activities of the Euro­
pean Communities in 1973, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, Luxembourg, 1974, p. 100.
On leaving his post as director-general for information 
in 1973, Jacques-René Rabier proposed to the administration 
the establishment of a mechanism for periodic public opinion 
polls in the Member States. ‘I was really keen on the idea 
as I had done a lot of political science. I had studied what 
surveys and their authors said about Europe. There were surveys 
in this country or that country, but nothing coordinated and no 
follow-up,’ he recalls (interview with Jacques-René Rabier, 5 July 
2010). This led to the birth of Eurobarometer, initially published 
twice a year. Jacques-René Rabier was in charge of Eurobarometer 
from 1986 to 1997.
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The decision was taken in 1973, on the basis of a 
memorandum submitted to the College by Com-
missioner Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza, to provide the 
offices in London and Rome initially with two ‘an-
tennae’ each (1). However, the Council categorically 
refused to grant any requests for appropriations for 
this (2). It was 1976 before the two subsidiary British 
offices in Cardiff and Edinburgh were opened  (3), 
to be followed by one in Belfast in 1978. The Rome 
PIO had to make do with a peripatetic team until 
the Milan office was set up in 1981.
Thus, although regionalisation of information 
seemed to be among the priorities of the Commis-
sion at the time of the first enlargement, it took 
some time before it became a reality. The lack of 
means provided by the Council (4), as well as politi-
cal objections at regional and national levels (5), are 
the reasons most often given for the lack of progress.
Merger
The next Commission also represented a period of 
transformation which resulted in DG X being com-
pletely merged with the spokesman’s group being 
placed under the direct authority of President Jen-
kins. While Renato Ruggiero was entrusted with 
(1) HAEC, COM(73), Minutes No 257, 20 June 1973, p. 23.
(2) HAEC, BAC 136/1987/174, Memo from Robert Sunnen to Armando To-
ledano-Laredo, 25 February 1974. 
(3) A temporary solution — which lasted 2 years — was adopted: two officials 
from the London PIO, Gwyn Morgan and Stanley Budd, were tasked with 
improving the regional dissemination of European information in Cardiff 
and Edinburgh respectively. Working with the London mission expens-
es budget, they stayed in a hotel and did not even have a car. See HAEC, 
BAC 136/1987/174.
(4) HAEC, BAC 136/1987/174, Memo from Seán Ronan to Stanley Budd and 
Gwyn Morgan, 6 July 1976. See also ‘Philosophie des bureaux de presse et 
d’information de la Commission’, Courrier du personnel, No 375, 14 Octo-
ber 1976, pp. 42–43.
(5) The example of DATAR (Délégation interministérielle à l’aménagement 
du territoire et à l’attractivité régionale — Interministerial delegation for 
planning and regional attractiveness) in France is well known. See Collow-
ald, P., ‘La “Trajectoire” Strasbourg–Luxembourg–Bruxelles’, in Dassetto, 
F. et Dumoulin, M. (eds), ‘Naissance et développement de l’informa-
tion européenne, Actes des journées d’étude [proceedings of study days] 
Louvain-la-Neuve, 22 May and 14 November 1990’, ‘Euroclio’ collection, 
‘Études et documents’ series, Peter Lang, Bern … Vienna, 1993, p. 43.
the dual responsibility of spokesman and director- 
general, Bino Olivi and Seán Ronan were both retired.
It would appear that it was the Welshman, Aneurin 
(‘Nye’) Hughes, Head of the Internal Coordination 
Division of the Secretariat-General, who started 
this reform. Shortly before Jenkins’s time, Hughes 
conducted an evaluation of the information ser-
A journalist by training, Fausta Deshormes La Valle entered the 
Communities’ Joint Press and Information Service in 1961. She 
covered university issues and youth affairs until 1973, when she 
joined the cabinet of Commissioner Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza, 
where she stayed until 1976. In 1977, she was put in charge of 
a newly created information unit in DG X dealing specifically with 
the media and women’s groups. ‘I wanted to inform women about 
European issues,’ she recalls. ‘Not just so that they knew what the 
Community was about, but also to make them feel closer to Europe, 
to make them aware of the need for European integration ... ’ 
(interview with Fausta Deshormes La Valle, 3 June 2011, pp. 19–
20). Above is the cover page of the 27th edition of the Cahiers de 
Femmes d’Europe (1988), the supplement to the Femmes d’Europe 
magazine, then celebrating its 10th year in existence. Fausta 
Deshormes La Valle was the driving force behind these information 
channels aimed at women until her retirement in 1992.
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vices  of the Commission at the request of Émile 
Noël and produced an extremely negative report in 
which he suggested a series of reforms, the main one 
being to amalgamate the Spokesman’s Service and 
DG X into a single entity under the responsibility of 
the president of the Commission. When the project 
was completed, Hughes was asked to become Rug-
giero’s adviser (1).
Unfortunately, the climate resulting from the reform 
was evidently far from calm, since the leadership 
was now split and, in short, the roles unclear. In the 
view of most people, Ruggiero paid too little atten-
tion to his post as director-general because most of 
his time was taken with his duties as spokesman (2). 
True, Collowald and Pryce were both still highly en-
gaged — the latter as principal adviser from 1978 — 
and heavily involved in the information campaign 
around the 1979 elections. The exact role and actu-
al influence of Aneurin Hughes, the ‘consigliere’ or 
‘lieutenant’  (3) that Renato Ruggiero brought with 
him despite the presence of two assistants, Robert 
Pendville and Paul Cerf, are difficult to determine, 
in particular because of the close links he kept with 
the Jenkins cabinet, which was responsible for over-
seeing information policy.
New enlargement, new Commission, 
more changes
After the well-known Schall report found that 
this reform had ‘undermined the essential task of 
information policy’ inasmuch as it had resulted in 
‘a weakening or even break-up of DG  X’  (4), the 
dir ectorate-general regained its former autonomy 
under the Thorn Commission, in which the infor-
(1) Interview with Aneurin Hughes, 5 October 2010. 
(2) Interviews with Aneurin Hughes, 5 October 2010, Roy Pryce, 19 Septem-
ber 2011, Paul Collowald, 6 September 2010, Willy Hélin, 15 June 2011, 
and Niels  Jørgen Thøgersen, 10 May 2011. Robert Pendville seemed to 
be the only one not to share this view (interview with Robert Pendville, 
24 March 2011).
(3) Interview with Aneurin Hughes, 5 October 2010.
(4) European Parliament, document 1-596/80, p. 27.
mation portfolio was returned to an Italian com-
missioner, Lorenzo Natali. But the winds of change 
were blowing again. Enzo Perlot, who had replaced 
Renato Ruggiero when he moved to pastures new 
during his term of office, resigned in Septem-
ber 1980. Manuel Santarelli and Paul Collowald 
then covered the roles of spokesman and director- 
general respectively. However, while Santarelli was 
confirmed as spokesman, Collowald — like Pryce be-
fore him — was replaced despite 8 years of good and 
loyal service. Once again, DG X was left leaderless.
The new director-general — the sixth in less than 
10  years — was the German Franz Froschmaier, 
who had been head of cabinet to Wilhelm  Hafer-
kamp. He remained in the post until 1987, thus pro-
viding a certain amount of continuity at the head of 
the DG for Information, which had been renamed 
DG ‘Information, Communication and Culture’ 
under the Delors Commission. The Frenchman 
Philippe Soubestre, former head of cabinet to 
Claude Cheysson, and the Italian Marco Piccarolo, 
whose links to the Natali cabinet were strong  (5), 
took over the two directorates; Philippe Soubestre 
was replaced in 1985 by Manuel Santarelli who suc-
ceeded Franz Froschmaier in 1987.
These periodic reorganisations undoubtedly affected 
DG X in terms of its working atmosphere or even its 
motivation (6), while also, according to some, giving 
it a poor reputation within the Commission. With 
the service accused of amateurism by some (7), infor-
mation tended to be seen as a minor portfolio which 
the responsible commissioners — Carlo Scarascia 
Mugnozza, Lorenzo Natali and Carlo Ripa di Meana 
in the period that concerns us — had probably not 
sought to obtain (8). However, the many structural 
(5) Interview with Marco Piccarolo, 23 November 2011.
(6) Interviews with Jacqueline Lastenouse,  24 March 2011, and Robert 
Pendville, 24 March 2011.
(7) Interviews with Fausta Deshormes La Valle, 3 June 2011, Robert 
Pendville, 24 March 2011, and Jacqueline Lastenouse, 24 March 2011.
(8) Interviews with Jacqueline Lastenouse, 24 March 2011, Gerardo Mombelli, 
2 June 2011, and Willy Hélin, 15 June 2011.
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reforms that it underwent, in particular under Presi-
dent Roy Jenkins between 1977 and 1980, suggest 
that, just as in the earlier period, what was at stake 
was not without significance.
The rise of information for the general 
public
Equally significant are the issues that the informa-
tion policy is intended to promote. Arguably the 
most important event in this respect was the first 
election of the European Parliament by direct 
universal suffrage. Since a citizen is, to use Alfred 
Sauvy’s formula, a well-informed person, DG X was 
fully mobilised. As Paul Collowald recalls: ‘ … I said 
to myself: “This is going to be something extraordi-
nary because, for the first time, European citizens 
are going to the polls”. But going to the polls with 
what impression of Europe? People have to feel moti-
vated. How do you motivate people? You have to feel 
involved. How do you get to feel involved? Simple: 
by being well informed. So I said to myself: “We have 
a great part to play here. We have to mobilise”’ (6).
Although the aim was to show how Community 
policies affected the day-to-day life of Europeans (by 
showing what the European Social Fund, the Euro-
pean Regional Development Fund and the European 
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, among 
others, had done for them) (7), the thrust of the in-
formation campaign was largely quantitative. The 
University information
Although the main initiatives for targeting information 
at the university sector were launched during the 1960s 
by Jean Moreau (1), it was Jacqueline Lastenouse who, 
for more than 35 years, was the point of contact for 
universities in the Commission.
She arrived as a trainee in November 1962, and worked 
under Moreau, maintaining the course set by him after 
he left following the first enlargement. She managed to 
maintain it despite the structural upheavals experienced 
by DG X, from which the Division for Information aimed 
at Schools, Universities and Young People did not 
escape.
While 1973 was seen as ‘a break with the founders’ 
(Jacques-René Rabier, Jean Moreau, Fausta Deshormes 
La Valle) (2), the Jenkins era saw the division led until 
1979 by Adriaan Sprey slotted into DG XII (Research, 
Science and Education) in a directorate called ‘Education, 
Training and the Cultural Sector’. Informing and 
promoting contacts with the world of academia is one 
thing; developing a Community policy on education is 
quite another. According to Jacqueline Lastenouse, ‘it 
was clear that we did not have any contact with the 
educational structures and policies of the Member 
States’ (3). As a result in particular of the intervention of 
the European Parliament (4), the division was quite 
logically brought back under DG X when the next 
Commission took office. The twofold task of 
disseminating information and networking with university 
academics (academic lawyers, political scientists, 
economists and, from 1981, historians) studying 
European issues was pursued during the 1980s without 
major difficulty despite a chronic lack of means and staff. 
The end of the decade was marked by the launch of the 
Jean Monnet programme. ‘What I always thought was 
important was precisely the work of creating that 
community of specialists in European integration and 
European studies within the academic world, beyond 
borders, in their subject and in their discipline’ (5).
(1) Dumoulin, M., ‘What information policy?’, in Dumoulin, M. (ed.), The 
European Commission 1958–72 — History and Memories, Office for Of-
ficial Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2007, 
pp. 507–531.
(2) Interview with Jacqueline Lastenouse, 24 March 2011.
(3) Ibid.
(4) OJ C 28, 9.2.1981, p. 75.
(5) Interview with Jacqueline Lastenouse, 24 March 2011.
(6) Interview with Paul Collowald, 6 September 2010.
(7) ‘Preparing the people for direct elections’, Courrier du personnel, No 369, 
29 March 1976, p. 23.
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Parliament and the Commission decided to com-
bine their efforts and set up a joint committee and 
drew up a joint special programme. With a budget of 
ECU 8.5 million, this programme comprised a wide 
range of activities designed to raise awareness so as to 
attract as many voters as possible to the polls. These 
included posters, competitions in the press, advertis-
ing on TV and radio, exhibitions and the distribu-
tion of stickers, badges and leaflets (1).
In that regard, the 1979 elections were indeed a 
turning point. The Community information effort 
had hitherto been mainly directed towards ‘prior-
ity circles’ — i.e. opinion formers — because they 
acted as multipliers (2), but it now sought to engage 
the general public (3), in the 1980s by means of 
sporting, artistic and other high-profile events. One 
example is the well-known Euroshow, for which a 
series of European variety artists took to the stage 
in Forest National (Belgium) on 5 May 1984, short-
ly before the second European elections. The show, 
which was distributed by the main TV channels of 
the Member States and aimed to ensure as broad a 
participation as possible in the 1984 elections, was 
interspersed with contributions from European 
personalities and short reports on landmark polit-
ical, cultural and popular events in the Community 
since the 1950s (4). But above all it represented the 
kind of public relations work to which DG X was 
increasingly dedicating its efforts. 
The language of the time is telling. This was the era 
of ‘communication’, a word which even featured in 
the name of the DG. Fewer magazines, brochures 
and other publications were produced and prior-
(1) For more details, see ‘Strengthening the Community in the hearts and 
minds of its citizens’, Courrier du personnel, No 401, 26 April 1979, 
pp. 8–16.
(2) Dumoulin, M., ‘What information policy?’, in Dumoulin, M. (ed.), The 
European Commission,  1958–72 — History and Memories of an Institution, 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxem-
bourg, 2007, pp. 507–531.
(3) Interviews with Robert Pendville, 24 March 2011, Pierre Bockstael, 7 July 
2010, and Marco Piccarolo, 23 November 2011.
(4) ‘DG X Eurocoup — Euroshow seen by ten millions’, Courrier du personnel, 
No 454, 14 and 17 June 1984, pp. 3–7.
ity was given to audiovisual media production  (5). 
Franz Froschmaier, in an interview in the autumn 
of 1984, said that it was now a question of ‘selling’ 
the Community to the various parts of the general 
public with each section of public opinion a differ-
ent market that needed to be approached in a dis-
tinct fashion (6).
‘ ... it is clear that our information policy, as it 
stands, is unable to create a massively 
pro-Community trend  ... the focus should not be 
on rational argument but we should appeal 
more to the emotions and use psychology’ (7). 
At the same time as it was taking this more pragmat-
ic approach, DG X still had those who argued for a 
more targeted approach. The fact that these two di-
vergent philosophies coexisted within the same dir-
ectorate-general could, according to some, give rise 
to misunderstandings or even clashes. Thus, Pierre 
Bockstael, a more recent arrival, claimed there was a 
need to renew methods he, among others, con sidered 
old-fashioned or even outdated (8). Similarly, Robert 
Cox advocated the need to break up a number of 
‘fiefdoms’ whose impact was considered to be very 
limited (9). On the other hand, some representatives 
of the old guard, such as Robert Pendville (10), were 
not very convinced of the results of disseminating in-
formation through large-scale popular events, while 
others, such as Fausta Deshormes La Valle (11), recall 
their difficult relations with the senior management 
which constantly sought to thwart their efforts.
This row between the old and the new, however 
real it may have been, must not be allowed to over-
(5) See the General Reports of the European Communities of the 1980s. 
(6) ‘Nachlese zur Direktwahl’, Courrier du personnel, No 457, October 1984, 
pp. 2–7.
(7) HAEC, BAC 408/1991/44, Memo from Franz Froschmaier to Émile Noël, 
2 October 1984.
(8) Interview with Pierre Bockstael, 7 July 2010.
(9) Interview with Robert Cox, 26 October 2010.
(10) Interview with Robert Pendville, 24 March 2011.
(11) Interview with Fausta Deshormes La Valle, 3 June 2011.
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shadow the basic agreement between both sides as to 
the fundamental aim of the Community’s informa-
tion policy. The efforts made to develop more inten-
sively a communication strategy aimed at the general 
public were in line, it was true, with the imperatives 
of an increasingly audiovisual age. But behind this 
divergence of method, the old and new approaches 
shared a common goal, namely that of presenting a 
living, relevant and concrete Europe to its citizens (1).
(1) Interview with Paul Collowald, 6 September 2010.
A people’s Europe
The concept of a ‘people’s Europe’ first appeared 
during this period, created as a counterbalance to 
the ‘businessman’s Europe’ brought into being by 
the Treaty of Rome. In the early 1970s, a period of 
crisis if ever there was one, Member States’ govern-
ments wanted to give Europe a more approachable 
and a more human face as it sought legitimacy by 
developing new Community policies and highlight-
ing a number of actions and measures directly and 
specifically affecting the lives of European citizens.
When he took over DG X’s ‘Radio and television’ unit in 1980, Robert Jarrett recalls: ‘At that time … none of the radio and television 
organisations from the Member States had their own facilities in Brussels. They had a correspondent, certainly, but they didn’t have their 
own technical facilities … So the radio and television studios … were used much more by radio and television correspondents from the 
different stations than by the Commission. We provided a facility for them in order to try to encourage them to cover European affairs as 
much as possible’ (interview with Robert Jarrett, 14 October 2010). In the photo (from left to right): Poul Dalsager, Lorenzo Natali, Gaston 
Thorn and Christopher Tugendhat inaugurate the new Commission television studios (6 November 1984).
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Produced in 1977, i.e. 2 years after the Tindemans report on ‘A citizen’s Europe’ and 2 years before the first European elections, 
this poster illustrates the Community’s preoccupation with encouraging men and women of all ages 
to embrace the European venture. 
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The Tindemans report
The well-known Tindemans report  (4), published 
on 29 December 1975, was partly based on this 
work. The report, containing a chapter entitled ‘A 
citizen’s Europe’, proposed, in addition to the social 
policy measures it advocated elsewhere, two catego-
ries of action: the protection of the rights of Euro-
peans — fundamental rights, consumer rights and 
the protection of the environment — and the de-
velopment of ‘external signs discernible in everyday 
life’, including ‘the gradual disappearance of fron-
tier controls on persons moving between member 
countries’ (as advocated by the Commission) and 
‘greater integration in educational matters by pro-
moting student exchanges’ (5).
Chapter IV of the Tindemans Report — which, 
as is well known, quickly joined ‘the Community 
good intentions’  (6) that had not been realised — 
concluded with the proposal to create a European 
foundation designed to promote ‘anything which 
could help towards greater understanding among 
our peoples by placing the emphasis on human con-
tact’ (7). The idea was taken up and the Commission, 
at the request of the Council, with the assistance of 
a group of independent experts, issued a report in 
which it said that the institution’s work would help 
to ‘develop the European citizen’s sense of belong-
ing to one and the same community’  (8). Despite 
completing this first stage, the project did not take 
off. It was not until March 1982 that the represent-
atives of the Member States signed an agreement es-
(4) See the introduction to Part Three.
(5) ‘European Union — Report by Mr Leo Tindemans to the European 
Council’, Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement, No 1, 1976, 
pp. 26–28. For a more detailed study of the Tindemans report, see, among 
others, Van de Gaer, S., Le rapport Tindemans: évolution et évaluation, dis-
sertation, Université catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, 2011.
(6) Olivi, B. and Giacone, A., L’Europe difficile. Histoire politique de la construc­
tion européenne, 3rd edn, Gallimard, Paris, 2007, p. 143. 
(7) Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement, No 1, 1976, p. 30.
(8) Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement, No 5, 1977, p. 8.
Foundations
Thus, the well-known declaration on European 
Union made during the Paris Summit of Octo-
ber 1972 stated that ‘economic expansion ... is not 
an end in itself ’, since the objective of the Commu-
nity is ‘an improved quality as well as an improved 
standard of life’ for its citizens. It went on: ‘special 
attention will be paid to non-material values … ’ (1). 
It was at this time that Community action in the 
cultural sector, among others, was born, a topic to 
which we shall return.
The December 1974 Paris Summit was a milestone 
in the emergence of a notion of European union 
that included citizenship.  First, it decided in favour 
of the election of the European Parliament by direct 
universal suffrage. Second, it called for the establish-
ment of a passport union to be looked into and, in 
anticipation of this, the introduction of a uniform 
passport and special rights which could be con-
ferred on the citizens of the nine Member States (2). 
The Commission got to work and produced two 
technical reports which it submitted to the Council 
on 3 July 1975 under a single title: ‘Towards a peo-
ple’s Europe’. It took the view that the uniform pass-
port — one of the advantages of which would be ‘to 
emphasise the feeling … of belonging’ of its holders 
to ‘the Community’ issuing it to them (3) — and the 
abolition of the control of such passports at the in-
ternal frontiers of the Community were two objec-
tives achievable in the short term. The special rights 
in question were, in its view, both political and civic 
and consisted mainly of voting rights, eligibility and 
access to public services within the Community.
(1) Bulletin of the European Communities, No 10, 1972, pp. 15–16.
(2) Bulletin of the European Communities, No 12, 1974, p. 8.
(3) Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement, No 7, 1975, p. 9.
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tablishing the foundation which, in the end, never 
came into existence (1).
Although the political impetus given by the Coun-
cil was quite significant at the beginning of the 
decade, it slowed down during the next few years. 
The Commission continued, however, throughout 
its range of activities to develop areas that were seen 
as ‘close to the citizens’, such as environmental pro-
tection, social policy, etc. There was also a report 
on the protection of fundamental rights (2), not to 
mention the first European elections in June 1979, 
an event which was as tangible as it was emblematic 
of the citizen’s involvement in the European project 
and to which, as has been stated above, the Com-
mission was fully committed.
The Adonnino Committee
Despite the good intentions expressed in the sol-
emn declaration on European Union (Stuttgart 
European Council, 17 to 19 June 1983) regarding 
cultural cooperation and exchanges of teachers and 
students, as well as those in the Spinelli draft treaty 
on citizenship, it was not until the Fontainebleau 
European Council (25 and 26 June 1984) that the 
heads of state or government took any action. 
Having agreed in principle to the creation of a 
European passport, Europe’s leaders also decided 
to set up an ad hoc committee for a people’s Eur-
ope, known as the Adonnino Committee, after 
its chairman Pietro Adonnnino, and at the same 
time agreed in principle to the creation of a Euro-
pean passport. Tasked with studying ‘measures to 
strengthen and promote its identity and its image 
both for its citizens and the rest of the world’, the 
committee produced a first report, which was ap-
(1) Interviews with Paolo Ponzano, 27 September 2010, and Robert Toulemon, 
22 September 2010.
(2) ‘The protection of fundamental rights in the European Community’, Bulle­
tin of the European Communities Supplement, No 5, 1976.
proved by the Brussels European Council (29 and 
30 March 1985), followed by a final report. These 
documents constitute an audacious collection of 
provisions on the free movement of people and 
goods, special rights of citizens, culture, commu-
nication, youth, education, sport, health and social 
security, as well as on symbols (flags, emblems, an-
them, stamps) to strengthen the image and identity 
of the Community.
The Milan European Council (28 and 29 June 1985) 
approved the proposals in the ad hoc committee’s 
final report and called on the Commission and the 
Member States to implement them, although it did 
express some concern over the delay in implementing 
the measures put forward by the first report (3). The 
Commission, cut to the quick, responded indignant-
ly. On 19 November, it sent a communication to the 
Council in which it described the Council’s record 
on following up the committee’s reports as ‘unsatis-
(3) Bulletin of the European Communities, No 6, 1985, p. 14.
This Plantu cartoon (26 June 1984) ironically portrays the main ‘successes’ of the 
Fontainebleau European Council of 25 and 26 June 1984: on one side there is the 
European passport, a symbol of greater union and citizenship adopted after more 
than 10 years of negotiation, which is being brandished by an emotional President 
Mitterrand of France in the midst of his counterparts; on the other, in the form of 
a ‘cheque’, there is the rebate granted to the United Kingdom which puts an end 
to the problem of the United Kingdom’s contribution to the Community budget, a 
symbol of much less idealism and solidarity, but which an equally emotional British 
prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, is waving in the air. Two contrasting victories for 
two equally contrasting concepts of Europe.
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factory’ (1). In the same vein, Carlo Ripa di Meana, 
the (first) commissioner responsible for the people’s 
Europe, among other things, stated at the General 
Affairs Council of 26 November that ‘the Commis-
sion cannot be held responsible for any delays of the 
Council’ and that, for its part, it had drawn up ‘a 
work programme whose priorities are based on the 
proposals of the Adonnino Committee’ (2).
The following year, the Commission did not miss 
the opportunity to remind the European Council 
meeting in The Hague (26 and 27 June 1986) that 
it had not yet adopted ‘any of the more meaning-
ful proposals in terms of popular impact’, and to 
request ‘fresh political impetus’  (3). The Commis-
sion’s reminder was prompted by lack of progress 
on flagship proposals such as the easing of internal 
border controls, the right of residence and the gen-
(1) HAEC, ‘A people’s Europe’, Communication from the Commission to the 
Council, COM(85) 640 final, 19 November 1985.
(2) HAEC, Archive of speeches, Statement by Commissioner Carlo Ripa 
di Meana at the General Affairs Council of 26 November 1985, ‘People’s 
Europe’.
(3) Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement, No 6, 1986, p. 51.
eral system for the mutual recognition of diplomas, 
aspects which remained pending in the absence of 
approval by the Council (4).
Main achievements
The most substantive achievements of a people’s 
Europe did not arrive, it is true, until after 1986, 
but  they were made possible by the relatively long 
incubation period described in these pages. More-
over, a number of highly symbolic measures were 
put in place before the end of the 1980s. Thus, citi-
zens of the Member States have been able to carry 
a common identity document, a European passport 
and a Community driving licence since 1985. And 
the European institutions have had a flag and an an-
them since 1986.
(4) Ibid.
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The European flag
The European flag, blue with a circle of 12 golden stars, 
was originally that chosen by the Council of Europe in 
1955. It took 30 years for the Community institutions 
as well to adopt this symbol of the union of the peoples 
of Europe.
The Commission seemed to pay little attention to the 
matter. Admittedly, in November 1978 it did select a 
single emblem for itself — a stylised letter ‘E’ on a dark 
blue background — but only in a ‘reduced’ way ‘limited 
to matters related to dissemination of information and 
in a few cases of external representation, without any 
political significance whatsoever’ (1). DG X, for its part, 
disapproved of the European Parliament’s resolution of 
11 April 1983 in favour of the adoption of the flag of 
the Council of Europe for the whole of the European 
Community (2). While, in Franz Froschmaier’s view, it 
was desirable to adopt a flag, the choice of that of the 
Council of Europe ‘ran counter to any attempt to create 
a “brand image” for the Community’ (3).
The Adonnino Committee, on completion of a study 
which it had been asked to carry out on ‘symbols of 
the Community’s existence, such as a flag and an 
anthem’ (4), among other things, took the same view 
as the Parliament, but suggested adding the 
Commission’s golden ‘E’ in the centre of the circle of 
stars to avoid confusion between the European 
Community and the Council of Europe. This was not 
the choice of DG X which, in the spring of 1985, 
made clear its opposition to it on the basis of a 
semiological analysis (5). In the same period, DG X 
commissioned a separate independent study which, 
on the basis of a poll of a sample of citizens in three 
Member States, put forward seven possible models 
for a European flag (6).
Finally, the matter was settled in the spring of 1986, 
first informally (7) and then formally. On 22 April, the 
Council declared that it would in future use the flag of 
the Council of Europe, a decision which was 
immediately followed by the Parliament, the 
Commission and the Court of Justice (7). The formal 
adoption of the European flag was marked by a 
ceremony held in Brussels on 29 May 1986 in front of 
the Berlaymont building. 
(1) HAEC, COM(78), Minutes No 492 final, meeting of 8 November 1978, 
p. 22.
(2) OJ C 128, 16.5.1983, pp. 18–19.
(3) Bockstael papers, Memo from Franz Froschmaier to Lorenzo Natali, 
21 April 1983.
(4) Bulletin of the European Communities , No 6, 1984, p. 11. 
(5) Pierre Bockstael papers, Memo from Franz Froschmaier to Carlo Ripa di 
Meana, 23 April 1985.
(6) Pierre Bockstael papers, IMADI (Instituut voor Marketing-Diagnostiek), 
‘The European flag — A study into the symbolic meaning which Euro-
pean citizens in France, Belgium and the Netherlands desire “their” flag to 
express, their perception of the flags of the USA, Japan and the USSR and 
the degree to which seven “European” alternative flag designs satisfy the re-
quirements for symbolic expression of the European citizen’, 31 May 1985.
(7) Collowald, P., ‘La “Trajectoire” Strasbourg–Luxembourg–Bruxelles’, in 
Dassetto, F. and Dumoulin, M. (eds), Naissance et développement de l’ in­
formation européenne, Actes des journées d’ étude [proceedings of study days], 
Louvain­la­Neuve, 22 May and 14 November 1990, ‘Euroclio’ collection, 
‘Études et documents’ series, Peter Lang, Berne … Vienna, 1993, p.  43; 
Delors, J. and Arnaud, J.-L., Mémoires, Plon, Paris, 2004, p. 318.
(8) Bulletin of the European Communities, No 4, 1986, p. 50. See also Donat, 
M. (von) and Krenzler, H. G., ‘Europa zeigt Flagge’, Historische Mitteilun­
gen der Ranke­Gesellschaft, No 23, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2010, 
pp. 282–286.
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After lengthy discussions, the European institutions decided to adopt the flag of the Council of Europe. On 29 May 1986 this was raised 
for the first time in front of the Berlaymont.
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In the same vein, it is worth pointing out the large-
scale sporting and cultural events, such as the Tour 
de l’Avenir in September 1986. As the second great 
sporting event sponsored by the Commission  (1), 
the cycling race won by Miguel Indurain was an op-
portunity to draw attention to Spain, Italy and Por-
tugal since that year the race started in Porto and 
finished in Turin (2). In the same way, the concept 
of European Capital of Culture began with Athens 
in 1985 (3). This event — the polar opposite of the 
businessman’s Europe — brings us now to the field 
from which it sprang, namely culture. 
(1) The first event was the ‘Course de l’Europe à la voile’ (European sailing re-
gatta) the year before.
(2) For more information, see HAEC, BAC 178/1992/91.
(3) ‘L’Europe des citoyens se construit pas à pas’, Courrier du personnel, No 477, 
September 1986, pp. 6–23.
Culture
Although it was not until the 1970s that culture 
made its first official, if somewhat modest, appear-
ance in the list of Community subject areas, there 
had been some interesting attempts during the 
1960s, such as the report presented in June 1963 by 
Leo De Block, an MEP, or that of his colleague 
Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza, in 1966, on cinema (4). 
Those initiatives were never followed up.
Community action in the field of culture
Altiero Spinelli, commissioner for industrial, tech-
nological and scientific affairs from July 1970, 
gave a decisive impetus to culture. At his behest, 
(4) Dumoulin, M., ‘Europe de la culture, culture européenne’, Journal of Euro­
pean Integration History, Vol. 5, No 2, 1999, pp. 7–16.
Florence became the second European Capital of Culture, a 
landmark initiative in the area of cultural cooperation between 
Member States launched in 1985. Following Athens, the cradle 
of the ancient world, Florence, the city of the Renaissance and 
Humanism, was selected to host exhibitions, theatre, cinema, 
music, dance and a whole range of artistic and cultural events.
The first ‘Tour de l’Avenir’ European Community cycle race, organised with the joint support of the European Commission and the European 
Parliament, took place from 11 to 22 September 1986. Most of the route ran through Spain and Portugal, to mark their recent accession. 
This sporting test, part of the efforts to promote the people’s Europe, was also an opportunity to familiarise inhabitants of the regions along 
the route with the European flag and anthem adopted by the Community institutions 3½ months earlier.
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Culture
Although it was not until the 1970s that culture 
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ance in the list of Community subject areas, there 
had been some interesting attempts during the 
1960s, such as the report presented in June 1963 by 
Leo De Block, an MEP, or that of his colleague 
Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza, in 1966, on cinema (4). 
Those initiatives were never followed up.
Community action in the field of culture
Altiero Spinelli, commissioner for industrial, tech-
nological and scientific affairs from July 1970, 
gave a decisive impetus to culture. At his behest, 
(4) Dumoulin, M., ‘Europe de la culture, culture européenne’, Journal of Euro­
pean Integration History, Vol. 5, No 2, 1999, pp. 7–16.
Florence became the second European Capital of Culture, a 
landmark initiative in the area of cultural cooperation between 
Member States launched in 1985. Following Athens, the cradle 
of the ancient world, Florence, the city of the Renaissance and 
Humanism, was selected to host exhibitions, theatre, cinema, 
music, dance and a whole range of artistic and cultural events.
two teaching and education working groups 
were set up in 1971, chaired by the Frenchman 
Félix-Paul Mercereau, former head of cabinet to 
Étienne Hirsch, President of Euratom. 
Since he believed that teaching and culture were 
strongly linked and because he felt that, after near-
ly a year, Mercereau and his team had made little 
headway  (1), Spinelli asked that the scope of the 
groups should be extended to cover the concepts of 
(1) Spinelli, A., Diario europeo: 1970–76, edited by Edmondo Paolini, il Muli-
no, Bologna, 1991, p. 247: ‘January [1972], Friday — I spoke to Mercereau 
and Stuffmann about the activities of the Mercereau group on education. I 
do not think they are making much headway’.
civilisation, society and culture (2). The Frenchman 
Robert Grégoire took matters in hand. A former 
ECSC official who had started his professional ca-
reer as a theatre director, Grégoire, who was ‘pas-
sionate about culture’  (3), quickly focused entirely 
on that aspect and wrote a document entitled ‘Pour 
une action communautaire dans le domaine de la 
culture’ (Community action in the field of cul-
ture) (4). It became a cornerstone. It was innovative 
both in terms of the socioeconomic approach and 
of the language it contained. As its title indicates, 
the aim was to propose action in the cultural field 
and not a cultural policy, an expression which 
would certainly have been considered too intru-
sive by Member States, jealous of their powers in 
this field, and by artists fearing that their freedom 
might be curtailed, not to mention those interna-
tional organisations already dealing with culture 
(including the Council of Europe and Unesco).
The Community has no call, in principle, to be-
come involved in this field, since neither the word 
‘culture’ nor the word ‘cultural’ are to be found in 
the EEC Treaty  (5). Thus, rather than interfering 
in culture itself (its content and purpose, among 
other things), Grégoire approached the matter in 
the only way possible under the treaty, namely from 
the socioeconomic angle. By considering artists as 
cultural workers and works of art as cultural goods, 
the Community ‘primarily seeks to support culture 
by the gradual establishment of an economic envir-
onment and a social environment which are more 
(2) Grégoire, R., Vers une Europe de la culture. Du théâtre à l’action communau­
taire, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2000, p. 181.
(3) Interview with Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi, Paolo Ponzano, Jean-Claude 
Eeckhout and Daniela Napoli, 27 September 2010, p. 44.
(4) HAEC, Communication from Altiero Spinelli to the members of the Com-
mission, SEC(72) 4250, 6 December 1972.
(5) The only allusion is contained in Article 36 of the treaty which refers to the 
protection of ‘national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeologi-
cal value’.
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favourable to it’ (1). The objective, in short, is not to 
intervene in culture but for culture (2).
‘Félix-Paul Mercereau and I did not have long to 
wait for the reaction of Altiero Spinelli. He called 
us into his office. Then he asked me a strange 
question: “How did you do it?” Then he said, “I’m 
going to put your memorandum to the 
Commission without changing a word”’ (3). 
The early years
The memorandum was transmitted to the Commis-
sion on 6 December 1972 and was well received (4). 
The Mercereau group was disbanded and a division 
devoted to ‘Issues in the Cultural Sector’, headed 
by Gregoire, was created within DG XII, itself re-
branded under the Ortoli Commission as the DG 
for  ‘Research, Science and Education’. The com-
missioner in whose portfolio it was included was 
the German Ralf Dahrendorf, who was succeeded 
by his compatriot Guido Brunner in autumn 1974. 
In September 1974, the Commission set itself the 
objective to develop proposals in a number of areas 
related to the cultural sector, including the free-
dom of movement for cultural works and cultural 
workers, the tax treatment of cultural foundations 
and philanthropic giving, and legislation on copy-
right  (5) and, on 1  July 1975, submitted the first 
action plan to the European Parliament. The Par-
liament acknowledged the work carried out, but 
asked the Commission to develop its proposals, 
granting it new financial resources for the following 
year (under budget heading 393, ‘Expenditure relat-
ed to cultural action’). This decision led to a tussle 
(1) Grégoire, R., ‘L’action communautaire dans le secteur culturel’, Revue du 
Marché Commun, No 217, 1978, p. 230.
(2) This phrase was based on a resolution of the European Parliament of 18 No-
vember 1983, cited in Grégoire, R., ‘La Communauté et la culture’, Revue 
du Marché Commun, No 274, 1984, p. 56.
(3) Grégoire, R., Vers une Europe de la culture. Du théâtre à l’action communau­
taire, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2000, pp. 182–183.
(4) COM(72), Minutes No 230 final, meeting of 6 December 1972, p. 9.
(5) EC Commission, Eighth General Report on the Activities of the European 
Communities in 1974, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, Luxembourg, 1975, p. 184.
between the Council and the Parliament, which in 
the end got its way (6). However laudable the sense 
of economic prudence demonstrated by the Council 
on this occasion may appear, the incident, while triv-
ial in material terms (the sum in question amounted 
to ECU 20 700), is clearly indicative of a level of dis-
approval on the part of the Member States, which 
thought of culture as their own private preserve. 
This did not prevent the Commission from putting 
forward to the Parliament in January 1976 a more 
developed communication, the Brunner document. 
This was followed, the following year, by a commu-
nication to the Council in which the Commission 
gave a progress report on Community action in the 
cultural sector and set out the steps still needing to 
be taken. 
The free trade in cultural goods, the fight against the 
theft and trafficking of such goods, the freedom of 
movement and of establishment of those working in 
the cultural sphere,  legal and fiscal harmonisation 
(notably of copyright), social measures (promoting 
the exchange and mobility of young cultural work-
ers, their social security cover, etc.) — it was thanks 
to the systematic application of treaty rules to such 
issues, combined with the valuable political and fi-
nancial support given by the European Parliament, 
that the cultural sector had, by the end of the 1970s, 
become a genuine component of the European eco-
nomic space (7).
The support of ministers
Encouraged by the increasing interest in its actions, 
Robert Grégoire’s division moved from DG XII in 
1981 to the Secretariat-General. It reported directly 
to the new Commission president, Gaston Thorn. 
Now that it could count more than ever on the sup-
port of the European Parliament, Community ac-
(6) Dumoulin, M., ‘Europe de la culture, culture européenne’, Journal of Euro­
pean Integration History, Vol. 5, No 2, 1999, p. 15.
(7) Ibid., p. 16.
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tion in the cultural sector found new allies among 
politicians in charge of culture in their respective 
countries. Thus, on the initiative of Jack Lang and 
Vincenzo Scotti, a first informal meeting of minis-
ters for culture took place in Naples in September 
1982. Even though some of their colleagues showed 
less enthusiasm for ‘far-reaching initiatives and 
real action at European level’ (1), a genuine head of 
steam had now been created at Member State level.
For its part, the Commission continued with its 
work and, on 12 October 1982, it submitted a 
communication to the Parliament and the Coun-
cil entitled ‘Stronger Community action in the 
cultural sector’. The document proposed a series of 
actions along four main lines: free trade in cul-
tural goods (the removal of administrative barriers 
at intra-Community frontiers); the improvement of 
living and working conditions for cultural workers 
(action on unemployment, income protection and 
improved social security, among others); the at-
traction of wider audiences (Community partici-
pation in the organisation of festivals, exhibitions 
and other  cultural events); and the protection of 
Europe’s architectural heritage (provision by the 
EIB of interest-free loans for conservation). The 
Commission communication was the subject of a 
Parliament report (the Fanti report) adopted in Oc-
tober 1983 and, a month later, it was also examined 
by the ministers of culture of the Ten during their 
second and final informal session — they would 
henceforth meet as a Council — chaired by the 
Greek minister Melina Mercouri. At that session, 
the ministers stated their readiness to ‘promote 
concrete cultural cooperation within the Commu-
nity’  (2). It was thus decided, among other things, 
to designate a European city of culture each year — 
starting with Athens in 1985 — probably one of the 
achievements best known by the general public.
(1) Bulletin of the European Communities, No 9, 1982, p. 40.
(2) HAEC, BAC 343/1991/88, Minutes of the informal meeting of ministers 
of culture (Athens, 28 November 1983), 15 December 1983, p. 1.
The move to DG X: priority on the 
audiovisual sector
As Community action in the cultural sector began 
to grow visibly in scale, the time came for Grégoire 
to pass on the baton. In 1986, his division was in-
corporated in DG X which had changed its name 
to ‘Information, Communication and Culture’. 
Frans  De  Koster, a former colleague and friend of 
Robert Grégoire in the Secretariat-General, put it 
succinctly: ‘He has done a remarkable job. All that 
the Community, and the Commission in particular, 
has achieved in terms of culture, it was he that start-
ed it and really mapped out the guidelines’ (3). How-
ever, those who still remember the handover have a 
slightly different view of Grégoire and his achieve-
ments. Gerardo Mombelli, Carlo Ripa  di  Meana’s 
deputy head of cabinet at the time, remembers the 
‘strange official from Marseille, protected by Noël’ 
whose record he judged as good, but limited. ‘From 
the beginning we tried to broaden the scope of 
the work and to suggest a wide range of new per-
spectives, actions and initiatives. At the time there 
was very little of that’  (4). This perception, shared 
by others, was in keeping with the phenomenon 
already mentioned, namely the emergence of an 
approach which now sought to develop Commu-
nity action on a more ambitious scale, geared to the 
public at large. The departure of Grégoire thus truly 
marked the end of an era. And the start of another.
He was succeeded by the Belgian Pierre Bockstael 
as head of a division which was now called ‘Cultural 
Action and Audiovisual Policy’. It was in fact from 
that moment that the Community began to draw 
up an audiovisual policy, starting with the pro-
posal for a directive adopted by the Commission in 
March 1986 entitled ‘The Community’s broadcast-
ing policy’ (5). This was closely followed by an action 
programme in favour of European audiovisual pro-
(3) Interview with Frans De Koster, 13 October 2010.
(4) Interview with Gerardo Mombelli, 2 June 2011.
(5) Bulletin of the European Communities, No 3, 1986, p. 11; No 5, 1986.
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duction (the MEDIA programme)  (1), a commu-
nication on the European Cinema and Television 
Year (scheduled for 1988) (2) and the signature of an 
agreement with the Europa-TV consortium which 
had been distributing the multilingual European 
television programme of the same name since Oc-
tober 1985  (3). However, Europa-TV was dropped 
in November 1986 because of financial difficulties.
A lot of ground had been covered since Spinelli’s 
creation of two working groups at the beginning of 
the 1970s.  Few would have been able to predict at 
the time that such a step would lead to the develop-
ment of Community activity in the cultural sector 
outlined above.  But that it is not all, since out of the 
same two groups emerged a strand of Community 
action in education to which we now must turn.
Education and training
The original status of education within the Com-
munity’s remit was comparable to that of culture. 
With no explicit mention of it in the EEC Treaty 
— unlike vocational training, which is referred to 
in Articles 118 and 128 — education is a sensitive 
policy field since it is closely linked to the sovereign 
competence of states. As with the field of culture, 
therefore, it was not until the early 1970s that there 
were the first truly Community-wide developments 
in this area, especially as, until then, it had been the 
Council of Europe that was regarded as the pre-
ferred channel for dealing with the issues at Euro-
pean level.
(1) Bulletin of the European Communities, No 4, 1986, p. 49.
(2) Bulletin of the European Communities, No 6, 1986, p. 51.
(3) Bulletin of the European Communities, No 10, 1986, p. 36; No 11, 1986, 
p. 56.
From cultural matters to social matters
However, at the beginning of the decade, the process 
of making education a Community policy was un-
doubtedly more advanced. In a crisis in which youth 
unemployment was growing, education and voca-
tional training were an answer to the socio economic 
problems of the time and hence more likely to be 
integrated into Community policies. Thus, shortly 
after the establishment within the Commission of 
the two groups on teaching and education, there 
was an initial meeting of the Community education 
ministers in November 1971. This meeting dealt 
mainly with the issue of the equivalence of qualifica-
tions and the European university project — which 
had been under discussion since the 1950s — but 
what really mattered historically was that ministers 
had demonstrated their readiness to start coopera-
tion as such in the field of education (4).
So far as the Commission is concerned, educa-
tion saw its Community legitimacy confirmed in 
structural terms in 1973, when it became part of 
DG  XII in the shape of a directorate under Alan 
Bath, a British official. The Directorate for Teach-
ing and Education, which at first consisted of four 
divisions — the number has varied over time — in-
cluding one under Robert Grégoire, was renamed 
‘Education, Training and the Cultural Sector’ after 
1976 and then moved to DG V (Employment and 
Social Affairs) in 1981 while, as we saw before, the 
cultural sector came under the Secretariat-General. 
The directorate which then came under Hywel Ceri 
Jones, a British official who had headed one of the 
divisions since 1973, was renamed ‘Education, Vo-
cational Training and Youth Policy’, a name which 
it kept beyond 1986.
The move to DG V, which amounted to a delink-
ing from the cultural sector, attested not only to 
the shift in the way in which education had been 
(4) Bulletin of the European Communities, No 12, 1971, pp. 28–30. 
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in education’ (4), touching on areas such as mobility, 
education of children of migrant workers, the acqui-
sition of modern languages and the academic recog-
nition of diplomas. These proposals were considered 
by the ministers for education of the Nine, meeting 
for the second time in June 1974. A resolution set-
ting out future areas of cooperation was adopted (5) 
and it was decided to create an education commit-
tee which was to submit a report by the end of 1975 
outlining the activities to be implemented in the 
seven priority areas selected by the ministers (6).
The committee, consisting of representatives of 
Member States and of the Commission, met for 
the first time in October 1974 and submitted, as 
agreed, a report and a draft resolution containing an 
action programme to European education ministers 
on 10 December 1975. The ministers approved the 
report and instructed the committee to coordinate 
and monitor the implementation of the action pro-
gramme and to prepare meetings of the Education 
Council. The Education Committee, which met 
every month, would play a key role over the years, 
acting as a veritable link between not only the rele-
vant Commission departments and the Education 
Council, but also the Community and the Member 
States. 
Finally adopted by the Council on 9 February 
1976 (7), the action programme was a key document 
laying the foundations for all subsequent coopera-
tion measures in the field of education. Remarkably, 
it anticipated virtually all of the areas where the 
Community was to launch educational initiatives, 
both up until 1986 and well beyond: foreign lan-
guage teaching, the education of migrant workers 
and their children, equal opportunities in educa-
tion, the study of Europe at school, cooperation in 
(4) European Commission, The History of European Cooperation in Education 
and Training, Office for Official Publications of the European Communi-
ties, Luxembourg, 2006, p. 65.
(5) OJ C 98, 20.8.1974, p. 2.
(6) Bulletin of the European Communities, No 3, 1974, pp. 17–18.
(7) OJ C 38, 19.2.1976, p. 1.
perceived over time but also to its twofold nature: 
socio economic on the one hand and cultural on the 
other. Jones, whose role in relation to education in 
the Commission was comparable to that of Grégoire 
for culture, had always considered it essential to re-
inforce the links between education and vocational 
training.
‘One big breakthrough from a policy point of 
view came in 1981, when the Commission 
proved itself to be in the avant-garde by 
recognising the inextricable links between 
education and vocational training, and thus the 
vital role of education in social and employment 
policy. The decision to merge education and 
vocational training in a single directorate within 
the DG responsible for social policy, DG V, 
supported the argument that many of us had 
been making for years’ (1). 
The first action programme
At the Commission’s request, in February 1973, the 
former Belgian Minister of Education Henri Janne 
presented a critical analysis of the issues surround-
ing education in Europe. The Janne report pin-
pointed the underlying tension, finding, first, that 
‘the close link which exists between education and 
culture’ cannot be ignored and, second, that ‘the 
economic (and therefore the “professional”) needs 
of training are not separable from the education sys-
tem in general’ (2). It was on the basis of this docu-
ment in particular that, a year later, the Commis-
sion submitted a series of proposals to the Council 
for action aimed at developing Community-level 
cooperation in the field of education (3). The Com-
mission communication of March 1974 marked the 
‘starting point of the political debate on the content 
and modalities of future Community cooperation 
(1) ‘The action programme — Interview with Hywel Ceri Jones’, Courrier du 
personnel, No 472, February 1986, p. 64.
(2) ‘For a Community policy on education’, Bulletin of the European Commu­
nities Supplement, No 10, 1973, pp. 11–12.
(3) ‘Education in the European Community’, Bulletin of the European Commu­
nities Supplement, No 3, 1974.
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the field of higher education, the occupational inte-
gration of young people, the compilation of docu-
mentation and statistics in the field of education 
and improving the interconnections between the 
various educational systems in Europe.
Flagship achievements
Although the action programme initially faced dif-
ficult conditions (a small budget and a chronic lack 
of staff on the one hand and objections from certain 
Member States in the Council on the other)  (1), a 
number of initiatives were successfully launched by 
the Commission through study visits, exchanges 
of information, pilot projects and joint study pro-
grammes, among others, which achieved results 
which have become emblematic of European co-
operation in education.
Higher education was a focal point inasmuch as a 
considerable number of joint study programmes 
(1) Several witnesses recall this. See, for example, the interviews with Ivor 
Richard, 21 October 2010, and Anne-Marie Lizin, 15 December 2010; Bul­
letin of the European Communities, No 6, 1976, p. 58; No 11, 1978, p. 59 and 
No 10, 1979, p. 66.
(over 600 in 10 years) were carried out in that field. 
They included, for example, the efforts made to 
provide information in the shape of the Student 
Handbook, which the Commission published 
from 1977; the Eurydice network which, as far 
back as 1980, made information exchange possible 
between policymakers and stakeholders in educa-
tion across Europe; and, since 1984, the NARIC 
network, the Community network of national 
information centres on academic recognition of 
diplomas, supporting student mobility. But it was 
not until the second half of the 1980s, thanks in 
particular to the judgment in the Gravier case (2), 
which saw higher education brought within the 
scope of the treaty, that the Commission was 
able to launch the major Community education 
and training programmes that have had such an 
impact: Comett, Erasmus, PETRA, Youth for 
Europe, Lingua, Eurotecnet and FORCE, among 
others.
Pierre-Olivier Laloux
(2) Judgment of 13 February 1985, Case 293/83, Gravier v Ville de Liège [1985] 
ECR 593.
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Jacques Delors: 
surfing the crest 
of the European wave
No Commission president has had the impact, 
both perceived and real, of Jacques  Delors. The 
longest serving of all Commission presidents, the 
former French minister of finance presided over a 
10-year period during which the integration process 
was dramatically revitalised, and both the pace of 
change and the status of the European Commission 
increased massively. A Community pronounced 
‘moribund’ by The Economist in 1982 (1) stood a dec-
ade later on the verge of completing a functioning 
internal market, had seen its institutional operation 
transformed and was at the centre of international 
attention (2). As Commission president, Delors was 
deeply involved in this extraordinary rebirth.
To some extent, of course, Delors benefited from 
inheriting the job at exactly the right moment. The 
(1) See Chapter 16, ‘Contested fields: the common agricultural policy and the 
common fisheries policy’.
(2) The Economist, 26 March 1982.
year 1985 was an excellent time to become presi-
dent of the Commission. After a difficult first half 
of the 1980s, expectations were low. Below the 
surface though, the period immediately prior to 
Delors’ arrival had seen a number of the obstacles 
to rapid advance at Community level swept away 
— notably with the resolution of the long-running 
British budgetary dispute at the Fontainebleau 
Council of June 1984. Furthermore, while the eco-
nomic difficulties of the 1970s and the early 1980s 
were still fresh enough in the memories of all 
European leaders for radical solutions to be attrac-
tive, the economic fortunes of the continent were 
beginning to revive, marking the start of a period 
where a European relaunch might have an imme-
diate positive effect. Lastly, the European leaders 
of the day all shared a readiness to allow a great-
er degree of market orientation in their national 
and European policies. By 1985, this consensus 
included François  Mitterrand, whose economic 
volte-face in 1982–83 made him ready to embrace 
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ly, the whole agenda and scope of the integration 
project. 
The central idea which Delors seized upon in order 
to rejuvenate the integration process was a very 
simple one — identify a single target, to which all 
participating states and institutions could adhere, 
set a deadline for the completion of this objective 
and lay out clearly the steps that would be need-
ed to attain this target by this deadline  (1). The 
goal selected — the establishment of a European 
single  market by the end of 1992 — was at one 
level profoundly unoriginal. Not only was the es-
tablishment of a functioning internal market an 
avowed intention of the original Treaty of Rome, 
(1) Interview with Jacques Delors, 11 March 2011.
a more liberal approach, but eager also to see the 
success of a Europe in the name of which he had 
abandoned his initial economic policy.
The opportunity still needed to be seized, how-
ever, and Delors deserves much credit for doing so 
effectively. In order to analyse how Delors was to 
achieve this, the following profile will first high-
light the importance of the 1992 project upon 
which he initially focused. It will then explain how 
the renewed sense of purpose gained from the sin-
gle market objective was used to advance not only 
the Commission’s own morale and pace of work, 
but also the rapport between the Commission 
and other European institutions — especially the 
European Council — as well as the prominence 
of the integration process in the imagination and 
interest of the wider European public and, final-
Jacques Delors reads the solemn declaration before the European Court of Justice presided over by Alexander Mackenzie Stuart in 
Luxembourg on 24 January 1985. Seated behind him is Stanley Clinton Davis, wearing headphones, and to his left Willy De Clercq.
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up by innumerable non-tariff barriers and other 
obstacles to trade? And yet, while obvious, it was 
also far-reaching, since its realisation would have 
profound implications for the manner in which all 
of the Community institutions functioned, could 
have a huge impact on the whole western Euro-
pean economy and might produce a cascade of fur-
ther integration in separate but related fields.
The first aspect of transformation was the manner 
in which the Commission itself functioned, and 
also how it regarded itself. Both Delors himself, 
and the commissioner to whom he entrusted the 
but it was also something that had been extensively 
discussed amongst corporate leaders, senior poli-
ticians and within the Commission in the years 
prior to 1985  (1). But in many ways this lack of 
originality was its great strength, for so common-
place an objective was by the same token a very 
hard goal to reject, especially within the context 
of a European Economic Community. How could 
the EEC not discuss the manner in which econom-
ic interchange within Europe had become clogged 
(1) Sandholtz, W. and Zysman, J., ‘1992: Recasting the European bargain’, 
World Politics, Vol. 42, No 1, 1989, pp. 95–128.
Gaston Thorn (on the right) hands over to Jacques Delors (on the left), 7 January 1985.
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tance in this regard. Levels of motivation rose still 
higher when the quest for the single market target 
broke the enduring impasse on institutional re-
form. With the introduction of more majority vot-
ing by the Single European Act — a treaty Delors 
himself had an important role in shaping — many 
long-cherished targets of the European  Commis-
sion that had been regarded as unattainable be-
cause of the opposition of a minority of Member 
States suddenly became conceivable.
The second major change concerned the Commis-
sion’s position in relation to the other Community 
institutions. Throughout the Presidencies of Roy 
Jenkins and Gaston Thorn, interinstitutional re-
lations had been a perennial source of anxiety and 
delay (2). Under Delors, they were altered profound-
(2) See introduction to Part Three.
internal market project, Arthur Cockfield, threw 
themselves into their new jobs with immense en-
ergy and zeal. They also made clear that they ex-
pected equal levels of commitment from all those 
they worked with. In the case of Delors, this mes-
sage was backed up by a particularly formidable 
cabinet, led by Pascal Lamy, who quickly became 
feared as much as he was respected (1). The identifi-
cation of a single target also helped renew the sense 
of purpose and morale of an institution that had 
previously seen so many of its endeavours come to 
nothing. This became all the more true once the 
target was endorsed by all of the Member States’ 
governments and once the first results began to 
be achieved. The Delors I budgetary package and 
the second banking directive, achieved in 1988 
and 1989 respectively, were of particular impor-
(1) Ross, G., ‘Inside the Delors cabinet’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 
Vol. 32, No 4, 1994.
Jacques Delors welcomes Pope John Paul II to the Commission in May 1985.
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European flag-bearer: Jacques Delors poses beside the recently 
launched European flag in September 1986.
respect from — the European  Parliament and the 
Council of Ministers.
The third effect was on the level of public inter-
est in the European integration process. This was 
something that had waned significantly since its 
1960s heyday, being replaced during much of the 
1970s with a mixture of public ignorance, indiffer-
ence and frustration regarding what was going on 
in Brussels. Despite high hopes, the advent of dir-
ect elections to the European Parliament in 1979 
had not succeeded in reversing this trend  (2). But 
in the mid- to late 1980s, the Delors Commission 
managed to persuade the wider European public — 
and indeed an audience that stretched well beyond 
the existing Community borders — that the inte-
gration process was relevant, exciting and liable to 
advance very rapidly. An avalanche of media cover-
age, academic interest and public attention was 
one result; the proliferation of non-member coun-
tries seeking to refresh and improve their ties with 
the suddenly fashionable and dynamic European 
Community was another. In the process, Delors 
himself achieved a level of public recognition and 
prominence unprecedented among Commission 
presidents.
Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, the revital-
isation of the integration process, which initial-
ly centred on the idea of a single market by 1992, 
helped create an atmosphere conducive to many 
other goals for European integration. The broad-
ening of the Community’s agenda was not an en-
tirely new phenomenon, with many aspects of what 
would become the wide range of activities set out 
in the Maastricht Treaty dimly discernible from 
the 1970s onwards. But it was with the mid-1980s 
renewal of the Community’s original purpose — 
trade liberalisation — that the pressures for, and the 
(2) Both the problem and the hope that direct elections would prove a cure were 
acknowledged in Richard Burke’s speech to the Association internationale 
des anciens des Communautés européennes (International Association 
of Former Officials of the European Communities), Paris, 3 May 1979 
(HAEC, Archive of speeches). 
ly, partly because a new agreed target facilitated 
interaction, and partly because results, once they 
began to arrive, created a virtuous circle of ambi-
tion, success and further ambition. Nowhere was 
this change more evident than at the level of the 
European Council, where Delors was able to be-
come a major protagonist in a way that no previous 
Commission president had. The exact manner in 
which this was accomplished is explored elsewhere 
in this volume  (1). Finally, of course, Delors’ abil-
ity to achieve results at this level depended upon the 
presence of national leaders eager to see integration 
advance and willing to allow the Commission pres-
ident to play a major role to that end. But at least 
up until the early 1990s, such a consensus did exist 
at European Council level, allowing Delors ample 
scope to push for his own goals at the most senior 
echelon of European decision-making, thereby rein-
forcing his authority within the Commission. Suc-
cess at European Council level also, of course, fed 
through into better relations with — and greater 
(1) See Chapter 8, ‘Relations with the European Council’.
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1990s would owe a good portion of its initial im-
petus to Delors’ arrival in Brussels and the launch 
of the single market project. 
Needless to say, to attribute everything that hap-
pened at European level in the 1980s and 1990s 
to Delors and his impact would be a massive 
over-simplification. The causes of the renewal of 
European integration during this period were 
much deeper and more varied. Nonetheless, it is 
clear that Delors proved to be a Commission lead-
er perfectly capable of seizing the initial opportu-
nity and then, once momentum had built up, of 
deftly navigating a particularly powerful European 
current. Eventually, of course, the tide would ebb. 
The 1990s would see the start of a public and po-
feasibility of, the much broader new agenda, com-
prising further monetary integration, a more active 
competition policy, environmental policy, justice 
and home affairs coordination, a common foreign 
policy and much else besides, suddenly rose signifi-
cantly. The way in which the Single European Act 
also included a section devoted to economic and so-
cial cohesion — thereby creating the necessary legal 
basis for the subsequent expansion of Community 
spending directed towards the less wealthy regions 
of Europe — further underlined how the identifica-
tion of one core objective had clear knock-on effects 
in other policy fields. And the success of the Single 
European Act made further institutional change 
much more likely. The pattern of deepening and 
institutional transformation that would mark the 
Jacques Delors greets crowds of children in June 1985: the new president proved remarkably effective at attracting popular attention.
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Jacques Delors holding the Unicef Sport Aid torch in May 1986.
litical backlash against the pace and scope of the 
revitalised integration process. And the Commu-
nity, now Union, is in some ways still coming to 
terms with the full extent of the changes initiated 
in the mid-1980s. But what is already clear is that 
because of the transformations that were wrought, 
the Brussels that Delors would leave in 1995 would 
be fundamentally different to the one he had ar-
rived in a little over a decade earlier.
Piers Ludlow
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Timeline 1973–86
1973
1 January Enlargement of the European Communities to include Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom
The Commission from 6 January 1973 to 5 January 1977
Composition: François-Xavier Ortoli (President), Albert Borschette (in office until 14 July 1976, replaced 
by Raymond Vouel on 20 July 1976), Ralf Dahrendorf (in office until 31 October 1974, replaced by Guido 
Brunner on 12 November 1974), Jean-François Deniau (in office until 12 April 1973, replaced by Claude 
Cheysson on 19 April 1973), Finn Olav Gundelach, Wilhelm Haferkamp, Patrick Hillery, Pierre Lardi-
nois, Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza, Henri Simonet, Christopher Soames, Altiero Spinelli (in office until 4 
July 1976, replaced by Cesidio Guazzaroni on 13 July 1976), George Thomson.
1973
3 April European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF) set up
3 July Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) opens in Helsinki
12 September New round of GATT multilateral trade negotiations opens in Tokyo
6–27 October Yom Kippur War. First oil shock
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1974
1 April British government seeks ‘renegotiation’ of the treaty of accession
25 April Carnation Revolution in Portugal and the end of the Salazar dictatorship
31 May Permanent delegation of the European Commission opens in Tokyo
24 July End of the Greek military junta
9–10 December Paris Summit. European Council established
1975
28 February First Lomé Convention (Lomé I) signed between the Community and 46 African, Caribbean 
and Pacific (ACP) states
18 March European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) set up
20 March Official inauguration of the European University Institute in Florence
9 May 25th anniversary of the Schuman Declaration
5 June Referendum in the United Kingdom. The British people vote in favour of keeping their 
country in the Community
12 June Official accession application by Greece
22 July European Court of Auditors established
1 August Final act of the CSCE signed in Helsinki
16 September Establishment of official relations between China and the Communities
25 November Death of Franco. Start of the democratisation process in Spain
29 December Presentation of the Tindemans report on European union
1976
2–16 February Barcelona Conference. Adoption of a draft convention for the protection of the 
Mediterranean Sea
1 April Lomé I enters into force
25–27 April Commission signs, on behalf of the EEC, a general cooperation agreement with the Maghreb 
countries (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia)
27 July Official opening of accession negotiations with Greece 
20 September Act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal 
suffrage signed
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The Commission from 6 January 1977 to 5 January 1981
Composition: Roy Jenkins (President), Guido Brunner (in office until 4 November 1980), Richard Burke, 
Claude Cheysson, Étienne Davignon, Antonio Giolitti, Finn Olav Gundelach, Wilhelm Haferkamp, 
Lorenzo Natali, François-Xavier Ortoli, Christopher Tugendhat, Raymond Vouel, Henk Vredeling.
1977
18 January Commission signs, on behalf of the EEC, a general cooperation agreement with the Mashreq 
countries (Egypt, Jordan and Syria)
March Davignon plan on restructuring the steel industry 
9 March European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop) opens in Berlin
28 March Official accession application by Portugal
7–8 May Downing Street Summit. The President of the Commission attends a G7 Summit for the first 
time
1 July Customs union in the enlarged Communities completed
28 July Official accession application by Spain
27 October Roy Jenkins, President of the European Commission, gives a speech in Florence on the 
prospects for monetary union
1978
6 January Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America, visits the Commission
6 February Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution, 
concluded in February 1976, enters into force
6–7 July Principles of the European Monetary System (EMS) adopted
1979
5 February Official opening of accession negotiations with Spain
20 February Cassis de Dijon judgment establishing the principle of mutual recognition
13 March European Monetary System (EMS) enters into force
16 March Jean Monnet dies
28 May Accession treaty signed with Greece
7–10 June First elections to the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage
31 October Second Lomé Convention (Lomé II) signed
13 December European Parliament rejects the budget for the first time
17 December The Community signs the agreements on the GATT multilateral trade negotiations (Tokyo 
Round)
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1980
7–8 March EEC–ASEAN cooperation agreement signed
1 October EEC–ASEAN cooperation agreement enters into force
October Commission declares a state of manifest crisis in the steel industry
1981
1 January Enlargement of the European Communities to include Greece
Lomé II enters into force
The Commission from 6 January 1981 to 5 January 1985
Composition: Gaston Thorn (President), Frans Andriessen, Claude Cheysson (in office until 22 May 1981, 
replaced by Edgard Pisani, in office from 26 May  1981 to 3 December 1984), Giorgios Contogeorgis, 
Étienne Davignon, Antonio Giolitti, Finn Olav Gundelach (in office until 13 January 1981, replaced by 
Poul Dalsager on 21 January 1981), Wilhelm Haferkamp, Karl-Heinz Narjes, Lorenzo Natali, Michael 
O’Kennedy (in office until 9 March 1982, replaced by Richard Burke on 1 April 1982), François-Xavier 
Ortoli (in office until 26 October 1984), Ivor Richard, Christopher Tugendhat.
1981
20 February Communication from the Commission on restructuring the steel industry
October Set of communications on the single market and common policies
19 November Genscher–Colombo plan on improving institutional mechanisms
1982
23 February Referendum in Greenland (Denmark) on leaving the EEC
25 March 25th anniversary of the signature of the Treaty of Rome
26 May Commission sends a communication on information technology (Esprit programme) to the 
Council
24 June Council adopts the Seveso directive (industrial risks)
1983
25 January Agreement on establishing a common fisheries policy
21 March General realignment of central rates under the EMS
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1984
14 February European Parliament adopts the Spinelli draft treaty on a European union
28 February Council adopts the Esprit programme
9 April Joint European Torus (JET) opens in Culham
25–26 June Fontainebleau European Council: establishment of the Adonnino Committee (people’s Europe) 
and the Dooge Committee (institutions) for the revision of the treaties. Increase in budgetary 
resources and compromise on the British budgetary contribution
8 December Third Lomé Convention (Lomé III) signed
The Commission from 6 January 1985 to 5 January 1989
Composition: Jacques Delors (President), Frans Andriessen, António José Baptista Cardoso e Cunha  (in 
office from 5 January 1986), Claude Cheysson, Henning Christophersen, Stanley Clinton Davis, Arthur 
Cockfield, Willy De Clercq, Manuel Marín (in office from 5 January 1986), Abel Matutes (in office from 
5 January 1986), Nicolas Mosar, Karl-Heinz Narjes, Lorenzo Natali, Alois Pfeiffer (in office until 1 Au-
gust 1987, replaced by Peter Schmidhuber, in office from 22 September 1987), Carlo Ripa di Meana, Pe-
ter Sutherland, Grigoris Varfis.
1985
14 January Speech by Jacques Delors before the European Parliament
1 February Greenland leaves the European Communities, but remains associated thereto as an overseas 
territory
12 June Act on the accession of Spain and Portugal to the European Communities signed
14 June Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands sign the 
Schengen Convention
White Paper on the completion of the internal market by 1992
28–29 June Milan European Council decides to convene an intergovernmental conference on the revision 
of the treaties
Final report of the ad hoc committee for a people’s Europe (Adonnino Committee)
1986
1 January Enlargement of the European Communities to include Spain and Portugal
17 and 
28 February
Single European Act signed in Luxembourg
29 May The European flag is raised for the first time, to the sound of Ode to Joy
Pierre-Olivier Laloux
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Organisation charts  
of the Commission
Organisation chart of the Commission of the European 
Communities, 5 November 1973 (1)
(1) Chart published in Courrier du personnel, No 283, 5 November 1973. 
The Commission
• President
• Vice-Presidents
• Members of the Commission
Secretariat-General 
of the Commission
• Secretary-General
• Deputy Secretaries-General
• Chief Advisers
• Adviser
Legal Service
• Director-General
• Deputy Director-General
Spokesman’s Group
• Spokesman
• Deputy Spokesman
Statistical Office
• Director-General
• Adviser
• Directorate A — Statistical methods and 
processing of data
• Directorate B — General statistics and 
national accounts 
• Directorate C — Demographic and social 
statistics
• Directorate D — Agricultural, forestry and 
fisheries statistics
• Directorate E — Energy, industry and small 
business statistics
• Directorate F — Trade, transport and services 
statistics
Administration of the Customs 
Union
• Director
• Chief Advisers
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Environment and Consumer 
Protection Service
• Director
DG I — External Relations
• Director-General
• Deputy Directors-General
• Administrative unit attached to the Director-
General:
— External economic policy planning staff
• Directorate A — Relations with international 
organisations
• Directorate B — Relations with North America, 
Australia, New Zealand and South Africa; 
commercial questions with respect to 
agriculture; protocol; external offices
• Directorate C — Bilateral and multilateral 
relations with the developing countries in Latin 
America and Asia (except Far East); United 
Nations economic agencies other than Unctad; 
generalised tariff preferences; coordination 
with the Directorate-General for Development 
and Cooperation concerning questions relating 
to the developing countries
• Directorate D — General questions and 
instruments of external economic policy; 
commercial questions in respect of industry; 
Far East
• Directorate E — Multilateral relations and 
specific questions of trade with countries with 
planned economies in Europe; credit insurance 
and export credit
• Directorate F — Relations with countries of 
northern, central and southern Europe
• External offices:
— Washington
— Paris (delegation to the OECD)
— Santiago de Chile
— Geneva (delegation to the international 
organisations)
DG II — Economic and Financial 
Affairs
• Director-General
• Adviser
• Secretary of the Monetary Committee
• Directorate A — National economies and 
economic trends
• Directorate B — Economic structure and 
development
• Directorate C — Monetary matters I
• Directorate D — Monetary matters II
• Directorate E — Budgetary and financial 
affairs
DG III — Industrial and 
Technological Affairs
• Director-General
• Deputy Director-General
• Administrative units attached to the Director-
General:
— Industrial and technological problems in 
relation to non-member countries
— Harmonisation of industrial policy with 
development cooperation policy
• Directorate A — Industry, technology and 
steel
• Directorate B — Industry, technology, nuclear 
and energy sectors
• Directorate C — Industry, technology, 
electronics, data processing, 
telecommunications, aerospace, land transport 
and new means of transport
• Directorate D — Industry, technology and 
various sectors
• Directorate E — Industrial and technological 
policy
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DG VI — Agriculture
• Director-General
• Deputy Directors-General
• Directorate A — International affairs relating 
to agriculture
• Directorate B — Organisation of markets in 
crop products
• Directorate C — Organisation of markets in 
livestock products
• Directorate D — Organisation of markets in 
specialised crops and fisheries
• Directorate E — Agricultural structures and 
environment 
• Directorate F — European Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund
• Directorate G — Agricultural economics
• Administrative unit directly attached to the 
Director-General:
— Relations with non-governmental 
organisations
• Directorate H — Agricultural legislation
DG VII — Transport
• Director-General
• Deputy Director-General
• Directorate A — General development of the 
common transport policy and coordination 
with the other policies
• Directorate B — Organisation of the transport 
market and air and sea transport
• Directorate C — Financial, infrastructure and 
technical aspects
DG IV — Competition
• Director-General
• Directorate A — General competition policy
• Directorate B — Restrictive practices and 
dominant positions
• Directorate C — Corporate combinations, rules 
of competition, ECSC Treaty, industrial 
property rights, energy and transport
• Directorate D — State aids, public 
discrimination, public enterprises and state 
monopolies
• Directorate E — Inspection
DG V — Social Affairs
• Director-General
• Deputy Director-General
• Administrative unit attached to the Director-
General:
— Reports, analyses and social aspects of 
Community policies
• Administrative unit attached to the Deputy 
Director-General:
— Preparatory work for intervention 
measures (studies and pilot schemes)
• Directorate A — Employment policy
• Directorate B — European Social Fund 
(operations)
• Directorate C — Social security and European 
social budget
• Directorate D — Living and working conditions
• Directorate E — Industrial relations
Luxembourg
• Directorate F — Health protection
• Directorate G — Industrial safety and 
medicine
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DG X — Information
• Director-General
• Directorate A — Coordination and programming
• Directorate B — Information operations
• Information offices:
1. Community countries
— Brussels
— Bonn
— Berlin (suboffice attached to Bonn office)
— Copenhagen
— Dublin
— The Hague
— London
— Luxembourg
— Paris
— Rome
2. Non-member countries
— Washington
— New York (suboffice attached to 
Washington office)
— Geneva
DG XI — Internal Market
• Director-General
• Directorate A — Movement of goods
• Directorate B — Right of establishment, 
freedom to provide services, approximation of 
commercial and economic laws
• Directorate C — Approximation of laws: 
companies and firms, public contracts, 
intellectual property, fair competition, general 
matters
DG VIII — Development and 
Cooperation
• Director-General
• Deputy Directors-General
• Administrative units directly attached to the 
Deputy Director-General with special 
responsibility for coordination of EDF 
operations:
— Financial matters concerning the EDF
— Secretariat of the EDF Committee
• Directorate A — General affairs and primary 
products
• Directorate B — Trade and development
• Directorate C — EDF programmes and projects
• Directorate D — EDF technical operations
DG IX — Personnel and 
Administration
• Director-General
• Advisers
• Administrative unit attached to the Director-
General:
— Medical Service
• Directorate A — Personnel
• Directorate B — Welfare, training and staff 
information
• Directorate C — General services and office 
equipment
• Directorate D — Translation, documentation, 
reproduction and library
• Directorate E — Interpreters and conference 
services
• Director (in Luxembourg)
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DG XVII — Energy and Euratom 
Safeguards
• Director-General
• Chief Adviser
• Adviser
• Administrative unit attached to the Director-
General:
— Energy policy
• Directorate A — Energy economy
• Directorate B — Coal
• Directorate C — Oil and natural gas
• Directorate D — Nuclear energy, other primary 
sources and electricity
Luxembourg
• Directorate E — Euratom safeguards
DG XVIII — Credit and Investments
• Director-General
• Directorate A — Borrowings and 
administration of funds
• Directorate B — Investments and loans
DG XIX — Budgets
• Director-General
• Administrative unit attached to the Director-
General:
— Methods, analyses and programmes
• Directorate A — Budgets
• Directorate B — Own resources and 
accounting
DG XX — Financial Control
• Director-General — Financial Controller
• Director — Deputy Financial Controller
• Administrative units attached to the Director-
General:
— EDF, Social Fund, readaptation of ECSC 
manpower
— EAGGF, revenue and management of assets
• Directorate A — Administrative and research 
expenditure
DG XII — Research, Science and 
Education
• Director-General
• Chief Adviser
• Directorate A — Education and training, 
external relations in research, science and 
education
• Directorate B — Research and development 
policy
• Directorate C — Scientific programmes 
and cooperation with national 
centres, research councils and scientific 
associations
• Administrative unit directly attached to the 
Director-General:
— Fusion programme
DG XIII — Scientific and Technical 
Information and Information 
Management
• Director-General
• Adviser
• Directorate A — Transfer of technology and 
industrial property questions
• Directorate B — Information management
DG XV (1) — Financial Institutions 
and Taxation
• Director-General
• Directorate A — Financial institutions
• Directorate B — Taxation
DG XVI — Regional Policy
• Director-General
• Deputy Director-General
• Directorate A — Analysis, documentation and 
objectives
• Directorate B — Coordination and 
programmes
• Directorate C — Development and conversion 
operations
(1) There was no DG XIV.
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Euratom Supply Agency
• Director-General (1)
Security Office
• Director
Office for Official Publications of 
the European Communities
• Director
• Publishing
• Sales Service
(1) As referred to in Article 53 of the Euratom Treaty.
Joint Research Centre
• Director-General of the JRC
• Chief Adviser
Geel establishment (Central Bureau for Nuclear 
Measurements)
• Director
• Chief Adviser to the Director
Karlsruhe establishment (Institute for 
Transuranic Elements)
• Director
Petten establishment
• Director
Ispra establishment
• Scientific Director
• Deputy Scientific Director
• Director of General Services
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Organisation chart of the Commission of the European 
Communities, September 1977 (1)
(1) Based on the ‘Directory of the Commission of the European Communities 
(September 1977)’, edited by the DG for Personnel and Administration and 
published by the Office for Official Publications of the European Commu-
nities, Luxembourg, 1977.
The Commission
• President
• Vice-Presidents
• Members of the Commission
Secretariat-General 
of the Commission
• Secretary-General
• Deputy Secretaries-General
• Director
• Chief Advisers
Legal Service
• Director-General
• Deputy Director-General
Statistical Office
• Director-General
• Adviser
• Directorate A — Statistical methods and 
processing of data
• Directorate B — General statistics and 
national accounts 
• Directorate C — Demographic and social 
statistics
• Directorate D — Agricultural, forestry and 
fisheries statistics
• Directorate E — Industrial and environment 
statistics
• Directorate F — External relations, transport 
and services statistics
Administration of the Customs 
Union
• Director
• Chief Advisers
Environment and Consumer 
Protection Service
• Head of Service
• Adviser
DG I — External Relations
• Director-General
• Deputy Directors-General
• Chief Advisers
• Protocol
• Directorate A — Relations with international 
organisations, commercial questions with 
respect to agriculture and fisheries and 
relations with South Africa
• Directorate B — Relations with North America, 
Australia, New Zealand and Japan
• Directorate C — Bilateral and multilateral 
relations with the developing countries in 
Latin America and Asia (except Middle and 
Far East); United Nations economic 
agencies other than Unctad and coordination 
with the Directorate-General for Development 
concerning questions relating to the 
developing countries
• Directorate D — General questions and 
instruments of external economic policy and 
commercial questions in respect of industry 
and energy
• Directorate E — Attached to one of the Deputy 
Directors-General:
— Generalised tariff preferences — Special 
Representative for Textile Negotiations 
— Negotiation and management of textile 
agreements ▶
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DG III — Internal Market 
and Industrial Affairs
• Director-General
• Deputy Directors-General
• Advisers
• Administrative unit attached to the Director-
General:
— Industrial and technological problems in 
relation to non-member countries; 
industrial cooperation
• Administrative unit directly attached to the 
Deputy Director-General with special 
responsibility for coordination of sectoral 
measures:
— Secretariat for internal and external work 
on raw materials
• Directly attached to the Deputy Director-
General with special responsibility for 
coordination of regulations and standards:
— Chief Adviser
• Directorate A — Industrial affairs I (removal of 
technical barriers, mechanical engineering, 
motor vehicles, chemicals and foodstuffs)
• Directorate B — Industrial affairs II (public 
contracts, electronics, data processing, 
telecommunications and aircraft)
• Directorate C — Industrial affairs III 
(intervention, shipbuilding, textiles, paper and 
footwear and construction)
• Directorate D — Approximation of laws and 
right of establishment and services 
• Directorate E — Steel
• Directorate F — Commerce; small and 
medium-sized enterprises; pharmacy; 
commercial law and economic legislation
• Unit attached to DG III for administrative 
purposes
— Business Cooperation Centre
• Directorate F — Relations with countries of 
northern, central and southern Europe
• Directorate G — Delegation for the accession 
negotiations with Greece
• Directorate H — Directly attached to the 
Director-General:
— Special Representative for the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
and Adviser on Relations with State-
Trading Countries
• External offices:
— Paris (delegation to the OECD)
— Geneva (delegation to the international 
organisations)
— Washington
— New York (delegation to the United 
Nations)
— Ottawa
— Santiago de Chile
— Tokyo
DG II — Economic and Financial 
Affairs
• Director-General
• Adviser
• Secretary of the Monetary Committee
• Attached to the Director-General:
— Economic advisers
• Directorate A — National economies and 
economic trends
• Directorate B — Economic structure and 
development
• Directorate C — Monetary matters I
• Directorate D — Monetary matters II
• Directorate E — Budgetary and financial 
affairs
▶
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DG VI — Agriculture
• Director-General
• Deputy Directors-General
• Directorate A — International affairs relating 
to agriculture
• Directorate B — Organisation of markets in 
crop products
• Directorate C — Organisation of markets in 
livestock products
• Directorate D — Organisation of markets in 
specialised crops
• Directorate E — Agricultural structures and 
environment 
• Directorate F — European Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund
• Directorate G — Agricultural economics
• Administrative unit attached to the Director-
General:
— Relations with non-governmental 
organisations
• Directorate H — Agricultural legislation
DG VII — Transport
• Director-General
• Directorate A — General development of the 
common transport policy; air and sea 
transport
• Directorate B — Organisation of the transport 
market; ports
• Directorate C — Financial, infrastructure and 
technical aspects
DG IV — Competition
• Director-General
• Administrative unit attached to the Director-
General:
— General competition policy
• Directorate A — Inspection and studies
• Directorate B — Restrictive practices and 
dominant positions
• Directorate C — Corporate combinations, rules 
of competition, ECSC Treaty, industrial 
property rights, energy and transport
• Directorate D — State aids, public 
discrimination, public enterprises and state 
monopolies
DG V — Employment and Social 
Affairs
• Director-General
• Chief Adviser
• Directorate A — General social policy 
guidelines
• Directorate B — Employment and vocational 
training
• Directorate C — European Social Fund
• Directorate D — Working conditions and 
migrant worker policies
• Directorate E — Industrial relations and 
labour law
Luxembourg
• Directorate F — Health and safety
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DG IX — Personnel and 
Administration
• Director-General
• Adviser
Brussels
• Administrative unit attached to the Director-
General:
— Medical Service
• Directorate A — Personnel
• Directorate B — Welfare, training and staff 
information
• Directorate C — General services and office 
equipment
• Directorate D — Translation, documentation, 
reproduction and library
• Directorate E — Interpreters and conference 
services
Luxembourg
• Director
Ispra
• Attached to the Director-General:
— Medical Service
DG VIII — Development
• Director-General
• Deputy Directors-General
• Administrative unit directly attached to the 
Director-General:
— Relations with Commission Delegates
• Directorate A — General development policy 
and international relations covered by that 
policy in coordination with DG I
• Directorate B — Africa, the Caribbean and the 
Pacific
• Administrative units directly attached to the 
Deputy Director-General with special 
responsibility for Directorate B:
— Maghreb, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Syria; and coordination with DG I on 
general matters relating to the 
Mediterranean area (VIII/1)
— Relations with Community and EEC–ACP 
institutions and with non-governmental 
circles (VIII/2)
• Directorate C — Projects
• Directorate D — Operations
• Directorate E — Finance and administration
• Attached to the Finance and Administration 
Unit
— European Agency for Cooperation (EAC)
• Directly attached to the Deputy Director-
General with special responsibility for 
Directorates C and D and Administrative Unit E
— Secretariat of the Financing Committee
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DG XII (2) — Research, Science and 
Education
• Director-General
• Chief Adviser
• Directorate A — Education, training and 
cultural questions
• Directorate B — Research and development 
policy
• Directorate C — Scientific and technological 
programmes; external relations in research, 
science and education
• Directorate D — Research, development and 
nuclear policy
• Administrative unit directly attached to the 
Director-General:
— Fusion and plasma physics programme
— Biology, radiation protection and medical 
research programme
DG XIII — Scientific and Technical 
Information and Information 
Management
• Director-General
• Adviser
• Directorate A — Transfer of technology and 
industrial property questions
• Directorate B — Information management
DG XIV — Fisheries
• Director-General
• Directorate A — Resources
• Directorate B — Market and structures
• Administrative unit attached to the Director-
General:
— Data processing and internal information
(2) There was no DG XI.
DG X — Spokesman’s Group and 
Directorate-General for Information
• Spokesman and Director-General
• Adviser
Spokesman’s Group
• Deputy Spokesman
• Members
Directorate-General for Information
• Directors
• Information offices (1)
1. Community countries
— Brussels
— Copenhagen
— Bonn
— Berlin (suboffice attached to Bonn office)
— Paris
— Dublin
— Rome
— Luxembourg
— The Hague
— London
— Cardiff (suboffice attached to London 
office)
— Edinburgh (suboffice attached to London 
office)
2. Non-member countries
— Santiago de Chile
— Ottawa
— Washington
— New York (suboffice attached to 
Washington office)
— Athens
— Tokyo
— Geneva
— Ankara
(1) In alphabetical order by country in which Commission information offices 
are located.
492 The European Commission 1973–86 — History and Memories of an Institution
DG XIX — Budgets
• Director-General
• Adviser
• Administrative unit attached to the Director-
General:
— General budget, financial management 
and information
• Directorate A — Financial intervention 
appropriations
• Directorate B — Financing of the budget, 
general affairs
DG XX — Financial Control
• Director-General (Financial Controller)
• Director (Deputy Financial Controller)
• Administrative units attached to the Director-
General:
— Control of revenue, the EAGGF ‘Guarantee’ 
section, and of food aid
— Control of the EAGGF ‘Guidance’ section, 
of the Social Fund, of the European 
Regional Development Fund, and of the 
readaptation of ECSC manpower
— Control of the EDF
• Directorate A — Control of administrative and 
research expenditure
DG XV — Financial Institutions 
and Taxation
• Director-General
• Directorate A — Financial institutions
• Directorate B — Taxation
DG XVI — Regional Policy
• Director-General
• Directorate A — Coordination, programmes, 
studies and analyses
• Directorate B — Development and conversion 
operations
DG XVII — Energy
• Director-General
• Chief Advisers
• Adviser
Brussels
• Administrative unit attached to the Director-
General:
— Energy policy
• Direction A — Energy economy
• Directorate B — Coal
• Directorate C — Oil and natural gas
• Directorate D — Nuclear energy, other primary 
sources and electricity
Luxembourg
• Directorate E — Euratom safeguards
DG XVIII — Credit and Investments
• Director-General
• Administrative unit attached to the Director-
General:
— Special studies and special cases
• Directorate A — Borrowings and 
administration of funds
• Directorate B — Investments and loans
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Euratom Supply Agency
• Director-General (1)
Security Office
• Director
Special Assignments
• Public Relations
• Advisers hors classe
Office for Official Publications of 
the European Communities
• Director
• Adviser
(1) As referred to in Article 53 of the Euratom Treaty.
Joint Research Centre
Brussels
• Director-General
• Deputy Director-General
• Services directly attached to the Director-
General:
— Director of JRC programmes
— Administrative coordination
Ispra
• Establishment Director
• Site Director
• Director for Forward Studies
• Projects Director
• Director of the Computers, Mathematics and 
Systems Analysis Department
• Director of the Applied Sciences and 
Technology Department
• Director of the Natural and Physical Sciences 
Department
Geel
• Establishment Director
Karlsruhe
• Establishment Director
Petten
• Establishment Director
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• Kenya
• Liberia
• Madagascar (7)
• Malawi
• Mali
• Mauritania
• Niger
• Nigeria
• Uganda
• Rwanda
• Senegal
• Sierra Leone
• Somalia
• Sudan
• Surinam
• Tanzania
• Chad
• Togo
• Trinidad and Tobago (8)
• Zaïre
• Zambia
(7) Also responsible for responsible for Djibouti.
(8) Also responsible for responsible for Grenada, Martinique, Guadeloupe, 
French Guiana, Saint Pierre and Miquelon and the South Atlantic overseas 
territories.
Commission delegations to ACP 
countries
• Dutch Antilles
• Barbados (1)
• Benin
• Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland
• Burundi
• Cameroon (2)
• Central African Empire
• Congo
• Ivory Coast
• Ethiopia
• Pacific (Fiji, West Samoa, Tonga) (3)
• Gabon
• Gambia
• Ghana
• Guinea Bissau
• Guinea Conakry
• Guyana (4)
• Upper Volta
• Mauritius (5)
• Jamaica (6)
(1) Also responsible for St Kitts, Nevis, Anguilla, Dominica, Antigua, 
St Vincent, Montserrat, St Lucia and the British Virgin Islands.
(2) Also responsible for Equatorial Guinea.
(3) Also responsible for the Pacific overseas territories.
(4) Also responsible for relations with the Caricom Secretariat.
(5) Also responsible for Comoros, Réunion and Seychelles.
(6) Also responsible for the Bahamas, Belize, the Cayman Islands and the 
Caicos Islands.
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Organisation chart of the Commission of the European Communities, 
December 1981 (1)
(1) Based on the ‘Directory of the Commission of the European Communities 
(December 1981)’, edited by the DG for Personnel and Administration and 
published by the Office for Official Publications of the European Commu-
nities, Luxembourg, 1981. 
The Commission
• President
• Vice-Presidents
• Members of the Commission
Secretariat-General 
of the Commission
• Secretary-General
• Deputy Secretary-General
• Directors
• Chief Advisers
• Adviser
Legal Service
• Director-General
• Deputy Director-General
Joint Interpreting and Conference 
Service
• Director
• Adviser
Statistical Office
• Director-General
• Adviser
• Administrative units attached to the Director-
General:
— Software design and development
— Data-processing management
• Directorate A — General economic statistics
• Directorate B — Demographic and social 
statistics
• Directorate C — Industrial, transport and 
services statistics
• Directorate D — Agriculture, forestry, fisheries 
and energy statistics
• Directorate E — External trade, ACP and 
non-member countries statistics
Customs Union Service
• Director-General — Head of Service
• Directorate A — Tariff questions
• Directorate B — Customs legislation
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DG II — Economic and Financial 
Affairs
• Director-General
• Deputy Directors-General
• Adviser
• Secretary of the Monetary Committee and the 
Economic Policy Committee
• Attached to the Director-General:
— Economic advisers
• Directorate A — National economies
• Directorate B — Economic structure and 
Community intervention
• Directorate C — Macroeconomic analyses and 
policies
• Directorate D — Monetary matters 
DG III — Internal Market 
and Industrial Affairs
• Director-General
• Deputy Directors-General
• Directorate A — Distributive trades and 
industrial affairs I (removal of technical 
barriers to trade, motor vehicles, mechanical 
engineering, foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals, 
electricity and chemicals)
• Directorate B — Industrial affairs II 
(telematics, data processing, 
telecommunications, transport and public 
contracts)
• Directorate C — Industrial affairs III (textiles, 
leather, paper, shipbuilding, miscellaneous 
industries and non-tariff barriers)
• Directorate D — Approximation of laws, 
freedom of establishment and freedom to 
provide services
• Directorate E — Steel
• Directorate F — Industrial restructuring, 
non-member countries and raw materials
DG I — External Relations
• Director-General
• Deputy Directors-General
• Chief Adviser
• Adviser
• Directorate A — GATT, OECD (commercial 
matters), commercial questions with respect 
to agriculture and fisheries, and relations with 
South Africa
• Directorate B — Relations with North America, 
Australia, New Zealand and Japan
• Directorate C — Relations with the developing 
countries in Latin America and Asia (except 
the Far East); coordination with the 
Directorate-General for Development on 
related questions and generalised tariff 
preferences 
• Directorate D — General questions and 
instruments of external economic policy, 
commercial policy in the field of industrial raw 
materials, coordination with the Directorate-
General for Development on general questions 
relating to the developing countries, and 
relations with international organisations 
other than Unctad
• Directorate E — Negotiation and management 
of textile agreements; trade in industrial 
products
• Directorate F — Relations with countries of 
northern, central and southern Europe
• G — Relations with state-trading countries
• Protocol
• H — Delegation for enlargement; accession 
negotiations and bilateral relations
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DG VI — Agriculture
• Director-General
• Deputy Directors-General
• Administrative unit directly attached to the 
Director-General:
— Economic and general matters
• Directorate A — General matters
• Directorate B — Agricultural legislation
• Directorate C — Organisation of markets in 
crop products
• Directorate D — Organisation of markets in 
livestock products
• Directorate E — Organisation of markets in 
specialised crops
• Unit directly attached to the Deputy Director-
General with special responsibility for 
Directorates C, D and E
— Periodic agricultural instruments and joint 
secretariat of management committees
• Directorate F — Agricultural structure and 
forestry
• Directorate G — European Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund
• Directorate H— International affairs relating 
to agriculture
DG VII — Transport
• Director-General
• Directorate A — General programming; 
international and institutional relations; air 
and maritime transport
• Directorate В — Inland transport markets; 
transport and energy 
• Directorate C — Infrastructures; transport 
technology; state intervention
DG IV — Competition
• Director-General
• Administrative unit attached to the Director-
General:
— General competition policy
• Directorate A — Inspection and 
documentation
• Directorate B — Restrictive practices and 
dominant positions
• Directorate C — Corporate combinations, 
ECSC Treaty rules of competition, industrial 
property rights, energy and transport
• Directorate D — State aids, public 
discrimination, public enterprises and state 
monopolies
DG V — Employment, Social Affairs 
and Education
• Director-General
• Chief Adviser
• Adviser
Brussels
• Directorate A — General social policy 
guidelines
• Directorate B — Employment
• Directorate C — European Social Fund
• Directorate D — Working conditions and 
migrant worker policies
• Directorate E — Education, vocational training 
and youth policy
Luxembourg
• Directorate F — Health and safety
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DG X — Information
• Director-General
• Planning and programming
• Directorate A — Information to Member 
States, applicant countries, ACP and 
non-member countries and priority milieux
• Directorate B — Methods and media
Spokesman’s Group (1)
• Spokesman
• Deputy Spokesman
DG XI — Environment, Consumer 
Protection and Nuclear Safety
• Director-General
• Administrative units directly attached to the 
Director-General:
— Legal and legislative aspects of 
implementation of programmes
— International affairs (implementation of 
conventions, exchange of information with 
non-member countries and activity on 
specialised committees of international 
organisations) 
• Directorate A — Protection and improvement 
of the environment
• Directorate В — Protection and promotion of 
consumer interests
(1) Under the authority of the president.
DG VIII — Development
• Director-General
• Deputy Directors-General
• Directorate A — General development policy
• Directorate B — Coordination of aid policies 
and programmes
• Administrative units directly attached to the 
Deputy Director-General with special 
responsibility for Directorate B:
— VIII/1 — Agreements with the Mashreq 
and Maghreb countries and Israel
— VIII/2 — Cooperation with 
non-governmental organisations
• Directorate C — Projects
• Directorate D — Operations
• Directorate E — Finance and administration
• Unit attached to Directorate E (Finance and 
administration)
— European Agency for Cooperation (EAC)
• Unit directly attached to the Deputy Director-
General with special responsibility for 
Directorates C, D and E
— Secretariat of the Financing Committee
DG IX — Personnel 
and Administration
• Director-General
• Deputy Director-General
• Adviser — Mediator
• Management and organisation
• Directorate A — Personnel
• Directorate B — Administration
• Directorate C — Translation, documentation, 
reproduction and library
• Directorate D — Personnel and administration 
— Luxembourg
• Directorate E — Informatics
• Attached to the Director-General:
— Medical service for decentralised staff
— Medical service for Brussels staff
— Medical service, Luxembourg
— Medical service, Ispra
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DG XIII — Information Market and 
Innovation
• Director-General
• Adviser
• Directly attached to the Director-General:
— Adviser for relations with other institutions
— Adviser for contractual and legal 
questions
— Task force on industrial innovation and 
support to telematics coordination
• Directorate A — New technologies
• Directorate B — Information management
DG XIV — Fisheries
• Director-General
• Directorate A — Resources
• Directorate B — Market and structures
• Administrative unit attached to the Director-
General:
— Data processing and internal information
DG XV — Financial Institutions and 
Taxation
• Director-General
• Directorate A — Financial institutions
• Directorate B — Taxation
DG XVI — Regional Policy
• Director-General
• Directorate A — Regional development 
policies
• Directorate B — Development and conversion 
operations
• Under the direct authority of the Member of 
the Commission with special responsibility for 
the coordination of Community funds:
— Task force for the coordination of 
structural instruments
DG XII — Science, Research 
and Development
• Director-General
• Deputy Directors-General
• Adviser
• Directorate A — Scientific and technical 
coordination, cooperation with non-member 
countries, and COST
• Directorate B — Scientific and technological 
research policy and industrial research
• Directorate C — Nuclear research and 
development
• Directorate D — Alternative energy sources, 
energy conservation and energy R & D 
strategy
• Directorate E — Biology, radiation protection 
and medical research
• Directorate F— Environment, raw materials 
and materials technologies
• Fusion programme
Joint Research Centre
Brussels
• Director-General
Ispra
• Establishment Director
• Site Director
• Director for Forward Studies
• Projects Director
• Director of the Informatics, Mathematics and 
Systems Analysis Department
• Director of the Applied Sciences and 
Technology Department
• Director of the Natural and Physical Sciences 
Department
• Director of Super SARA Task Force
Geel
• Establishment Director
Karlsruhe
• Establishment Director 
Petten
• Establishment Director
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DG XX — Financial Control
• Director-General (Financial Controller)
• Director (Deputy Financial Controller)
• Adviser
• Administrative units attached to the Director-
General:
— Control of revenues; general matters
— Control of the EAGGF
• Administrative unit attached to the Deputy 
Financial Controller:
— Control of social and regional expenditure
• Directorate A — Control of operating, research 
and cooperation expenditure
Euratom Supply Agency
• Director-General (1)
Security Office
• Director
Office for Official Publications of 
the European Communities
• Director
(1) As referred to in Article 53 of the Euratom Treaty.
DG XVII — Energy
• Director-General
• Deputy Director-General
Brussels
• Directorate A — Energy policy, analyses and 
forecasts, and contracts
• Directorate B — Coal
• Directorate C — Oil and natural gas
• Directorate D — Nuclear energy
• Directorate E — Energy saving and alternative 
energy sources, electricity and heat
Luxembourg
• Directorate F — Euratom safeguards
DG XVIII — Credit and Investments
• Director-General
• Adviser
• Directorate A — Borrowings and 
administration of funds
• Directorate B — Investments and loans
DG XIX — Budgets
• Director-General
• Directorate A — Financial intervention 
appropriations and administrative expenditure
• Directorate Β — Financing of the budget
• Directorate C — General affairs and relations 
with Parliament and the Court of Auditors
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• Congo
• Dutch Antilles
• Egypt
• Ethiopia
• Gabon
• Gambia
• Ghana
• Guinea Bissau (6)
• Guinea Conakry
• Guyana (7)
• Ivory Coast
• Israel
• Jamaica (8)
• Japan
• Jordan
• Kenya
• Lebanon
• Liberia
• Madagascar
• Malawi
• Mali
• Mauritius (9)
• Morocco
• Mauritania
• Niger
• Nigeria
• Pacific (10)
• Papua New Guinea (11)
• Rwanda
• Senegal
• Sierra Leone
• Somalia
• Sudan
• Surinam
• Syria
• Tanzania
(6) Also responsible for Cape Verde.
(7) Also responsible for relations with the Caricom Secretariat.
(8) Also responsible for the Bahamas, Belize, the Cayman Islands and the 
Turks and Caicos Islands.
(9) Also responsible for Comoros, Djibouti, Mayotte, Réunion and Seychelles.
(10) Also responsible for Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, Brunei, French Polynesia, New 
Caledonia and dependencies, Vanuatu, Pitcairn, Tuvalu and Wallis and the 
Futuna Islands.
(11) Also responsible for Kiribati and the Solomon Islands.
Information offices (1)
• Bonn
• Berlin (suboffice attached to Bonn office)
• Brussels
• Copenhagen
• Madrid
• Paris
• Athens
• Dublin
• Rome
• Milan (suboffice attached to Rome office)
• Luxembourg
• The Hague
• Lisbon
• London
• Belfast (suboffice attached to London office)
• Cardiff (suboffice attached to London office)
• Edinburgh (suboffice attached to London 
office)
• Geneva
• Ankara
External delegations (2)
1. In third countries
• Algeria
• Australia
• Barbados (3)
• Benin
• Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland
• Burundi
• Cameroon (4)
• Canada
• Central African Republic
• Chad 
• Chile (5)
(1) In alphabetical order by country in which Commission information offices 
are located.
(2) In alphabetical order by country in which Commission external delegations 
are located.
(3) Also responsible for Antigua, British Virgin Islands, Dominica, Montserrat, 
St Kitts, Nevis, Anguilla, St Lucia and St Vincent and for the Caribbean 
Development Bank.
(4) Also responsible for Equatorial Guinea.
(5) Suboffice of the delegation for Latin America (see Venezuela).
▶
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• Thailand (headquarters of the delegation in 
south and south-east Asia)
• Togo
• Trinidad and Tobago (1)
• Tunisia
• Uganda
• United States:
— Washington
— New York
• Upper Volta
• Venezuela (headquarters of the delegation for 
Latin America)
• Yugoslavia
• Zaïre
• Zambia
• Zimbabwe
2. To international organisations
• Geneva
• New York
• Paris
• Vienna
(1) Also responsible for French Guiana, Grenada, Guadeloupe and depend-
encies, Martinique, Saint Pierre and Miquelon and the South Atlantic over-
seas territories.
▶
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Organisation chart of the Commission of the European 
Communities, October 1986 (1)
(1) Based on the ‘Directory of the Commission of the European Communities 
(October 1986)’, edited by the DG for Personnel and Administration and 
published by the Office for Official Publications of the European Commu-
nities, Luxembourg, 1986.
The Commission
• President
• Vice-Presidents
• Members of the Commission
Secretariat-General of the 
Commission
• Secretary-General
• Deputy Secretary-General
• Directors
Legal Service
• Director-General
• Deputy Director-General
Spokesman’s Service (2)
• Spokesman
• Deputy Spokesman
Joint Interpreting and Conference 
Service
• Director-General
• Adviser
• Administrative units directly attached to the 
Director-General:
— General matters
— Training
• Conference Services Directorate
Statistical Office
• Director-General
• Adviser
• Administrative unit directly attached to the 
Director-General:
— OS-1: Office for liaison with Community 
institutions in Brussels
— Directorate institutions in Brussels
• Directorate A — Processing and dissemination 
of statistical information
• Directorate B — General economic statistics
• Directorate C — External trade, ACP and 
non-member countries, and transport 
statistics
• Directorate D — Energy and industrial 
statistics
• Directorate E — Demographic and social 
statistics; agricultural statistics
(2) Under the authority of the president.
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DG II — Economic and Financial 
Affairs
• Director-General
• Deputy Directors-General
• Advisers
• Secretary of the Monetary Committee and the 
Economic Policy Committee
• Directly attached to the Director-General:
— Economic advisers
• Administrative unit attached to one of the 
Deputy Directors-General:
— Data processing and statistics 
coordination
• Directorate A — National economies
• Directorate B — Economic structure and 
Community intervention
• Directorate C — Macroeconomic analyses and 
policies
• Directorate D — Monetary matters
• Commission/European Investment Bank liaison 
office
DG III — Internal Market 
and Industrial Affairs
• Director-General
• Deputy Directors-General
• Director
• Directorate A — Industrial affairs I
• Directorate C (3) — Industrial affairs III — 
distributive trades
• Directorate D — Approximation of laws, 
freedom of establishment and freedom to 
provide services
• Directorate E — Steel
• Directorate F — Industrial restructuring, 
non-member countries and raw materials
Task force — Small and Medium-
sized Enterprises
• Director
(3) There is no Directorate B shown for DG III in the organisation chart.
DG I — External Relations
• Director-General
• Deputy Directors-General
• Adviser hors classe
• Protocol
External relations and regional policy (1)
• Directorate A — GATT, OECD, commercial 
questions with respect to agriculture, fisheries, 
services and high technology, and relations 
with South Africa 
• Directorate B — Relations with North America, 
Australia and New Zealand; external relations 
in the research, science and nuclear energy 
fields
• Directorate C — General questions and 
instruments of external economic policy
• Directorate D — Negotiation and management 
of textile agreements; trade in industrial 
products
• Directorate E — Relations with northern and 
central European countries, and state-trading 
countries
• Directorate F — Relations with China, Japan, 
and the other countries of the Far East
North–South relations and Mediterranean 
policy (2)
• Directorate G — Mediterranean, Near and 
Middle East
• Directorate H — Relations with developing 
countries in Latin America and Asia (except 
the Far East)
• Directorate I — North–South relations
(1) Special responsibilities of Willy De Clercq.
(2) Responsibilities of Claude Cheysson.
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DG VI — Agriculture
• Director-General
• Deputy Directors-General
• Director
• Chief Adviser
• Administrative unit attached to the Director-
General:
— Economic affairs and general problems
• Directorate A — General matters
• Directorate B.I — Agro-economic legislation
• Directorate B.II — Quality and health
• Directorate C — Organisation of markets in 
crop products
• Directorate D — Organisation of markets in 
livestock products
• Directorate E — Organisation of markets in 
specialised crops
• Administrative unit directly attached to one of 
the Deputy Directors-General:
— Periodic agricultural instruments and joint 
secretariat of management committees
• Directorate F.I — Agricultural structure and 
forestry
• Directorate F.II — European Agricultural 
Guidance Fund and agricultural research
• Directorate G — European Agricultural 
Guarantee Fund
• Directorate H — International affairs relating 
to agriculture
DG VII — Transport
• Director-General
• Administrative unit attached to the Director-
General:
— Relations with other institutions, 
international relations
• Directorate A — Maritime transport, 
legislation and transport economics
• Directorate В — Inland transport; market 
analysis; transport safety; research and 
technology
• Directorate C — Air transport, transport 
infrastructure and social and ecological 
aspects of transport
DG IV — Competition
• Director-General
• Deputy Director-General
• Hearing Officer
• Administrative unit directly attached to the 
Deputy Director-General:
— Directorate A — General competition 
policy
• Directorate B — Restrictive practices and 
dominant positions I 
• Directorate C — Restrictive practices and 
dominant positions II
• Directorate D — Coordination of competition 
decisions
• Directorate E — State aids
DG V — Employment, Social Affairs 
and Education
• Director-General
• Adviser
• Secretariat for the Social Report (reports and 
analyses)
• Directorate A — Employment
• Directorate B — Living and working conditions 
and welfare
• Directorate C — Education, vocational training 
and youth policy
• Directorate D — European Social Fund
• Directorate E — Health and safety
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DG IX — Personnel and 
Administration
• Director-General
• Deputy Director-General
• Director
• Adviser — Mediator
• Administrative units attached to the Director-
General:
— External offices
— Staff information
— Medical service for decentralised staff
— Medical service for Brussels staff
— Medical service, Luxembourg
— Medical service, Ispra
• Directorate A — Personnel
• Directorate B — Administration
• Directorate C — Translation
• Directorate D — Personnel and administration 
in Luxembourg and general services
• Directorate E — Informatics
• Directorate F — Coordination and resources
DG X — Information, 
Communication and Culture
• Director-General
• Cultural activities and audiovisual policy
• Directorate A — Information
• Directorate B — Communication
DG VIII — Development
• Director-General
• Deputy Directors-General
• Adviser
• Administrative unit attached to the Director-
General:
— VIII/1 — Development analysis and 
forecast
— VIII/2 — The Courier (EEC/ACP) and 
documentation 
• Directorate A — Development activities
• Administrative unit directly attached to one of 
the Deputy Directors-General:
— VIII/3 — Non-governmental organisations
• Directorate В — West and central Africa
• Directorate C — East and southern Africa; the 
Indian Ocean
• Directorate D — The southern and eastern 
Mediterranean; the Caribbean and Pacific 
• Administrative unit directly attached to one of 
the Deputy Directors-General:
— VIII/4 — General planning questions; 
finance committees
— VIII/5 — Technical specialists’ group
• Directorate E — Finance
• Administrative unit directly attached to 
Directorate E (Finance)
— European Association for Cooperation 
(EAC)
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Joint Research Centre
Brussels
• Director-General
• Programmes Director
• Adviser
Ispra
• Establishment Director
• Advisers
• Administration Director
• Site Director
• Projects Director
• Director of Department A
• Director of Department B
• Director of Department C
Geel
• Establishment Director
Karlsruhe
• Establishment Director
Petten
• Establishment Director
DG XIII — Telecommunications, 
Information Industry and 
Innovation
• Director-General
• Deputy Director-General
• Advisers
• Directly attached to the Director-General:
— Adviser (responsible for contractual and 
legal questions)
• Task force on industrial innovation and 
support to telematics coordination
• Directorate A — New technologies
• Directorate B — Information management
DG XI — Environment, Consumer 
Protection and Nuclear Safety
• Director-General
• Administrative units directly attached to the 
Director-General:
— Implementation of programmes and 
general affairs
— International affairs
— Nuclear safety
— Finance and contracts
• Directorate A — Protection and improvement 
of the environment
• Directorate В — Protection and promotion of 
consumer interests
DG XII — Science, Research and 
Development
• Director-General
• Deputy Directors-General
• Adviser
• Concertation Unit for Biotechnology in Europe
• Directorate A — Scientific and technical 
coordination, cooperation with non-member 
countries, and COST
• Directorate B — Means of action
• Directorate C — Technological research
• Directorate D — Nuclear research and 
development
• Directorate E — Alternative energy sources, 
energy conservation and energy R & D 
strategy
• Directorate F — Biology, radiation protection 
and medical research
• Directorate G — Environment, raw materials 
and materials technologies
• Fusion programme
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DG XVII — Energy
• Director-General
• Deputy Director-General
• Directorate A — Energy policy, analyses and 
forecasts, and contracts
• Directorate B — Coal
• Directorate C — Oil and natural gas
• Directorate D — Nuclear energy
• Directorate E — Energy saving and alternative 
energy sources, electricity and heat
Luxembourg
• Directorate F — Euratom safeguards
DG XVIII — Credit and Investments
• Director-General
• Adviser
• Directorate A — Borrowings and 
administration of funds
• Directorate B — Investments and loans
DG XIX — Budgets
• Director-General
• Director with responsibility for general 
coordination
• Chief Adviser
• Adviser
• Administrative units directly attached to the 
Director-General:
— Budget forecasts and economic and 
financial assessment
— Coordination of the directorate-general’s 
external relations
— Documentation and overview
— Relations with Parliament’s Committee on 
Budgetary Control and the Court of 
Auditors
• Directorate A — Expenditure
• Directorate B — Resources
• Directorate C — Budget execution
Task Force on Information 
and Telecommunications 
Technologies
• Director-General
• Directorate A  — Information technology — 
Esprit
• Directorate B — Telecommunications
DG XIV — Fisheries
• Director-General
• Director
• Directorate A — Markets and external 
resources
• Directorate B — Internal resources and 
monitoring
• Directorate C — Structures
DG XV — Financial Institutions 
and Company Law
• Director-General
• Directorate A — Financial institutions
• Directorate В — Company law, company and 
capital movements taxation
DG XVI — Regional Policy
• Director-General
• Administrative unit directly attached to the 
Director-General:
— Financial management, monitoring and ex 
post evaluation
• Directorate A — Guidelines and priorities
• Directorate B — Preparation and assessment 
of operations
• Directorate C — Development operations
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Office for Official Publications of 
the European Communities
• Director
Information offices (2)
• Bonn
• Berlin (suboffice attached to Bonn office)
• Munich (suboffice attached to Bonn office)
• Brussels
• Copenhagen
• Madrid
• Paris
• Marseille (suboffice attached to Paris office)
• Athens
• Dublin
• Rome
• Milan (suboffice attached to Rome office)
• Luxembourg
• The Hague
• Lisbon
• London
• Belfast (suboffice attached to London office)
• Cardiff (suboffice attached to London office)
• Edinburgh (suboffice attached to London 
office)
• Geneva
• Ankara
(2) In alphabetical order by country where Commission information offices are 
located.
DG XX — Financial Control
• Director-General (Financial Controller)
• Director (Deputy Financial Controller)
• Directorate A — Questions of principle; control 
of operating, research and cooperation 
expenditure
• Directorate B — Control of revenues, 
expenditure under the EAGGF, IMPs and the 
Social and Regional Funds
DG XXI — Customs Union 
and Indirect Taxation
• Director-General
• Director-General of the Customs Union Service
• Adviser
• Directorate A — Tariff questions
• Directorate B — Customs legislation
• Directorate C — Indirect taxation including 
elimination of fiscal frontiers
DG XXII — Coordination of 
Structural Instruments
• Director-General
Euratom Supply Agency
• Director-General (1)
Security Office
• Director
(1) As referred to in Article 53 of the Euratom Treaty.
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• Ethiopia
• Gabon (12)
• Gambia
• Ghana
• Grenada (13)
• Guinea Bissau
• Guinea Conakry
• Guyana (14)
• Mauritius (15)
• India (headquarters of the delegation for 
south Asia)
• Indonesia (16)
• Israel
• Ivory Coast
• Jamaica (17)
• Japan
• Jordan
• Kenya
• Lebanon
• Lesotho
• Liberia
• Madagascar
• Malawi
• Mali
• Mauritania
• Morocco
(12) Also responsible for the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Principe.
(13) Suboffice of the delegation to Trinidad and Tobago.
(14) Also responsible for relations with the Caricom Secretariat.
(15) Also responsible for Comoros, Mayotte, Réunion and Seychelles.
(16) Office of the delegation for south-east Asia (headquarters: see Thailand).
(17) Also responsible for the Bahamas, Belize, the Cayman Islands and the 
Turks and Caicos Islands.
External delegations (1)
1. In third countries
• Algeria
• Angola
• Antigua and Barbuda (2)
• Australia (3)
• Bangladesh (4)
• Barbados (5)
• Belize (6)
• Benin
• Botswana
• Brazil
• Burkina Faso
• Burundi
• Cameroon (7)
• Canada
• Cape Verde
• Central African Republic
• Chad
• Chile (8)
• Comoros (9)
• Congo
• Costa Rica (10)
• Djibouti
• Egypt
• Equatorial Guinea (11)
(1) In alphabetical order by country where Commission external delegations 
are located.
(2) Suboffice of the delegation to Barbados.
(3) Also responsible for New Zealand.
(4) Branch office of the delegation for south Asia (headquarters: see India).
(5) Also responsible for Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, St Lucia, St Vincent 
and the Grenadines, St Kitts-Nevis, the OCTs of Anguilla, the British 
Virgin Islands and Montserrat.
(6) Suboffice of the delegation to Jamaica.
(7) Also responsible for Equatorial Guinea.
(8) Office of the delegation for Latin America (headquarters: see Venezuela).
(9) Suboffice of the delegation to Mauritius.
(10) Office of the delegation for Latin America (headquarters: see Venezuela).
(11) Suboffice of the delegation to Cameroon.
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• United States:
— Washington
— New York
• Vanuatu (7)
• Venezuela (headquarters of the delegation for 
Latin America)
• Western Samoa (8)
• Yugoslavia
• Zaïre
• Zambia
• Zimbabwe
2. To international organisations
• Geneva
• New York
• Paris
• Vienna
Pierre-Olivier Laloux
(7) Suboffice of the delegation for the Pacific (Fiji).
(8) Suboffice of the delegation for the Pacific (Fiji).
• Mozambique
• Netherlands Antilles
• Niger
• Nigeria
• Pacific (Fiji) (1)
• Pakistan
• Papua New Guinea (2)
• Rwanda
• São Tomé and Principe (3)
• Senegal
• Seychelles (4)
• Sierra Leone
• Salomon Islands
• Somalia
• Sudan
• Suriname
• Swaziland
• Syria
• Tanzania
• Thailand (headquarters of the delegation for 
south-east Asia)
• Togo
• Tonga (5)
• Trinidad and Tobago (6)
• Tunisia
• Uganda
(1) Also responsible for Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, French Polynesia, New Caledonia 
and dependencies, Vanuatu, Pitcairn, Tuvalu and Wallis and the Futuna 
Islands.
(2) Also responsible for Kiribati.
(3) Suboffice of the delegation for Gabon.
(4) Suboffice of the delegation for Mauritius.
(5) Suboffice of the delegation for the Pacific (Fiji).
(6) Also responsible for French Guiana, Grenada, Guadaloupe and depend-
encies, Martinique, Saint Helena and its dependencies, Saint Pierre and 
Miquelon, the Falkland Islands and their dependencies, the French south-
ern and Antarctic territories and the British Antarctic territories.
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The Ortoli Commission (6 January 1973 to 5 January 1977)
The Commission presided over by François-Xavier Ortoli took office on 6 January 1973. Following the en-
largement of the Communities on 1 January 1973 to include Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, 
the number of members of the Commission was increased to 13: two each for the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, France, Italy and the United Kingdom and one each for Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands. Tasks were once again broken down by portfolio.
Meeting of the Ortoli Commission. Starting from François-Xavier Ortoli (seated on the right, without glasses, leaning on the table) and going 
clockwise round the table: François-Xavier Ortoli; Émile Noël, Secretary-General of the Commission; Albert Borschette; Claude Cheysson; 
Pierre Lardinois; Altiero Spinelli; Christopher Soames; Wilhelm Haferkamp; Patrick Hillery; Ralf Dahrendorf; Finn Olav Gundelach; George 
Thomson; Henri Simonet; Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza.
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Member Duties Age Head(s) of cabinet
Albert Borschette (LU)
until 14 July 1976, 
replaced by Raymond 
Vouel
• Competition
• Personnel and administration
52 Robert Sunnen (LU)
Guido Brunner (DE)
from 12 November 
1974, succeeding Ralf 
Dahrendorf 
• Research, science and education
• Scientific and technical information 
and information management
• Statistical Office
• Joint Research Centre (JRC)
44 Rolf Möhler (DE)
Claude Cheysson (FR)
from 19 April 1973, 
succeeding Jean-
François Deniau
• Development and cooperation
• Budget
• Financial control
53 Pierre Duchâteau (FR), 1973
Jacques-Alain de Sédouy (FR), 
1973–76
Philippe Soubestre (FR), 1976
Ralf Dahrendorf (DE)
until 11 November 
1974, replaced by Guido 
Brunner
• Research, science and education
• Scientific and technical information 
and information management
• Statistical Office
• Joint Research Centre (JRC)
43 Hans Gläsner (DE)
Jean-François Deniau 
(FR)
until 12 April 1973, 
replaced by Claude 
Cheysson
• Development and cooperation
• Budget
• Financial control
44 Jean Chapperon (FR)
Cesidio Guazzaroni (IT)
from 13 July 1976, 
succeeding Altiero 
Spinelli
• Industry and technology policy 
(except steel)
• Taxation and financial institutions
65 Riccardo Perissich (IT)
Finn Olav Gundelach 
(DK)
• Internal market
• Management of the customs union
47 Manfred Caspari (DE), 1973–74
Niels Helveg Petersen (DK), 
1974–76
Wilhelm Haferkamp 
(DE)
(Vice-President)
• Economic and financial affairs
• Credit and investments
49 Franz Froschmaier (DE)
Patrick John Hillery (IE)
(Vice-President)
• Social affairs 49 Edwin Fitzgibbon (IE)
Pierre Lardinois (NL) • Agriculture 48 Hans Wijnmaalen (NL)
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François-Xavier Ortoli 
(FR) 
(President)
• Presidency
• Secretariat-General
• Legal Service
• Spokesman’s Group
• Security Office
• Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities
• Personnel and administration (from 
July 1976)
47 Philippe de Margerie (FR), 
1973–76
Denis Gautier-Sauvagnac (FR), 
1976
Carlo Scarascia 
Mugnozza (IT) 
(Vice-President)
• Transport
• Information
• Environment policy and protection 
of consumer interests
• Parliamentary affairs (with the 
President)
52 Giuseppe Jacoangeli (IT), 
1973–75
Armando Toledano-Laredo (IT), 
1975–76
Henri Simonet (BE) 
(Vice-President)
• Taxation and financial institutions
• Energy
• Euratom Supply Agency
• Industrial and technological policy 
(for steel from July 1976)
41 Jean Somers (BE), 1973–75
Michel Vanden Abeele (BE), 
1975–76
Félix Trappeniers (BE), 1976
Christopher Soames 
(UK) 
(Vice-President)
• External relations 52 David Hannay (UK)
Altiero Spinelli (IT) 
until 4 July 1976, 
replaced by Cesidio 
Guazzaroni
• Industry and technology policy 65 Riccardo Perissich (IT)
George Thomson (UK) • Regional policy 51 Gwyn Morgan (UK), 1973–75
Michael Jenkins (UK), 1975–76
Raymond Vouel (LU) 
from 20 July 1976, 
succeeding Albert 
Borschette
• Competition 53 Robert Sunnen (LU)
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The Jenkins Commission (6 January 1977 to 5 January 1981)
The Commission presided over by Roy Jenkins took office on 6 January 1977. Like its predecessor, it was 
made up of 13 members.
First meeting of the Jenkins Commission, 6 January 1977. Starting from Roy Jenkins (seated on the right, leaning on the table, with a 
cirulation folder in front of him) and going clockwise round the table: Roy Jenkins; Émile Noël, Secretary-General of the Commission; 
Crispin Tickell, Jenkins’s head of cabinet (seated behind); Guido Brunner; Christopher Tugendhat; Richard Burke; Claude Cheysson; Finn Olav 
Gundelach; François-Xavier Ortoli; Lorenzo Natali; Raymond Vouel; Étienne Davignon; Antonio Giolitti; Henk Vredeling; Wilhelm Haferkamp.
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Guido Brunner (DE)
until 4 November 1980
• Research, science and education
• Scientific and technical information 
and information management
• Energy
• Joint Research Centre (JRC)
• Euratom Supply Agency
46 Rolf Möhler (DE), 1977–78
Jürgen Kühn (DE), 1978–80
Richard Burke (IE) • Transport
• Taxation
• Consumer affairs
• Relations with the European 
Parliament (until June 1979)
• Research, science and education 
(from November 1980)
44 John Hogan (IE)
Claude Cheysson (FR) • Development 56 Philippe Soubestre (FR), 1976
Étienne Davignon (BE) • Internal market and industrial 
affairs
• Management of the customs union
• Information market and innovation 
(from November 1980)
• Energy (from November 1980)
44 Jean Durieux (BE), 1977
Hugo Paemen (BE), 1977–80
Pierre Defraigne (BE), 1977–80 
(for industrial affairs)
Antonio Giolitti (IT) • Regional policy
• Coordination of Community funds
61 Luciano Cafagna (IT)
Finn Olav Gundelach 
(DK)
(Vice-President)
• Agriculture
• Fisheries
51 Arne Larsen (DK), 1977
Erik Lyrtoft-Petersen (DK), 
1978–80
Wilhelm Haferkamp 
(DE)
(Vice-President)
• External relations 53 Franz Froschmaier (DE)
Roy Jenkins (UK)
(President)
• Presidency
• Secretariat-General
• Legal Service
• Spokesman’s Group and 
information
• Security Office
56 Crispin Tickell (UK)
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Lorenzo Natali (IT)
(Vice-President)
• Environment
• Enlargement
• Nuclear safety
• Contacts with Member States’ 
governments and public opinion on 
preparation for direct elections to 
the European Parliament (until June 
1979)
• Relations with the European 
Parliament (from June 1979)
54 Paolo Pensa (IT)
François-Xavier Ortoli 
(FR)
(Vice-President)
• Economic and financial affairs
• Credit and investments
• Statistical Office
51 Denis Gautier-Sauvagnac (FR), 
1976
Christopher Tugendhat 
(UK)
• Personnel and administration
• Financial institutions
• Budget
• Financial control
• Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities
39 Richard Hay (UK), 1977–79
Pauline Neville-Jones (UK), 
1979–80
Raymond Vouel (LU) • Competition 53 Robert Sunnen (LU)
Henk Vredeling (NL)
(Vice-President)
• Employment and social affairs
• Tripartite Conference
52 Robert Cohen (NL), 1977
Nel Barendregt (NL), 1978–80
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The Thorn Commission (6 January 1981 to 5 January 1985)
The Commission presided over by Gaston Thorn took office on 6 January 1981. The enlargement of the 
Communities on 1 January 1981 to include Greece brought the number of members of the Commission 
to 14.
Meeting of the Thorn Commission, 20 April 1982. Starting from Gaston Thorn (seated on the right, with a folder in front of him) 
and going clockwise round the table: Gaston Thorn; Émile Noël, Secretary-General of the Commssion; Richard Burke; Poul Dalsager; 
Frans Andriessen; Antonio Giolitti; Lorenzo Natali; François-Xavier Ortoli; Étienne Davignon; Giorgios Contogeorgis; Ivor Richard; Edgard Pisani; 
Karl-Heinz Narjes; Christopher Tugendhat; Wilhelm Haferkamp. 
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Frans Andriessen (NL) • Competition
• Relations with the European 
Parliament
51 Carlo Trojan (NL)
Richard Burke (IE)
from 1 April 1982, 
following on from 
Michael O’Kennedy
• Personnel and administration
• Joint Interpreting and Conference 
Service
• Statistical Office
• Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities
49 Liam Hourican (IE)
Claude Cheysson (FR)
until 22 May 1981, 
replaced by Edgard 
Pisani
• Development 60 Philippe Soubestre (FR)
Giorgios Contogeorgis 
(EL)
• Transport
• Fisheries
• Coordination of questions related 
to tourism
68 Ioannis Yennimatas (EL)
Poul Dalsager (DK)
from 21 January 1981, 
following on from 
Finn Olav Gundelach
• Agriculture 51 Erik Lyrtoft-Petersen (DK), 1981
Ove Juul Jørgensen (DK), 
1981–84
Étienne Davignon (BE)
(Vice-President)
• Industrial affairs (including from 
1983 the Information Technology 
and Telecommunications Task 
Force)
• Science and research
• Energy
• Euratom Supply Agency
• Joint Research Centre (JRC)
48 Hugo Paemen (BE)
Pierre Defraigne (BE), 1981–83 
(industrial affairs)
Antonio Giolitti (IT) • Regional policy
• Coordination of Community funds
65 Riccardo Perissich (IT)
Finn Olav Gundelach 
(DK)
until 13 January 1981, 
replaced by Poul 
Dalsager
• Agriculture
• Fisheries
55 Erik Lyrtoft-Petersen (DK)
Wilhelm Haferkamp 
(DE)
(Vice-President)
• External relations (including nuclear 
affairs)
57 Franz Froschmaier (DE), 1981
Eberhard Rhein (DE), 1981–84
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Karl-Heinz Narjes (DE) • Internal market
• Environment, consumer protection 
and nuclear safety
• Innovation and information market
• Customs Union Service
56 Heinrich von Moltke (DE)
Lorenzo Natali (IT)
(Vice-President)
• Enlargement
• Overall Mediterranean policy
• Information
58 Paolo Pensa (IT)
Michael O’Kennedy (IE)
until 9 March 1982 (1), 
replaced by Richard 
Burke
• Personnel and administration
• Joint Interpreting and Conference 
Service
• Statistical Office
• Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities 
44 Tom O’Dwyer (IE)
François-Xavier Ortoli 
(FR)
(Vice-President)
until 26 October 1984
• Economic and financial affairs
• Credit and investments
55 Pierre de Boissieu (FR)
Edgard Pisani (FR)
from 26 May 1981 
until 3 December 1984, 
following on from 
Claude Cheysson
• Development 62 Christian Blanc (FR), 1981–83
Jean Delorme (FR), 1983–84
Ivor Richard (UK) • Employment and social affairs
• Education and vocational training
• Tripartite Conference
48 Aneurin Hughes (UK)
Gaston Thorn (LU)
(President)
• Presidency
• Secretariat-General
• Legal Service
• Spokesman’s Group
• Security Office
• Cultural affairs
52 Adrien Ries (LU), 1981
Fernand Spaak (BE), 1981
Jean Durieux (BE), 1981–84
Christopher Tugendhat 
(UK)
(Vice-President)
• Taxation and financial institutions
• Budget
• Financial control
43 Pauline Neville-Jones (UK), 
1981–82
Paul Lever (UK), 1982–84
(1) On 2 February 1982, Michael O’Kennedy requested leave of absence from his duties as a member of the Commission in order to stand in the Irish general 
election on 18 February 1982. His duties within the Commission were carried out ad interim by the President, Gaston Thorn, replaced if necessary by Frans 
Andriessen. Following his election to the Dáil Éireann, Michael O’Kennedy resigned from the Commission on 9 March 1982.
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The Delors I Commission (6 January 1985 to 5 January 1989)
The first Commission presided over by Jacques Delors took office on 6 January 1985. It had 14 members. 
Following the enlargement of the Communities on 1 January 1986 to include Spain and Portugal, the num-
ber of members was increased to 17.
First meeting of the enlarged Delors Commission, 6 January 1986. Starting from Jacques Delors (seated on the right, one hand on the 
table, without glasses) and going clockwise round the table: Jacques Delors; Pascal Lamy, Jacques Delors’ head of cabinet (seated 
behind); Émile Noël, Secretary-General of the Commission; Claude Cheysson; Nicolas Mosar; António José Baptista Cardoso e Cunha; Peter 
Sutherland; Willy De Clercq; Manuel Marín; Frans Andriessen; Lorenzo Natali; Arthur Cockfield; Alois Pfeiffer; Stanley Clinton Davis; Abel 
Matutes; Carlo Ripa di Meana; Grigoris Varfis; Henning Christophersen; Karl-Heinz Narjes.
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Member Duties Age Head(s) of cabinet
Frans Andriessen (NL)
(Vice-President)
• Agriculture
• Fisheries (in 1985)
• Forestry (from 1986)
55 Carlo Trojan (NL), 1985–87
Hans Wijnmaalen (NL), 1988
António José Baptista 
Cardoso e Cunha (PT)
from 5 January 1986
• Fisheries 52 Eurico Luís Cabral da Fonseca 
(PT)
Claude Cheysson (FR) • Mediterranean policy and North–
South relations
64 Philippe Soubestre (FR), 1985–87
Daniel Bernard (FR), 1987–88
Henning 
Christophersen (DK)
(Vice-President)
• Personnel and administration
• Budget
• Financial control
45 Bjarne Bladbjerg (DK)
Stanley Clinton Davis 
(UK)
• Transport
• Environment
• Consumer protection (in 1985) 
• Nuclear safety
• Forestry (in 1985)
56 Graham Meadows (UK)
Arthur Cockfield (UK)
(Vice-President)
• Internal market
• Financial institutions and taxation 
(became financial institutions and 
company law from 1986)
• Customs Union Service (became 
customs union and indirect taxation 
in 1986)
68 Adrian Fortescue (UK)
Willy De Clercq (BE) • External relations and trade policy 57 Alexander Schaub (DE)
Jacques Delors (FR)
(President)
• Presidency
• Secretariat-General
• Legal Service
• Spokesman’s Service
• Joint Interpreting and Conference 
Service
• Security Office
• Monetary affairs
• Coordination of structural 
instruments (in 1985)
59 Pascal Lamy (FR)
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Member Duties Age Head(s) of cabinet
Manuel Marín (ES)
(Vice-President)
from 5 January 1986
• Employment and social affairs
• Education and training
36 Santiago Gómez-Reino Lecoq (ES)
Abel Matutes (ES)
from 5 January 1986
• Credit, investments and financial 
engineering
• Small and medium-sized 
enterprises
44 Juan Prat y Coll (ES)
Nicolas Mosar (LU) • Energy
• Euratom Supply Agency
• Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities 
57 John Peters (LU), 1985–86
Fernand Thurmes (LU), 1986–88
Karl-Heinz Narjes (DE)
(Vice-President)
• Industrial affairs
• Information technology
• Science and research 
• Joint Research Centre (JRC)
60 Heinrich von Moltke (DE), 
1985–86
Johannes Dohmes (DE), 1986–88
Lorenzo Natali (IT)
(Vice-President)
• Enlargement (in 1985)
• Cooperation and development
62 Paolo Pensa (IT)
Alois Pfeiffer (DE)
until 1  August 1987, 
replaced by Peter 
Schmidhuber
• Economic and financial affairs
• Enlargement (in 1985)
• Credit and investments
• Statistical Office 
• Regional policy (1986–87)
60 Otto Dibelius (DE)
Carlo Ripa di Meana (IT) • Institutional questions
• Information
• Cultural affairs
• Citizen’s Europe
• Tourism
55 Riccardo Perissich (IT), 1985–86
Gerardo Mombelli (IT), 1986–88
Peter Schmidhuber (DE)
from 22 September 
1987, succeeding Alois 
Pfeiffer
• Economic and financial affairs
• Regional policy
• Statistical Office
55 Thomas Hertz (DE)
Peter Sutherland (IE) • Competition
• Social affairs and education (in 
1985)
• Relations with the European 
Parliament (from 1986)
38 Richard O’Toole (IE)
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Grigoris Varfis (EL) • Regional policy (1985)
• Relations with the European 
Parliament (in 1985)
• Consumer protection (from 1986)
• Coordination of structural 
instruments (from 1986)
58 Achilleas Mitsos (EL), 1985–88
Marios Camhis (EL), 1988
NB:  The codes in brackets after the names of the members of the Commission and heads of cabinet indicate their nationality: BE = Belgian, DE = German, 
DK  =  Danish, EL = Greek, ES = Spanish, FR = French, IE = Irish, IT = Italian, LU = Luxembourgish, NL = Dutch, PT = Portuguese, UK = British. 
The age given in the third column is the commissioner’s age on taking up employment. 
Pierre-Olivier Laloux 
and Christian Van de Velde
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The Commission, international 
organisations and multilateral 
agreements
United Nations system
United Nations Organisation (UN)
Principal organs
Status of the Community Other methods of cooperation 
General Assembly Observer status pursuant to 
Resolution 3208(XXIX) of the General 
Assembly, adopted on 11 October 1974
 > Participation, without the right to vote, 
in the work of the assembly and its 
committees
Economic and 
Social Council 
(Ecosoc)
Observer status pursuant to 
Resolution 1267(XLIII) of Ecosoc, of 
3 August 1967, reinforced by decision of 
20 May 1971 (further defined by Article 79 
of the rules of procedure adopted by Ecosoc 
Resolution 1949(LVIII) on 8 May 1975)
 > Participation, without the right to vote, 
in sessions and at meetings of common 
interest
Exchange of documentation and 
consultations, based on the exchange 
of letters of 28 November and 
9 December 1958 between the United 
Nations Secretariat and the Commission
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Subsidiary organs
Regional commissions 
Status of the Community Other methods of cooperation 
Economic 
Commission for 
Europe (ECE)
Consultative status (equivalent to observer 
status) pursuant to Decision L(XXX) of the 
ECE, 15 April 1975, based on paragraph 12 
of the ECE mandate
 > Participation, without the right to vote, 
in sessions and at committees’ meetings 
and working groups
Exchange of documentation, joint 
examination of proposed plans and 
programmes and consultations, based on 
the exchange of letters of 30 September 
and 7 October 1958 between the ECE 
Secretariat and the Commission
Economic and 
Social Commission 
for Asia and the 
Pacific (ESCAP)
Consultative status (equivalent to observer 
status), based on paragraph 10 of the 
ESCAP mandate
 > Participation, without the right to vote, in 
plenary sessions
 > Participation, without the right to vote, in 
the Mekong Committee
Exchange of documentation, joint 
examination of proposed plans and 
programmes and consultations, based on 
the exchange of letters of 24 January and 
27 February 1959 between the Secretariat, 
the ECAFE and the Commission
Economic 
Commission for 
Latin America 
(ECLA)
Observer status by decision of ECLA of 
1958, based on paragraph 7 of the ECLA 
mandate
 > Participation, without the right to vote, in 
plenary sessions
Exchange of information and 
documentation and consultations between 
the ECLA Secretariat and the Commission 
since 1958
Economic 
Commission for 
Africa (ECA)
Observer status based on paragraph 11 of 
the ECA mandate
 > Participation, without the right to vote, in 
plenary sessions
Economic 
Commission for 
Western Asia 
(ECWA)
Observer status based on paragraph 7 of 
Ecosoc Resolution 1818(LV), adopted on 
9 August 1973, and Article 66 of the rules 
of procedure of the ECWA
 > Participation, without the right to vote, in 
annual sessions
Reciprocal consultations on questions of 
common interest
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Technical organs
Status of the Community Other methods of cooperation 
United Nations 
Conference 
on Trade and 
Development 
(Unctad)
Observer status based on 
Resolution 1995(XIX) of the General 
Assembly, adopted on 30 December 1964
 > Participation, without the right to vote, 
in the sessions of the Conference, the 
Trade and Development Board, subsidiary 
organs and working groups
Exchange of documentation and 
consultations between the Unctad 
Secretariat and the Commission
United Nations 
Development 
Programme 
(UNDP)
Observer status based on Article 36 of the 
rules of procedure of the Governing Council 
of the UNDP
 > Participation, without the right to vote, in 
the sessions of the Governing Council
Exchange of documentation between the 
UNDP Secretariat and the Commission 
United Nations 
Industrial 
Development 
Organisation 
(UNIDO)
Consultative status (equivalent to 
observer status) based on paragraph 35 
of Resolution 2152(XXI) of the General 
Assembly adopted on 17 November 1966, 
and Article 75 of the rules of procedure of 
the Industrial Development Board
 > Participation, without the right to vote, in 
sessions of the Industrial Development 
Board and meetings of common interest
Exchange of documentation and 
information, exchange of views on 
questions of common interest, cooperation 
on industrial studies, technical assistance, 
industrial training, etc., based on the 
exchange of letters of 25 November 1976 
between UNIDO and the Commission
United Nations 
Environment 
Programme 
(UNEP)
Observer status based on paragraph 5 
(section IV) of Resolution 2997(XXVII) 
of the General Assembly adopted on 
15 December 1972, and Article 68 of the 
rules of procedure of UNEP
 > Participation, without the right to vote, in 
sessions of the Governing Council and in 
conferences and working groups
Exchange of documentation and 
information between the UNEP Secretariat 
and the Commission since 1972
United Nations 
Commission on 
International 
Trade Law 
(Uncitral)
Observer status based on paragraph 12 
of Resolution 2205(XXI) of the General 
Assembly, adopted on 17 December 1966
 > Participation, without the right to vote, in 
ordinary sessions and specialised groups
Exchange of documentation and 
information between the Uncitral 
Secretariat and the Commission
UN/FAO Inter-
governmental 
Committee of the 
World Food Pro-
gramme (WFP)
Observer status based on paragraph 12 
of Resolution 1714(XVI) of the General 
Assembly, adopted on 19 December 1961
 > Participation, without the right to vote, in 
the Committee sessions
Exchange of documentation and 
information between the WFP Secretariat 
and the Commission
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Status of the Community Other methods of cooperation 
World Food 
Council (WFC)
Observer status based on Article 60 of the 
rules of procedure of the Council, adopted 
in 1976
 > Participation, without the right to 
vote, in meetings of the Council and in 
discussions on all questions of common 
interest
Exchange of documentation between the 
WFC Secretariat and the Commission 
United Nations 
Relief and 
Works Agency 
for Palestine 
Refugees in 
the Near East 
(UNRWA)
Cooperation based on Resolution 302 (IV) 
of the General Assembly adopted on 
8 December 1949
 > Allocations of food aid since 1970
 > Cash contributions
Exchange of documentation 
and information between the 
UNRWA Secretariat and the Commission
United Nations 
Children’s Fund 
(Unicef)
Observer status based on Article 61 of the 
rules of procedure of the Governing Council 
of Unicef
 > Annual food aid agreements
Exchange of documentation and 
information between the Unicef Secretariat 
and the Commission
Office of 
the United 
Nations High 
Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR)
Observer status by decision of the Executive 
Committee (fourth session, October 1960, 
Geneva)
 > Participation, without the right to vote, 
in meetings of the Executive Committee 
and public sessions 
 > Allocations of food aid
 > Cash contributions
Exchange of documentation and 
consultations, based on the exchange of 
letters of 27 April and 7 May 1960 between 
the UNHCR and the Commission
Specialised agencies 
Status of the Community Other methods of cooperation
International 
Labour 
Organisation (ILO)
Observer status based on Article 12 of the 
constitution of the ILO
 > Participation, without the right to vote, 
in sessions of the Conference and the 
Governing Body, and conferences and 
meetings of the International Labour 
Office
Exchange of documentation, consultations 
and establishment of joint working 
committees, based on the agreements 
between the International Labour Office and 
the ECSC (OJ 11, 14.8.1953, p. 167), the 
EEC (OJ 27, 27.4.1959, p. 521) and the EAEC 
(OJ 18, 9.3.1961, p. 473)
Establishment of a standing liaison 
committee based on the exchange of 
letters of 5 October and 2 November 1961 
between the International Labour Office and 
the Commission
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Status of the Community Other methods of cooperation
Food and 
Agriculture 
Organisation of 
the United Nations 
(FAO)
At the invitation of the Secretariat
 > Participation, without the right to vote, in 
sessions and committee meetings
Exchange of documentation, consultations, 
establishment of joint working committees, 
exchange of experts, based on the 
exchange of letters of 25 October and 
11 December 1961 between the FAO and 
the Commission
International Fund 
for Agricultural 
Development 
(IFAD)
Observer status based on Article 3(b) 
of the agreement of 13 June 1976 
establishing IFAD
 > Participation, without the right to vote, 
in the meetings of the Preparatory 
Commission
Exchange of documentation between the 
IFAD Secretariat and the Commission
United Nations 
Educational, 
Scientific 
and Cultural 
Organisation 
(Unesco)
Observer status based on Article XI of the 
convention establishing Unesco 
 > Participation, without the right to vote, 
in general conferences, ministerial 
conferences (political and scientific, 
education) and meetings of government 
experts, working groups and subgroups
Exchange of information and 
consultations and joint working groups, 
based on the exchange of letters 
of 2 and 15 September 1964 and 
12 December 1972 and 14 February 1975 
between Unesco and the Commission
World Health 
Organisation 
(WHO)
Exchange of letters between the European 
Community and the WHO of 26 April 1982
 > Participation as an observer in sessions 
of the Plenary Assembly of the Executive 
Committee, of the Regional Committee 
for Europe, and in the work of their 
committees
Two-way exchange of information and 
documentation
Technical assistance for the study of 
matters of common interest
Codex Alimentarius 
(joint FAO/WHO 
programme)
At the invitation of the Secretariat
 > Participation, without the right to vote, in 
meetings of common interest
Exchange of documentation since 1961
Intergovernmental 
Maritime Consulta-
tive Organisation 
(IMCO)
As observer, at the invitation of 
the Secretariat according to the 
1974 agreement based on Article 47 of the 
Convention of IMCO
 > Participation, without the right to vote, in 
sessions of the Assembly and the Council, 
and in the work of committees and sub-
committees
Exchange of documentation and 
information, cooperation and consultations 
on matters of common interest based on 
the exchange of letters of 11 February 
and 28 June 1974 between the 
IMCO Secretariat and the Commission
World Intellectual 
Property 
Organisation 
(WIPO)
At the invitation of the Secretariat 
according to the 1977 agreement based on 
Article 13 of the Stockholm Convention of 
14 July 1967
 > Participation, without the right to vote, in 
meetings of common interest
Exchange of documentation and 
information based on the exchange 
of letters of 14 July and 15 July 1977 
between the WIPO Secretariat and the 
Commission
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Status of the Community Other methods of cooperation
International Bank 
for Reconstruction 
and Development 
(IBRD)
 > Participation in sessions, without the right 
to vote, based on the statute of the bank 
(Section 8.a)
Exchange of documentation since 1964
International 
Monetary Fund 
(IMF)
 > Participation in sessions, without the 
right to vote, based on Article X of the 
agreement establishing the IMF
Exchange of documentation since 1958, 
and cooperation on matters of common 
interest based on the exchange of letters 
of 20 January and 20 March 1972 between 
the IMF Secretariat and the Commission
Autonomous agencies related  
to the United Nations system
Status of the Community Other methods of cooperation
International 
Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA)
Observer status based on Article XVI(A) of 
the statute of the IAEA
 > Participation, without the right to vote, in 
sessions and scientific meetings
Exchange of documentation and 
information, and cooperation in all fields of 
common interest since 1958 between the 
IAEA Secretariat and the Commission
Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the EAEC 
and the IAEA on implementation of the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons — signed on 5 April 1973, entry 
into force on 21 February 1977
Cooperation agreement between 
the EAEC and the IAEA — signed on 
1 December 1975, entry into force on 
1 January 1976
Agreement on safeguards between the 
United Kingdom, the EAEC and the IAEA — 
signed on 6 September 1976, entry into 
force on 14 August 1978
Agreement on safeguards between France, 
the EAEC and the IAEA — signed on 20 and 
27 July 1978, not yet in force
General 
Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT)
The EEC has implemented concessions 
(actively and passively) since 1961, as a 
customs union
 > Participation in:
• sessions of the contracting parties and 
the Council, and in working groups and 
various committees as regards matters 
within the Community’s competence
• multilateral trade negotiations initiated 
under the GATT
Exchange of documentation and 
consultations between the GATT Secretariat 
and the Commission since 1958
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United Nations study groups on commodities
Status of the Community Other methods of cooperation
Lead and Zinc 
(International 
Study Group)
Observer status based on declaration by 
the study group at its plenary assembly of 
18 October 1961
 > Participation in sessions, without the right 
to vote
Rubber 
(International 
Study Group)
Observer status based on decision of the 
managing committee of March 1962
 > Participation in sessions, without the right 
to vote
Wool 
(International 
Study Group)
Observer status based on decision of the 
group of October 1961
 > Participation in sessions, without the right 
to vote
Regional intergovernmental organisations
Status of the Community Other methods of cooperation
Organisation 
for Economic 
Cooperation and 
Development 
(OECD)
 > Participation, without the right to 
vote, based on Additional Protocol 
No 1 to the Convention on the OECD 
(14 December 1960), in the Council 
(ministerial level), the Development 
Assistance Committee as a member, the 
work of various committees, groups and 
meetings of experts 
 > Participation in the work of the Nuclear 
Energy Agency (NEA) under Article 21 of 
the agency’s statute:
• establishment of a software library at 
Ispra (JRC)
• practical cooperation in all fields 
relating to nuclear energy based on 
the formal agreement concluded on 
30 June 1964 between the EAEC and 
the NEA
 > Participation, without the right to vote, 
in the work of the IEA (International 
Energy Agency) which was set up in 
November 1974
Exchange of documentation and 
information between the OECD Secretariat 
and the Commission 
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Status of the Community Other methods of cooperation
Council of Europe Observer status based on the resolution 
adopted by the Committee of Ministers at 
its eighth session (May 1951)
 > Participation, without the right to vote, in:
• discussions of the Committee of 
Ministers as regards problems of a 
general nature
• the Joint Assembly
• the work of the committees of experts, 
subcommittees and working groups
Exchange of documentation and 
information, reciprocal consultations 
based on the exchange of letters of 
18 August 1959 between the Council of 
Europe and the Commission
Western European 
Union (WEU)
 > Participation in the sessions of the 
assembly 
 > Involvement in the work of the 
Committee of Ministers as regards 
economic questions
Customs 
Cooperation 
Council (CCC)
Observer status based on Decision No 175 
of the Customs Cooperation Council 
(July 1968) in application of Article 3(H) 
of the Convention establishing a Customs 
Cooperation Council
 > Participation in sessions, without the right 
to vote
Exchange of documentation and 
information between the CCC Secretariat 
and the Commission since 1958
Intergovernmental 
Committee for  
European  
Migration (ICEM)
At the invitation of the Secretariat
 > Participation, without the right to vote, 
in meetings of the Council and technical 
groups of experts on questions of 
common interest
 > Mutual assistance in carrying out certain 
tasks of common interest
Exchange of documentation and 
information and reciprocal consultations 
based on the exchange of letters of 3 July 
and 12 July 1961 between the ICEM and 
the Commission
Central Office 
for International 
Railway Transport 
(OCTI)
At the invitation of the Secretariat
 > Participation as observer, without the 
right to vote, in sessions and meetings of 
common interest
Exchange of documentation and 
information and reciprocal consultations 
based on the exchange of letters of 
22 January and 2 March 1959 between the 
OCTI and the Commission
European 
Conference of 
Ministers of 
Transport (ECMT)
 > Participation as observer, without the 
right to vote, in sessions of the Council 
of Ministers and the Committee of 
Deputies based on Article 11(a) of the 
ECMT protocol, and in the work of some 
subsidiary organs
Based on the exchange of letters 
between the ECMT and the Council of the 
European Communities of 27 March and 
23 June 1975
Exchange of documentation and 
information and reciprocal consultations 
based on the exchange of letters of 
8 January and 21 November 1962, and 
subsequently of 18 February, 7 March and 
27 June 1972, between the ECMT and the 
Commission
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Status of the Community Other methods of cooperation
Central 
Commission for 
Navigation of the 
Rhine (CCNR)
 > Participation, without the right to vote, 
in plenary sessions and meetings of 
common interest based on Article II, 
stipulation (h) of the Strasbourg 
Convention of 20 November 1963, 
amending Article 44 of the Revised 
Convention for the Navigation of the 
Rhine signed at Mannheim on 17 October 
1868
Exchange of documentation and 
information, based on the exchange of 
letters of 6 June 1961 between the CCR 
and the Commission
North Atlantic 
Assembly
 > Participation in sessions of the assembly 
and in meetings of committees 
(economic, science)
Common Afro-
Malagasy 
and Mauritian 
Organisation 
(OCAM)
 > Participation in sessions, without the right 
to vote
Exchange of documentation and 
information, based on the exchange 
of letters of 24 November 1961 and 
21 January 1962 between the OCAM and 
the Commission
Association of 
South-East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN)
 > Participation, without the right to vote, 
in meetings of the joint study group (two 
per year)
Exchange of documentation and 
information, based on the exchange of 
letters of 7 May 1975 between ASEAN and 
the Commission
Organisation of 
American States 
(OAS)
Observer status based on Articles 52(d) and 
118(h) of the charter of the OAS
 > Participation in meetings of OAS organs
Exchange of documentation and 
information based on the exchange 
of letters of 19 December 1970 and 
26 February 1971 between the OAS and 
the Commission
Council of Arab 
Economic Unity 
(CAEU)
 > Cooperation agreement between the 
CAEU and the European Communities of 
7 June 1982
 > Participation as an observer in meetings 
where there is a common interest
Two-way exchange of information and 
documentation
Source:  Commission of the European Communities, ‘The European Community, international organisations and multilateral agreements’, Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities,  Luxembourg, 1983.
Élisabeth Palmero
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Committees (1)
The annex lists a variety of committees of varying provenance and with differing 
responsibilities. For example, it includes committees provided for by the treaty 
(such as the ECSC Consultative Committee), committees established by Coun-
cil decision (such as the Economic Policy Committee) and committees set up by 
the Commission itself (such as most advisory committees). As far as responsibil-
ities are concerned, the list contains committees (such as most advisory commit-
tees) whose task it is to assist the Commission in its role of drafting legislative 
proposals, committees (such as the agricultural management committees) that 
assist the Commission in its role of implementing legislation adopted by the 
Council, and committees responsible for implementing the agreements con-
cluded with non-member countries (joint committees).
1. Committees of services other 
than directorates-general
Secretariat-General
• ECSC Consultative Committee
(1)  ‘Directory of Committees I’, IX/C/3 (internal document), Terminology Office, Commission of the European Com-
munities, Brussels, 1980; ‘Directory of Committees’, Terminology and Computer Applications Department (TAI), 
Commission of the European Communities, Publications Office of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1986; 
HAEC, BAC 516/2004/8, ‘List of Council and Commission committees’, Bulletin of the European Communities 
Supplement, No 2, 1980; HAEU, BAC 82/1989/246, ‘Note à l’attention des directeurs généraux et chefs des services 
sur les comités et groupes d’experts’, SEC(85) 1709, 18 November 1985.
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Eurostat (Statistical office) 
• Committee for External Trade Statistics
• Standing Committee for Agricultural Statistics
Customs Union Service (CUS)
• Committee on Origin (of Goods)
• Customs Valuation Committee
• Committee on Common Customs Tariff Nomenclature
• Committee for Customs Processing Arrangements
• Advisory Committee on Customs Matters
• Committee on Duty Free Arrangements
• Committee on Recovery of Claims
• Community Transit Committee
• Committee on General Customs Rules
• Committee for Mutual Assistance
• Committee on Economic Outward Processing Arrangements for Textiles
• Customs Cooperation Committee (EEC–Turkey)
• Customs Cooperation Committee (EEC–countries other than Turkey)
• Committee on Arrangements for the Temporary Movement of Goods 
within the Community
• Committee on the Movement of Goods
Joint Research Centre ( JRC) 
Advisory committees on programme management
• General Consultative Committee of the JRC; GCC (N) (1)
• Scientific Committee of the JRC
• Scientific Council of the JRC
Euratom Supply Agency 
• Advisory Committee of the Euratom Supply Agency
(1)  (N) = Committee abolished (no longer to be found in 1985).
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2. Committees by directorate-general
External Relations (I) 
• Select Committee for Consultations on Trade Agreements with Third 
Countries
• Advisory Committee — Protection Against Dumped or Subsidised 
Imports; Anti-dumping Committee
• Advisory Committee on Common Rules for Exports
• Committee for the Administration of Quotas
• Advisory Committee for Export Credit Insurance
— Advisory Committee on Safeguard Measures — Spain
— Advisory Committee on Safeguard Measures — Turkey
— Advisory Committee on Safeguard Measures — Austria
— Advisory Committee on Safeguard Measures — Sweden
— Advisory Committee on Safeguard Measures — Switzerland
— Advisory Committee on Safeguard Measures — Iceland
— Advisory Committee on Safeguard Measures — Portugal
— Advisory Committee on Safeguard Measures — Norway
• Select Committee for Cooperation Agreements between Member States 
and Third Countries
• Advisory Committee on Common Rules for Imports from the 
People’s Republic of China (N)
• Textile Committee
• Advisory Committee on Common Rules for Imports
• Advisory Committee on Common Rules for Imports from State-trading  
Countries
• Advisory Committee on Common Rules for Imports from State-trading  
Countries; Committee on the Eastern Countries (N)
• Advisory Committee on Common Rules for Imports from the 
People’s Republic of China
• EEC–Yugoslavia Cooperation Committee
• Steel Liaison Committee (CNS 10866/83)
• Advisory Committee for the East European Countries; Advisory 
committee for import arrangements for products originating in state-
trading countries, not liberalised at Community level
• Advisory committee for strengthening of the common commercial policy 
with regard in particular to protection against illicit commercial practices
• Anti-dumping Committee
• Committee on Rules for Exports 
• ‘Ad hoc’ Advisory Committee on the Reprocessing of Irradiated Nuclear 
Fuels
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Joint committees (comités mixtes)
• EEC–EFTA Joint Committees
• EEC–Canada Joint Cooperation Committee
• Joint committees in charge of managing the bilateral free trade agreement
— EEC–Iceland 
— EEC–ECSC–Finland
— EEC–ECSC–Norway 
— EEC–ECSC–Sweden
— EEC–ECSC–Austria
— EEC–ECSC–Switzerland
— EEC–ECSC–Portugal
Joint committees (commissions mixtes)
• Joint Committee on the Agreement between Switzerland and the EEC on 
the processing traffic in textiles
• EEC–Spain Joint Committee
• Joint Committee on Community transit: EEC–Switzerland
• Joint Committee on Community transit: EEC–Austria
• EEC–Yugoslavia Joint Committee (replaced since 15 February 1983 by the 
Cooperation Council)
• EEC–Uruguay Joint Committee 
• EEC–Brazil Joint Committee 
• Joint committee for the agreement concerning products of the clock and 
watch industry between the EEC and the Swiss Confederation
• EEC–Sri Lanka Joint Committee
• EEC–Mexico Joint Committee
• EEC–Pakistan Joint Committee
• EEC–China Joint Committee for Trade
• EEC–ASEAN Joint Cooperation Committee
• Joint Committee on Fisheries: EEC–Senegal
• Joint Committee on Fisheries: EEC–Guinea–Bissau
• EEC–Romania Joint Committee
• EEC–India Joint Committee 
• Joint Cooperation Committee for the EEC/Cartagena Agreement and 
the member countries thereof: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and 
Venezuela
• Joint Cooperation Committee — EEC–Yemen Arab Republic
• EEC–Bangladesh Joint Committee 
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Economic and Financial Affairs (II)
• Monetary Committee
• Alternates of the Monetary Committee
• Committee of Governors of the Central Banks
• Economic Policy Committee
— Economic Policy Committee — reduced composition ‘Economic’
— Economic Policy Committee — reduced composition ‘Budgetary’
— Economic Policy Committee — reduced composition ‘Medium-term’
— Working Group on ‘Public Finances’ of the Economic Policy Committee
Internal Market and Industrial Affairs (III)
Committees for adaptation (1):
• Committee for the Adaptation to (Scientific and) Technical Progress of the 
Directives on …
— … Motor Vehicles
— … Measuring and Checking Instruments
— … Dangerous Substances and Preparations (2)
— … Lifting and Mechanical Handling Appliances
— … Agricultural and Forestry Tractors
— … Aerosol Dispensers
— … Fertilisers
— … Electrical Equipment for Use in Potentially Explosive Atmospheres
— … Pressure Vessels
— … Apparatus Producing Radio Interference
— … Colouring Matters for Medicinal Products
— … Detergents
— … Appliances Using Gaseous Fuels
— … Electro-medical Equipment Used in Medicine
— … Construction Plant and Equipment (N)
Advisory Committees on Training: 
• Advisory Committee on Medical Training
• Advisory Committee on Training in Nursing (ACTN)
• Advisory Committee on the Training of Dental Practitioners
• Advisory Committee on Veterinary Training
• Advisory Committee on the Training of Midwives
(1) In this list, the first part ‘Committee for the Adaptation to (Scientific and) Technical Progress of the Directives’, 
which always forms a part of the titles, is not repeated but is represented by ‘ ... ’. 
(2) From 1986, the committee was managed jointly by DG III and DG XI (it is counted once in DG III).
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Concerted action committees (COMACs), Community–COST 
concertation committees (CCCCs) on … (1)
• … Effect of processing on the physical properties of foodstuffs or COMAC 
— Foodstuffs
• … Effect of processing on the physical properties of foodstuffs (action 
COST bis)
• … Effects of thermal processing and distribution on the quality and 
nutritive value of food; Quality and nutritive value of food
• … Effects of processing and distribution on the quality and nutritive value 
of food (2) 
Other committees: 
• Standing Committee on Foodstuffs
• Fast Reactors Coordinating Committee (N)
• Advisory Committee on Public Contracts
• Scientific Committee for Food
• Pharmaceutical Committee
• Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products
• Committee of Senior Officials on Public Health
• Advisory Committee on Foodstuffs
• Scientific Committee for Pesticides (N)
• Committee on Commerce and Distribution (CCD)
• Contact Committee on the Accounting Directives
• Scientific advisory committee to examine the toxicity and ecotoxicity of 
chemical compounds (3)
— Toxicology section of the scientific advisory committee to examine the 
toxicity and ecotoxicity of chemical compounds
— Ecotoxicology section of the scientific advisory committee to examine 
the toxicity and ecotoxicity of chemical compounds
• Contact Committee on the Annual Accounts of Certain Types of 
Companies (N)
• Advisory Committee for the Management and Coordination of 
Data-Processing Programs (ACDP) (N)
• Committee on the Implementation at Community level of the Agreement 
on Technical Barriers to Trade
• Committee for Veterinary Medicinal Products
• Standing Committee on Standards and Technical Regulations
• Committee on Community Policy regarding Forestry and Forestry-based 
Industries
• EC/US Steel Arrangement Committee
(1) In this list, the first part ‘Concerted Action Committee (COMAC)’ or ‘Community–COST Concertation Commit-
tee (CCCC)’, which always forms a part of the titles, is not repeated but is represented by ‘ ... ’.
(2) From 1986, the committee was managed by DG XII.
(3) From 1986, the committee was managed jointly by DG V and DG XI (it was counted in DG III for 1980 and once in 
DG V for 1986).
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Task Force: Information and telecommunications technologies
• Advisory Committee for the Management and Coordination of 
Data-Processing Programs (CCPI)
• Advisory Committee for Projects Promoting Microelectronic Technology
• Advisory Committee for INSIS (Community interinstitutional integrated 
services information system) users
• Advisory committee for the European programme for research and 
development in information technologies (Esprit); Esprit Management 
Committee (EMC)
• Caddia (Cooperation in Automation of Data and Documentation for 
Imports/Exports and Agriculture) Steering Committee
• Committees: 
— COST Expert
— Consultative Committee on Trade Unions
— Round Table
Competition (IV)
• Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions
• Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions in  
the Transport Industry
Employment and Social Affairs (V) and education
Joint committees:
• Joint Advisory Committee on Social Problems in Road Transport
• Joint Advisory Committee on Social Problems in Inland Navigation (1) 
• Joint Advisory Committee on Social Questions in the Railways (N)
• Joint Committee on the Social Problems of Agricultural Workers
• Joint Committee on Social Problems in Sea Fishing
• Joint Committee for the Footwear Industry
• Joint Committee on Inland Navigation
• Joint Committee on Railways
Adaptation committees:
• Committee for the Adaptation to Technical Progress of the Directives on 
Provision of Security Signs at Places of Work
(1) This committee was replaced by the Joint Committee on Inland Navigation (N).
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• Protection of workers from the risks related to exposure to chemical, 
physical and biological agents at work
Other committees:
• Joint Committee for the Harmonisation of Working Conditions in the 
Coal Mining Industry
• Joint Committee for the Harmonisation of Working Conditions in the 
Steel Industry
• Steel Industry Safety and Health Commission
• Expert group under Article 37 (of the Euratom Treaty)
• Committee of the European Social Fund
• Safety and Health Commission for the Mining and Other Extractive 
Industries
• Advisory Committee on Vocational Training
• Advisory Committee on Free Movement of Workers
• Technical Committee on Free Movement of Workers
• Administrative Commission on Social Security for Migrant Workers 
(CASSTM)
— Audit Board at the Administrative Commission on Social Security for 
Migrant Workers
• Advisory Committee on Social Security for Migrant Workers
• Advisory Committee on Safety, Hygiene and Health Protection at Work
• Advisory Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men
• Committee for exceptional financial support in favour of Greece in the 
social field
• Advisory committee on special measures of Community interest in the 
field of employment
• Scientific advisory committee to examine the toxicity and ecotoxicity of 
chemical compounds
• Paul Finet Foundation 
• Producers’ and Workers’ Plenary Committee and Sub-Committee on 
Safety, Hygiene and Occupation Health Care (Article 55 of the ECSC 
Treaty) 
• ECSC research programme
Agriculture (VI)
Management committees: 
• Management Committee for Oils and Fats
• Management Committee for Live Plants
• Management Committee for Milk and Milk Products
• Management Committee for Beef and Veal
• Management Committee for Raw Tobacco
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• Management Committee for Flax and Hemp
• Management Committee for Hops
• Management Committee for Seeds
• Management Committee for Fruit and Vegetables
• Management Committee for Sugar
• Management Committee for Cereals
• Management Committee for Pigmeat
• Management Committee for Poultrymeat and Eggs
• Management Committee for Products Processed from Fruit and Vegetables 
• Management Committee for Isoglucose (N)
• Management Committee for Dried Fodder
• Management Committee for Wine
• Management Committee for Sheep and Goats 
• Joint meeting of agricultural management committees
Advisory committees:
• Advisory Committee on the Social Problems of Agricultural Workers (N) 
• Advisory Committee on Social Questions affecting Farmers and the 
Members of their Families
• Advisory Committee on Seeds
— Advisory Committee on Seeds, a special section on the ‘approximation 
of laws’
• Advisory Committee on Cereals
— Special Rice Section of the Advisory Committee on Cereals
• Advisory Committee on Milk and Milk Products
• Advisory Committee on Beef and Veal
• Advisory Committee on Pigmeat
• Advisory Committee on Poultrymeat
• Advisory Committee on Eggs
• Advisory Committee on Oils and Fats
— Section ‘olive and olive products’ of the Advisory Committee on Oils 
and Fats 
— Section ‘oilseeds and oleaginous fruit and products thereof ’ of the 
Advisory Committee on Oils and Fats
• Advisory Committee on Sugar
— Joint Working Party of the Consultative Committee on Sugar 
• Advisory Committee on Fresh and Processed Fruit and Vegetables
• Advisory Committee on Wine 
• Advisory Committee on Raw Tobacco 
— Joint Working Party of the Advisory Committee on Raw Tobacco
• Advisory Committee on Hops 
— Joint Working Party of the Advisory Committee on Hops 
• Advisory Committee on Live Plants 
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• Advisory Committee on Flax and Hemp
— Special ‘silkworm’ section of the Advisory Committee on Flax and Hemp 
— Special ‘cotton’ section of the Advisory Committee on Flax and Hemp 
— Joint Working Party of the Advisory Committee on Flax and Hemp
• Advisory Veterinary Committee 
• Advisory Committee on Questions of Agricultural Structure Policy
• Advisory Committees on Feedingstuffs 
— Special section on the ‘harmonisation of legislation’ of the Advisory 
Committees on Feedingstuffs 
— Working Group on ‘Statistics’ of the Advisory Committees on 
Feedingstuffs 
— Working Group on ‘Proteins’ of the Advisory Committees on 
Feedingstuffs
— Working Group on Dehydrated Fodder of the Advisory Committees 
on Feedingstuffs 
— Working Group on Peas and Field Beans of the Advisory Committees 
on Feedingstuffs 
• Advisory Committee on Sheepmeat and Goatmeat 
Other committees:
• Standing Committee on Agricultural Structures (SCAS)
• Community Committee on the Farm Accountancy Data Network 
(FADN) 
• Standing Committee on Seeds and Propagating Material for Agriculture,  
Horticulture and Forestry
• Standing Veterinary Committee
• EAGGF Committee
• Standing Committee on Feedingstuffs
• Standing Committee on Agricultural Research (SCAR)
• Scientific Committee on Animal Nutrition
• Standing Committee on Plant Health
• Standing Committee on Zootechnics
• Scientific Committee on Pesticides
• Scientific Veterinary Committee
— ‘Animal health’ section of the Scientific Veterinary Committee
— ‘Veterinary public health’ section of the Scientific Veterinary 
Committee
— ‘Animal welfare’ section of the Scientific Veterinary Committee
• Community Inspection Committee on the application of the classification 
scale for carcases of adult bovine animals
• Standing Committee on Agricultural Research
• Trade Mechanisms Committee 
• Agri-monetary Committee 
• Committee on Conditions of Competition in Agriculture
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Transport (VII)
Adaptation committees:
• Committee for the Adaptation to Technical Progress of the Directives — 
Introduction of recording equipment in road transport (tachograph)
Other committees:
• Advisory Committee on Transport (Article 83 Committee)
• Committee of Government Experts appointed to assist the Commission in 
carrying out Studies on Transport Costs
• Committee on the Adjustment of the National Taxation Systems relating 
to Commercial Vehicles
• Advisory Committee on Aids to Transport by Rail, Road and Inland 
Waterway
• Government Experts Committee for the Coordination of Studies of the 
Utilisation of Transport Infrastructures 
• Advisory Committee on Railway Accounts
• Road Haulage Tariff Committee (N)
• Transport Infrastructure Committee
• Advisory Committee on Railway Costing
• Advisory Committee on Transport Aids 
• Committee for the adaptation to technical progress on tachographs 
• Committee of Experts on International Road Tariffs
• Concerted action committees (COMACs) — Shore-based marine 
navigation aid system
— ‘Controllers programme’ subgroup
— Subgroups/programmes
• Committee on Transport Costs
Development (VIII)
• Finance committees 
• European Development Fund Committee (EDF Committee)
• Committee for Aid to Non-Associated Developing Countries 
(NADC Committee) 
• Food Aid Committee
• Comittee on safeguard measures provided for in the second ACP–EEC 
Convention
• Single Committee (of the European Agency for Cooperation)
• Management Committee for the Special Programme to Combat Hunger 
in the World
• Programming Committee 
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Environment and Consumer Affairs Service (SEPC) —  
Environment, consumers, nuclear safety (DG XI) 
Committee for the Adaptation of Directives to (Scientific and) Technical 
Progress on …
• … Methods of Textile Analysis
• … Quality of Bathing Water (N)
• … Cosmetic Products (N)
• … Surface Fresh Water Quality
• … Toxic and Dangerous Waste
• … Quality of Fresh Waters suitable to Support Fish Life 
• … Construction Plant and Equipment 
• … Conservation of Wild Birds
• … Surface Water intended for the Abstraction of Drinking Water
• … Quality of Water intended for Human Consumption
• … Air Quality Limit Values and Guide Values for Sulphur Dioxide and 
Suspended Particulates
• … Dangerous Substances and Preparations
• … Major-accident Hazards of Certain Industrial Activities
• … Monitoring of Environments concerned by Waste from the Titanium 
Dioxide Industry
• … Limit Value for Lead in the Air
• … Air Quality Standards for Nitrogen Dioxide
• … Cosmetics Directive
• … Elimination of Technical Barriers to Trade in Dangerous Substances and 
Preparations 
• … Directives on Determination of the Noise Emission of Construction 
Plant and Equipment
Other committees:
• Consumers Consultative Committee (CCC)
• Waste Management Committee (WMC)
• Scientific Committee on Cosmetology
• Scientific Advisory Committee on the Toxicity and Ecotoxicity of 
Chemical Compounds
— Toxicology Section of the Scientific Advisory Committee on the 
Toxicity and Ecotoxicity of Chemical Compounds
— Ecotoxicology Section of the Scientific Advisory Committee on the 
Toxicity and Ecotoxicity of Chemical Compounds
• Advisory committee on the control and reduction of pollution caused by  
hydrocarbons discharged at sea
• Advisory committee on the control and reduction of dangerous pollution
• Committee on Cetacean Products
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• Committee on the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
• Advisory committee on the Community system of information on 
accidents involving consumer products 
• Advisory committee on the Community system for the rapid exchange of  
information on dangers arising from the use of consumer products
• Advisory committee on action by the Community relating to the 
environment
• Advisory committee on the management of the Community system of 
information on accidents involving consumer products following revision 
of the Directive by lawyer-linguists
• Management Committee on Dangerous Substances
• Advisory Committee on Rapid Exchange
• Committee of Experts on Accidents in the Home
Research, Science and Education (XII)
Advisory committees on programme management (ACPM): Concerted 
action committee (COMAC), Community–COST concertation 
committee (CCCC) (1) on …
• … Treatment and use of sewage sludge; Sewage sludge (N)
• … Research into the growth of large urban concentrations; Urbanism (N)
• … Analysis of organic micropollutants in water; Organic micropollutants 
in water; Organic micropollutants in the aquatic environment
• … Physico-chemical behaviour of atmospheric pollutants; Atmospheric 
pollutants 
• Shore-based marine navigation aid systems
• Treatment and use of organic sludges and liquid agricultural waste
• Air pollution effects on terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems
• Use of lignocellulose-containing by-products and other plant residues for 
animal feeding
Medical research — COMAC (2) on …
• … Registration of congenital abnormalities (Congenital abnormalities)
• … Cellular ageing and decreased functional capacity of organs 
(Cellular ageing) (N)
• … Extracorporeal oxygenation
• … Detection of the tendency to thrombosis (Thrombosis)
(1) In this list, when the first part ‘Concerted action committee (COMAC)’ or ‘Community–COST concertation com-
mittee (CCCC)’ forms a part of the titles, it is not repeated but is represented by ‘…’.
(2) In this list, when the first part ‘Concerted action committee (COMAC)’ forms a part of the titles, it is not repeated but 
is represented by ‘…’.
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• … Understanding, evaluation and treatment of hearing impairment 
(Hearing impairment)
• … Criteria for perinatal monitoring (Perinatal monitoring)
• … Common standards for quantitative electrocardiography (Quantitative 
electrocardiography)
• Epidemiology, statistics and clinical trials
• Biomedical engineering, technology assessment, transfer and 
standardisation (Biomedical engineering)
• Applied biology, physiology and biochemistry
• Research on health services
Other committees:
• Scientific and Technical Committee (STC)
• Fast Reactors Coordinating Committee (FRCC)
• European Research and Development Committee (ERCD)
• Scientific and Technical Research Committee (CREST)
• Advisory Committee on Fusion (CCFP)
• Advisory Committee on Scientific and Technical Training (ACSTT) 
• Committee for the European Development of Science and Technology 
(Codest)
• Industrial Research and Development Advisory Committee (IRDAC) — 
ex CORDI 
• Advisory Committee on Industrial Research and Development 
(CORDI) (N)
Information Market and Innovation (XIII) 
• Committee for Scientific and Technical Information and Documentation 
(CSTID)
• Consultative Committee for Innovation and Technology Transfer (CIT)
Fisheries (XIV)
• Advisory Committee on Fishery Products
• Standing Committee on the Fishing Industry
• Management Committee for Fishery Products
• Scientific and Technical Committee on Fisheries (STCF)
• Management Committee for Fishery Resources
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Taxation and Financial Institutions (XV)
• Advisory Committee on Value Added Tax
• Banking Advisory Committee
• Advisory Committee on the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business of 
Credit Institutions and the Advisory Committee on the Coordination of 
Banking Legislation (N)
• Contact Committee Coordinating the Conditions for the Admission of 
Securities to Official Stock Exchange Listing
Regional Policy (DG XVI)
• Regional Policy Committee (RPC)
• European Regional Development Fund Committee (ERDF)
• Ad hoc Belfast Committee 
Energy (XVII)
Adaptation committee:
• Committee for the Adaptation to Technical Progress of the Directives 
— Indication by Labelling of the Energy Consumption of Household 
Appliances
Advisory Committees on the Management of Demonstration Projects 
(ACMDP) 
• Liquefaction and gasification of solid fuels
• Exploitation of alternative energy sources
• Energy saving
• Substitution of hydrocarbons 
Other committees:
• Standing Committee on Uranium Enrichment (Copenur)
• Energy Committee
• Advisory Committee on measures of Community interest relating to 
energy strategy
• Advisory Committee on the Management of Demonstration Projects in 
the Field of Energy Saving (N)
• Advisory Committee on the Management of the Projects to Exploit 
Alternative Energy Sources (N)
• Advisory Committee on the Management of Projects for the Exploitation 
of Solar Energy (N)
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• Advisory Committee on the Management of Projects for the Liquefaction 
and Gasification of Solid Fuels (N)
• Advisory Committee on the Management of Projects for the Exploitation 
of Geothermal Energy (N)
• Advisory Committee on the Programme for Research and Technological 
Development in the field of Non-nuclear Energy 
Budgets (XIX)
• Advisory Committee on the Communities’ Own Resources
• Committee on supplementary measures in favour of the United Kingdom
3. Advisory committee on programme 
management on … (1) (ACPMs not included 
in DG XII and/or the JRC)
• … Reactor safety (N)
• … Plutonium fuels and actinide research (N)
Direct action on …
• … Measurements, standards and reference techniques (METRE) — 
Nuclear (N)
• … Operation and utilisation of the HFR (High Flux reactor) (HFR reactor)
• … High-temperature materials (N)
• … Informatics (N)
• … Fissile material control (N)
• … Forecasting and assessment in the field of science and technology 
(FAST)
Indirect action on …
• … Plutonium recycling in light-water reactors (Plutonium recycling) (N)
• … Energy conservation (N)
• … Geothermal energy (N)
• … Systems analysis: development of models (N)
• … Biology — health protection (radiation protection) (Radiation 
protection) (N)
• … Primary raw materials (N)
• … Uranium exploration and extraction (N)
(1) In this list, when the first part ‘Advisory committee on programme management on … (ACPM)’ forms a part of the 
titles, it is not repeated but is represented by ‘…’.
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• … Decommissioning of nuclear power plants (N)
• … Urban and industrial waste recycling (secondary raw materials) (Urban 
and industrial waste recycling) (N)
• … Climatology (N)
Direct and indirect action on …
• … Solar energy (N)
• … Production and utilisation of hydrogen (N)
• … Environment and resources (N)
• … Reference materials and methods (N)
• … Management and storage of radioactive waste
• … Fusion and plasma physics (N)
• Community plan of action in the field of radioactive waste
• Eurotra (Machine translation system of advanced design) 
Advisory committees on programme management, subsequently 
management and coordination advisory committees
• Industrial technology
• Scientific and technical standards
• Biotechnology
• Raw materials and other materials
• Nuclear fission energy: reactors and safety, control of fissile materials
• Nuclear fission energy, fuel cycle/processing and storage of waste  
• Non-nuclear energy
• Development-linked research
• Medical and health research
• Radiation protection
• Environment and climatology 
• Linguistic problems
Filippa Chatzistavrou
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Sources
1. Archives of the European institutions 
Central Historical Archives of the European Parliament, Luxembourg
Historical Archives of the European Commission, Brussels (HAEC)
ECSC, EEC, EAEC and EC archives: BAC
Archive of speeches
Minutes of the meetings of the College of Commissioners of the European 
Communities, 1973–86
Historical Archives of the European Union, Florence (HAEU)
MAEF (Ministère des affaires étrangères français) archives 
Archives of the Council of the European Union, Brussels
2. Archives held by other European players 
Archives deposited with an institution
Archives deposited with the Historical Archives of the European Union, Florence 
(HAEU)
Emanuele Gazzo archives: EG
Émile Noël archives: EN
Private papers
Pierre Bockstael archives
Hermann da Fonseca-Wollheim archives
Ranieri di Carpegna archives
Hans Carle archives
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Georges Rencki archives
Louis Mordrel archives
Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa archives
3. Archives in the Member States
Belgium
Archives of the National Bank of Belgium, Brussels
Luxembourg
Centre d’études et de recherches européennes Robert Schuman, Luxembourg
Netherlands
International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam
European Trade Union Confederation archives
United Kingdom
All Souls College, Oxford
Crispen Tickell papers
The National Archives, Kew
Records of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and predecessors (FCO)
Records of the Prime Minister’s Office (PREM)
4. Oral archives
Testimonies collected as part of the Histcom2 project, with a 
view to writing the history of the Commission from 1973 to 
1986
• Group interview with Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi, Paolo Ponzano, Jean-
Claude Eeckhout and Daniela Napoli, Brussels, 27 September 2010, 
by Michel Dumoulin and Michel Mangenot.
• Antonino Abate (with Rolf Wägenbaur), Brussels, 28 October 2011, 
by Sigfrido Ramírez-Pérez and Marc Fallon.
• Roderick Abbott, Brussels, 2 February 2012, by Angel Viñas.
• Herbert Allgeier, Brussels, 4 November 2010, by Arthe Van Laer.
• Michel Amory (with Ivo Dubois), Brussels, 4 April 2011,  
by Filippa Chatzistavrou.
• Frans Andriessen, Brussels, 14 October 2010, by Arthe Van Laer 
and Laurent Warlouzet.
• Gilles Anouil, Paris, 5 November 2010, by Sylvain Schirmann.
• Raymond Appleyard, Brighton, 17 October 2011, by Christian Van de Velde.
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• Christopher Audland, Ackenthwaite, 8 September 2010, by Piers Ludlow.
• Hans Beck, Tervuren/Tervueren, 20 January 2011, by Jürgen Elvert. 
• François Benda, Paris, 2 November 2010, by Katja Seidel.
• Hans Jørgen Bendixen, Copenhagen, 5 December 2011, by Johnny 
Laursen.
• Hélène Bernet and Jean-Claude Séché, Brussels, 14 June 2011,  
by Michel Dumoulin, Marc Fallon and Sigfrido Ramírez-Pérez.
• Hans-Friedrich Beseler, Overijse, 27 September 2010, by Sigfrido Ramírez-
Pérez.
• Bjarne Bladbjerg, Aarhus, 5 May 2011, by Johnny Laursen.
• Wim Blonk, Overijse, 8 March 2011, by Pierre-Olivier Laloux  
and Christian Van de Velde.
• Pierre Bockstael, Waterloo, 7 July 2010, by Michel Dumoulin.
• Annette Bosscher, Ixelles/Elsene, 13 August 2010, by Pierre Tilly.
• Philippe Bourdeau, Brussels, 1 June 2011, by Christian Van de Velde.
• Eduard Brackeniers, Brussels, 26 April 2011, by Michel Mangenot.
• John Braun, London, 15 October 2010, by Pierre Tilly.
• Amedeo Brusasco, Brussels, 8 August 2011, by Christian Van de Velde.
• Margaret Brusasco-Mackenzie, Brussels, 8 August 2011,  
by Christian Van de Velde.
• Günter Burghardt, Brussels, 3 October 2011, by Angel Viñas.
• Jean-Louis Cadieux, Paris, 19 November 2010, by Laurent Warlouzet.
• Marios Camhis, Athens, 19 October 2011, by Filippa Chatzistavrou.
• Hans Carle, Brussels, 10 February 2011, by Michel Dumoulin.
• Michel Carpentier, Bordeaux, 22 October 2010, by Arthe Van Laer.
• Hervé Carré, Langast, 3 July 2011, by Éric Bussière and Ivo Maes.
• Giancarlo Chevallard, Brussels, 25 November 2010,  
by Pierre-Olivier Laloux and Christian Van de Velde.
• Paolo Clarotti, Brussels, 29 October 2010, by Ivo Maes.
• Fabio Colasanti, Brussels, 25 January 2011, by Michel Dumoulin.
• Paul Collowald, Brussels, 6 September 2010, by Michel Dumoulin and 
Pierre-Olivier Laloux.
• Jean-Pierre Contzen, Brussels, 11 July 2011, by Arthe Van Laer.
• Robert Cox, Brussels, 5 March 2012, by Michel Mangenot.
• Robert Cox, Brussels, 26 October 2012, by Guia Migani.
• Almut da Fonseca-Wollheim, Hamburg, 22 September 2011,  
by Angel Viñas.
• Étienne Davignon, Brussels, 14 September 2010, by Arthe Van Laer.
• Catherine Day, Brussels, 9 September 2011, by Jürgen Elvert.
• Robert De Bauw, Brussels, 24 June 2010, by Michel Dumoulin  
and Christian Van de Velde.
• Pierre Defraigne, Brussels, 13 October 2010, by Arthe Van Laer.
• Jean Degimbe, Woluwe[-Saint-Lambert]/[Sint-Lambrechts-]Woluwe, 13 July 
2010, by Pierre Tilly.
• Frans De Koster, Brussels, 13 October 2010, by Pierre-Olivier Laloux.
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• Frans De Koster, Brussels, 30 November 2010, by Pierre-Olivier Laloux.
• Jacques Delors, Paris, 11 March 2011, by Piers Ludlow.
• Gérard de Milly, Brussels, 8 June 2011, by Filippa Chatzistavrou.
• Jean-Pierre Derisbourg, Paris, 29 November 2011, by Sylvain Schirmann.
• Fausta Deshormes La Valle, Rome, 3 June 2011, by Pierre-Olivier Laloux.
• Yves-Thibault de Silguy, Paris, 20 July 2010, by Michel Mangenot.
• Otto Dibelius, Munich, 21 August 2010, by Jürgen Elvert.
• Ranieri di Carpegna, Turin, 22 November 2010, by Guia Migani.
• Jean Dubois, Brussels, 16 February 2011, by Laurent Warlouzet.
• Ivo Dubois (with Michel Amory), Brussels, 4 April 2011,  
by Filippa Chatzistavrou.
• Ivo Dubois and Guy Vanhaeverbeke, Brussels, 7 April 2011,  
by Christian Van de Velde.
• Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Brussels, 8 October 2010,  
by Sigfrido Ramírez-Pérez and Angel Viñas.
• Michael Emerson, Brussels, 26 July 2010, by Piers Ludlow.
• Lucien Emringer, Steinsel, 17 December 2010, by Corinne Schroeder.
• Jürgen Erdmenger, Woluwe-Saint-Pierre/Sint-Pieters-Woluwe, 30 Septem-
ber 2010, by Pierre-Olivier Laloux and Christian Van de Velde.
• Karen and Jürgen Erdmenger, Woluwe-Saint-Pierre/Sint-Pieters-Woluwe, 
30 September 2010, by Pierre-Olivier Laloux and Christian Van de Velde.
• Niels Ersbøll, Copenhagen, 3 October 2011, by Johnny Laursen.
• Leslie Fielding, London, 29 October 2010, by Angel Viñas.
• Maria Pia Filippone, Brussels, 8 July 2011, by Michel Mangenot.
• Christian Fischer-Dieskau, Cologne, 23 March 2011, by Jürgen Elvert.
• Emiliano Fossati, Brussels, 17 March 2011, by Christian Van de Velde.
• Erwan Fouéré, Brussels, 24 June 2011, by Christian Van de Velde.
• Michael Franklin, London, 5 August 2010, by Katja Seidel.
• Dieter Frisch, Brussels, 28 June 2010, by Michel Dumoulin.
• Dieter Frisch, Brussels, 2 March 2012, by Guia Migani.
• Franz Froschmaier, Brussels, 4 October 2010, by Angel Viñas.
• Jean Gabolde, Brussels, 28 November 2011, by Corinne Schroeder.
• Denis Gautier-Sauvagnac, Paris, 10 September 2010, by Michel Mangenot.
• Giacomo Giacomello, Brussels, 6 October 2010, by Corinne Schroeder.
• Philippe Goybet, Brussels, 21 April 2011, by Éric Bussière.
• Jean Groux, Paris, 25 June 2010, by Michel Mangenot.
• Jean-Claude Guibal, Paris, 25 September 2010, by Éric Bussière.
• Arié Gulden, Trintange, 15 September 2011, by Corinne Schroeder.
• David Hannay, London, 14 July 2011, by Piers Ludlow.
• Michael Hardy, London, 26 July 2010, by Piers Ludlow.
• Jens Hauge Pedersen, Copenhagen, 2 May 2011, by Johnny Laursen.
• Richard Hay, London, 10 August 2010, by Piers Ludlow.
• Eric Hayes, Copenhagen, 22 November 2010, by Angel Viñas.
• Willy Hélin, Brussels, 15 June 2011, by Pierre-Olivier Laloux.
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• Ole Bus Henriksen, Dragør, 28 January 2011, by Johnny Laursen.
• Aneurin Hughes, London, 5 October 2010, by Piers Ludlow.
• Robert Jackson, London, 27 September 2011, by Piers Ludlow.
• Bärbel Jacob, Krefeld, 3 September 2010, by Jürgen Elvert.
• Michel-Jean Jacquot, Paris, 9 September 2010, by Katja Seidel.
• Eckhard Jaedtke, Berlin, 3 June 2011, by Jürgen Elvert.
• Robert Jarrett, London, 14 October 2010, by Pierre Tilly.
• Stanley Johnson, London, 18 October 2011, by Christian Van de Velde.
• Hywel Ceri Jones, London, 14 October 2010, by Pierre Tilly.
• Jean-Marie Junger, Brussels, 16 August 2011, by Christian Van de Velde.
• Louis Kawan, Brussels, 15 December 2011, by Michel Dumoulin.
• Louis Kawan, Brussels, 5 March 2012, by Michel Dumoulin.
• Neville Keery, Dublin, 21 September 2010, by Brigid Laffan.
• Friedrich Klein (in the presence of Hans-Friedrich Beseler), Tervuren/
Tervueren, 22 February 2011, by Pierre-Olivier Laloux.
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List of acronyms
A 
AACM: Associated African Countries and Madagascar
ACEA: European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association 
ACP (country): African, Caribbean and Pacific States (party to the Lomé Convention)
AIIC: International Association of Conference Interpreters
AIPN: Autorité investie du pouvoir de nomination (appointing authority)
AMUE: Association for the Monetary Union of Europe 
ARD: Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland (consortium of public broadcasters in the Federal 
Republic of Germany)
ASEAN: Association of South-East Asian Nations
ASEM: Asia–Europe Meeting
AU: African Union
AUA: agricultural unit of account
AURA: Association universitaire de recherché en administration (university association 
for research in administration)
B
Benelux: Economic Union of Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands
BEUC: European Bureau of Consumers’ Unions
BIO: Bureau Information Only
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BPI: press and information offices
BRITE: basic research in industrial technologies for Europe
C
Caddia: cooperation in automation of data and documentation for imports/exports 
and agriculture
CAEU: Council of Arab Economic Unity
CAP: common agricultural policy
CCC: Customs Cooperation Council
CCCC: Community–COST Concertation Committee
CCD: COST
CCMC: Committee of Common Market Automobile Manufacturers
CCNR: Central Commission for Navigation on the Rhine
CCT: Common Customs Tariff
Cedefop: European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training
CEGOS: General Commission of the Scientific Organisation of Labour
CEMT: European Conference of Ministers of Transport
CEN: European Committee for Standardisation
Cenelec: European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation
CERD: Comité européen de la recherche et du développement
CERE: Centre d’études et de recherches européennes Robert Schuman 
CFP: common fisheries policy
CGC: Management and Coordination Advisory Committee
CIEC: Conference on International Economic Cooperation
CLCA: Liaison Committee for the Motor Industry in the EEC countries
CMEA: Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CNOF: Comité national de l’organisation française
Codest: Committee for the European Development of Science and Technology 
Cogeca: General Committee for Agricultural Cooperation in the European Union
COIT: Central Office for International Railway Transport  
COMAC: concerted action committee
Comett: Community Programme for Education and Training for Technologies
COPA: Committee of Professional Agricultural Organisations
CORDI: Advisory Committee on Industrial Research and Development
Coreper: Committee of Permanent Representatives
COST: European Cooperation in Science and Technology
CREST: Scientific and Technical Research Committee
CSCE: Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CUS: Customs Union Service
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D
DAC: Development Assistance Committee (OCED)
DC: developing country
DGB: Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (German Confederation of Trade Unions)
DOM: French overseas department
DOM-TOM: French overseas departments and territories
DREE: Direction des relations économiques extérieures (Directorate for External 
Economic Relations)
E
EAC: European Association for Cooperation
EAEC: European Atomic Energy Community
EAGGF: European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund
ECA: Economic Commission for Africa (UN)
ECAFE: Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
ECJ: European Court of Justice 
ECLA: Economic Commission for Latin America (UN)
Ecosoc: Economic and Social Council
ECPS: Environment and Consumer Protection Service
ECSC: European Coal and Steel Community
ECU: European currency unit
ECWA: Economic Commission for Western Asia (UN)
EDF: European Development Fund
EEB: European Environmental Bureau
EEC: European Economic Community
EEZ: exclusive economic zone (zone extending 200 miles)
EFTA: European Free Trade Association
EIB: European Investment Bank
Eliamep: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy
EMCF: European Monetary Cooperation Fund
EMS: European Monetary System
EMU: economic and monetary union
ENA: École nationale d’administration
ENSAE: École nationale de la statistique et de l’administration économique
EPC: European political cooperation
Erasmus: European community action scheme for the mobility of university students
ERDF: European Regional Development Fund
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ERT: European Round Table of Industrialists
ESC: Economic and Social Committee
ESCAP: Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UN)
ESF: European Social Fund
Esprit: European strategic programme for research and development in information 
technology 
ETUC: European Trade Union Confederation
EUA: European unit of account
EURAM: European research on advanced materials 
Euratom: European Atomic Energy Community
Eureka: European Research Coordination Agency
Eurodif: European Gaseous Diffusion Uranium Enrichment Consortium
Eurofer: European Confederation of the Iron and Steel Industry
Eurofound: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions 
Eurotecnet: European Technical Network (demonstration projects in the field of 
vocational training in new information technologies)
Eurydice: education information network in the European Community
F
FAO: Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
FAST: forecasting and assessment in science and technology
FEDOM: Federation of Overseas Companies 
FFPE: Fédération de la fonction publique européenne (European Civil Service 
Federation)
FIDE: International Federation for European Law
FORCE: action programme for continuing vocational training
FRG: Federal Republic of Germany
G
G7: Group of Seven 
GATT: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP: gross domestic product
GEEF: Groupe d’études économiques et financières dans la Communauté élargie
GEMA: Gesellschaft für musikalische Aufführungs- und mechanische 
Vervielfältigungsrechte
GIIT: Groupe de travail interinstitutionnel de terminologie et de documentation, 
(Interinstitutional Working Party on Terminology and Documentation)
GNP: gross national product
GSP: Generalised System of Preferences (instrument defined in the Unctad)
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I
IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency
IAMLADP: Inter-Agency Meeting on Language Arrangements, Documentation and 
Publications (UN)
IBM: International Business Machines Corporation
IBRD: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)
ICEM: Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration
ICS: interservice consultation
IEA: International Energy Agency (OECD)
IFAD: International Fund for Agricultural Development 
ILO: International Labour Organisation 
IMCO: Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation
IMF: International Monetary Fund
IMP: integrated Mediterranean programme
Insead: European Institute of Business Administration
IRDAC: Industrial Research and Development Advisory Committee
ISE: International Steel Entente
ISO: International Organisation for Standardisation
J
JET: Joint European Torus
JICS: Joint Interpreting and Conference Service
JNRC: Joint Nuclear Research Centre
JRC: Joint Research Centre
L
Lingua: programme for increasing foreign language competence in the European 
Community
M
MAGP: multiannual guidance programme 
MCA: monetary compensatory amount
MEDIA: measures to promote the development of the European audiovisual industry 
MLTS: Medium- and Long-term Translation Service
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N
NAA: North Atlantic Assembly
NARIC: National Academic Recognition Information Centre 
NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEA: Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD)
NGO: non-governmental organisation
NPM: new public management
O
OAPEC: Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries
OAS: Organisation of American States
OCAM: Common Afro-Malagasy and Mauritian Organisation
OCT: overseas countries and territories
OECD: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OJ: Official Journal
OPOCE: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities
P
PETRA: action programme for the training of young people and their preparation for 
adult and working life
PSEO: Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish socialist workers’ party)
R
RACE: research and development in advanced communication technologies in Europe
RDP: rural development programme
RIA: regional impact assessment
S
SCA: Special Committee on Agriculture
SEA: Single European Act
SFIE: Syndicat des fonctionnaires des institutions européennes (Union of International 
and European Civil Servants)
SG: Secretariat-General
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SGCI: Sécretariat général des affaires européennes (General Secretariat for European 
Affairs)
SJ: Service Juridique (Legal Service)
SME: small and medium-sized enterprise
SNE: seconded national expert
SPD: Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany)
Stabex: system for the stabilisation of export earnings (ACP countries and OCTs)
STAR: special telecommunications action for regional development (programme for 
the development of certain disadvantaged areas within the Community by providing 
better access to advanced telecommunications services)
Sysmin: system for safeguarding and developing mineral production (special financing 
facility for mining products from ACP countries and OCTs)
T
TAC: total allowable catch
TFEU: Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
U
UA: unit of account
UCL: Université catholique de Louvain
UIECS: Union of International and European Civil Servants  
UK: United Kingdom
UN: United Nations
Uncitral: United Nations Commission on International Trade Law  
Unctad: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP: UN Development Programme
Unesco: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNEP: United Nations Environment Programme
UNHCR: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees  
UNICE: Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe
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UNIDO: United Nations Industrial Development Organisation
UNRWA: United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near 
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USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
US: Union Syndicale, European Public Service
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Valoren: programme for the development of certain less-favoured regions by 
exploiting endogenous energy potential
VAT: value-added tax
W
WFC: World Food Council
WFP: World Food Programme (UN)
WHO: World Health Organisation
WIPO: World Intellectual Property Organisation
WTO: World Trade Organisation (successor to GATT)
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Cover illustration: 
On 29 May 1986, the European ﬂ ag is raised for the 
ﬁ rst time outside the Berlaymont — the Commission’s 
headquarters in Brussels — at a ceremony to celebrate 
its oﬃ  cial adoption by the Community institutions. The 
institutions are represented (from le  to right) by: Charles 
Rutten, Dutch ambassador to the European Communities, 
representing the Council Presidency; Jacques Delors, 
President of the European Commission; Pierre Pﬂ imlin, 
President of the European Parliament; and Carlo Ripa di 
Meana, member of the European Commission responsible 
for institutional matters. The adoption of the European 
ﬂ ag, symbol of the union of the peoples of Europe, is the 
embodiment of the political and institutional advances of 
the time.
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o en portrayed as a period of stagnation a er the hopes raised by the The Hague Summit of 
December 1969.
However, this volume — based on hitherto unpublished sources — shows that, despite the less 
propitious climate, the plans, ideas and changes initiated in the 1970s would set the scene for 
the fresh impetus given by the Single European Act and the upturn in the mid-1980s. A new 
sense of direction was thus breathed into a number of policies, including those on the internal 
market, innovation, research, regional policy, energy and the environment.
Faced with the challenges of those years, it was up to the Commission, then the Commission of 
the European Communities, to drive the European project further and deeper, taking due account 
of the social and economic backdrop and seizing opportunities as and when they arose. Between 
1973 and 1986, there were four Colleges and 45 commissioners. The institution itself had to 
adapt and introduce reforms in the wake of the successive enlargements and deepening integra-
tion, exempliﬁ ed by the creation of the European Council and the strengthening of the powers of 
the European Parliament, whose members were elected by universal suﬀ rage from 1979.
Twenty-two professors or researchers from 15 universities joined forces to produce this work, 
under the coordination of the Université catholique de Louvain in Louvain-la-Neuve.  They were 
granted privileged access to the Commission’s archives and were able to interview numerous 
former commissioners and oﬃ  cials who were working at the coalface at the time.  
A similar project had already resulted in the publication of a book about the institutions’ forma-
tive years between 1958 and 1972.
KA-30-13-347-EN-N
JEN402409_JacquetteENVol2.indd   1 1/04/14   12:50
doi:10.2792/19118
ISBN 978-92-79-32957-9

